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 ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines literary representations of the Partition of India in 1947 as it 
affected the southern princely state of Hyderabad, Deccan. Through my focus on Hyderabad, I 
interrogate and reject the assumption generally made in scholarly analyses of Partition that this 
momentous, life-changing event did not significantly affect South India. In doing so, I also 
question the origins of the self-professed secular, egalitarian, and democratic Indian nation by 
shedding light on the invasion of Hyderabad and the subsequent erasure of this event from Indian 
historiography and mainstream culture.  
Different literary texts respond differently to this fraught, suppressed history. Engaging 
with questions about gendered and classed violence, trauma, and silence, I study three literary 
texts written several decades after Partition: Anita Desai’s novel Clear Light of Day (1980, 
English), Samina Ali’s novel Madras on Rainy Days (2004, English), and Kishorilal Vyas 
“Neelkanth’s” short story “Durga” (2005, Hindi). In my analysis, I utilize the theorizations of 
Partition scholars such as Jill Didur and Nandi Bhatia about how literature destabilizes the 
hegemony of mainstream and official narratives of cataclysmic historical events such as 
Partition. I also draw on Didur’s argument that literature not only has the power to upturn such 
historical narratives, which silence alternative narratives, but that literature itself must also be 
scrutinized as a narrative, ideologically motivated and politically interested. Retrospectively 
engaging in different measures with Partition, Hyderabad, and communalism, each literary text 
in my corpus points to the ongoing impact of Partition on Hyderabadis and throws crucial light 
on the issues of citizenship, class, gender, and narrative in the context of Partition and 
Hyderabad. In the process, they demonstrate/expose the implicit as well as explicit assumption in 
Partition Studies that the South was immune to the cartographic cracking of India.           
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Keywords: Hyderabad, Partition literature, Anita Desai, Samina Ali, Kishorilal Vyas 
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Introduction: Partition Studies and Its Engagements with Hyderabad in the 1940s 
In 1947, the transfer of power from the British Raj to Indians was accompanied 
by the Partition of India into India and Pakistan (West Pakistan, now known as Pakistan; 
and East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh). The two provinces that were at the heart 
of the Partition debates between Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims were Punjab and Bengal. 
The demographic upheaval and the ensuing communal (sectarian)
1
 violence that Partition 
constituted resulted in the largest migration in human history as well as the slaughter of 
hundreds of thousands of people. Numerical estimates of the migrations vary wildly 
between eight million to ten million people; there were also anywhere between two 
hundred thousand and two million people who were killed (Butalia, Other 3; Menon and 
Bhasin 35). The gendered nature of the violence of Partition is seen in the fact that 
approximately seventy-five thousand women are reported to have been abducted and 
raped (Butalia, Other 3).  
The sheer magnitude of the abductions of women was such that the Indian and 
Pakistani governments arrived at an agreement called the Inter-Dominion Treaty of 
December 6, 1947 and decided to “recover” as many women as they could through the 
Central Recovery Operation; social workers such as Kamla Patel (in Lahore and 
Amritsar) and Anis Kidwai (in Delhi) participated in this “recovery” operation under the 
supervision of Mridula Sarabhai, a Congress activist (Butalia, Other 114; Menon and 
Bhasin 71-3). The treaty was followed in December 1949 by a Bill called the Abducted 
                                                          
1 The term “communalism” is generally used to describe sectarian violence between Hindus and Muslims in India. For 
an extremely detailed etymology and history of the term, see Gyanendra Pandey’s The Construction of Communalism 
in Colonial North India (1990). For a shorter but succinct and insightful definition and history of communalism in 
South Asia as well as its prevalence in west-based South Asian diaspora, see Crispin Bates’s introduction to 
Community, Empire and Migration: South Asians in Diaspora (2001) (1-3). See also Ayesha Jalal’s critique of the 
questionable way the term has been used by scholars to refer to Muslim politics in her “Exploding Communalism: The 
Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia” (1998). 
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Persons Recovery and Restoration Act. This Bill was introduced in the Indian Constituent 
Assembly and remained in force till 1957 (Butalia, Other 140; Menon and Bhasin 99). 
The Central Recovery Operation recovered about thirty thousand abducted women during 
its existence (Butalia, Other 130). 
While the partitioning of the Punjab saw a large exchange of minority community 
populations between Indian and Pakistani Punjab in the late 1940s, the persecution of 
non-Muslim minorities persists in Pakistan as the most recent exodus of Pakistani Hindus 
from Punjab (and also Sindh and Balochistan) in 2012 has revealed (Lakshmi, “Hindus”; 
Bareth, “Pakistani”; Tribune, “Fleeing”; Times of India, “118”; BBC News, “Pakistani”). 
The more porous borders of West Bengal and Bangladesh have also witnessed a 
continuous trickle of refugees and migrants coming to India from Bangladesh since 1947. 
The strident advance of Hindutva, a right-wing Hindu fundamentalist ideology, which 
derives its force from reinforcing narratives of Muslim violence during Partition, has also 
spelled death and destruction for India’s Muslim minority.      
Partition violence has been represented in literature written in several languages 
such as Urdu, Punjabi, Hindi, and English. The Urdu short stories and sketches of writers 
such as Saadat Hasan Manto (Siyah Hashiye (1948), “Toba Tek Singh” (1955)) and Ismat 
Chughtai (“Roots”), as well as the Urdu poetry of Faiz Ahmad Faiz (“Subh-e-Azadi” 
(1947)) are a few examples of vernacular literary works that represent the brutality and 
savagery with which people were raped and killed during Partition. Amrita Pritam’s 
Punjabi poem “Ajj akhaan Waris Shah nu” (1948) and novel Pinjar (1950), Attia 
Hosain’s English short stories “Phoenix Fled” and “After the Storm” (1953), and her 
novel Sunlight on a Broken Column (1961), Bhisham Sahni’s Hindi novel Tamas (1974), 
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Anita Desai’s English novel Clear Light of Day (1980), Bapsi Sidhwa’s English novel 
Cracking India (1988), Shauna Singh Baldwin’s English novel What the Body 
Remembers (2000), and Samina Ali’s English novel Madras on Rainy Days (2004) are 
only a handful of examples from what is a very rich and diverse collection of writing that 
addresses difficult questions associated with Partition and how it continues to haunt 
South Asians down to the present day. Similarly, cinema has also engaged with Partition 
right from the start, as is evident from Nemai Ghosh’s Bengali film Chinnamul (1950), 
Ritwik Ghatak’s Bengali trilogy Meghe Dhaka Tara (1960), Komal Gandhar (1961), and 
Subarnarekha (1962), and M.S. Sathyu’s Urdu film Garm Hawa (1973).  
There are also literary anthologies such as Writings on India’s Partition (1976), 
which is edited by Ramesh Mathur and Mahendra Kulasrestha and contains English 
translations of Hindi, Urdu, and Punjabi short stories, poems, an excerpt from a play, and 
two critical essays on literary texts; the three-volume anthology of Partition short stories 
titled Stories About the Partition of India (1994), which is edited by Alok Bhalla and 
includes short stories in English as well as English translations of Urdu, Hindi, Bengali, 
Punjabi, Sindhi, and Malayalam short stories; Orphans of the Storm (1995), which is 
edited by Saros Cowasjee and K.S. Duggal and consists of short stories on Partition by 
writers who wrote in English, Hindi, Urdu, and/or Bengali; and Vibhajan ki Kahaniyan 
(“Stories of Partition,” 2006), which is a compilation of Urdu short stories edited by 
Musharraf Alam Zauqi. Zauqi’s collection is published in Hindi’s Devanagari script for 
easier access by many Indian readers. Crossing Over: Partition Literature from India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh (2007), edited by Frank Stewart and Sukrita Paul Kumar, also 
makes a significant contribution because not only does it consist of stories, essays, and 
 4 
 
excerpts from novels written in English, Hindi, Urdu, and Bengali, but the text is also 
interspersed with photographs of Teresa Vas, a Goan Christian from Karachi who now 
lives in Hawai’i, and whose family’s experiences of Partition as disruption and separation 
dot the pages between individual stories, excerpts, and essays. This photographic archive 
is particularly significant because it highlights the fact that Partition not only affected 
Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs, or Punjabis, Bengalis, and North Indians generally, but also 
shook the lives of those who could not or did not relate on a basic level with any of these 
indices of political identity. The two-volume anthology India Partitioned: The Other 
Face of Freedom (1995), which is edited by Mushirul Hasan and consists of stories, 
poems, diaries, eye-witness accounts, and excerpts from novels and autobiographies that 
were originally written in English, Hindi, and Urdu, makes a similar contribution by 
reproducing the 1947 drawings of artist and Partition eye-witness Krishna Khanna as 
frontispieces. 
However, the post-Partition years of the Indian state are marked by an official and 
historiographical silencing of any discussion of Partition violence. Gyanendra Pandey has 
argued in “In Defence of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India 
Today” (1991), Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism, and History in India 
(2001) and, most prominently, in “The Prose of Otherness” (1994), that historians’ 
history of Partition declares violence to be non-narratable in order to distance us from it. 
It “tends to produce a prose of Otherness” in its account of “the masses” driven by 
unreason to commit acts of communal violence. Pandey, and other scholars such as 
Krishna Kumar, have made similar arguments that the absence of representations of 
Partition in nationalist historiography in India can be attributed to the potential of 
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memories of such extremes of violence and devastation to mar the construction of a new 
nation and its quest for modernity and progress. Thus, everything that does not contribute 
to the building of the nation state is Othered. The historians’ history of Partition, 
therefore, represents Partition as “a history of crisis for the Indian nation and the 
nationalist leadership” (Pandey, “Prose” 194). What actually happened during Partition, 
i.e. communal violence, is underrepresented as the focus remains on India’s freedom 
struggle.  
The élitism of this nationalist historiography is seen in the fact that there is never 
any mention of the experiences of common people, or even any mention of the militant 
struggles led by people in the quest for freedom. In other words, there is no popular 
construction of Partition and the violence that constituted it, no representation of its 
human dimension. Historians’ history writes Partition history as a history of causes or 
origins, represents it not as a part of this, but of another, alien history which we do not 
really claim as our own, and localizes it by problematically asserting that it was a freak 
occurrence, an aberration which just happens in the difficult birth and lives of nations.
2
 
Historians have also remained silent on Partition violence with the conviction that this 
silence and consequent forgetting is in the interests of that essential unity between 
Indians. But Pandey warns that if we do not examine how Partition was constituted by 
violence and how that violence unfolded, we will never know our past politics and will, 
                                                          
2 For examples of such perceptions amongst historians, see the essays in the first volume of Pangs of Partition (2002) 
by the following historians: B.R. Nanda, Chittabrata Palit, S.K. Chaube, V.N. Datta, Salil Mishra, Sucheta Mahajan, 
Dwijendra Tripathi, and Lal Bahadur Varma. Literary scholars too are not entirely exempt from this trend. For 
example, the fact that Partition literature does not try to “fathom the cause or source” of Partition makes it “inadequate 
and wanting” in Mathur’s assessment (18). See also Bhalla’s introduction to Stories About the Partition of India, where 
he suggests that Partition violence stems from the “irrational passions that erupted so violently amongst us” (xiv); this 
approach is in line with the way nationalist historians face Partition violence as well as communal violence in general 
and “serves to normalize the violence and reduce history to a more or less generalized account of the triumphant march 
of modernity and progress” (Pandey, “Prose” 192-3). 
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therefore, be unable to control our future politics and prevent history from repeating 
itself.
3
  
It was only in the 1980s, a decade of terrible communal violence in India, with 
anti-Sikh riots taking place in Delhi and its surrounding areas in 1984, anti-Muslim riots 
in Bhagalpur in 1989, and Hindu-Muslim riots in Hyderabad in 1989, that historians 
began to seriously consider Partition in their work. This violence drew to a head with the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid (“Babri Mosque”) in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992 and 
the Hindu-Muslim riots that followed in Bombay, Surat, Ahmedabad, and Bhopal in 
1992-1993. And then there was 1997, the year when India and Pakistan celebrated with 
great pomp and fervour fifty years of independence. The body of scholarship we know as 
Partition Studies began to take definitive shape in the atmosphere created by these events; 
amidst the nationalist jubilation that followed such bloodthirsty aggression, scholars were 
compelled to rethink that which remained forgotten: Partition, the darker side of 
independence.  
As a result of this initiative, the corpus of Partition scholarship has expanded in 
recent years and has helped us to better appreciate, acknowledge, and share the 
tremendous and continuing impact of Partition on South Asians. Scholars have worked 
extremely hard and been very innovative in uncovering and analyzing the human 
experiences of Partition that are embedded in various locations and genres. Research has 
been conducted on literature, oral testimonies, letters, political pamphlets, parliamentary 
records, journalistic sources, memoirs, autobiographies, school history textbooks, 
                                                          
3 Furthermore, the fact that there were acts of kindness during Partition between members of different communities 
must not be allowed to underplay the history of changing relations between those communities, “of emerging right-
wing formations and attitudes of a state that has become increasingly partisan and, indeed, of a growing societal 
tolerance of violence and brutality” (Pandey, Remembering 64). 
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sketches, painting, photographs, political cartoons, websites, cinema, theatre etc. Scholars 
have debated, speculated, and dialogued over the role of literature in contributing to 
Partition scholarship; they have interrogated the forms and shapes taken by mainstream 
Partition historiography as well as the way the Indian and Pakistani states have dealt with 
Partition; they have rewritten and reformed the discipline of Partition historiography and 
pedagogy; and they have investigated how Partition continues to critically affect South 
Asians in the subcontinent as well as in diaspora abroad.  
Scholars must be commended for their inquiries into the way Partition has 
transformed the geographical, demographical, political, cultural, social, and economic 
visage of those regions that have been commonly believed to be most affected by this 
event. These places most prominently include those areas that were cartographically cut 
up, such as Punjab and Bengal. There has also been some attempt by historians such as 
Pandey, Mushirul Hasan, Papiya Ghosh, Mukulika Banerjee, Parshotam Mehra, 
Kanchanmoy Mojumdar, Jayanta Sengupta, and K.S. Singh to analyze the impact of 
Partition on places that were not literally partitioned, such as Delhi, Kashmir, Sindh, 
Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Bihar, Central Provinces and Berar, Orissa, tribal 
communities and North-East India, and the North West Frontier Province. However, in 
spite of the ingenuity and determination of these scholars to look for forgotten or 
neglected experiences of people during Partition, there is an almost absent-minded 
tendency to assume that there was no impact of Partition in South India.  
It is this gap that my dissertation seeks to fill (in some measure) through its focus 
on literary representations of Partition as it affected the princely state of Hyderabad, 
which was situated on the Deccan plateau of South India and consisted of a Hindu 
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majority ruled by a Muslim Nizam until 1948, when it was forced to “accede” to India.4 
The comparatively less (than Punjab) communal violence in the princely states, reported 
by contemporary British commentators and administrative officials, appears to have 
become an indicator that nothing happened in places such as Hyderabad. But after Shail 
Mayaram’s astonishing essay “Speech, Silence and the Making of Partition Violence in 
Mewat” (1997) about the impact of Partition in the princely states of Bharatpur and 
Alwar, where Meos (a hybrid Hindu-Muslim community) were persecuted openly by the 
rulers and their forces and about thirty thousand are believed to have been killed in 
Bharatpur alone (129), it is impossible to believe that the princely states with their mixed 
populations of Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims remained unaffected by Partition.  
Indeed, my research shows that Hyderabad, landlocked in the “belly” of India, 
was completely transformed during Partition. Not only did it lose its distinct identity as a 
sovereign, independent state dominated by a particularly Deccani (Urdu, “southern”) 
synthesis of Muslim and Hindu culture; it also underwent significant cultural, linguistic, 
social, political, and economic changes after acceding to India. In fact, the literal and 
metaphorical idea of “absorption” of Hyderabad into India can be read in oppositional 
terms from the literal and metaphorical idea of partitioning in Punjab and Bengal. Yet, as 
I argue in this dissertation, absorption was no less violent, dislocating, and devastating 
than partitioning.  
Scholars have acknowledged “the culpability of state authorities in hardening 
[during and since Partition] borderlines and boundaries that were once flexible or porous” 
                                                          
4 The verb accede with reference to the princely states echoes the language contained in the Instrument of Accession, a 
legal document drafted by a Negotiating Committee consisting of native princes and Indian ministers on July 31, 1947. 
By signing it, individual rulers of India’s many princely states would effectively hand over the legislation and 
governance of their states in matters of defence, external affairs, and communications to the Indian government. The 
Instrument of Accession is reproduced in V.P. Menon’s The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (1972) (109-
10). 
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(Kaul 5). But what about such cases as Hyderabad where considerable efforts were made 
to ensure that borders disappeared and people were forced to assimilate into hegemonic 
definitions of national culture and religious community? My dissertation explores what 
happens when a political entity from which one derives critical notions of self-identity 
simply vanishes off the map into a kind of cartographic oblivion. In other places, 
“[v]arious state agencies forced people to choose between one nation and the other, or 
one religious identity and another, or, more often than not, made the choice for them” (5). 
This was also true of Hyderabad. Through an engagement with questions about 
nationalism, communalism, gender, and class
5
, my dissertation explores how 
Hyderabadis were and continue to be affected by the turmoil of Partition. In doing so, I 
focus specifically on the violence enacted on Hyderabadi women during and since 
Partition and how responses to this violence have played with the different layered 
dimensions of silence and speech. The formulaic pattern of Partition violence in the 
North was also replicated in Hyderabad, as the numbers of people killed, raped, and 
dispossessed clearly shows. This violence as well as the metamorphosis of Hyderabad’s 
                                                          
5 My understanding and usage of the word “class” (and its associated terminology, such as “bourgeois,” “working 
class,” and “middle-class”) stems from the way it has been theorized and applied by Subaltern Studies scholars, such as 
Ranajit Guha and Partha Chatterjee, in their work on peasant struggles and insurgencies, and communist and Marxist 
scholars from Hyderabad and Telangana, such as the collective of left-wing feminist scholars from Stree Shakti 
Sanghatana as well as communist activists and intellectuals such as P. Sundarayya and Raj Bahadur Gour, in their work 
on the Telangana Armed Struggle (1946-1951). For instance, Ranajit Guha argues that class consciousness and identity 
amongst peasant insurgents stems from a “negative consciousness” (Elementary 23), i.e. one that is defined in 
opposition to the élite (bourgeois, middle-class, and/or upper-class) subject and everything that s/he stands for 
economically, politically, culturally, socially, and even linguistically. Peasant identity “amounted to the sum of his 
subalternity. In other words, he learnt to recognize himself not by the properties and attributes of his own social being 
but by a diminution, if not negation, of those of his superiors” (18). Furthermore, Guha goes on to clarify that sectarian 
and ethnic solidarities also have the potential to inflect class consciousness and either reinforce class solidarities or, as I 
argue later in this thesis, undermine them. In addition to this, ideological affinities across class lines between those who 
may be traditionally defined as élite and those who are subalterns may also play a role in class struggles, as some 
Telangana activists and researchers have argued in the case of the Telangana Struggle (Stree 9).    
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identity after it was forced to accede to India is largely unacknowledged in Partition 
Studies.       
In fact, there appears to be a questionable presumption in scholarship that nothing 
much happened during Partition in regions that have not been studied so far by scholars. 
This is the perception that emerges from comments that assert that “Partition had a very 
different impact on different parts of this country, with many regions not affected at all” 
(Kaul 9, emphasis added). This statement begs a few questions. What regions are these 
that were “not affected at all,” and on what research does Suvir Kaul base his conviction 
that nothing happened there? It also appears that repetition has played a crucial role in 
firmly establishing a North-centric belief where Partition is concerned. Thus, Pandey 
writes that “a substantial part of the rural and urban population was implicated [during 
Partition], victims and aggressors were often, the same people, and attack followed 
attack, and revenge followed revenge, for several weeks, if not months, in a large part of 
north-western India” (“Community” 2037, emphasis added). In another article, he writes 
that “Partition was, for the majority of people living in what are now the divided 
territories of northern India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the event of the twentieth century” 
(“In Defence” 560, emphasis added). While it is certainly true that Punjab witnessed 
intense and terrible horrors over a very short period of time, that Delhi burned and was in 
turmoil for many tense months, and that Bengalis still face the trauma of displacement 
and disenfranchisement, the repeated emphasis by competent and meticulous scholars 
that Partition affected North India seems to have crystallized in our minds to mean that it 
was only North India that was affected by it.  
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Pandey also mysteriously states that South Indian troops were deployed in Delhi 
during Partition because they “took a more neutral stand in the battle between Hindus and 
Muslims – whether because this was a largely north Indian affair, or because of the 
different signals emanating from the government” (Remembering 141). He does not 
provide sources for this information, nor does he elaborate on why he believes that the 
communal tensions of Partition were “a largely north Indian affair” or what the “different 
signals emanating from the government” were. It is also not possible to divine what this 
means from the context of Delhi in which he makes this statement. So, the question that 
arises is this: what provokes Pandey’s speculation that South Indian troops were 
somehow free of communal bias and that the South Indian regions from which they came 
remained immune from the religious polarization witnessed by communities in North 
India? Pandey’s implicit assumptions need to be scrutinized in light of the fact that South 
India has many pockets of large urban Muslim populations, such as Hyderabad city 
(41.17%), Dakshina Kannada (22.1%), Kozhikode (37.5%), Kannur (27.6%), 
Malappuram (68.5%), Kasaragod (34.3%), and Palakkad (26.9%) (Government of India, 
Census). Given the long reach and wide spread of Partition politics and violence in North 
Indian regions with majority or significant minority Muslim populations, scholars must 
not assume that South Indian majority and minority Muslim populations remained 
untouched by Partition until research has conclusively proved that this was the case.      
Hasan too is not exempt from stating the occasional “fact” without citing his 
sources or his reasons for believing them. For example, he makes a case for studying 
Partition on account of the misery it caused to many people, even though “only 33 per 
cent of the country’s population was affected by the communal eruption” (Inventing 30, 
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emphasis added). He does not state what parts of the country come under this figure. 
Another puzzling discrepancy arises when Hasan claims that “only 3 per cent of the 
country’s population was affected by the communal eruption” (“Memories” 175, 
emphasis mine). From where does he collate these disparate figures? Such 
inconsistencies in numbers only testify to a need for more scholarship about how 
Partition affected localities, communities, and regions that are outside North India.   
Pandey makes a pertinent point when he writes that “the task of analysing 
partition narratives and memories is much too large for any one researcher to aim at 
comprehensive coverage” (“Community” 2037). However, just because scholars must 
necessarily restrict themselves to zeroing in on a limited area in the interest of producing 
meaningful and in-depth research, this is no reason for us to believe or to encourage the 
belief, particularly in the absence of research to prove it, that South India was somehow 
sheltered from the impact of Partition. Perhaps the state of Partition Studies today can be 
understood through Pandey’s own theorization about the idea of a centre of knowledge. 
Pandey points out that standard historiographical procedure since the nineteenth century 
appears to have required the taking of a prescribed centre (of a state-formation, nation-
state) as one’s vantage point and the official archive as one’s primary source for the 
construction of an adequate general history. This procedure is not  
easily discarded, both because states and nations are central organising principles 
of human society as we know it, and because the historian must necessarily deal 
with periods, territories, social groups and political formations constituted into 
unities or blocs. However, the fact of their constitution – by historical 
circumstance and by the historian – needs to be borne in mind. The provisionality 
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and contested character of all such unities (the objects of historical analysis) must 
be underlined. (“In Defence” 571)     
While Pandey’s context is that of political systems, it also applies to geographical 
locations. This mainstream historicizing of an Indian politics that is firmly anchored to 
Delhi and North India points to what Pandey calls “[t]he remoteness of Delhi” (571). In 
other words, by maintaining Delhi and North India as the epicentre of Indian politics and 
normative culture in historiography, historians have grossly overlooked how significant 
historical events that occur in India, such as Partition, affect those parts of the country 
that are geographically and normatively far removed from the North. 
Perhaps what we need to recognize in Partition Studies is indeed the constructed 
centring of Partition politics in North India. The “Delhi” of Partition Studies must be 
decentred to incorporate new ways of thinking about Partition in parts of India where 
divisions were not cartographic. Pandey explains how any representation of Partition, 
whether it is stored in official archives or between the pages of a novel, is a fragment. 
The metaphor is also applicable to the contributions of Partition Studies thus far. The 
contribution of my dissertation is that it complements these existing fragments with its 
own fragmentary but vital intervention by focusing on the impact of Partition on 
Hyderabad.  
 A good place to commence this project is to acknowledge what has been said 
(however little or marginal) about Hyderabad in the existing body of work on Partition. 
Perhaps the most significant scholarly contribution to our knowledge of how Partition 
affected Hyderabad comes from the work of anthropologist Karen Leonard and scholar 
and librarian Omar Khalidi. While Leonard’s encyclopedic mapping of twentieth century 
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migrations of Hyderabadis in her book Locating Home: India’s Hyderabadis Abroad 
(2007) as well as some of her earlier articles, such as “Construction of Identity in 
Diaspora: Emigrants from Hyderabad, India” (1999) and “Hyderabadis in Pakistan: 
Changing Nations” (2001), do not take Partition as a necessary starting point or rationale 
for her research, she does address the way Partition was a large factor (among others) for 
encouraging the migrations of Hyderabadis to Pakistan, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, the Middle-East, and Australia during and since the late 1940s. One of 
these diasporic Hyderabadis is Khalidi, who has significantly redressed the mainstream 
silencing of the violence in Hyderabad during the late 1940s by reprinting parts of a 
confidential and damning Indian government report on the Indian army’s activities in 
Hyderabad during its invasion of that state; producing an annotated bibliography of 
primary and secondary sources on Partition in Hyderabad; and editing a volume of essays 
and articles called Hyderabad: After the Fall (1988) on the experiences and memories of 
Hyderabadi survivors of Partition.      
Albeit in much smaller measure than in Leonard’s or Khalidi’s work, it appears 
that the fate of Hyderabad has also been at the back of Hasan’s mind when he edited his 
two books of essays on Partition because both India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and 
Mobilization (1994) as well as Inventing Boundaries: Gender, Politics and the Partition 
of India (2002) contain an essay each on the upheavals in that state in the mid-twentieth 
century. The contribution of Ian Copland’s essay in India’s Partition to scholarship about 
Hyderabad lies in the fact that, by focusing on the Hindu-Muslim riots in Hyderabad 
between 1937 and 1940, it dispels the widespread notion that princely states such as 
Hyderabad or, for that matter, places in South India were free of communal violence. In 
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Inventing Boundaries, Hasan reprints Alec Reid’s column (dated April 13 and 16, 1949) 
from the Statesman, in which Reid takes a clearly polemical position in favour of the 
Indian government’s position vis-à-vis Hyderabad by arguing that the invasion of 
September 1948, which resulted in the forced accession of Hyderabad to India, was 
beneficent for Hyderabadis in general. While his analysis includes mention of several 
different strains of political activity in Hyderabad, such as that of the Congress, the 
violent paramilitary Razakars, and the communists, it does not take into account the 
extensive repression and persecution of communists and Muslims that the Indian army 
indulged in after Hyderabad’s accession. My dissertation examines in detail the impact of 
Partition on Muslims in Hyderabad during and since Partition, thereby restoring to 
history in some small measure these experiences which have been and continue to be 
silenced by mainstream Indian culture, the Indian state, as well as Indian historiography. 
 There are also small hints in other scholars’ work that suggest that all was not 
well in Hyderabad during Partition. Joya Chatterji points out in a footnote to her essay on 
the Indian state’s treatment of Punjabi and Bengali Partition refugees that the “Police 
Action” (the Indian government’s euphemistic term for its armed invasion of Hyderabad 
in September 1948) and the tensions caused by the Indo-Hyderabad dispute between 
India and Pakistan caused a sudden, sharp wave of migrations from East Bengal to West 
Bengal by Hindus who feared that they would face reprisals in Muslim-majority East 
Bengal (104). In addition to this, there are half-sentences in Pandey’s work, tip-offs as it 
were, that South India did not remain unaffected by Partition, for he parenthetically 
admits that, in addition to Muslim refugees all over north India, there were Muslim 
refugees “in some parts of southern India too” (Remembering 128).  
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Besides these references in historiography and sociology to tensions in Hyderabad 
and South India, Bhalla’s anthology consists of two stories by Lalithambika 
Antharjanam, which were originally written in Malayalam, a South Indian language. “A 
Leaf in the Storm” deals with the anguish of a pregnant woman “recovered” from her 
abductor and brought to a refugee camp in East Punjab, and “The Mother of Dhirendu 
Muzumdar” represents the predicament of East Bengali Hindus who not only faced 
communal violence during Partition but were also persecuted in 1971. Through direct 
addresses to Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, the protagonist of the latter story holds 
up to scrutiny the divisive politics of Partition and the leaders who were instrumental in 
executing them. The fact that a Malayalam-speaking, upper-caste Keralan woman who 
lived in rigidly defined purdah all her life engages sensitively, politically, and 
knowledgeably with Partition as a theme in her oeuvre shows that Partition is not solely 
or exclusively a northern debate and that it has influences, resonances, and consequences 
that extend beyond the north. And while current scholars have remarked on the 
“unexpected and pleasant find” (Asaduddin 326) these two stories are, they have not 
bothered to examine why they are interesting and significant. Nor does Bhalla himself 
attempt to do that in his introduction to the anthology.  
Thus, while there are a few significant nods towards Hyderabad as a region where 
the reverberations of Partition were felt, there has been no full-scale, multi-dimensional 
analysis of the experience and immediate and continuing relevance of Partition in the 
lives of Hyderabadis since the 1940s. While the social and political story of Hyderabad in 
the milieu of Partition forms the subject of my next chapter, the three chapters that 
succeed it examine the representation of Hyderabad in the context of the gendered 
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communal violence of Partition in three literary texts. And my analysis of these literary 
texts draws extensively from existing critical scholarship about the role of literature in 
Partition Studies. 
This scholarship has underscored and emphasized the crucial importance of 
literature and creative representations in remembering, confronting, and understanding 
Partition. For example, significant perspectives on such representations emerge in the 
second volume of Pangs of Partition (2002). Edited by S. Settar and Indira B. Gupta, this 
volume abounds with approaches to Partition through literature (prose, poetry, theatre), 
linguistics, pedagogy, painting, film, history, personal narratives, and translation studies. 
The use of fragments in Bengali literature and film and how these operate to reveal the 
tremendously disruptive character of Partition is highlighted by Partha Chatterjee, who 
explains that Partition is never the openly obvious plot concern in Ritwik Ghatak’s films. 
Instead of a central focus on Partition, the dispossession and fragmentation it caused are 
represented through the use of metaphors, such as the repeatedly drawn and erased chalk 
drawings by two little girls in Komal Gandhar (1961), which gesture towards the infinite 
and obsessive desire to start life all over again.
6
 Tapati Chakravarty makes a similar 
argument about the representation of Partition through fragments when she points out that 
Bengali poetry, which has extensively dealt with the theme of Partition, is a particularly 
apt medium to convey the affective sense of fracturing Partition involved because, unlike 
modern Bengali prose, it did not rely upon “experientially concrete history … to 
                                                          
6 Somdatta Mandal comes to the same conclusion when he highlights Nemai Ghosh’s Chinnamul (1951), Ritwik 
Ghatak’s Meghe Dhaka Tara (1960), Komal Gandhar (1961), and Subarnarekha (1962), Buddhadeb Dasgupta’s 
Tahader Katha (1992), Masiuddin Shaker and Sheikh Niamat Ali’s Surya Dighal Bari (1979), Tanvir Mokammel’s 
Chitra Nadir Pare (1999), and Supriyo Sen’s Way Back Home: A Documentary (2002) as being crucial Indian and 
Bangladeshi cinematic memorializations of the 1947 Partition of Bengal, particularly relevant in light of the relative 
scarcity of Bengali prose on the subject. Like Chatterjee, Mandal explains how Partition is represented in Bengali 
literature and film as a metaphysical wound afflicting the mind, not the body, and characterized as nostalgia, not 
madness. 
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construct its diction” (277). In fact, being much more pliable and allowing for affective 
distance between “the discursive conditions of the production of a poem as a text, and the 
text’s formal structure,” poetry has been found to be more suited to take on a theme as 
overwhelming as Partition than the starkly realistic genre of twentieth century Bengali 
prose (277).    
Historians such as Hasan as well as Pandey have also zeroed in on the fact that 
while historians have focused on the “grand narrative” of Partition (Hasan, “Memories” 
175), which single-mindedly concentrates on the intricate manoeuvres between the high 
political players at the centre of the Partition debates before independence, writers and 
poets have taken on the difficult theme of Partition trauma and dispossession in their 
work. It is this general failure of mainstream and nationalist history to represent Partition 
that prompts Pandey to instead focus on the literary “fragment,” i.e. fragmentary 
narratives of communal violence suffused with “other [non-official] potentially richer 
definitions of the ‘nation’ and the future political community,” which undermine the 
patriarchal, nationalist history of Partition that represents a “shallow homogenisation” of 
Partition history through omniscience
7
 (Pandey, “In Defence” 559, 569). In doing so, he 
acknowledges the critical role played by literature in the absence of meaningful 
historiography that would grapple with difficult questions such as violence and trauma. 
He claims to analyze literature – Manazir Ashiq Harganvi’s poems, Kidwai’s first-person 
account of Partition, and Manto’s “Toba Tek Singh” – not as sources but as “the 
articulation of another subject-position arising from a certain experience (and 
                                                          
7 Scholars have now acknowledged that, besides many other reasons, it was difficult for Indians to engage or think 
about Partition amidst the celebrations of fifty years of independence in 1997 because “our memories of Partition are 
fragmented and painful” (Kaul 3). The fragmentation of experience caused by Partition-related trauma as well as the 
inherently fragmentary character of memory have resulted in the widespread representation of Partition in literature in 
fragments. The fact that historians, sociologists, and political scientists have also recognized and endorsed such 
representations has resulted in “fragment” becoming the operative word in Partition Studies. 
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understanding) of sectarian strife, which may say something about the parameters of our 
own subject-position and understanding” (569).  
It is because of this crucial role of literature amidst a glaring lacuna in 
historiography till the 1980s that Hasan stresses that to understand what Partition 
signified to ordinary people, we must turn to literature. He zeroes in on the crux of the 
matter when he suggests that  
[w]hat political debate will never fully do – and the reason we so badly need 
literature – is to defeat the urge to lay the blame, which keeps the animosity alive. 
Only literature can truly evoke the sufferings of the innocent, whose pain is more 
universal and ultimately a vehicle of more honest reconciliation than political 
discourse. (184) 
But while Hasan recognizes the affective power of literature and its general success in 
crafting a sense of the psychological trauma that Partition caused to individuals and 
communities, his recourse to literature is perhaps too credulous. Partition literature does, 
certainly, succeed in destabilizing official narratives, and “in exposing the inadequacy of 
numerous narratives on independence and Partition, compel us to explore fresh themes 
and adopt new approaches that have eluded the grasp of social scientists” (185). 
However, can it really be generalized that Partition literature represents “a grim and 
sordid contemporary reality without drawing religion or a particular community as the 
principal reference point” (185)? Hasan’s understanding of literature that represents the 
communal violence and rupture of Partition, which he takes at face value, does not 
consider the underlying motives and ideological bent of writers, poets, and playwrights.     
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It is in this context of the writing and reception of literary texts on Partition that 
Jill Didur’s Unsettling Partition: Literature, Gender, Memory (2006) makes a crucial 
contribution. In this book, Didur raises questions about how literary texts about Partition, 
and the academic study of literature, culture, and history, are “enrolled in the production 
of nationalist imaginaries as well as how they subvert and rewrite them” (20). Employing 
Chatterjee’s premise that nationalism sees the conduct of women within the domestic 
sphere as crucial to the survival of the spiritual life of the nation and, therefore, the nation 
itself, the category “woman” becomes a metonym for or even a synonym for nation in the 
“canonized narrative of partition” (16), effecting an “erasure of difference” (158), 
“leaving minorities, actual women, and lower castes/classes in a disjunctive relation with 
the nation” (28) because they do not conform to the scripted citizenship of the nation-
state. This notion of communal and national identity located “in” women came to the fore 
when Partition happened and different communities and nations went into competition 
with each other (36). Furthermore, the abducted women who survived Partition became 
constant reminders to national patriarchal interests that they had failed to preserve the 
women’s sexual “purity” (and, therefore, male communal and national honour) and that 
the only way to control the damage was to “recover” these women (38).  
However, while Didur expresses appreciation for the relatively new trend begun 
by historians such as Pandey to focus on the literary fragment, she is skeptical about the 
way representations of abducted women and their silences in Partition literature are 
interpreted and used by historians. An approach to Partition through literature, she writes, 
“point[s] to a more contingent and polyphonic reading of national identity” (6). But, she 
writes, while historians such as Pandey claim to analyze literature not as sources but as 
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“the articulation of another subject-position arising from a certain experience (and 
understanding) of sectarian strife, which may say something about the parameters of our 
own subject-position and understanding” (“In Defence” 569), they fail to do exactly that. 
In other words, in complete contradiction to his avowed aim, Pandey ends up credulously 
deploying the literary as “evidence” of the everyday (Didur, Unsettling 17, 56). For 
example, referring to his analysis of Kidwai, Didur argues that Pandey naïvely overlooks 
how the material reality of women being raped, mutilated, and bearing children from 
unplanned pregnancies as a result of Partition violence necessitated reworkings of 
discursive domains such as conservative-nationalism, communalism, and patriarchy. As 
Didur points out, such women “destabilized their [own] convergence in the nationalist 
imaginings of the recently formed postcolonial state” (57). The postcolonial state, the 
developing nation, was thrown into a crisis of self-representation as a result of the 
existence of such women and, often, their refusal to conform to what was expected by 
them from the state and/or community. The role of abducted women in disrupting the 
confident progress of nationalism and making its patchwork narration visible is 
completely elided, the women’s agency stripped, in Pandey’s work.  
Didur contends that the use of literary texts in such Partition historiography as 
Pandey’s is “insufficiently theorized with respect to their [historiographers’] 
understanding of literary language”8 (17). She is concerned about how historians are 
disposed to consider literature as documents (and not “re-presentations” of Partition 
violence), which will somehow “complete” our knowledge about Partition. Such a 
                                                          
8 It appears that this tendency of historiographers is also becoming a matter of concern for creative writers. For 
example, Manju Kapur feels the need to attach to her Partition novel Difficult Daughters (1998) a disclaimer that “[t]he 
historical events of this novel have been used in purely imaginative reconstructions.” In this way, she points out the 
literariness of her historical novel. 
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perspective ignores the fragmentariness and particularity of texts and perspectives and 
fails to recognize that literary representations of Partition are not “confessional chronicles 
of ‘emotional trauma’,” but “interested commentaries” on historical events (48). Didur’s 
point about the ideological investment embedded in any representation throws into doubt 
not only Pandey’s use of literary narratives in his work on Partition and communalism, 
but also Hasan’s idealized argument that Partition literature must be examined because it 
is presumed to be uniformly non-communal and deals with “the people’s suffering.”  
Didur argues that by failing to recognize that there is art and ideology involved in 
literary writing, we risk reinscribing the same universalizations that are contained in 
official, patriarchal narratives of Partition, instead of considering how literary texts 
“might destabilize the concept of representation in this scholarship as a whole” (47). She 
explains that our reading practice must recognize how language and discourse “mediate 
and fragment all experience and textual analysis of the past” (48). She also underlines the 
“interpretive function of reading and writing about the partition, the discursive 
construction of subjectivity, agency, nationalism, and history that are involved in its 
narrativization” (5), and accentuates the “instability of meaning in the language of 
narrative” (40) as well as the “literariness of narrative” (43). Building on Donna 
Haraway’s theorizations, Didur argues that literature representing historical events should 
be read as “diffracted and metonymical (which recognizes the mutually constitutive 
relation between the literal and figurative in narrative) rather than as reflective and 
metaphorical (which understands them as related but independent)” (50). Such a “staged 
dialogue … puts pressure on totalizing constructions of the self, experience, and agency 
and their relation to the notion of citizenship in the modern nation-state” (Didur 44). 
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Thus, she argues, literary and historical narratives, both of which are linguistically and 
ideologically constructed (43), must be read dialogically towards a revisionist history of 
Partition. 
Hasan has also pointed out this subversive facet of Partition literature when he 
emphasizes the role of literature as a witness to trauma, one that provides “a framework 
for developing an alternative discourse [from the state’s] on inter-community relations … 
[and which] unfold[s] certain critically important dimensions without religion or 
community emblem as the principal reference point” (Inventing 17-8). In fact, in an 
oblique way, Hasan makes a point that is a little similar to Didur’s, although Didur’s 
work explicitly centres on the critical role of literature in interrupting official narratives. 
Hasan’s implicit recognition that literature constructs Partition around a different set of 
coordinates, setting up solidarities through common suffering and sorrow instead of 
unities along religious or national lines (Inventing 39-40), is in accordance with Didur’s 
argument that literature frequently and crucially rebels against the way Partition is 
constructed and understood by nationalists and communalists.  
Didur points out that, through a dual strategy of reading in which we situate the 
perception of abducted women’s experience in terms of gender and pay attention to the 
literariness of language in all Partition texts, hegemonic community and state narratives 
are undermined and other narratives are allowed to “emerge, interrupt, and question the 
hegemony of the assumed understandings” of Partition (Unsettling 13). And by focusing 
on the mediated character of narratives, literary or historical, the reader/scholar is 
directed away from women’s bodies and sexualities, which are the all-important focus of 
the patriarchal community as well as the nation state, and is instead led to concentrate on 
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how women’s silences destabilize the loquacity of official discourses on the subject.9 In 
this context, Didur theorizes the silence surrounding communal violence that dominates 
in women’s responses to Partition and is reproduced in testimonies and literary 
representations of Partition. Bearing in mind Anne Hardgrove’s concerns about the 
efforts of scholars to “recover” women’s absent narratives of Partition, she argues that  
the loss of an archive suggested by this silence necessitates that scholars adopt a 
pedagogy for the study of partition history that moves away from a model that 
seeks to ‘recover’ the past and instead focuses on how totalizing representational 
strategies smooth over ambivalent responses to the birth of the modern nation-
state. (18)  
What she means by this is that silence is strategically used often not only by women 
themselves but also as a literary device in Partition literature such as Jyotirmoyee Devi’s 
The River Churning (1995) to represent abducted women’s experiences that are at odds 
with the homogenizing narratives of the nation. Devi uses silence or absence of details of 
her female protagonist’s experiences during Partition to avoid lapsing into the inevitable 
patriarchal, nationalist vocabulary of “honour” and “shame” associated with the female 
body. Pointing out that there were many who died during Partition, Didur explains that 
the Partition archive will, by definition, always be incomplete (136-7). Furthermore, the 
urge to “recover” trauma and testimony is often an attempt on our part to comfortably 
deal with Partition and hurriedly move on. But Devi’s novel prevents the reader from 
being able to “complete” his/her understanding of Partition by conveniently and 
                                                          
9 At the same time, we must also bear in mind what Mayaram tells us as she writes about the present-day silences of 
Meo communities about the persecution they faced during Partition in the princely states of Bharatpur and Alwar. 
Mayaram reminds us that the silence of Partition survivors, whether self-imposed for reasons of self-preservation or 
imposed by others, is incorrectly and opportunistically interpreted by official channels as well as those who wield 
power that exploitation and conflict have ceased to affect survivors and do not matter anymore (161). 
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simplistically retrieving the history of the protagonist. Through silence, Devi gestures 
towards the “original incompleteness of history or an example of ‘loss as loss’” (139). In 
doing so, her representation critically cracks the state’s monolithic conception of women 
as “victims.” In Devi’s portrayal of silence and absence of testimony, therefore, the 
protagonist sidesteps the tyrannically singular, abstract categories of identity in which the 
state and the community would like to see her fixed through the (here) sinister agency of 
speech. And by surrendering to this silence, readers not only appreciate the history of loss 
as loss but also refuse to identify with a paradigm that forces authors to fix women within 
the singular vocabulary imposed by patriarchal, nationalist discourses on the experiences 
of women during Partition. 
In fact, Didur’s research suggests that the specific relevance of literature in 
understanding Partition lies in its mediated character. Building on social anthropologist 
Veena Das’ formulation that the gendered subject’s body constitutes the mediating sign 
between the individual and society (Critical 184), Didur writes that realist literature 
becomes such an appropriate place to study this mediation because it too is mediated. In 
other words, realist literature represents “reality” through its mediation by language. 
Thus, instead of leaving unquestioned realism, the predominant genre of Partition 
literature and generally “interpreted as the unmediated, reflective, and subjective ‘T’ruth 
of partition experience” (Unsettling 19), Didur rigorously re-reads realist literature and 
finds that, while realist narratives help to “(re)produce an imagined community 
[patriarchal, masculinist, majoritarian nation], they also exhibit contradictions that 
produce slippages in that same narrative structure” (40). Therefore, realist literature too 
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must be read as mediated, since it “prompts us to scrutinize the gendered citizen-subject’s 
compromised position in relation to state and community agendas”10 (14).  
Furthermore, the specific character of literature as “a form of writing that 
foregrounds the metaphorical and indirect properties of language,” gestures towards how 
that mediation takes place. Through the use of metaphoricity, which finds such friendly 
ground in the literary craft, literature represents which discourses are available to the 
gendered subject at any given time, as well as, significantly, “the specificity of the limits 
of what can be known about the subject’s experience” (12). It is here that Didur hopes 
that her study will contribute to the creation of the “therapeutic spaces” of socially shared 
expressions of pain that Das hopes for
11
 (Critical 192-3, 196), by highlighting how realist 
narratives about women’s abductions during Partition can be sensitively and carefully 
read and brought to exert pressure against hegemonic, homogenizing patriarchal-
nationalist narratives about Partition and the experiences of women during that event.  
In addition to this, a mediated platform like literature is compatible with the 
inherent inconsistency of memory, as Didur points out with reference to Nandi Bhatia’s 
essay in Pangs of Partition, where Bhatia argues that the uncertainties created by ever-
morphing memories lead the protagonist of Sidhwa’s Cracking India (1988) to question 
                                                          
10 A good example of how Didur thinks realist literature should be read comes from Das, who uses literature to write 
meaningfully about the socio-political crises that surfaced in an unprecedented manner during Partition. For example, 
she refers to a comment made by the protagonist in Krishna Sobti’s Hindi novel Mitro Marjani (1966), in which Mitro 
dwells on the inconsistency of social customs, so that the sperm of a man from her own religious community 
legitimizes a wife’s existence, but that of a man from the Other community destroys that existence. Das does not use 
Mitro’s musings here as a source to authenticate or validate experiences of women, but she uses her ironic, 
philosophical query as an entry point into a discussion of the dilemma in which abducted women found themselves, as 
well as the crisis of self-representation state and community in turn were thrown into. Like Mitro, who interrogates 
patriarchal codifications of honour within kinship relations, Das asks a similar question while extending the realm of 
inquiry to nationhood and asking how the nation approaches rape and how it addresses the question of raped women 
and their illegitimate pregnancies and children (Critical 56). Thus, she uses the discursive space within literature 
(Bhatia 195) to add credence to her point and to start off her chapter in a memorable way that makes an impact, but she 
does not use it to echo some kind of unassailable, omniscient truth about Partition. 
11 Das emphasizes the need for the expression of abducted and/or “recovered” women’s pain to become Indian 
society’s shared experience, so that a moral community can emerge that witnesses this pain, contemplates the guilt we 
carry within us, and helps survivors to cope and live.  
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and argue with herself, with others, with nations, and Partition. Thus, Bhatia explains that 
Lenny, the protagonist, constantly interrupts the novel’s narrative with the contradictions 
of which her memories consist, and this, along with her already liminal status as the 
member of a supposedly neutral religious minority (Parsis) makes visible her 
“fragmented, nonlinear, and contradictory experience of ‘independence’” (Didur, 
Unsettling 69).  
Besides engaging with the question of memory, Bhatia’s essay also elaborates 
upon the role of Partition literature and the dilemma of “authenticity” that historians are 
flummoxed by in their forays into testimonies and personal narratives of Partition. The 
crux of Bhatia’s argument lies in the fact that she does not engage with the notion of 
authenticity as being the paramount criterion in determining the validity of Partition 
literature, testimonies, or personal narratives. Instead, referring to literature in particular, 
she argues that by employing techniques such as “storytelling, dialogue, flashback and 
description” (195), as well as different linguistic registers to convey class, regional, 
national, religious, and other differences (201), which became sharply and acutely visible 
in the late 1940s, literary texts that represent Partition offer a platform to readers and 
survivors for debating and discussing vital issues such as violence, agency, and 
communalism (195). To understand the value of testimonies and personal narratives, we 
must, therefore, turn to Partition literature and see how it not only affirms the experiences 
of suffering that people underwent during Partition, but how it also “functions as a 
discursive space that allows the silenced subjects to speak, interpret and raise critical 
questions” (195-6). Bhatia suggests that literary texts walk us through significant 
moments during Partition, and by means of the representation of affective responses, 
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experiences, and witnessing, they help in the mediated retrieval of silenced voices as well 
as provide a historical sense and sociological frame for the circumstances in which 
identities – “religious, familial, communal, gendered and national – were continually 
formed, deformed and reconstructed in the process” (195, 199, 203). And as she has 
argued here as well as elsewhere with Anjali Gera Roy, literary texts function as “sites of 
cultural memory about a shared experience” (Bhatia 199), as “memorials, memorials that 
are especially important in light of the absence of other public or sculptural monuments 
to commemorate the event of Partition” (Gera Roy and Bhatia xiv). In other words, in the 
absence of an institutionalized memory of Partition, literary as well as cultural texts such 
as films contribute to the public remembrance and reconstruction of “the pain, suffering, 
and survival of Partition” (xiv).  
Bhatia’s and Didur’s theorizations about the nature of memory and literature 
allow for the formulation of a wider theory about the role of literature in Partition 
Studies. In their work, they underscore the constructedness and fragmentariness of both 
memories as well as literature. Furthermore, Didur goes on to connect women’s use of 
literary indirectness in the testimonies that Das observed during her own research to 
Cathy Caruth’s theorization about the emergence of history through and in spite of a 
limited cognition of traumatic experiences by survivors and their listeners/readers 
(Unsettling 142). Caruth argues that it is through gaps and through the excruciating 
fragmentariness of testimony that history, particularly the history of trauma (which is 
always, by definition, incomplete), emerges (11). It is this fragmentariness of trauma, in 
fact, that makes it a particularly good “host” for history, since it is in the gaps that trauma 
invariably contains that history as personal experience stands a chance of issuing forth 
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(11). It is in these configurations of memory, trauma, fragment, literature, and history that 
a sensitive Partition narrative, which pays attention to the officially, patriarchally, and 
nationally neglected experiences of ordinary people, can arise. In other words, the 
craftedness of literature makes literature a hospitable ground for the fragmentariness and 
the constructedness of memories and traumas of Partition. In this way, the “history” of 
Partition that can be read in Partition literature is located in the incompleteness of trauma 
and memory. And even though literature is constructed and memory is fragmentary, both 
search for cohesion and structure, which is what the traumatized individual too often 
endlessly seeks. Das has, indeed, accurately understood the connection between trauma, 
history, and literature when she suggests that “[s]ome realities need to be fictionalized 
before they can be apprehended” (“Language” 69).           
Didur’s and Bhatia’s theorizations about the role of literature in addressing the 
difficult subject of Partition, as well as my own work in this dissertation on the gendered 
violence faced by women during and since Partition in Hyderabad, are explicitly and 
implicitly informed by the work of Das, a social anthropologist, as well as feminist 
historians Urvashi Butalia, Ritu Menon, and Kamla Bhasin. In fact, one of the most path-
breaking moments in Partition Studies has consisted of the pioneering scholarship 
produced by Butalia in her book The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of 
India (1998) and Menon and Bhasin in their Borders and Boundaries: Women in India’s 
Partition (1998). Butalia’s and Menon and Bhasin’s work marked a conscious decision to 
depart from the usual trend in Partition Studies at the time (and which Pandey had 
already critiqued in the early 1990s) to focus on the intricate political manoeuvres 
between the Muslim League and the Congress, between Jinnah and Gandhi, Nehru and 
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Patel etc. Butalia writes that through her book, she puts centre-stage “the small actors and 
bit-part players [of Partition], whose lives, as the lives of all people, were inextricably 
interwoven with broader political realities” (71). The research conducted by Butalia and 
Menon and Bhasin consists of interviews and oral narratives of the experiences of 
ordinary people, women, children, and Dalits;
12
 this work becomes even more relevant 
when they remind us that there are no monuments on either side of the Indian and 
Pakistani borders that memorialize the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. 
Butalia’s and Menon and Bhasin’s work also highlights the dual and often conflicting 
perspectives of officialdom and eye-witness narration in Partition memoirs written by 
female state social workers such as Kidwai in her In Freedom’s Shade (1974) and Kamla 
Patel in her Torn from the Roots (1977).
13
 But out of several contributions to constructing 
a people’s history of Partition, the most important achievement of their work so far is that 
it inserted women, hitherto forgotten, back into the history of Partition by highlighting 
the specific nature of Partition violence.  
Focussing largely on the experience of Punjabi and North Indian women, Butalia 
and Menon and Bhasin argue that violence against women during Partition was gendered 
and formulaic, connected to communal and patriarchal conceptions of honour and shame 
vested in the female body that were deployed in inter-communal conflicts. Furthermore, 
they show that, contrary to widespread perceptions that men only abducted women of 
                                                          
12 Besides these sources, their work also considers diaries, memoirs, newspaper reports, letters, records of constitutional 
debates, reports of enquiry commissions, pamphlets, and books. 
13 Both Kidwai and Patel represent their own dilemmas over the Central Recovery Operation and poignantly express 
their helplessness in the face of regulations which allowed “recoveries” that ended in the separation of children from 
their desperate mothers or doting foster parents, or lovers from one another, or even wives from husbands. Their 
doubts, censure, as well as self-censure mark points of rupture where the ostensibly undeniable legitimacy and 
confidently linear trajectory of the patriarchal nationalist state is radically questioned. In doing so, they also undo the 
state’s rhetorically constructed “victim” image of abducted women and represent them with subjective agency (Didur, 
Unsettling 53, 55). 
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Other communities, men often abducted women of their own communities. When the 
threat of violence from the Other community became imminent, they frequently killed 
“their own” women to prevent their conversion to the Other religion or, what was deemed 
worse, to prevent their impregnation by men of the Other community. In problematic 
patriarchal assertions, such women are glorified as martyrs, usually by male Partition 
survivors.
14
 Another myth that Butalia and Menon and Bhasin debunk about the 
abductions of women is that only young women and girls within reproductive age were 
kidnapped; they point out that older women were often abducted because they owned or 
were trustees of property. They also highlight the fact that there were many cases where 
families were reluctant about taking back female relatives, especially if they had had 
children from their abductors or were pregnant with the children of their abductors, 
because this would be a constant reminder of the women’s violation and consequent 
“impurity.” Such women were expected to abort or give up their children if they expected 
their families to take them back; if they refused to do so, they ended up living the rest of 
their lives in ashrams originally set up by the state as transit points for abducted women. 
The measure of the social taboo over sexual transgression is seen in the fact that many 
abducted women were not accepted by their families even after they had given up their 
children.    
But families and communities were not the only ones who added to the 
traumatization of abducted women. Butalia’s and Menon and Bhasin’s work also 
ascertains the often dubious role the state played in “recovering” abducted women. In 
fact, women became scapegoats for the state’s assertion of Indian national identity vis-à-
                                                          
14 Many women also killed themselves, immersed in patriarchal anxieties that their conversion and/or impregnation by 
men of the Other community would be an indelible blot on the “honour” of their communities (Butalia, Other 168-9). 
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vis Pakistan. As the records of the Indian Constituent Assembly debates reveal, the 
state’s recovery operation became an opportunity to malign the character of Pakistan 
(Butalia, Other 140). Pakistan’s very existence, the allegedly communalist rationale for 
its construction, its reluctance to open up certain areas of the country for the recovery of 
abducted women, and its protestations against the use of the military instead of the police 
in the recoveries, became opportunities for elected members of the Indian government to 
slander Pakistan as uncivilized and barbaric. Pakistan became identified by its men, 
“tarred with the same brush”; it did not act, it was alleged, as a “civilized” country 
should, and it did not display “moral standards” (142).  
India, on the other hand, was constructed very differently in both the Assembly 
debates as well as right-wing Hindutva organs, such as the RSS mouthpiece the 
Organizer, as a civilized but weak, passive, and guiltless victim
15
 (145-6). Thus, the 
recovery of women in both the Indian state’s perspective and the Hindutva outlook had 
nothing to do with the interests of women because women were simply not consulted 
about how they would like to live their lives. It was the retrieval of national honour that 
lay behind the concerted efforts of the Indian state to “recover” women; therefore, 
                                                          
15 The bodies of women became conflated with the “body” of the nation in parliamentary and Hindutva discourses. 
While Pakistan was envisaged as masculinized and tyrannical, parallel images of a feminized, maternal India were set 
up, so that “[t]he very formation of the nation of Pakistan out of the territory of Bharat (or, the body of Bharatmata) 
became a metaphor for the violation of the body of the pure Hindu woman” (Butalia, Other 145). This metaphor was 
accompanied by a call to arms for Hindu men, to man up as it were, in the service of the feminized nation (145-
7). Thus, just as Pakistani men and Pakistan were constructed as one and the same thing, Hindu manhood and 
Hindu/Indian nationalism came to be connected, and gendered violence against Hindu/Sikh women became (and has 
since remained) an excuse for Hindu nationalist platforms such as the Organizer to call for Hindu men to militarize 
against Muslims/Pakistanis. For a detailed analysis of the role of V.D. Savarkar, the foremost ideologue of Hindutva, in 
the public, mainstream construction of Muslim men as (invariably) rabid, fanatical invaders and Hindu men as non-
violent and weak, and the need for Hindu men to militarize, see Purshottam Agarwal’s “Savarkar, Surat and Draupadi: 
Legitimising Rape as a Political Weapon” (1996). See also Ashis Nandy’s The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of 
Self under Colonialism (1988), Partha Chatterjee’s National Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse 
(1986), and Mrinalini Sinha’s Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late 
Nineteenth Century (1995). The careful sculpting of this image is important because it contributes to defining the role 
of Hindu men in the sexual violence of Partition as somewhat mitigated, owing to “weakness,” a benign impotence of 
sorts, as if Hindu men would have been unable (even should they wish it) to perform the kind and extent of violence 
that the rabid and highly sexual Muslim men of present-day Pakistan had committed. For another Hindu nationalist 
endorsement of this highly problematic view, see the account of K.M. Munshi (257-8). 
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Hindu/Sikh women had to be “retrieved” in order to restore India’s honour (read Indian 
men’s honour), and Muslim women had to be sent “home” to Pakistan in order to show 
how morally superior India was to that country. Thus, abducted Muslim women were 
seen to rightfully belong to Pakistan, even though India claimed to be a secular state and 
clearly made a great show out of distinguishing itself on this count from Pakistan 
(Butalia, Other 111); and Hindu/Sikh women had to be returned to India because they 
were automatically assumed to belong to India. 
The discourse of “honour” and, consequently, “purity” and “impurity” also threw 
into crisis the lives of women who had borne their abductors’ children, and the callous 
attitude towards their fate belied the Indian State’s construction of itself as secular against 
its criticism of Pakistan as Muslim and communal. Not only were women denied by the 
nationalist state the right to exercise their agency and decide what they wanted to do, i.e. 
stay with their abductors or return to their pre-Partition families, but their right to keep 
their children was also taken away from them on account of nationalist considerations. 
There were strong objections in Constituent Assembly debates about children of Muslim 
women by Hindu/Sikh men being taken to Pakistan since paternity was believed to define 
religious and, consequently, national identity. The wishes of the mothers did not matter, 
and it also did not concern staunchly nationalist members that the fathers were abductors 
and rapists. At the same time, these children were “impure” on account of their Muslim 
maternity, which made it impossible for them to have claim to full Indian citizenship. 
Where the fathers were Muslim abductors and the mothers Hindu/Sikh, the mothers’ 
rightful place was clearly established as India; again, if these women were pregnant, they 
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would have to either abort their unborn children,
16
 or if they were already mothers, they 
would have to leave their children behind in Pakistan, which was believed to be the best 
place for children of Muslim paternity (Butalia, Other 213-9). Whether their fathers could 
be traced or even convinced to keep the children was another matter entirely.   
In fact, as Das has pointed out in Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective 
on Contemporary India (1995), the state appropriated the patriarchal anxieties of families 
and communities about sexuality and reproductivity and gave them an unrelentingly 
forceful and singular impetus as far as the futures of these women were concerned, 
thereby wilfully overlooking and undermining the subtle, tactful strategies that 
communities and families often deploy to reabsorb abused women and their questionable 
children within the communal fold.
17
 Thus, she argues in Critical Events, in 
“Composition of the Personal Voice: Violence and Migration” (1991), and an essay co-
authored with Ashis Nandy and titled “Violence, Victimhood, and the Language of 
Silence” (1985), that women’s bodies became the unambiguous site on which nationalist 
ideologies publicly debated over the significance of sexual and reproductive violence
18
 
for the honour of the nation. In this way, the state’s recovery program had unhappy 
ramifications for those women who had managed to settle down to some semblance of 
                                                          
16 Significantly, the state had no qualms about abortion or even setting aside a special budget for it at a time when it 
was actually illegal (Butalia, Other 128; Singh, “Lady” 190-1). Camp workers, who were, of course, arms of the state, 
often felt a sense of wrongdoing because performing abortions constituted bending the law and thus “kept [them] a 
closely guarded secret so that no one would find out about them and they [the pregnant women] wouldn’t have 
difficulties in the future.” In an attempt to justify the state, one of them displaces concern onto the women by saying 
that “[t]he circumstances were such that we had to do this, otherwise the women might have committed suicide. All this 
was done behind closed doors” (190-1). 
17 This is not to suggest, Das clarifies, that communities did not discriminate vehemently and even reject recovered 
women and their children, relegating them to lives of loneliness and oblivion in ashrams and refugee camps (Critical 
78, 81). In fact, it was in the centre-stage of violence between communities that women were thrust during Partition 
(81). However, what is also highly relevant in terms of the complicity of the state in this ill-treatment of women is that 
“there is evidence of state intervention aimed at maintaining norms of honour and purity in violation of the practical 
exigencies of kinship in the community” (78). 
 
18 Das’s argument is that the violence against women and their communities during Partition was not only pointedly 
sexual but also purposefully directed towards women’s reproductive and maternal functions (Critical 68-9). 
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normalcy with their abductors; the state uprooted them and, arguably, abducted them all 
over again (Butalia, Other 117). Yet, we must not forget, and Butalia and Menon and 
Bhasin remind us about this, that there were many women who were happy to be 
recovered and reunited with their families.  
This last point needs to be emphasized periodically in Partition Studies because 
the questionable aspect of the state’s notion of recovery has resulted in gross 
overstatements by scholars who have used Butalia’s and Menon and Bhasin’s research in 
their own work. In “Partitioning Bodies: Literature, Abduction and the State” (2009), 
Bede Scott has drawn attention to the fact that the reluctance of some women to be 
returned has been naïvely understood by some literary scholars, who have examined the 
work of Sidhwa, Pritam, and Manto, as the unconditional wish of all abducted women. 
Their simplistic interpretation of complex and varied situations reveals the dangers of 
misunderstandings related to feminist historians’ research. Feminist history has itself 
come under some criticism in “South Asian Women’s Communal Identities” (1995), 
where Hardgrove raises vital questions about the need for scholars to be self-reflective 
about their practices when it comes to “recovering” the experiences of women during 
Partition. Hardgrove points out that we may be doing more damage than good if we are 
not sensitive to “the ways that our use of both witnesses and written evidence can become 
another act of abduction and/or ‘fixing’ of women’s communal identities”19 (2427). Like 
Butalia, Hardgrove also goes so far as to suggest that the state kidnapped women to 
(forcibly) return their rights to them (2427), and she is concerned that scholars should not 
                                                          
19 Such concerns are well-founded, especially when scholars unthinkingly give expression to what appears to be an 
almost greedy quest for knowledge. Take for example, Kaul’s comment, “Many members of the generation that lived 
through those times are still alive, and they are an invaluable historical archive” (5). His words suggest that Partition 
survivors are repositories of testimonies that scholars are entitled to ransack.   
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do the same. If we are not careful, she points out, we may end up discursively repatriating 
women in the same way that the state did through its own recovery program (2427).   
Hardgrove points out how women resist such incorporation into scholarly 
recovery programmes, which, she alleges, aim to retrieve them as “symbols of identity” 
(2429), by refusing to talk about certain things to scholars. She exhorts scholars to rethink 
the space and place of research, to remember that we ask these women to speak in times 
when communalist violence has only escalated to new levels of organized horror, and to 
recognize that their speech may expose the guilt of their close male kin and thereby 
jeopardize the semblance of normalcy that their lives may have achieved after 
experiences of intense trauma (2430). Thus, she cautions us to be mindful of how we 
change the lives of women we interview. She represents our position as scholars as 
precarious and insidious when she asks, “Do women constitute themselves as ‘victims’ 
before or after our interviews?” (2430). Butalia is also troubled by the ethics of 
revisionist research, and asks the following questions: “How do we reach beyond the 
stories into the silences they hide; how can we assume that speech, the breaking of 
silence, is in itself a good thing?” (Other 10). Therefore, while Butalia’s book is an 
attempt to (partially) restore forgotten histories of Partition, and is driven by her 
conviction that it is by remembering and, in the process, memorializing Partition that we 
can forget and move on, it is also periodically haunted by the question of whether or not 
recovery is necessarily a good thing.   
Besides their revisionist approach to Partition as well as their extensive 
theorizations of the gendered nature of Partition violence, I also draw in my dissertation 
from Butalia’s, Menon and Bhasin’s, and Das’s complex examinations of the silence 
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surrounding Partition. There is, of course, as they point out, the state’s silence on 
Partition as it affected individuals, communities, and also localities and regions such as 
Hyderabad. This silence is masked by the enthusiastic loquacity of the state about the 
history of independence from British rule. In addition to this, Butalia and Menon and 
Bhasin encountered various degrees of silence surrounding the people who had lived 
through Partition and who were reluctant about excavating memories which they said 
they had put past them. Their work reveals the different workings of silence in the private 
memories of Partition: the arrested silence that is born from the sheer horror and trauma 
of one’s experiences of violence and dislocation;20 the guilty silence of those who had not 
only suffered themselves during Partition but also inflicted suffering upon others;
21
 and 
the self-preserving silence of those who had suffered the taboo of losing honour through 
rape and/or were aware that their kinsmen had committed similar violent acts during 
Partition. The last kind of silence incorporates also an inability to mourn ritually and 
publicly; it is an indicator of “poisonous knowledge” (“Act” 221-2), as Das argues in 
“Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain” (1997) and “The Act of 
Witnessing: Violence, Poisonous Knowledge, and Subjectivity” (2000), because women 
are often painfully aware that the men whom they love are also the men who killed not 
only Others, but also often their own kinswomen for the sake of honour. They know that 
                                                          
20 In a later article, Butalia suggests that it was the trauma of Partition that forced people into silence and that it is the 
contemporary polarizations on the basis of religion in Indian political life that have compelled them to speak about their 
experiences during Partition (“An Archive” 209). Butalia also wonders whether the silence of historians about the 
trauma of Partition has something to do with the belief that Partition was a topic that needed some time before it could 
be discussed again (Other 36). 
21 Unlike the Holocaust, there was no clear-cut, binary sense of aggressors and victims associated with Partition, and 
virtually every family had both. Butalia writes that this could be one explanation why Partition memories were alive 
only within the private circle of the family, where the “‘ugly’ parts of this history could be suppressed” (Other 8-9). 
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this violence may be directed towards them too, if they do not cooperate with established 
conventions of silence.
22
  
Thus, silence is also gendered, and Butalia observed patriarchy at play when she 
noticed that it was not only difficult to get women to talk about Partition, but it was 
difficult as well to keep them talking when men were around. If husbands or sons were 
around, these men tended to take over the interview, whether inadvertently or otherwise, 
thereby “making the women lapse into a sort of silence” (Other 12). She adds further that 
“[t]he men seldom spoke about women. Women almost never spoke about themselves, 
indeed they denied they had anything ‘worthwhile’ to say, a stance that was often 
corroborated by their men”23 (100). This kind of silence, as well as the fact that when 
women spoke, they spoke of the minutiae of their experiences during Partition, while 
men usually concentrated on the relations between communities and broad political 
realities, forced Butalia and Menon and Bhasin to think that there may be such a thing as 
a “gendered telling of Partition” (Butalia, Other 12) or even a “gendered telling of 
violence” (Menon and Bhasin 54).  
Butalia also points out that the silence of survivors is also contingent upon who 
poses the questions and how and who takes the responsibility for what that silence 
                                                          
22 However, this complicit as well as traumatized silence is much more complicated than being just a singular 
imposition by external factors, as Das herself indicates. In her essay (1991), Das shows how Indian society enforces 
silence upon “recovered” women such as Manjeet, a woman she interviewed, not only to enable the continuity of the 
norms of family and community about “honour” and “shame,” but also to allow such women to have some semblance 
of a normal life in the family and community. Das emphasizes that she does not intend to essentialize the therapeutic 
qualities of silence (70). But she notes that this kind of contract of silence in exchange for a relatively normal life was 
in sharp contrast to other stories she had heard about recovered women who had been rejected by their families (70). 
She points out how Manjeet’s husband often called her a prostitute when he was drunk, but that the society of women 
around her could continue to ignore this, “allowing an existence, however fragmented, however poisoned, to continue” 
(70). She also writes about the dangers a breach of silence and the ensuing confrontation would create because it would 
require Manjeet’s husband, her uncle, her brother, etc. to occupy “well defined positions in languages of honour and 
shame and confront each other as adversaries” (70).  
23 Furthermore, because “[m]uch of the time the interview had to be conducted in the nooks and crannies of time that 
were available to women between household tasks” (Other 12), the way women lived or, in other words, the gendered 
practical and logistical duties they were responsible for as homemakers, wives, and mothers, increased the degree of 
difficulty the interviewers experienced in getting them to produce their testimonies. 
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unleashes. With regard to the silence of women, she emphasizes the importance of 
“learning to listen differently, often of listening to the hidden nuance, the half-said thing, 
the silences which are sometimes more eloquent than speech” (Other 12). She writes that 
she only spoke to those who willingly spoke, for “speech is not always cathartic, not 
always liberating” (42). Furthermore, not only were women who actually experienced 
violence during Partition silent, but also silent for many years were those women who 
worked as state social workers and tried to recover and rehabilitate abducted women. For 
example, it took Patel and Kidwai many years before they felt comfortable publishing 
their memoirs because old memories brought back long-lasting personal traumas as well 
as the public realities of severe breaches during Partition between Hindus, Sikhs, and 
Muslims that could be misused in today’s political landscape to further divisive interests.  
Das has also interpreted the silence of “recovered” women to mean an exercise of 
agency; recovered women often do not feel the need to speak (“Language” 84). She 
shows how women whom she interviewed tactfully deployed the use of silence through 
indirectness (the literariness of metaphor and metonym), thereby surmising that they 
indicated pain as part of their experience, but evidently saw no need to give voice to its 
specifics. For instance, one woman mentioned “a cousin” who was abducted and later 
recovered from a Muslim’s house. Das posits that this woman, who warned that 
“carelessly uttered words” could destroy the lives of married women, could very well be 
the speaker herself
24
 (“Composition” 70). These fragmentary testimonies may be 
examples of the “half-said thing” (Other 12) that Butalia mentions and cautions that 
                                                          
24 Pandey also finds that indirect testimonies exist in the use of rhetorical devices such as euphemisms and hyperbole. 
Thus, a converted male Partition survivor spoke to him euphemistically of “meat” instead of pork, the forbidden meat 
which some Muslims were fed during Partition as part of a symbolic conversion to Hinduism. This survivor also spoke 
hyperbolically about “rivers of blood” and “thousands of corpses” (“Community” 2039). 
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researchers and scholars must be alert to. The advantage that the indirect agency of 
silence gives to women, and that I have already mentioned in connection with Didur’s 
work, is that it often enables them to have some control over the way they prefer to be 
remembered or forgotten by history. However, Pandey notes that women are also 
culpable in maintaining patriarchal silences at the expense of other women’s interests 
behind a façade of loquacity. He finds “histories of assertion and suppression at one and 
the same time” (“Community” 2041) in narratives by female Partition survivors. One 
such story is that told by an elderly woman about a very young girl who had been 
abducted and brought by a male relative to the woman’s home, where she “became a part 
of the family” and later went away “cheerfully” with the recovery people (“Community” 
2039). Pandey writes that this narration is clearly an attempt by the woman to normalize 
the experience of abduction and thereby wish away the violence and brutality of the times 
in recollection. While this testimony shows concern for girls and women, it is still 
complicit in the professed, false conviction that their village was an exception where no 
violence ever took place.  
In fact, Pandey argues in his book Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism 
and History in India (2001) that in general, narratives of Partition violence constitute the 
making of the community as well as the subject of history. He has pointed out that 
violence is always represented in Partition testimonies as well as testimonies of present 
day communal violence
25
 as being ‘out there’ and “never in us” (“Community” 2037), 
                                                          
25 Present-day communal violence between Hindus and Muslims on the subcontinent is inextricably connected to 
Partition. For example, Partition is invoked again and again to justify propaganda and systematic pogroms against 
Muslims in India. For more on this, see the contents of a Hindu Mahasabha pamphlet translated and reproduced in full 
by Pandey (“In Defence” 566-7).   
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perpetrated by Others and outsiders, and never by the Self or by insiders.
26
 Therefore, 
violence is what marks the perimeter of the community, so that it “can occur only at or 
beyond that limit” of community (2037). And like Butalia, Menon and Bhasin, and Das 
have also suggested, Pandey explains that the limiting of violence to the outside of the 
perimeter of the community means that the violence that takes place within the 
community, such as martyrdom and revenge, is not really violence at all (“Community” 
2037), but acts that are required to be performed to maintain the purity of the community 
(2045).  
Besides Pandey, Sukeshi Kamra has also explained in her book Bearing Witness: 
Partition, Independence, End of the Raj (2002) how the mohalla (Hindustani, “locality”) 
is sanctified in Partition testimonies as well as certain examples of Partition fiction; the 
oneness of the local community is almost always visualized as being torn apart by 
“outsiders,” or “insiders” who were struck with a temporary insanity (122-6). This is why 
people produce new visions of an exceptionally harmonious pre-Partition past, in which 
lives, cultures, happiness, and tears, were shared in ways in “our town,” “our village,” or 
“our locality” that Partition and its politics made impossible to uphold. These memories 
stand out against Partition violence and “[n]one of this [violence], it is suggested, 
happened here” (Pandey, “Community” 2037). Thus, rape, forced conversions, and the 
“half-acknowledged violence of revenge” took place elsewhere, and never to people 
whom one knew or to whom one was related (2037). Moreover, the declared memories of 
an affectionately shared community life is mingled with the refusal to recognize violence 
done to others and the rejection of any meaningful admission of the culpability of loved 
                                                          
26 Politicians are held responsible for misguiding those members of a community who have committed violence 
“outside,” in other communities (“Community” 2044). In some cases, this disavowal is so complete that people assert 
that violence happened because “God willed it” (2041). 
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ones in the terrible brutality that prevailed. Indeed, Pandey observes sharply that “[t]he 
partition survivor’s narrative, it needs to be noted, is always a victim’s narrative, only 
occasionally slipping into – or acknowledging – an account of attacks in which the 
‘victims’ themselves participated” (2044).  
Through his focus on violence within mohallas, Pandey has also ascribed value to 
limiting the scope of discussion about Partition to localities (such as Hyderabad). 
Remembering Partition examines what Partition as a moment of nation-state formation 
means for populations, cultures, and histories, which became nationalized by the 1940s. 
Zooming in on Partition violence in the areas of Delhi and Garhmukhteshwar, he 
discusses how the local is subsumed in the national at such moments; Pandey argues that 
by localizing events and entities and stripping them of their “history, complexity and 
contested character” (120), historians confiscate from people an entire sense of history. 
They do this by eliminating the importance of the concrete details of how Partition 
affected localities; such details are significant because they often incorporate difference 
and divergence on account of varying regional contexts and have the potential of 
disrupting the homogeneous narrative of Partition constructed at the national level. By 
undermining them as merely localized and, therefore, not relevant to the big picture of 
Partition, historians annihilate historical and experiential difference and generally deny 
the ability of local experiences to inflect and interrogate the official, mainstream, singular 
narrative of Partition. Hyderabad, which experienced Partition in ways that are similar as 
well as vastly dissimilar from the manner in which Partition affected other parts of India, 
such as those regions which were geographically split, is a case in point. As I show in 
Chapter II, those Partition-related experiences of Hyderabadis that differ from the version 
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of history the Indian state would like to maintain are completely hushed up by both the 
state as well as dominant sections of Indian society.  
In this way, as Pandey argues, the index of power that operates to frequently 
reduce and dismiss the dissonant possibilities in details of local experience by rendering 
them “local” and nothing more, acts to maintain an account of Partition that overlooks 
nuances, complexities, and contradictions. By slapping a singular, universalizing, 
nationalizing version of Partition history and experience upon a large collection of 
diverse communities and regions that have experienced Partition in particular, and not 
general, ways, historians homogenize, dehumanize, and demonize whole communities. In 
this regard, Pandey also raises critical questions about citizenship which my dissertation 
benefits from. He makes crucial inquiries into how women, Muslims, Dalits, and Anglo-
Indians are denied citizenship in the post-Partition nation, and upper-caste, middle-class 
Hindu men are entitled to a kind of citizenship that is so privileged and normative that it 
is “invisible.” Such (often institutionalized) perceptions of citizenship and identity stem 
from the moment of rupture that Partition was, and the concrete conviction with which 
they are affirmed by the logic and ideology behind state policies and interventions 
continue to marginalize and discriminate against people on the basis of gender, religion, 
caste, class, and race.     
In this way, the radical body of work on Partition that Pandey, Butalia, Menon 
and Bhasin, and Das have produced reveals that there has been profoundly thoughtful and 
multi-dimensional research into the Partition experiences and silences of various groups 
and subject positions. However, a lacuna that becomes visible in their work, and that 
Butalia and Menon and Bhasin openly acknowledge, is that no interviews from Bengal or 
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even from Pakistan or Bangladesh are included in it. Nor are the experiences of 
Hyderabadis, which I address in my dissertation, present in their work. While language 
issues are common in any kind of cross-regional or cross-state research connected to an 
area as linguistically diverse as the Indian subcontinent, and perhaps call for the need for 
more translations of existing research from different parts of the subcontinent as well as 
multi-lingual projects involving scholars with different language skills, the bigger 
problem that Butalia uncovered in the course of her research was the official attempts in 
India and Pakistan to restrict researchers from the other country from accessing archives, 
records, or even people. In this, the living legacy of Partition – bitterness, hostility, and 
distrust – makes itself known. This inheritance is also manifested when those researchers 
who are able to access people in the other country find themselves at the receiving end of 
the interviewees’ bitterness and pain.  
Nevertheless, Menon was able to focus on Partition from a larger, subcontinental 
framework in her book No Woman’s Land: Women from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh 
Write on the Partition of India (2004), a collection edited by her which consists of cross-
border experiential accounts by Pakistani, Indian, and Bangladeshi women of various 
communities. These writings address shared gendered concerns or histories as a 
consequence of 1947 and 1971. The central theme of all the narratives, which is revealed 
in the title itself, is that dominant, patriarchal discourses dictate that women have no 
country to claim and no citizenship to defend or acquire and that even their bodies, which 
do not belong to them, become akin to territorial acquisitions and sites on which 
dominant ideologies work to assert their superiority (7). The anthology includes 
narratives of camp workers whose accounts are absent from government records or 
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ministry reports, such as Lady Camp Commandant Jogendra Singh, a refugee from 
Lahore who worked in camps in Karnal and Kurukshetra and describes the delicacy with 
which “mixed” pregnancies were aborted in camps with covert official approval. The 
diversity in the narratives and speaking subject positions in this anthology are seen in the 
inclusion of the accounts of Shehla Shibli, a Hindu married to a Muslim and now living 
in Pakistan, who writes that her post-Partition identity may be “Either, Neither, or Both,” 
and Bangladeshi professor and human rights and gender activist Meghna Guhathakurta, 
who reproduces her mother’s and paternal grandmother’s accounts of being members of a 
family of intellectuals that had refused to migrate to West Bengal in 1947 and were 
ruthlessly persecuted by the Pakistani army in the Bangladesh War of Independence in 
1971.  
Such recent efforts to revise the known, hegemonic state narrative of Partition and 
incorporate into the field a human history by introducing a comparative element that 
brings together different communities and countries to confront and cope with the past 
and present trauma of Partition have also included significant scholarly interventions 
from the perspective of South Asian diaspora based in western countries.
27
 My own work 
                                                          
27 Other recent contributions to revisionist history that help us better appreciate and dismantle the hegemonic narratives 
of Partition erected by the state as well as nationalist historians include the following texts: Asim Roy’s review essay in 
India’s Partition, which explains that while mainstream historiography argues that Jinnah’s entire personality, 
ideology, and policy changed after the disastrous performance of the Muslim League in the 1937 elections, the 
revisionist school argues that there was no real change in his political goals and it was only his strategies and tactics 
that had changed; Chatterjee’s essay in the same volume, which shows that the mobilization of Muslim masses to 
support the Pakistan demand in Bengal revolved around the question of class, since in Bengal peasants were mostly 
Muslim, and landlords, Hindu; and Ramnarayan Rawat’s essay in The Partitions of Memory, which focuses on the 
activities of the Scheduled Castes Federation in the United Provinces (present-day Uttar Pradesh, India) and shows how 
Partition provided new opportunities to marginalized groups such as Dalits, who organized politically as a community 
separate from caste-Hindus (as well as Muslims) and demanded the constitutional rights accorded to minorities. A 
radically new approach also emerges in Priyamvada Gopal’s interpretation of the much-analyzed, canonical Partition 
oeuvre of Manto. Her essay in The Partitions of Memory on Manto’s short story “Thanda Gosht” (“Cold Meat”) and 
the accounts of the obscenity trials in Pakistan that were launched as a result of the publication of this story underscores 
the fact that Manto’s Partition-era short stories and fragments not only represented women’s experiences of sexual 
brutality, but also men’s own crises of self and sexuality after such encounters. In other words, Manto asked crucial 
questions on what it is to be violent, what violence means to the existence of men, and does violence rebound upon the 
perpetrator and “push him to face his own contradictions as brute (‘haivaan’) and as human being (‘insaan’)?” (247) 
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in this dissertation includes an analysis of how Partition is remembered by different 
generations of Hyderabadi survivors and how present-day communal violence in 
Hyderabad is connected to Partition in Indian-American writer Samina Ali’s debut novel 
Madras on Rainy Days (2004). This recent realignment of Partition Studies to include the 
memories, postmemories, and experiences of diaspora is best represented by Papiya 
Ghosh’s pioneering and encyclopedic work Partition and the South Asian Diaspora: 
Extending the Subcontinent (2007). This book outlines the persistent relevance of 
Partition and its politics in the lives of subcontinental diaspora and transnational subjects, 
as well as North American and British diaspora and transnational subjects, arguing 
effectively that “the nation-making scripts of the twenties and the forties … [must be 
considered] in the backdrop of a context that is increasingly transnational” (xix). 
Specifically, the first part of Ghosh’s book deals with the predicament of the mehsoor 
Pakistani (“stranded Pakistanis”; twice or thrice migrants originating from the Indian 
state of Bihar) still living in refugee camps in Bangladesh, awaiting endlessly a passage 
by land, air, or sea that will take them to Pakistan, the promised land for which they 
believe they have made numerous sacrifices, but where they are not wanted even if they 
manage to get there. Indeed, the fact that the Bihari muhajireen (“refugees”) are not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Partition drew Manto towards the conclusion that masculinity must be radically reconstituted if society is to be 
meaningfully transformed (254). For Manto, not only was nationalism a “gendered and sexualized process,” but nation-
formation was also “the flashpoint for struggles over the meaning of community, morality and even the nature of reality 
itself” (244). The remarkable thing about the entire debate over “Thanda Gosht” during and after the trial is, Gopal 
writes, that there is no reference to female sexuality and womanhood, and the “burden of scrutiny is on the character of 
the state and its male citizens” (258). Another significant contribution to creating a revisionist history of Partition is 
Kamra’s Bearing Witness: Partition, Independence, End of the Raj (2002). Besides a detailed exploration of the high 
politics of Partition from the new angle of political cartoons, Kamra’s book includes an astonishing and novel variety 
of texts and genres connected to Partition, such as oral testimonies by urban lower middle-class and working-class 
people, agricultural workers, and farmers and the writings of displaced colonials as well as the British press. Kamra 
also furnishes insights into aspects of Partition violence that have thus far not been examined and that merit our 
attention, such as the sexual violence and mutilation of men, violence perpetrated by women, and the fate of abducted 
middle- and upper-class women, who appear to have dropped out of the pages of history. Kamra points out that most of 
the women “recovered” by the state during Partition belonged to the lower classes, and it is ironic that it is their voices 
that are recorded and not the voices of middle- and upper-class women, who usually find it easier to make it to 
historical records on account of their class privilege.  
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welcome in Sindh (where they were supposed to be relocated during Partition) or in East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh critically undermines the Muslim League’s ideal of Pakistan as a 
sanctuary for all South Asian Muslims. Today, the international Bihari diaspora fight for 
those Bihari muhajireen left in perpetual transit in Bangladesh. The significance of 
Ghosh’s contribution lies in the fact that, until her book was published, the experiences of 
Bihari muhajireen was an “unwritten strand of the subcontinental partition diaspora that 
folded into the South Asian diaspora in a staggered sort of way” (book jacket).  
The second part of Ghosh’s book concentrates on how the spectre of Partition is 
consistently resurrected in the political ideology and practice of religious 
majoritarianisms in the South Asian diaspora in North America and the United Kingdom. 
Ghosh focuses on how the privileged middle-class South Asian diaspora in North 
America and the UK and the politically mobilized working-class South Asian diaspora in 
the UK have furthered right-wing Hindutva ideology in the subcontinent politically, 
financially, as well as discursively. Their extensive and successful propagation of 
Hindutva is “inflected by the remains of the nation-makings around the partition 
experience” (xxvi) and plays a crucial role both in diasporic politics and in subcontinental 
politics. This “diasporic mediation” (xxvi) is achieved through many political and social 
organizations as well as the prolific print and web presence of diasporic Hindutva forces, 
which are supported as well as followed by Hindutva organizations in the subcontinent. 
At the same time, Ghosh’s research shows that there is also a fierce response to this 
potent, destructive ideology from diasporic Indian Muslims, secularists, and left-wing 
adherents and that, therefore, these solidarities are also examples of how diaspora 
interrupt nationalist politics in the subcontinent. These groups fight a sustained battle 
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against Hindutva in both the subcontinent as well as diasporic locations and employ for 
their cause the memories of a common, syncretic heritage lost during Partition. The 
pathos of this nostalgic narrative often successfully disrupts the violent communal 
passions distilled and deployed as “natural reactions” to Partition by sectarian forces 
amongst the international diaspora, particularly since it emphasizes how international 
locations furnish platforms for reunions of the communities that were rent asunder by the 
cracking of India in 1947.
28
          
The fact that it addresses Partition from the perspective of South Asian diaspora 
abroad is also the most significant contribution of Partitioned Lives: Narratives of Home, 
Displacement, and Resettlement (2008), edited by Gera Roy and Bhatia. In incorporating 
essays on films (about Partition experiences from Punjab and Bengal), which is a medium 
that is especially and increasingly popular amongst nostalgic diasporic and displaced 
populations of Indians, the essays in Partitioned Lives enable “a reassessment of Partition 
for global audiences” (xii); Partition Studies is, therefore, acknowledged to be no longer 
limited to or relevant to subcontinental audiences alone. This opening up of the field is 
also achieved in this volume by the incorporation of essays written about diasporic 
representations and significations of Partition by scholars such as Paulomi Chakrabarty, 
Shubh Mathur, Prabhjot Parmar, and Amber Fatima Riaz. For example, Parmar points out 
the validity of diasporic engagements with Partition on account of two things: the 
postmemories of Partition that South Asian American and Canadian writers and 
filmmakers such as Shauna Singh Baldwin and Deepa Mehta have, and the “ongoing 
trauma” (Gera Roy and Bhatia ix) of Partition that diasporic subjects like them and large 
                                                          
28 I borrow this metaphor of violent rupture from the title of Sidhwa’s Partition novel Cracking India (1988). 
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sections of their audience experience in new global political contexts of communal 
divisions and separations.
29
 
Other scholarship that is also concerned with the repercussions of Partition today 
includes The Partitions of Memory: The Afterlife of the Division of India (2001), a 
collection of diverse essays edited by Kaul. It is driven by the urgency that Partition and 
“its known and unknown legacies” (3) continue to play a central role through communal 
violence, and in notions of political identity and citizenship, the establishment and 
conduct of public institutions, as well as the playing out of private lives in India and 
South Asia. In India, he writes, secular thought constantly struggles against “the legacy of 
religious difference, a legacy sharpened to murderous point by Partition, which insists on 
the violent separateness of ‘Hindus’ and ‘Muslims’” (8). This tension is such a potent 
force in South Asian politics generally that Kaul points out that state policies are guided 
by “fear legitimized by the processes of Partition” (9). So, the question is not only how 
Partition created nation-states, but how these nation-states need and sinisterly utilize 
memories of Partition violence (made possible through subtly meted doses of fear about 
future partitions by interested political parties and agendas), to justify their own authority 
(8-9). Besides essays by Mukulika Banerjee, Chatterji, Rawat, Butalia, and Gopal, which 
I have already mentioned, this volume also contains Richard McGill Murphy’s article, 
                                                          
29 There were many such events in the 1990s that Parmar suggests fuelled diasporic interventions by writers and 
filmmakers; these included the following: the possibility of the separation of Québec from Canada, the ethnic violence 
in Rwanda and Bosnia, and the continued aggression between India and Pakistan, which became nuclear states in the 
latter part of that decade. Jonathan Greenberg’s essay in this volume also emphasizes the influential role of 
postmemory in defining the steady proliferation of not only creative but also scholarly texts that have examined or 
brought to light varied perspectives on Partition. Therefore, he points out, not only have revisionist scholars or 
communalist groups contributed to keeping relevant debates about Partition alive, but there is also a “generational 
resistance” (262) to silencing and forgetting of Partition by scholars through the use of postmemory. For example, the 
work of Butalia and Sudhir Kakar, as well as many others who are based both in western diaspora, such as Kamra and 
Bhatia, and in South Asia, is inspired by and infused with autobiographical accounts of how Partition affected their 
own families. Cf., for example, Kamra’s book Bearing Witness, which contains a foreword by her father Mulk Raj 
Kamra, a Partition eye-witness and survivor, who has finally been given the chance to speak of the disruption and 
despair that Partition means to him. 
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which explains how the nation-states of India and Pakistan elaborately, ritually, and 
constantly construct and reiterate their difference from and enmity towards each other 
during public displays of ceremonial nationalist aggression such as the daily flag-
lowering ceremony at the Wagah border. 
It is this assertion of political and national authority at the expense of 
communities and localities by the Indian state that I explore, amongst other things, in the 
next chapter, where I lay out the events that took place in the princely state of Hyderabad 
in the late 1940s. My reading of the integration of Hyderabad as part of the histories and 
experiences of Partition in the subcontinent is legitimized by the contexts and details 
explicitly and implicitly provided in Indian and Hyderabadi government reports, memoirs 
of officials, political pamphlets, Communist Party reports, and feminist histories and oral 
histories of and by Hyderabadi women. I also refer to archival resources about the Indo-
Hyderabad dispute that I had consulted in May 2011 at the National Archives in New 
Delhi. The significance of this last set of sources lies in the fact that these newspaper 
accounts from the 1940s have not been consulted in detail in any account about this 
subject. The sense of immediacy that these accounts contain, as well as the different, 
often opposing perspectives from which they capture in minute detail the nuances of the 
debates surrounding Hyderabad’s future, make these sources invaluable in any significant 
scholarly undertaking about the Partition experiences of Hyderabadis. 
After explaining how profoundly the embedded context of Partition as well as the 
actual upheavals of the 1940s affected and transformed the political, social, cultural, 
economic, demographic, and cartographic identity of Hyderabad, I proceed to examine 
how literary texts represent these tumultuous changes. Chapter III examines how Anita 
 51 
 
Desai chooses to represent Hyderabadis and their Partition experiences in her English 
novel Clear Light of Day (1980). I argue that although Desai’s novel must be 
acknowledged as an early representation of Partition at a time when historiography was 
not even ready to mention the topic of Partition, it nevertheless perpetuates the official 
silence surrounding Partition as it affected Hyderabad. The fact that Hyderabadis too 
experienced violence during Partition is completely elided in Desai’s novel, which 
evokes static Orientalist stereotypes of decadence and excess in its representation of 
Hyderabadi Muslims. By also avoiding any recognition of Hyderabadi subject positions 
that were embroiled in Partition politics in Hyderabad, Desai’s text becomes complicit in 
the general and official silencing of the Hyderabadi Partition subject as well as the 
effacement of Hyderabad from mainstream history.  
From the representation of Hyderabadis and Partition by a writer far removed 
from Hyderabad, I move in Chapter IV to an analysis of an English novel about the same 
topic written by an American author of Hyderabadi origin. Samina Ali’s Madras on 
Rainy Days engages with great urgency with how Partition continues to hound not only 
survivors but also those who have been born after Partition; these generations live with 
deeply ingrained, traumatic postmemories of Partition and also face reinforced and bolder 
outbreaks of communal violence in present-day Hyderabad city. Ali’s novel irrevocably 
connects the language of horrifically meaningful present-day violence, in which women’s 
bodies are etched, marked, and carved up with communal hatred, to the formulaic 
violence of Partition. In addition to this, Madras on Rainy Days creates grounds for 
further debates about the citizenship (or lack thereof) of Muslims in the Indian nation; it 
also raises questions about the treatment of internally displaced Muslim survivors of 
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Partition. Besides these interventions, this novel also allows for a critical examination of 
how the silence of working-class characters about Partition remains unexplored in 
middle-class narratives such as Ali’s; it shows how silence as a potential exercise of 
agency is not recognized by Hyderabadi élites as a form of covert resistance by women 
who do not want to be part of the hegemonic and homogenizing patriarchal narratives of 
Partition.  
In the last chapter, I shift from explaining how a novel by a Hyderabadi-American 
Muslim woman represents the cost of Partition and what it does to women’s bodies to a 
Hindi story written by a Hyderabadi Hindu man, who represents the rapes of Hindu 
women by Muslim Razakars in Hyderabad during the 1940s as an implicit justification 
for the present-day persecution of India’s Muslims. Not only does Kishorilal Vyas 
“Neelkanth” argue in favour of pre-emptive crack-downs on Muslims; his Hindu 
nationalist perspective also narratively appropriates the politics of Sikhs to further a 
violent cause and seeks to undo their attempts to forge a separate identity from Hindus 
since the anti-Sikh riots of 1984. Furthermore, Chapter V also considers other aspects of 
Hindutva as they are embedded in Neelkanth’s writing. Since the late nineteenth century, 
there has been a huge and continuous investment by some upper-caste, middle-class 
sections of Hindu society in two sacrosanct symbols of Hinduism – women and cows. It 
is these two symbols that Neelkanth sets up in his story “Durga” (2005) as emblematic of 
a peaceful, prosperous Hindu-by-definition India; by representing the defilement of one 
(cows) and the imminent danger of violation of the other (women) during Partition 
violence in Hyderabad, Neelkanth uses Partition narratives to promote communal 
violence against Muslims.  
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In this way, by engaging with texts that retrospectively represent Partition as it 
affected/affects Hyderabad, I seek to uncover what Partition did to Hyderabad, how 
mainstream India silences the trauma and dislocation experienced by Hyderabadis as well 
as their struggles and resistances against oppression during this period, and how that 
silencing is being challenged and/or propagated in some measure through literary 
interventions.   
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“An Enemy Within Her Belly”: Material Conditions in Hyderabad in the 1940s, and 
the Indo-Hyderabad Dispute 
In this chapter, I outline the material conditions in the princely state of Hyderabad 
during the late 1940s, when the reality and imminence of Partition loomed high over the 
horizon of British India. I describe in detail the activities of the various political players, 
big and small, as well as outline the nature of the ideologies that throve in Hyderabad at 
the time. These players and ideologies consisted of the following: the Hyderabadi 
minority ruling class of Muslims, led by the seventh Nizam of Hyderabad, Mir Osman 
Ali Khan (1886-1967) of the Asaf Jahi dynasty (1720-1948); the peasants and workers 
who participated in the Telangana Armed Struggle (1946-1951), an uprising against the 
feudal, political, and cultural hegemony of the ruling class in Hyderabad; the paramilitary 
Muslim Razakars, who terrorized the populace in general and non-Muslims in particular; 
and the Hyderabad State Congress (HSC), which was set up to represent the democratic 
aspirations of Hyderabadis and align these aspirations alongside those of people in British 
India. In addition to this, this chapter also explores the nature of the intervention of the 
Indian state in Hyderabad in 1948 and explains the role prominent Congress statesmen 
played in the invasion and forced integration of Hyderabad as well as the subsequent 
hushing up of the violence perpetrated by arms of the Indian state against sections of the 
Hyderabadi population.  
The description of the material conditions in Hyderabad in the context of Partition 
and independence that I provide in this chapter is crucial because the literary texts that I 
analyze later in this dissertation respond to these events and represent them from varied 
political perspectives and attitudes. In order to construct my arguments in this chapter, I 
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refer to several sources: feminist histories and oral testimonies by Hyderabadi women, 
reports by Communist Party leaders who participated in the Telangana Struggle against 
the Nizam and the subsequent Indian military regime, Indian and Hyderabadi government 
reports, memoirs of officials of both governments, and political pamphlets from 
Hyderabad. In addition to these sources, I also refer to archival resources, which consist 
of newspaper accounts that represent in minute detail the events that took place in 
Hyderabad and New Delhi in the 1940s. These resources occupy an important place in 
this chapter because, first, they drive home the urgency of the time-bomb that was 
Hyderabad in the context of Partition and Partition violence and, second, they have not 
been consulted in detail in any scholarship so far about the Indo-Hyderabad dispute. 
What is also significant is that some of these newspaper accounts make manifestly clear 
the questionable morality behind India’s invasion because they provide not only a minute 
account of how the tension between India and Hyderabad escalated on a daily basis, but 
also fine details such as particularly revealing turns of phrase employed by Indian 
journalists, statesmen, and military men in their dealings and reports about Hyderabad.      
Additionally, this chapter outlines the violence that was perpetrated by the 
Razakars, the Nizam’s forces, and the Nizam’s police on non-Muslims as well as poorer 
sections of society, such as landless peasants and members of the working-class, and also 
elaborates what forms of political and social resistance these groups used to respond to 
such aggression. I also describe how the Nizam’s government clamped down on such 
resistances and fiercely suppressed them. Furthermore, my sources illustrate that such 
resistances often worked across communal lines and that there were sections of Muslim 
society in Hyderabad that were against the Nizam’s misrule and Razakars’ tyranny 
 56 
 
against non-Muslims. These Muslims were, consequently, at the receiving end of the 
Razakars’ violence. And, as I will show, they also faced tremendous repression at the 
hands of the military administration established by India after it invaded Hyderabad and 
forced the Nizam to accede in September 1948. The reprisals that were carried out by 
Indians against Hyderabadi Muslims for Razakar atrocities against Hindus as well as the 
Muslim atrocities against Hindu/Sikh minorities in other parts of the subcontinent during 
Partition is denied or not acknowledged by the Indian state.  
That Partition violence was indeed a concern for Hyderabad is seen in the state’s 
official position on accession, represented in Hyderabad’s Relations with the Dominion 
of India (1948), a government publication which reprinted correspondence and speeches 
pertaining to the relations between Hyderabad and Britain, and Hyderabad and India, 
towards the end of the British Raj. Thus, the Nizam’s firman (Farsi, “decree”) of June 11, 
1947 cited Partition as his reason for being unable to accede to India. He wrote,  
The basis of the division of British India is communal. In my state, however, the  
two major communities [Muslims and Hindus] live side by side … By sending  
representatives to either of the Constituent Assemblies [of India or Pakistan],  
Hyderabad would seem to be taking one side or the other. (1)  
On September 18, 1947, he informed Lord Mountbatten (Governor-General of India – 
1947-1948)
30
 that  
                                                          
30 Much to the despair of his Prime Minister as well as the annoyance of India’s Agent-General in Hyderabad, the 
Nizam depended heavily on Mountbatten as well as Sir Walter Monckton QC, Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam and 
related to Mountbatten (Ali, Tragedy 61; Munshi 35). Hyderabadi Prime Minister Mir Laik Ali writes that the Nizam 
did not seem to realize that major decisions about free India did not lie with Mountbatten anymore, that Mountbatten 
was now working as the representative of the Indian Government, and that he (the Nizam) would now have to negotiate 
with the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel instead (62). 
Disappointed with the deadlock, Monckton left Hyderabad in frustration and returned on request several times, and 
finally helped Hyderabad draft its presentation before the UN in September 1948 (253). 
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the political effects of division of territory and government on a purely communal 
basis have become tragically clear. I am apprehensive that accession would 
introduce the same ruinous disturbance and bloodshed into my state and I am 
satisfied that it is my duty in the interests of my subjects to avoid this. (11)  
Throughout his correspondence with India as well as his firmans to his subjects, the 
Nizam stressed that Hyderabad would definitely have a “close association” (11), a 
“political relationship other than accession”31 (5) with India, and that it desired to “live in 
the closest friendship and amity with both [India and Pakistan]” (1). Hyderabad had ties 
with both India and Pakistan, as the Nizam reminded Mountbatten in a letter dated 
August 8, 1947 (3). While he emphasized that Hyderabad would cooperate with India’s 
defence and external affairs expectations, he also expressed his inability to commit to the 
exact nature of association between Hyderabad and the two new countries, for he was 
uncertain about their relationship with each other (4). He specified for the moment that in 
the case of hostility between India and Pakistan, Hyderabad would remain neutral (5, 10). 
This condition was incorporated into the Draft Heads of Agreement produced by 
Hyderabad as part of the ongoing attempts at the time between India and Hyderabad to 
come to some sort of agreement about the future relationship between the two states (12).  
The Nizam’s double bind, which was born out of the decisive divisions of 
Partition, also proceeded from his desire to hold onto political power as the hereditary 
ruler of Hyderabad. In fact, it is probable that Partition gave him the pretext to claim that 
he was in a dilemma over which country to accede to, thereby deferring accession for the 
time being. However, other contemporary sources, such as the last Hyderabadi Prime 
                                                          
31 He also reminded Mountbatten that this was an alternative open to the princely states, as specified by the Crown’s 
Memorandum of May 12, 1946 as well as the Statement of June 3, 1947, both of which were accepted by both the 
Congress and the Muslim League (5). 
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Minister Mir Laik Ali’s account Tragedy of Hyderabad (1962), testify to the communal 
anxieties that bubbled up to the surface in Hyderabad as a result of the violence that took 
place in the subcontinent in 1947. Tragedy of Hyderabad represents Ali’s perspective on 
his premiership (November 1947 – September 1948) and the events that transpired in 
Hyderabad in this period. It was published in Karachi, where Ali lived in exile after 
escaping in 1950 from house arrest by the Indian army in Hyderabad. The book was 
banned in India till September 2011 (Siasat, “Tragedy”); after the ban was lifted, it made 
it to The Hindu’s best-seller list on April 7, 2012 (“Best Sellers”). However, it is still next 
to impossible to find in popular, urban-based bookstore franchises in India such as 
Crossword or even online stores such as Flipkart.    
At the time when Mir Osman Ali Khan was Nizam of Hyderabad and Mir Laik 
Ali was his Prime Minister, there were approximately five hundred and sixty-five 
princely states in India, and the largest with an area of 82,000 square miles was the 
southern state of Hyderabad. The Muslim Nizam ruled over a feudal state which 
consisted of a majority Hindu population totalling 18.6 million in 1951. Hyderabad had 
three linguistically divided regions: Telangana, which had nine districts of Telugu 
speaking people; Marathwada, which consisted of five districts of Marathi speaking 
people; and Karnataka, which was home to three districts of Kannada speaking people 
(Stree 2; Sundarayya 7). The linguistic breakdown of the state at that time pointed to a 
forty-seven percent Telugu
32
 speaking majority, and a twelve percent Urdu speaking 
minority. However, Urdu was the only medium of instruction both at the middle and high 
school levels (Stree 7, 77; Sundarayya 7). There were few educational facilities for girls 
                                                          
32 The Andhra region was also Telugu speaking, but was under the Madras Presidency (Stree 9). The Telugu spoken in 
Telangana is different from the Telugu spoken in Andhra. It has many Urdu words and idioms and is different from the 
“purer” Sanskritized Telugu of Andhra (282). 
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(Stree 7). When Telugu medium high schools such as the Girls’ High School in 
Narayanguda emerged, they were refused affiliation to Osmania University
33
 while Urdu 
institutions were granted affiliation (2). Osmania University, established in 1919, was the 
only university in the state (7), and its medium of instruction was Urdu. Public meetings, 
literary associations, and libraries could be organized or established only with the 
government’s permission, which was rarely bestowed, and students could not join any 
political, cultural, or social organizations (Stree 7; Sundarayya 18; Reddy 12; Rao, 
Refutation 3). There were no Telugu, Marathi, or Kannada daily newspapers while there 
were five in Urdu before the breakout of the First World War (Stree 7). Not only was it 
necessary to get Cabinet approval for bringing out Telugu newspapers, but it was also 
mandatory to get its content approved (Reddy 2). Literature consisting of any anti-
colonial or anti-Nizam content was banned, and customs police not only kept an eye on 
the people but also the books that entered the state (Sundarayya 18).  
Although the Muslim population of the state was only twelve percent, the 
administrative set-up consisted of an overwhelming ninety percent majority of Muslim 
officials
34
 (Sundarayya 8). However, the communal non-representativeness of the state’s 
administrative apparatuses pales in comparison to its everyday misrule and complete 
inability to justly govern the area under its jurisdiction. At this time, ownership of land in 
Hyderabad involved ownership or control of everyone who lived on the land (Stree 3). 
Hereditary estates, called paigahs, jagirs, and samsthanams, were held by Muslims and 
Hindus who were loyal to the Nizam (4); these loyal subjects not only enjoyed land 
                                                          
33 The school was then affiliated to the Karve Women’s University in Pune (Stree 2).  
 
34 It is important to remember, however, that sweeping generalizations about the privilege of belonging to the “Muslim 
ruling class” of Hyderabad do not account for more than half of Hyderabad’s Muslim population, which was 
desperately poor and lived in both towns and villages (Smith 4; Copland 368-9).  
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revenue but also had rights over excise, forests, and fisheries, and exercised police and 
judicial functions (Stree 4; Reddy 3; Sundarayya 10). In exchange for their rights, they 
paid an annual tribute to the Nizam (4). These lands accounted for thirty percent of the 
total land in the state, while the sarf-e-khas lands, which were used by the Nizam for his 
personal expenses, constituted ten percent of Hyderabadi land. The rest were khalsa or 
diwani lands, which belonged to and were administered by the Nizam’s government 
(Stree 4; Sundarayya 9). Taxes were collected by government officials in these areas 
under the ryotwari system, and the middle-men received titles such as deshmukh, sar 
deshmukh, desai or sardesai, and became powerful landlords who came to own state land 
legally through careful manipulation of the law
35
 (Stree 5; Chakravartty 122; Sundarayya 
10-1). They cultivated these lands partly through vetti, or the forced labour of bonded 
tenants (Chakravartty 122). These upper- and middle-caste landlords controlled sixty 
percent of arable khalsa or state land in Telangana.  
Conditions were more oppressive in jagir lands, which belonged totally to 
individual landlords, than the sarf-e-khas lands, which were used by the Nizam, because 
civil courts had no jurisdiction over the privately owned jagirs; taxes were also higher in 
private jagir lands than state-owned khalsa lands (Stree 5; Sundarayya 10). There were 
also arable khalsa lands lying fallow that could easily be leased by the state to 
desperately needy cultivators, but were left uncleared and unoccupied (Stree 225). 
Furthermore, while steps were taken by the Nizam in the form of a firman to prevent 
illegal exactions by deshmukhs on khalsa lands, this was merely a “paper proclamation,” 
and exploitation continued with the active cooperation of corrupt government officials 
                                                          
35 The most powerful and cruel landlords were the Jannareddy Pratap Reddy family and Visnuru Ramachandra Reddy, 
who are known to have owned 150,000 acres and 40,000 acres of land respectively (Stree 4-5; Sundarayya 15). 
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(Sundarayya 16). Such mismanagement of resources by the state, as well as its inability 
to implement even those policies which were designed to help landless peasants, only 
aggravated the peasants’ suffering and paved the way for the mass resistance that 
followed in 1946 in Telangana.    
In fact, the worst feudal exploitation in Hyderabad was in Telangana, where 
peasants were subjected to the dehumanizing practice of vetti in both jagir as well as 
khalsa lands.
36
 Vetti included not just agricultural labour and household chores and 
errands performed in landlords’ houses, but also free “caste services” by barbers, 
washerfolk, weavers, blacksmiths, carpenters, and potters, and services rendered during 
visits by state officials to the villages (Sundarayya 12-3; Stree 5; Chakravartty 122; 
Reddy 4). While no one, not even the upper castes such as Brahmins remained unaffected 
by vetti (Reddy 4; Sundarayya 12), the groups that suffered most by this practice were the 
lower and untouchable castes of malas and madigas (Stree 5). Other marginalized 
communities that were even worse off than the lower castes were tribal communities such 
as the konda reddys, koyas, chenchus, lambadis, and banjaras in Warangal and Nalgonda 
districts; these communities were bound to landlords by bhagela, a system that tied them 
through heredity to be indebted serfs to their masters (Stree 5; Sundarayya 247). Peasants 
could work for themselves only after they had finished working in the landlords’ fields 
(Stree 6; Reddy 39). Their own crops could be confiscated by the landlords at any time 
(Stree 6). In addition to such debilitating and crushing circumstances associated with 
their livelihood, the Telangana peasants also had to contend with the molestation and 
                                                          
36 The condition of factory workers appears to have been no better. While industries were heavily subsidized and 
industrialists received large loans from the government, the workers received very low wages. Muslim employees were 
forced to turn to handicrafts such as carpet-making and hand-weaving to supplement their meagre incomes 
(Sundarayya 17). 
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sexual slavery of female peasants in landlords’ houses. Vetti included the oppressive, 
traditional practice in landlords’ houses of sending slave-girls along with brides to their 
marital homes (Sundarayya 14; Stree 3; Custers 143). Telangana women have told 
researchers that those women who protested against sexual slavery or concubinage were 
punished with gangrape and sexual torture by landlords’ goons (Stree 44-6). They also 
explained that women avoided even wearing flowers in their hair, for fear of attracting 
the landlords’ or the Razakars’ attention (46, 61, 63).   
The Razakars were a paramilitary group associated with the Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-
Muslimeen (“Council of United Muslims”; henceforth, Majlis). Although the Majlis had 
been around since 1927, it was under Bahadur Yar Jung’s presidency (1938-1944), and in 
the face of increasing Hindu-Muslim, Congress-League tensions in British India, that it 
went from being a social and cultural body to an explicitly political one (Ali, Tragedy 40-
1; Wright, “Revival” 132-3). Its slogan now became An-al-Malik (Arabic, “I am the 
king”); it propagated the theory that Asaf Jahi rule was the symbol of Muslim power in 
India and that Muslims were the legitimate rulers of Hyderabad, which, according to the 
Majlis, should remain independent and not accede to the Indian union like most other 
princely states (Reddy 9; Sundarayya 17; Ali, Tragedy 44-5). These positions were only 
affirmed further when Qasim Razvi, a practicing lawyer in the western districts of 
Hyderabad and the leader of a local branch of the Majlis (Ali, Tragedy 76), became 
President of the Majlis in 1946. 
The White Paper on Hyderabad (1948), which represented the independent Indian 
government’s official position on what became known as the Indo-Hyderabad dispute in 
1947, estimated that there were seventy thousand Razakars by the middle of 1948. Both 
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the White Paper (31) and Hyderabad’s last Prime Minister (Tragedy 68) acknowledged 
the rapid and continuing growth of the Razakars during the late 1940s. Ali claimed that 
they “were not a private army but small groups of people”37 (195), “local civil defence 
units, primarily of the Muslims,” and organized by the Majlis to fight off Indian raiders, 
who killed people and looted or destroyed property
38
 (67). On the other hand, the White 
Paper claims, in response to Hyderabad’s protests (letter from Ali to Munshi dated 
March 20, 1948, Hyderabad’s Relations 34, 44), that it was in order to prevent the 
incursions and attacks of Razakars into Indian territory that Indian troops had to be 
stationed on Indian borders with Hyderabad (28, 34-5). It also claims that the Razakars 
had access to military vehicles, proper weapons, liberal supplies of petrol, and large sums 
of money from questionable and illegal sources and that they carried out a sophisticated 
propaganda campaign against India
39
 through news dailies, magazines, and even 
Hyderabad Radio
40
 (31-2). The White Paper alleges that the Razakars, led by Razvi, 
made explosive declarations about their descent from Muslim invaders (32) and that they 
                                                          
37 The Secretary to the Indian Government made this allegation in a letter to Ali dated March 23, 1948 (Hyderabad’s 
Relations 32). India’s Agent-General K.M. Munshi also subscribed to this line of thought (Munshi 122).   
 
38 Commentators such as Clyde Eagleton agree with this assessment where the Indian raiders are concerned. Eagleton 
points out that the Razakar organization grew rapidly as danger of attack from India grew, and their intent was to 
protect Hyderabad and Muslims from border raids and invasion (76). Munshi writes that Ali told officials in Delhi, 
including Mountbatten, that the Razakars had come into play spontaneously after Hyderabadi Muslims began to feel 
endangered by India (123).    
 
39 While the White Paper’s claims about how well-organized and well-equipped the Razakars were remain 
unsubstantiated, Wilfred Cantwell Smith points out a telling fact that reveals the investment of the Nizam’s government 
in the Razakar organization: when retired Muslim officials published a protest against Razakar atrocities, they found 
themselves in trouble not only with the Razakars but also with the government (Smith 16; see also White Paper 16; 
Munshi 188). Such incidents of repression of Hyderabadi Muslims who tried to challenge the Razakars did not go 
unnoticed by the international press, and the Manchester Guardian observed that the attack on freedom by Muslim 
extremists in the state not only affected Hindus, but also “the more conciliatory Moslems” (“Hyderabad” 14 Sep. 
1948). Further evidence of this covert support is found in Ali’s account, a fact which undermines his own point that the 
Razakars had no money or were given only “a few thousand rupees” on a few occasions by the government, when he 
reveals that “the only comparatively large amount that was ever paid to the Majlis was to assist the victims of the 
border raids [allegedly by Indians], but even there it was under five hundred thousand rupees” (84). 
 
40 In turn, Hyderabad argued that India had been sustaining and reinforcing anti-Hyderabad propaganda through All-
India Radio (Ali, Tragedy 142). 
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asserted that they would soon hoist the Asaf Jahi flag on the ramparts of the Red Fort in 
Delhi, the symbolic seat of power over India (7-8, 32). The last point is confirmed by 
Ali’s account, which maintains that Razvi’s declaration to conquer Delhi did irreparable 
harm to the cause of Hyderabad’s sovereignty41 (83), and the oral account of B. Narsing 
Rao, former President of the Nizam College Students’ Union and former Chairman of the 
Communist Action Committee, which states that Razvi made the following declaration at 
a condolence meeting held in Hyderabad city after Gandhi’s assassination: “Woh din 
door nahin jabke Asafia parcham Dilli ke Lal Qile par lehraya jayega” (“The day is not 
far when the Asafia flag will be unfurled on the Red Fort of Delhi”) (DVD 9 1:31:51-
1:32:12).  
Hyderabadi communist leader Raj Bahadur Gour writes that Razvi emphasized to 
the Razakars that it was they and they alone who could save Hyderabad from India 
because they were willing to die for the cause of Hyderabadi independence (“Hyderabad” 
77, 82). After Gandhi’s assassination on January 30, 1948, Razvi pointed out to 
Hyderabadis that the assassination was the Hindu nationalist faction’s way of clearing the 
path to destroy those Muslims who had survived Partition and stayed in India (Munshi 
148). He made references in his speeches to the treatment of Muslim minorities in India 
during Partition, and urged Muslim women in Hyderabad to contemplate the fate of their 
Muslim sisters in India (143). Razvi even distanced himself and his Razakars from the 
violence they were busy perpetrating by suggesting that “communists and congressmen 
dressed as Muslims commit all the atrocities and plunder the villages. They even shout 
                                                          
41 Ali adds that when Razvi was censured in Hyderabad for this comment, he defended himself by saying that it was in 
response to an Indian minister’s declaration that the Indian tricolour will soon fly over every Hyderabadi village (83). 
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‘Alla Ho Akbar’ so that the people may be misled into believing that they are being 
attacked by Muslims” (Rahber-e-Deccan, 31 Jan. 1948, qtd in Gour, “Hyderabad” 111).  
It is also probable that Razvi greatly exaggerated the numbers of Razakars in his 
speeches and addresses (Ali, Tragedy 79), thereby contributing to the wild figures quoted 
by the Indian press. However, Ali writes that while the Razakars and their leader were 
very enthusiastic, they were not very effective in protecting Muslims in the state (79). 
This interpretation can be attributed to the inherent, divisive nature of this organization, 
which sought to violently segregate Hyderabadis along communal lines. Religious 
communal affiliation was not the only category on which solidarity was based in 
Hyderabad; there were class-based as well as political solidarities amongst those who 
wanted a democratic government in Hyderabad. Radical journalist Shoebullah Khan’s 
assassination on August 22, 1948 is only one example of the ways in which these 
affiliations amongst Hyderabadis were often crucially attacked by the Razakars, who 
were eventually unable to contribute in any productive or positive way to the political or 
social culture of Hyderabad in the 1940s.    
Gour writes that Razakars were given military training in Hyderabad city as well 
as the districts. Centres were run by retired and serving officials of the Nizam’s army and 
police
42
 (“Hyderabad” 83). Razakars were trained and armed with long sticks, steel or 
iron spears, swords, some matchlocks, and muzzle-loaders
43
 (Sundarayya 61; Ali, 
Tragedy 67-8). Unleashed amongst the Hyderabadi populace, they raped women 
(Sundarayya 65, 68, 73; Gour, “Hyderabad” 15), looted and burnt houses, forcibly 
                                                          
42 For details about how Razakars were recruited, trained, armed, and deployed, see Ali’s chapter on the subject in 
Tragedy of Hyderabad (76-87). 
 
43 For details about how the Razakars were armed by local manufacturers as well as through factories run by the Majlis, 
see Gour (83-5). 
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collected levy and excise duty, and killed people (Sundarayya 65). The Nizam’s police 
and military also tortured
44
 and raped women, especially when they came from villages 
that supported Communists by giving them food and shelter (Sundarayya 68, 148-9; Stree 
56, 61-2, 64, 137, 242). The kind of brutality that the police were involved in can be 
judged from the rape of Kankamma in Potlapadu (Suryapet taluqa). Kankamma had 
delivered a child only a few days before she was gangraped by policemen and left 
bleeding profusely and fatally (Gour, “Hyderabad” 60). Telangana women’s narratives 
also describe the mass rapes carried out by Razakars in the village of Akkirajupalli.
45
 
Women remember how uniformed Razakars came to Communist villages in carts, 
separated the men from the women, tortured and stabbed the men, tore off women’s 
marriage beads and stripped them (Stree 55, 56, 58, 62, 63).  
Moreover, male survivors of Partition in Punjab have claimed that Hindu/Sikh 
women were desperate to preserve their and their community’s “honour” and did so by 
killing themselves to avoid being raped and, consequently, “dishonoured” by Muslim 
men (Butalia, Other 163-66; Menon and Bhasin 49-56). Such assertions have also been 
made about Telangana (Chakravartty 125). But women who participated in the Telangana 
struggle emphasized that cherished social values and even relationships were suspended 
in favour of self-preservation during the brutal repression by the Razakars. Take for 
example a remark by Vajramma: “In those days when the Razakars asked us to dance 
bathkamma we danced. We stripped when they asked us to strip. In those days where was 
                                                          
44 A clear trend that emerges suggests that the police were far more wary of torturing middle-class or upper-class 
women protestors in both Hyderabad city and in the districts for fear that they may be connected to influential people 
(Stree 69, 119, 218). This bias emphasizes two things: the chokehold that nepotism had over state apparatuses in 
Hyderabad and the classed nature of the violence perpetrated by the state.  
  
45 Mass rapes were also committed in Akunuru by the police, and Padmaja Naidu set up a Congress All-Party 
Committee to inquire into these incidents after the invasion of Hyderabad by India in September 1948 (Stree 109-10; 
Reddy 44; Sundarayya 82). Many other organizations were also involved, but the inquiry was abandoned when people 
felt that the women did not want to talk about their experiences, even with other women (Stree 110). 
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the honour, where was the shame? We were all like this …” (Stree 56) When the police 
came, Vajramma says that even mothers abandoned their infant children in their cradles 
in their haste to get away (56).  
Sugunamma talks about how Razakar terror against Hindus in Bibinagar and 
Secunderabad forced many Hindus to come to the villages and how people feared that by 
raping women and looting jewellery and money, the Razakars were trying to eliminate 
the Telugu people (77). Of course, the Razakars’ chief purpose was to target non-
Muslims and undermine their majority presence and influence in Hyderabad. However, 
the conviction that they specifically wanted to eliminate Telugu-speaking Hindus arises 
from the divisive politics they played amongst the people. P.S. Sundarayya, a prominent 
leader of the Telangana struggle, describes in his book Telangana People’s Struggles and 
Its Lessons (1972) how the Razakars tried to polarize Hindus and Muslims in Pedaveedu 
and Chintalammagudem. Hindu landlords were trying to communalize an agricultural 
labour strike by refusing to issue grain to the mostly Muslim labourers in these places, 
and so the Razakars attempted to shepherd the Muslim labourers into a separate 
organization from their Hindu counterparts (70).  
Similarly, in 1946, during a raid on a village called Mallareddygudem 
(Huzurnagar taluqa), the Nizam’s military carried out terrible brutalities. They also 
separated the Muslims from the non-Muslims, taking four hundred non-Muslims as 
prisoners (Sundarayya 48). This became an opportunity for “anti-people elements in the 
village” to spread rumours that the Muslims were behind the attack and that they were 
sheltering the military in their houses. The communist village now had doubts about the 
loyalty of the Muslim villagers and sent word to its leaders to stay away until things had 
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calmed down (Sundarayya 48-9). This pointed segregation of Muslim peasants and Hindu 
peasants seems to have been a common political strategy used during the Nizam’s rule 
and, in spite of Sundarayya’s attempts to underplay it, appears to have often succeeded in 
communalizing the identities of the villagers and sowing discord between them.
46
  
However, in spite of everything, Hindu and Muslim peasants were united in the 
Telangana struggle, and this unity was a “nightmare to the bureaucrats and the landlords” 
(Sundarayya 32). Gour makes the same point about the Majlis’ often ineffectual attempts 
to mobilize Muslims extensively against Hindus (“Hyderabad” 40) and points out along 
with Sundarayya
47
 how Muslim activists, workers, peasants, rural artisans, and the rural 
poor fought against Razakars and Nizam’s police and army during demonstrations48 
(Gour, “Hyderabad” 53, 60; Sundarayya 8-9). In his article “Anti-Nizam Struggle: 
Participation of Muslims” (1972), Gulam Hyder names several Muslims in Hyderabadi 
cities as well as the rural areas who actively participated in the struggle and kept it going. 
He also points out that the Razakars were not only unable to cut much ice in villages, but 
that they also could not break the unity of the working-class and recruit new members 
from it (150).  
                                                          
46 For Gajjela Balamma, for example, who was interviewed by Stree Shakti Sanghatana, the enemy was definitively 
Muslim, and she narrates the story of how a Muslim, who had lived on the charity of the village, went and informed the 
Razakars and police about the Communist sympathies of the village. Balamma, whose infant daughter died in the 
attack that followed, concludes that “[i]t’s because the Muslims came in that such a thing happened. It was the Muslims 
who did this” (59). 
 
47 In fact, Sundarayya writes that the heroic and fatal struggle of a poor Muslim peasant called Bandagi against landlord 
Visnuru Ramachandra Reddy in the 1920s was immortalized during the Telangana struggle in the 1940s in a play 
called Ma Bhoomi (Telugu, “My Land”), which was performed by two hundred amateur Telugu performing groups 
(14). Ravi Narayan Reddy, another Telangana struggle leader, notes that after Bandagi was murdered by the landlord, 
the people built a tomb at the site of his martyrdom and visited it every year (39).    
 
48 Gour points out that in spite of the partial success the Majlis achieved in poisoning Muslim youth with communalist 
notions in order to protect the “decaying feudal regime,” the Muslim workers were united with their non-Muslim 
colleagues in their “day-to-day struggle for bread” (“Hyderabad” 108). He writes of Razakars whose views were 
transformed and who joined the struggle after they realized that the Majlis’ agenda would not address their lot (108).  
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However, this unity amongst the people does not mean that Razakar violence was 
significantly diminished by the middle years of the movement. We learn more about the 
impact of their atrocities from a political pamphlet titled Lawyers Admonish the Nizam 
(undated) and issued by the Department of Publicity, Propaganda, and Information of the 
Hyderabad State Congress (henceforth, HSC), which was formed by Ramachar and B. 
Ramakrishna Rao in July 1938 (Munshi 22). The pamphlet contains a “Declaration made 
by 99 Members of the Legal Profession in Hyderabad City Before the Chief Justice, on 
25
th
 February 1948,” in which the impact of the atrocities carried out by the Razakars is 
described in detail. The declaration points out that “while thousands have migrated out of 
the State with their families, hundreds of the poorer [sic] have sought shelter behind hills 
and jungles, leaving their homes and hamlets” (3). The lawyers, who declare themselves 
distanced from “political, communal or religious objectives” (3-4), suspended their 
practice of law in protest against conditions in the state and ask for the establishment of 
Responsible Government in Hyderabad under the Nizam
49
 (4).  
The pamphlet also consists of a “Memorial submitted to the Nizam by the 
Pleaders Protest Committee on the 5
th
 April 1948,” which lists the HSC and the Majlis as 
“two divergent and opposite camps drifting poles apart” (6). According to the committee, 
the HSC wanted Hyderabad to accede to India and the Majlis did not (6). It noted that 
“[a]s it is, the loose talk of possible war with Indian Union and the highly provocative 
propaganda in the local press, platform and radio have created a thick mask of prejudice 
outside and panic inside the State” (8). Furthermore, the Majlis had not only helped 
                                                          
49 The Communist Party’s own position on this was that the first step towards full responsible government and 
(simultaneously) an intermediate step towards dissolving the state and reconstituting three states along linguistic lines 
would be an Interim government based on a joint executive council consisting of fifty percent Majlis representatives 
and fifty percent State Congress, or Andhra Mahasabha, Maharashtra Parishad, and Kannada Parishad representatives. 
These would transfer power to elected representatives after the war. But all the other democratic parties were opposed 
to this suggestion and wanted the immediate break-up of the state (Sundarayya 27). 
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develop “an unreal sense of racial superiority among the Muslims in general,” it had also 
produced out of them the “fascist” Razakars (9) who, “[i]n the name of helping the 
Government to maintain peace and order,” had joined hands with the police and burnt 
and looted hundreds of villages.
50
 Such means of suppressing the uprising were justified 
by the Majlis as jihad or “just war,” states the memorial (9). Majlis office-bearers51 were 
reported to have participated in raids conducted by Razakars (9). Attacks by Razakars 
and police were not limited to the borders but also took place in the interiors. Normal life 
had ceased, and while those who had means migrated, those who did not were “leading 
[a] precarious existence, sleeping in fields or the jungles” (10).  
Ali’s own account estimates that between fifty to sixty thousand Hindus fled 
Hyderabad after having suffered Razakar attacks (81). Gour also writes that Razakar 
attacks created a panic that engulfed Hyderabad city and dislocated the social and 
economic fabric of the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. For example, 
transport staff could not come to work and only six out of thirty double decker buses 
could travel between Hyderabad and Secunderabad (“Hyderabad” 70). The debilitating 
impact of Razakar activities on businesses and middle-class professions in the city 
centres resulted in large scale migrations of upper- and middle-class Hyderabadi Hindus 
to neighbouring Indian union provinces in 1947; thousands poured out of the state (Gour, 
“Hyderabad” 70; Smith 19; Munshi 1, 137). And no less than thirty thousand people, 
mostly from the working- and lower middle-classes, whose lives and possessions were at 
                                                          
50 Telangana women’s narratives confirm these instances of arson and state that these incidents led the women and their 
families to join the Communist Party and retaliate (Stree 47). Forced migration, arson, looting, and murder by Razakars 
are also attested to in the White Paper (32-3). For extensive details on Razakar atrocities in the villages, see the 
resignation letter and report written by J.V. Joshi, a Minister in the Hyderabad Government, attached as an appendix in 
the White Paper (52-7). 
  
51 Gour claims that Razvi himself commanded the perpetration of crimes by his Razakars (“Hyderabad” 106).  
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the receiving end of Razakar violence, took shelter in Bolarum, where Indian forces were 
stationed (Gour, “Hyderabad” 70). The striking lawyers added that the Government had 
been telling the world that the complaints and inquiries which confirmed violence and 
brutality were nothing but lies and propaganda. Even protests, publication of facts, 
resignations of legislators, non-cooperation of lawyers, and strikes by merchants were 
being described as political stunts.
52
 The Memorial warned that if the Razakars were not 
disbanded soon, there was risk of “a fratricidal war without any hope of reconciliation 
whatsoever in the near future” (10).    
The Razakars provoked angry reactions in Indian newspapers and public culture. 
Thus, in May 1948, the British Information Services press report notes that Hindustan 
Times, Pioneer and Indian Express all prominently and “conspicuously” featured 
Razakar violence in and around Hyderabad (“Extract from Daily Press Summary, British 
Information Services dated 13
th
 May, 1948”). Wilfred Cantwell Smith writes that these 
reports were often exaggerated and in many cases fabricated. In an atmosphere already 
highly communally charged, their effect was provocative (18). Ali credits the Indian 
press with the “extensive though negative publicity” of the Razakars and writes that it 
gave them the limelight and importance they needed (Tragedy 76, 81). In fact, part of 
Razvi’s strategy to instil awe of Muslims in Hindu minds appears to have been to certify 
the exaggerated stories in Indian newspapers (85). Amongst many such occasions (179-
80, 186, 211-14), Ali writes about one when the Hindustan Times published a front-page 
headline about a “Hyderabad Weapons Week” that featured the Razakars on parade and 
reproduced the gist of an inflammatory, communal speech allegedly made by Razvi 
                                                          
52 Munshi too writes that he encountered great difficulties in authenticating reports about Razakar violence, owing to 
the influence of the Razakars and the interference of the Nizam’s government (82-4). 
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(111). This report obviously incensed Delhi and all its political quarters, until it was 
proven false (112). In any case, the organized publicity given to the Razakars in Indian 
newspapers became an important factor in the Indian government’s approach towards 
Hyderabad, because it hyped the abilities and activities of the Razakars (86). Thus, even 
though the report was proved false, according to Ali, the Hindustan Times feature did 
significant damage to Indo-Hyderabad relations (112). There was also a great deal of 
confusion, with both sides constantly denying each other’s accusations and reports. For 
example, the Evening Times reported on May 20 that, according to New Delhi Radio, 
there was a second train attack in Hyderabad following one on a mail train in which nine 
were reportedly injured. The second attack had no casualties but approximately ₤250 
worth of property was looted. The Hyderabad Government spokesperson had said that the 
first incident had occurred because of an argument between drunks, and a statement was 
released which denied that train passengers were killed and women and children abducted 
when a Madras-Bombay train was attacked at Changapur, Hyderabad. The statement 
adds that, prior to the Changapur incident, six Hyderabadi Muslim passengers were 
attacked at Dudni, the first railway station in Indian territory adjoining the Gulbarga 
district (“New Train Attack”). Hence, there were considerable offensive and defensive 
thrusts between the Indians and the Hyderabadis over the Razakars and the law and order 
situation in Hyderabad.  
However, even though the Press exacerbated the situation by excessively 
sensationalizing it, oppression by the Razakars, the Nizam’s police, the Nizam’s army, 
and above all, feudal landlords, was a pervasive reality for the Hindu as well as Muslim 
peasantry and working classes of Hyderabad. It was in revolt against such a system of 
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oppression that the Telangana peasantry rose. The leadership and ideological bent of the 
peasants’ struggle came from the Communist Party, which had been banned in 1939. In 
1940, the banned Party was working through the Andhra Maha Sabha (“Great Andhra 
Assembly”; henceforth, AMS), which was originally conceived of as the Andhra Jana 
Sangham (“Andhra People’s Organization”) and established in 1921 by Madapati 
Hanumanth Rao (Stree 7). Working covertly, the Party wanted to develop the AMS as “a 
fighting all-in-united front organisation” of the people in Telangana53 (Sundarayya 20). In 
1942, the ban on the Communist Party was lifted and all Party workers started working 
openly (19), although they still chose to work through the AMS (Stree 11). In 1945, the 
AMS held its eighth and last session in Khammam, and it called on the people to struggle 
actively and overthrow the autocratic Nizam and the oppressive feudal system 
(Sundarayya 21; Stree 12). It was at this point that the character of the organization 
became openly political (Reddy 19).   
The Telangana Armed Struggle proper (1946-1951), which at its height involved 
three million people in three thousand villages (Stree 3; Sundarayya 2), is said to have 
been triggered when Chaityala Ailamma of Palakurthi succeeded in retaining her land 
and crop in the face of force by landlord Visnuru Ramachandra Reddy. Her resistance 
generated support from other villagers and Sangham (local branch of the AMS) 
volunteers in large numbers, and they protected her property from being stolen (Stree 11; 
Sundarayya 35-6, 329; Reddy 41; Chakravartty 126-7). Another important incident in the 
early phase of the movement was when the lambadas in Mundrai resisted attempts by the 
                                                          
53 Sundarayya writes that, thus far, the AMS had recommended constitutional, administrative, and educational reforms, 
but had not gone to the extent of mobilizing people in a political struggle. Nevertheless, it had successfully been “a 
focal point for the rising democratic aspirations of the people” (19) and had given “an organisational form to the 
people’s resentment against the autocratic rule of the Nizam and their anger at the deprivation of even simple liberties” 
(Stree 10). 
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landlord to illegally occupy their lands (Stree 11; Reddy 41). Finally, there was Doddi 
Komarayya, a village Sangham leader who was killed by Ramachandra Reddy’s men in 
Kadavendi (Jangaon taluqa) in July 1946 as he led thousands of people against the 
landlord (Stree 36; Sundarayya 36; Reddy 42). Komarayya’s death was seen as 
martyrdom (Sundarayya 36), and slogans testifying to his immortality as “Amarjeevi” 
(Sanskrit, literally “immortal(ly)-living”) and songs about Ailamma’s struggle became 
narrative rallying points for the uprising. The movement greatly intensified after 
Komarayya’s death when many more outraged people joined it, and a people’s court was 
elected by thousands to try the culprits (Sundarayya 36-9; Reddy 42-3; Stree 12). 
Besides poor peasants, the rich and middle-class peasantry, who also faced 
landlord oppression in some form or the other, joined the struggle (Stree 6). In addition to 
peasants, there were some rich landlords who supported the peasant uprising against the 
Nizam (102, 189). The anti-feudal agrarian programme of the Communist Party consisted 
of mobilizing people to refuse to perform vetti or deliver forced grain levies. People were 
also motivated by Party workers to prevent illegal exactions and to seize, occupy, and 
cultivate the state’s khalsa lands and waste lands illegally controlled by landlords. They 
also grabbed and redistributed the landlords’ grain stocks and burnt landlords’ and 
moneylenders’ records and promissory notes. There was a call for fair rent for tenants, 
fair wages for agricultural workers, and the abolition of exorbitant interest on grain and 
loans given by the landlords to peasants (Sundarayya 58; Chakravartty 124; Reddy 40-1; 
Gour, “Hyderabad” 26).  
In the early days of the Telangana struggle, landlords would send their men to 
usurp land and steal the peasants’ produce. But when the peasants’ resistance grew 
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stronger, the landlords brought in armed police (Sundarayya 29). It was to defend the 
people against the police and its increasing repression that armed guerilla squads were 
organised across the state by the Communist Party (working through the AMS) at the 
district, zonal (taluqa), and village levels (Sundarayya 40, 65; Reddy 47, 50). These 
squads were led by village people’s committees (Chakravartty 124) and were given 
elementary training in field-craft, handling small arms, use of explosives for mining and 
bomb-making, and tactics about attacking enemy targets. They armed themselves with 
whatever they had and, with the sanction of the Politburo, began to seize fire-arms 
(sporting guns, muzzle-loaders, revolvers, and rifles) from willing or unwilling landlords 
and officials (Sundarayya 40, 63-4; Stree 239). These guerilla squads restricted and 
resisted the Razakars and police, attacked and destroyed police camps,
54
 protected the 
people, carried out propaganda in villages, and found and seized weapons (Sundarayya 
66-9). At the height of the struggle, the people built an army of ten thousand village 
squad members and about two thousand regular guerilla squads to defend themselves 
against the Razakars and the Nizam’s police (Stree 2).  
Sundarayya estimates that although exact details such as names and villages are 
uncertain, and the truth of numbers is “sought to be suppressed by the authorities” (viii), 
there were about four thousand
55
 people killed, fifty thousand beaten, tortured, and 
terrorised by the Nizam’s police and armed forces (and later the Indian police and armed 
forces) as well as landlords from 1946 to 1951 (viii, 1). He argues that the anti-Nizam 
movement did not grow in the cities the way it did in the villages because there was little 
                                                          
54 Sundarayya writes that constant attacks by guerillas on police camps, which were usually situated in landlords’ 
houses, ensured that the police lived in perpetual fear, and the raids on villages decreased significantly (103). 
 
55 According to Sundarayya, other calculations fix this number as closer to six thousand (viii). His own history of the 
Telangana movement is based on “factual material contained in reports, that were received from different area 
organisers of the Telangana struggle … and also on the basis of personal experiences” (5).  
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industrialization in the cities (and, therefore, few workers) and a largely middle- and 
upper-class intelligentsia that tended to sympathize with the Nizam and the landlords 
(136). In fact, Sundarayya writes, the cities became bases for the enemy’s military and 
police operations and also harboured exiled landlords and their agents (136). While it is 
true that the Razakars carried out raids from their city centres, Gour’s account as well as 
Hyder’s account paint a picture of the people’s struggle in the cities that is very different 
from Sundarayya’s report of the same. They state that there was a consistent resistance 
against the Nizam’s government, the arms of the state, as well as the Razakars, that was 
launched by students and workers in the cities; this political mobilization was nourished 
by specific programs designed to keep the movement going and different trade, students’, 
and women’s organizations connected and united (Gour, “Hyderabad” 27; Chakravartty 
124). Hyder writes that in cities and industrial centres such as Hyderabad, Secunderabad, 
Aurangabad, Nanded, Warangal, Gulbarga, and Shahabad, “trade-union activity was 
touching ever new heights” (145), and the All-Hyderabad Trade Union Congress was 
formed in August 1946 (146). Strikes in July 1947 by textile workers, cement workers, 
municipal workers, students, and farmers in towns and cities across the state plagued the 
Nizam’s government (Gour, “Hyderabad” 7). Sundarayya does concede that the few 
Communist cadres in Hyderabad, Warangal, and the mining areas were very important 
because they helped purchase and supply to guerilla squads writing and duplicating 
paper, medicines,
56
 essential items, and some arms and ammunition (300, 136). It was not 
easy to gain access to and deliver such supplies to communist cadres and guerilla squads, 
and things often became difficult for the movement in the rural areas because vital things 
                                                          
56 For an account of how medical aid was organized and rendered during the struggle, see B.S. Paranjpe’s “Medical 
Work in the Telengana Armed Struggle” (1973). 
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such as medicine supplies had to be procured from the Indian Union when it was not 
possible to get them from Hyderabadi cities. City contacts also helped to organize 
underground offices from where contact could be maintained with neighbouring fighting 
regions. This was very expensive and also dangerous, and underground centres were 
blown up repeatedly, and Communist cadres were arrested, tortured, and shot (136-7).       
Stree Shakti Sanghatana’s We Were Making History: Life Stories of Women in the 
Telangana People’s Struggle (1989) takes into account the role of women in the struggle. 
This role has been either ignored or assigned peripheral space in accounts by communist 
leaders, both male and female. So, Renu Chakravartty, in her admirably detailed and 
comparative account titled Communists in Indian Women’s Movement: 1940-1950 (1980) 
cites examples of Telangana women confronting the enemy as exceptional and 
astonishing instances of women’s initiative. Most of her examples and analysis reveal her 
uncritical conception of women’s main role in the struggle as merely assisting or 
supporting men
57
 (125, 127, 129). AMS, Congress, and Harijan leader Ravi Narayan 
Reddy also consigns women to a supportive role in the struggle in his Heroic Telangana: 
Reminiscences and Experiences (1973). Sundarayya’s account is more promising, for he 
acknowledges that women had participated “equally along with the men” in the struggle 
(126). He points out that they were elected to village committees (126-7) and highlights 
instances such as the labour strikes in twenty villages in Khammam district in the latter 
phase of the struggle, where “women labourers were in the forefront and went 
independently on strike,” influencing other villages that also struck (259). He dedicates 
an entire chapter to women, in which, in addition to providing detailed accounts of 
                                                          
57 An example of her short-sightedness is that she fails to appreciate the nature of the problematic reasoning put forth 
by the Communist Party leadership whenever it refused to allow large numbers of women to join guerilla squads 
because they were women (130). 
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gendered violence against women by state apparatuses, he also points out new political 
roles that women played, as fighters, orators, and propagandists. His account is valuable 
because it is a critical account by a prominent leader of the struggle about women’s 
participation as well as women’s limitations in the struggle, owing to gender 
discrimination on the part of the Communist Party leadership.
58
   
  We Were Making History is a vital and unique book because it not only presents 
the perspective of specific heroines of the struggle such as Mallu Swarajyam or 
Acchamamba
59
 but also remembers those who belonged to the “prehistory of the 
movement” (260) and conveys “a sense of the pain, the isolation, the courage, the 
ingenuity, the creative brilliance of their lives” (27). Significantly, Stree Shakti 
Sanghatana discovered from the women it interviewed that the demand that women 
should join the movement in large numbers came from women themselves and that the 
Party did not encourage it
60
 (265). Testimonies by women express bewilderment over the 
fact that they were trained in self-defence, but were never “expected or allowed” (215) to 
                                                          
58 For example, while the Party promoted widow remarriage (Sundarayya 144), women’s education (Stree 144), the 
right of women to divorce (192-3), and interfered in cases of known domestic violence amongst its cadres (152), its 
active stance nevertheless often went against the interests of women on questions such as sexual harassment (87, 163), 
unplanned pregnancies (265-6), and pressure from husbands and families to return to traditional roles and expectations 
(102, 231, 263). This was done in order to not alienate mass opinion against the Party (72, 93-4, 263). By not radically 
questioning such premises that ultimately determined women’s lives, the Party failed to see that women had the right to 
choose between family and political life and, therefore, the question of whether or not it was “right” to take women 
away from their families was unfounded (269). Many women felt betrayed as social reform swiftly took a backseat in 
the struggle on the Party’s pretext that fighting against class oppression was a more urgent concern (236, 240, 245). 
They felt isolated because they were discouraged on disciplinary grounds from speaking to or supporting other women 
with similar gender-related problems (90, 102, 244). They also felt that the Party leadership had let them down by 
encouraging them to imagine a world where freedom, independence, and equality would be their due rights, but failing 
to deliver on those promises even on its own turf (71, 72, 89, 102, 103, 252). For more on these points, besides We 
Were Making History, see Vasantha Kannabiran and K. Lalitha’s theorization of women as the “small voices” in 
Telangana historiography (1989), and Ranajit Guha’s review of their article in “The Small Voice of History” (1997).  
 
59 This Acchamamba was named after Dr. Acchamamba, who was not only a prominent member of the Andhra Mahila 
Sangham (“Andhra Women’s Assembly”) but also went on to become a key figure in organizing medical aid and 
facilities during the movement. Her house was a hub for progressive political and literary figures (Stree 9).    
 
60 The fact that there were relatively few women in the movement is explained away by Party leaders in terms of the 
“traditional backwardness” of women (Stree 262). In this way, the Party not only failed to realize that consciously 
politicizing the gender aspect of the struggle would usher in a new, progressive philosophy, but as a consequence also 
made it difficult for women to survive politically (264). 
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participate in confrontational situations such as violent protests and guerilla warfare
61
 
(199). They say that it was assumed that they would fall behind or get caught by the 
enemy if they did participate. In spite of this, in Hyderabad city, Brij Rani Gour 
organized men and women to keep the Razakars away from residential localities, and 
both men’s squads and women’s squads kept a vigil at night (199). The assumption that 
women would be unable to physically cope with guerilla warfare is disproved by women 
such as Venkatamma, who dressed in men’s clothes and fought with hand grenades (Stree 
51-2; Sundarayya 348-9), and Nagamma, a fierce fighter who overtook her husband 
amidst great patriarchal criticism to attain the rank of squad commander (Stree 243-4). 
There were other armed guerilla fighters too, such as Rangamma (Sundarayya 245); there 
were also couriers such as Savitramma (346) and suppliers such as the koya girl 
Budemma (350). Many women also became part of the cultural squads of the Communist 
Party, composing, reinventing, and performing old and new songs and plays
62
 that spoke 
of class and gender justice and equality
63
 (48). In this process, regional genres of poetry 
and drama such as burrakatha and golla suddulu (shepherd’s tales) were performed on a 
large scale (Reddy 46). Women also travelled to different villages, trained and educated 
                                                          
61 Swarajyam points out that unless women had run away from home, they were not allowed to be part of the guerilla 
squads (Stree 241). We do not know the reason behind this logic because she does not elaborate on this further. 
Moreover, we know of female guerilla fighters such as Nagamma, who were not runaways.  
 
62 These performing traditions that mixed performing arts with political propaganda flourished and were met with great 
success, not only in Telangana but also in the cotemporaneous Tebhaga movement (Chakravartty 19-20). An example 
of how well-known some of these traditions became is seen in the case of Moturi Udayam, a greatly admired Telugu 
singer in the Party, who sang a song about Hitler and Stalin in front of Jawaharlal Nehru. She also performed in a 
burrakatha at the All-India Women’s Conference in Tenali in front of Soviet visitors who took photographs of the 
production and displayed them in Moscow (196).  
 
63 In doing so, they drew on the narrative resources that were available to them as women who were either unlettered or 
possessed limited formal education. Then, and now, when their stories and testimonies emerge in We Were Making 
History, they narrate a specific women’s history of the struggle through songs, anecdotes, and storytelling, with 
different linguistic registers and literary strategies such as metaphors, similes, and hyperbole (28). 
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other women in housekeeping, childcare, and workers’ rights,64 and persuaded people 
that they could trust the communists (Stree 66, 68, 141). Pramila Mahendra informs us 
that this training of women by female communist cadres also took place in Hyderabad 
city (101). Women in both Hyderabad city and the rural areas used creative strategies 
drawn from familiar domestic life to defend and protect themselves and others from the 
enemy. For example, they armed themselves with pounding sticks, chilli powder (Stree 
12), stones, and boiling water (Sundarayya 40). Chilli powder in particular emerges as a 
common weapon used not only by the enemy as a means of torture (Stree 50; Sundarayya 
35, 41), but also by the insurgents themselves against Razakars (Stree 56, 67) and police 
(Stree 242; Gour, “Hyderabad” 39) and, later, Congress workers (Stree 192). In addition 
to this, purdah became a means by which women hid and transported not only weapons 
but also male colleagues (Stree 120, 175, 234; Sundarayya 80). In one case, purdah was 
combined with the taboo of menstruation (believed to be a state of “pollution”), and a 
hunted male squad leader was saved by being dressed up as a girl by the women, who 
pretended that “she” had to be sequestered because she had reached puberty (Sundarayya 
245).  
In addition to the Telangana struggle, women also participated in Hyderabadi 
social and political life in the 1940s through other organizations which were part of the 
anti-Nizam and, later, anti-Congress struggles. The growing Hindu intelligentsia as well 
as a thriving business and industrial community in early twentieth century Hyderabad had 
seen to the nourishment of the political consciousness of many middle-class 
                                                          
64 Many women who performed vetti were not allowed to go home to breastfeed their babies. They were told that they 
could squeeze the milk out on the bunds and send it home through a shared babysitter, but that they would not be 
allowed to go home. The Party workers involved in training and educating these women stressed that they must insist 
on their right to go home and feed their children (Stree 68, 237).   
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Hyderabadis
65
 (Stree 8). In spite of the odds, the end of the nineteenth century had 
witnessed a cultural revival in Hyderabad state. Ganesh Chaturthi was first publicly 
celebrated in 1895, and the first Telugu library was opened in 1901 (7). Vaman Naik 
formed the first Congress committee in Hyderabad in 1918 (7). Marathi and Kannada 
educational societies were formed and schools were opened (7). In 1921, books on the 
history of the Telugu people were published by the Andhra Jana Sangham, which 
renamed itself the AMS in 1928 (Stree 7-8; Sundarayya 19). Telugu newspapers such as 
Nilagiri Patrika and Golconda Patrika began to appear (Stree 7-8). Telugu medium girls’ 
schools such as the Andhra Balika High School, established in 1928, began to come up 
(8). Maharashtra Parishad and Karnataka Parishad were established in 1937 to look after 
the concerns of Marathi and Kannada speakers respectively (8). At a time when it was 
unthinkable for upper- and middle-class Muslim and Hindu women to speak publicly, 
reformist women’s organisations such as the All-India Women’s Conference (1927) and 
the Andhra Mahila Sabha (1930) were founded (8). The Navjivan Mahila Mandal, which 
consisted of two thousand Hindi speaking members from different economic classes and 
political affiliations, and also contributed active members such as Pramila Mahendra, Brij 
Rani Gour, Sarju Behen, and Yasoda Behen to the left movement, was established in 
Hyderabad in 1937 (8). There were also some women in the Congress (97). However, 
                                                          
65 A prominent member of the Hyderabadi intelligentsia was Dr. Aghorenath Chattopadhyaya, father of poet and 
Congress leader Sarojini Naidu (1879-1949). Chattopadhyaya was twice deported from the Nizam’s dominions for his 
endorsement of swadeshi and other radical political and social movements in Hyderabad (Paranjpe, Sarojini vii). His 
house was a hub of “intellectual adventurism and free thinking” (viii). Naidu’s own distinguished career as a Congress 
politician is marked by a puzzling lack of direct participation in Hyderabad’s democratic struggles. This dissonance can 
probably be understood in terms of the fact that she was a pet of both Nizam VI, who gave her a scholarship that 
enabled her father to send her to study in England (viii), as well as Nizam VII. She wrote two poems dedicated to 
Nizam VI: “Ode to the Nizam” (1905) and “Ya Mahbub” (1911). The latter is a funeral lament written as a tribute to 
Nizam VI after his death. Makarand Paranjpe suggests that Naidu may have tactfully decided to involve herself in 
politics outside Hyderabad in order to remain in the good books of Nizam VII (xviii). Naidu also preferred to live and 
work in British India because there was no literary circle in Hyderabad for Indian writers who wrote in English (xxiv, 
xxv).   
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Pramila Mahendra observes that there were very few Muslim women who attended 
meetings of the Andhra Mahila Sabha or the Navjivan Mahila Mandal in Hyderabad
66
 
(99). 
Furthermore, there were other political establishments such as the Arya Samaj, 
which was established in 1892 (Stree 7) to respond to ruling Muslim class hegemony and 
look after Hindu interests. Significantly, Sundarayya marks the rise of the Arya Samaj as 
the point when the anti-Nizam struggle became organized on communal lines (8). Reddy 
emphasizes that the Anjuman-e-Tabligh-ul-Islam, which was supported by the Nizam in 
its drive to convert Dalits and other marginalized and disillusioned Hyderabadi non-
Muslim groups to Islam,
67
 and the Arya Samaj, which responded by converting Muslims 
to Hinduism through its shuddhi sabhas (“purification assemblies”), were the two 
organizations that contributed to the polarization of Hindus and Muslims in the state (8-
9). Both were subsequently banned by the Nizam’s government (9).   
                                                          
66 Of the few that we know who were politically visible in Hyderabad, Princess Durreshehwar and Princess Niloufer, 
who were in the Nizam’s government, are examples (Stree 97). Remarkable examples of prominently political Muslim 
women are the sisters Jamalunnisa Baji and Razia Begum. Middle-class Urdu-speaking women, they attended meetings 
of the Progressive Writers’ Association. They stopped observing purdah during World War II, and then launched a 
movement against it (173). They were labelled kafirs (“unbelievers”) for supporting and wearing only indigenous 
swadeshi cotton textiles (172). They also started a magazine called Tameer and published short stories in the Osmania 
journal (172). They attended the Hindi conference in Lucknow, sympathized with the Quit India Movement, supported 
the nationalist struggle, hoisted red flags, and finally joined the Communist Party in 1946. During the struggle against 
the Nizam and after the ban on the Communist Party, they stored arms and sheltered comrades who had gone 
underground (174), in spite of being threatened by the Razakars (Chakravartty 134). They even hosted all-India 
communist leaders such as A.K. Gopalan, who had come to Hyderabad to visit leaders of the struggles in Hyderabad 
city and Telangana (135). They held clandestine meetings of the Progressive Writers’ Association in their homes (Stree 
175; Chakravartty 134). Makhdoom Mohiuddin, the renowned communist and Progressive poet and leader, went 
underground, but still held classes for political activists in their house (Chakravartty 134-5).  
 
67 Reddy (9) and the Stree Shakti Sanghatana researchers (11) situate this particular drive to convert non-Muslims to 
Islam within a ruling class anxiety about the numerical minority of Muslims in Hyderabad. Ali writes that he took great 
pains to impress upon Gandhi that Hyderabadi Muslims were an insecure minority by the 1940s, and that migration of 
Muslims into the state would not only resolve their problems but also that of Muslims in the Southern Provinces (117-
8). 
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In spite of the ban on Indian national leaders from entering Hyderabad
68
 (Stree 7), 
many young Hyderabadis had participated in Salt Satyagraha and other anti-colonial 
non-cooperation movements in British India in 1930-1932 and had even courted arrest 
and gone to jail. They brought this political consciousness back to Hyderabad with them 
(Sundarayya 19; Reddy 6). The first satyagraha in Hyderabad took place in 1938. 
Satyagrahis were arrested by the Nizam’s police, and the HSC was banned and remained 
banned till 1946
69
 (Reddy 24-5, 29). In June 1947, the HSC passed a resolution 
“expressing the twin Congress demands of accession to the Indian union and 
establishment of responsible government under the aegis of the Nizam”70 (Gour, 
“Hyderabad” 3). While the HSC raised a slogan that promoted the merger of Hyderabad 
with India, the Communist Party took this further by advocating not only abolition of the 
Nizamate and unification with an Indian people’s state, but also the dissolution of the 
state along linguistic lines
71
 (Sundarayya 57). Swami Ramanand Tirth, who was elected 
                                                          
68 Regardless, Gandhi made his way to Hyderabad city in 1934 to inaugurate a khadi bhandar in the city to help raise 
funds for the Harijan Sevak Sangh. Despite obstacles, he managed to raise twenty thousand rupees for the cause (Reddy 
8). 
 
69 Reddy writes that after their release in early 1939, the first batch was summoned by Gandhi to Wardha. Gandhi 
insisted that the Hyderabad satyagraha be put down, because he was convinced that it was communalist in character 
and, therefore, made the HSC comparable to other organizations in Hyderabad such as the rabid Arya Samaj and the 
Hindutva organization the Hindu Mahasabha (27). Ali’s account informs us that the HSC’s satyagraha was carried out 
arm-in-arm with the Hindu Mahasabha and the Arya Samaj (32-3). Furthermore, the Arya Samajis and Hindu 
Mahasabhaites were trying (in vain) to help the HSC by smuggling in satyagrahis from British India (Reddy 26-7). 
Crediting the HSC with dividing the people (35), Ali also writes that the 1938 satyagraha created communalist feelings 
amongst people in border areas, particularly in the western districts near Bombay, and that Muslim lives and property 
were attacked as a result (34). For an analysis of the 1938 satyagraha and a markedly different assessment of the 
communal tensions in pre-accession Hyderabad, see Ian Copland’s “‘Communalism’ in Princely India: The Case of 
Hyderabad, 1930-40” (1993).  
 
70 The HSC also echoed the Indian (Congress) government’s claim that no matter whether they were Hindus or 
Muslims, the people of Hyderabad were from the same stock as their brothers in India, and the barriers that had been 
created to isolate them were artificial political barriers (Gour, “Hyderabad” 3). The Andhra Prabha, the leading Telugu 
daily published from Madras, also editorially expressed similar views about “our brothers in Hyderabad” (30 Nov. 
1947, qtd in Gour, “Hyderabad” 78). 
 
71 In fact, Sundarayya writes that the Telangana struggle played a significant role in the subsequent reorganisation of 
Indian states on linguistic lines, inspiring the struggle that led to the formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956 and forcing 
the ruling Congress leadership to “demolish the unprincipled and arbitrary division of the country made by the former 
British rulers” (3). 
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President of the HSC in 1947 (Ali, Tragedy 37), organized a second satyagraha. 
Satyagraha centres were established in Hyderabad, Madhira, and Aurangabad (26). 
Communists collaborated with the HSC during this period and held joint meetings and 
discussions with its workers. They unfurled both the HSC and communist flags together 
and supported the HSC’s satyagraha by participating in demonstrations and picketing 
(Sundarayya 56-7); boycotting colleges, schools, and courts; and recruiting students to 
the AMS (Reddy 49; Sundarayya 57). They supported the HSC’s practice of breaking 
customs barriers along the state border by destroying official records at customs posts 
(Reddy 49; Sundarayya 57; Munshi 58).  
However, because of the spread and increase of Razakar terror, a large number of 
people, “especially from the rich top sections,” left for Union territory (Sundarayya 59). 
Gour writes that HSC satyagraha camps and squads also left and established themselves 
on the borders, from where they started counter-raids into Hyderabadi territory 
(“Hyderabad” 109-10). Gour condemns the HSC, particularly its leaders, such as Tirth, as 
well as the Indian Congress, its parent organization, for refusing to cooperate with the 
people’s struggle against the Nizam in Hyderabad (7, 8, 29-30, 112, 118). Referring to 
the forced accession of Hyderabad to India in 1948, after which the deposed Nizam still 
retained his wealth and was made Rajpramukh of Hyderabad, Gour condemns both the 
HSC and the Congress for compromising with the feudal princes (79). Sundarayya points 
out that while there were some “militant and honest members” (59) of the Congress who 
remained behind to fight the Nizam and the Razakars alongside the communists and 
AMS workers, the only significant contribution of HSC leaders was to fight a press battle 
against the Hyderabadi government from Bombay and Madras (150). Thus, in the 
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Congress’ refusal to work hand in hand with the Communist Party and the AMS, and the 
unwillingness of the HSC to stand their ground in Hyderabad and fight against the 
Nizam, we see that the Congress party, which claimed to empathize with and represent 
the democratic aspirations of Hyderabadis, largely left the people to their own devices 
and preferred to protest and play politics from the sidelines.
72
   
Many Hindu students boycotted Osmania University after it banned the song 
“Vande Mataram” and went to other institutions such as Shantiniketan in Bengal (Stree 
99, 9). This Hindu nationalist song propagated the idea of the elimination of Muslims 
from the Motherland that was India and was hugely controversial in British India. Yet the 
fact that the Hindu students’ demand for their right to be able to sing this song was 
backed up by Progressive Muslim students shows that many Hindu and Muslim students 
in Hyderabad were united in spite of differences and launched a concentrated resistance 
against the Nizam’s misrule. Such Muslim students joined the new Comrades’ 
Association (1938-1944), which not only functioned as a platform for communists while 
the Party was first under ban (1939-1942),
73
 but also contributed active members to the 
Telangana movement (Stree 9; Hyder 140). Prominent members included Makhdoom 
Mohiuddin (1908-1969), the Progressive poet and revolutionary, and Gour (Reddy 30). 
The All-Hyderabad Students’ Union (AHSU), which actively participated in the struggle 
against the Nizam and later the oppressive Indian military government that replaced it, 
was founded in 1939; at a time when purdah restrictions succeeded in holding back many 
                                                          
72 In fact, the landlord-dominated, bourgeois leadership of the Congress went out of its way to crush the people’s 
struggle. In 1945, communists were formally expelled from the Congress under pressure from Vallabhbhai Patel 
(Reddy 29). To remain in the Congress, people were required to give up their Communist Party membership. 
Chandragupta Chaudhary argues that Gandhi was against this move, but his views were ignored (131). Sundarayya 
writes that this decision was motivated by the Congress’s conviction that the communists had tried to undermine the 
anti-colonial struggle by siding with the British during World War II (39). 
 
73 The Party was banned again in November 1946 by the Nizam. Prominent leaders, who were in any case 
underground, fled Hyderabad city and operated out of Vijayawada (Reddy 46). 
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upper- and middle-class Muslim and Hindu women, the AHSU boasted three women 
members (Stree 10).  
At this time, there was a proliferation of progressive literature in Hyderabad in the 
form of newspapers such as Payam and Rayyat (9). Niaz Fatehpuri’s Nigar was banned 
by the Nizam (Hyder 138-39), as was Qazi Abdulghaffar’s Payam (147). In addition to 
these newspapers, the Hyderabadi people’s resistance and the subversive activities of 
students were also reported, supported, and promoted by other newspapers that attacked 
the Nizam’s misrule and criticized the Razakars’ oppression. These were Shoebullah 
Khan’s Imroze, and Syed Hasan’s Taj (edited by “Maikash” and Husaini Shahid). Taj 
was known not only for its prominently placed reports about the Telangana struggle, but 
also because it published Maikash’s poems about the struggle, such as “Talash,” 
“Kadvandi,” and “Jag Uthaa Jangaon” (151). Such activities by Muslim journalists and 
poets also showed, like the political activities of Progressive Muslim students, that there 
were large sections of Hyderabadi Muslims who dynamically resisted the communalist 
activities of the Razakars as well as the Nizam’s misrule. However, these radical 
journalists were frequently targeted by the Razakars for daring to challenge them and 
rouse Muslims against them. Thus, Khan was attacked on August 22, 1948, and his hands 
were chopped off; he later succumbed to his injuries
74
 (151). Resistance by a defiant 
Communist Party also continued unabated as it took over a weekly called Naya Daur 
after the Party had been banned; this was edited by Mahendra and Hyder (147). In 
addition to the Hyderabadi newspapers, pressure on the Nizam’s government and the 
                                                          
74 The message that the pen, in fact, is not mightier than the sword, is received loud and clear in the symbolism 
contained in the Razakars’ act of chopping off Khan’s hands. Narsing Rao, who witnessed this assassination, has told 
researchers that a week before Khan was killed, Razvi addressed a meeting in the Zamarud Mahal Talkies in 
Hyderabad city and said: “Jo log hamaare khilaaf likhte hain, unka panja kaat diya jayega” (“Those who write against 
us will find that their hands have been chopped off”) (DVD 9, 1:35:16-1:36:25). Munshi too mentions this part of 
Razvi’s speech in his memoir (192).  
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Razakars was consistently maintained by the nationalist literature and Communist Party 
literature from India, which was smuggled into the state and which exerted influence on 
its youth (Stree 10).  
The HSC’s call to observe August 7, 1947 as “Join Indian Union Day” by holding 
public meetings despite bans was answered by people as they organized and attended 
many meetings in villages and as students and workers struck in many towns (Gour, 
“Hyderabad” 8). On August 13, 1947, two days before India became independent from 
British rule, the Nizam’s government as well as the Majlis banned the hoisting of the 
Indian flag. Violation of the official ban involved imprisonment for up to three years or a 
fine or both (10-1). As a pre-emptive measure, Tirth and other HSC leaders were arrested 
on the night of August 14, and rigorous police arrangements were made in the Sultan 
Bazar area in Hyderabad where the offices of the HSC and the AHSU were located. 
However, on August 15, as planned, a hundred AHSU students shouted slogans in favour 
of responsible government and accession to India. Rafi Ahmed, AHSU Joint Secretary, 
unfurled the Indian flag (10). The flag was also hoisted at the All-Hyderabad Trade 
Union Congress, the road transport department, and by women’s groups in Hyderabad 
city (10-1). Three hundred students of Kamareddy High School in Nizamabad district 
took out a procession with the Indian flag. While the police did not intervene, some 
teachers and staff members severely caned many students (11). The Razakars’ response 
to these events was to tear and trample the Indian flag and burn it down, even in case of 
Indian post offices and trains coming from Indian territory (despite assurances from the 
Hyderabad government that this would not happen) (12). Gour writes that, supported by 
the police, “[b]atches of armed Muslims” terrorised people in the streets on August 16 
 88 
 
(13). They attacked people in Moosakhan Bazar, Regimental Bazar, Kummarguda, and 
other places in Hyderabad city. Shops and houses were looted and burnt, and eight people 
were killed (13). In these accounts of disorder and chaos during August 1947, it is the 
inability of the Nizam’s government to curb the violence and control the Razakars that 
emerges.  
On August 14, 1947, the day Pakistan got its independence, and a day before 
India became independent, the Nizam conveyed in a letter to Mountbatten that he was 
“not prepared to execute an Instrument of Accession” (Hyderabad’s Relations 7). An 
agreement “short of accession” was acceptable, as he clarified to him via telegram on 
August 23, 1947 (10). Mountbatten responded that India thought that the Instrument of 
Accession “contains terms most generous to the States,” and that in light of what India 
had committed to in other states, it would “find it very difficult to offer any other 
Instrument to any State” (16). India’s objection to Hyderabad’s Draft Heads of 
Agreement was also that it withheld all legislative powers from India and that 
Hyderabad’s demand for the right to enter into direct political relations with any foreign 
power was not in consonance with its promise to conform to India’s foreign policy 
(Hyderabad’s Relations 16; Munshi 112).   
Independence came and went, and the dispute between India and Hyderabad 
became worse. After much back and forth between the two states, it was decided that in 
the absence of a permanent arrangement, a Standstill Agreement should be negotiated 
which would determine the relationship between India and Hyderabad for a year. Several 
drafts were made and many negotiating sessions took place (Ali, Tragedy 69). Finally, 
against the disapproval of many of his ministers and also the Majlis, the Nizam was ready 
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to sign the Standstill Agreement with India (71). To prevent this from happening, a crowd 
thirty-thousand strong, led by the Majlis, prevented the Chhattari delegation from leaving 
for Delhi
75
 (72). A new delegation was appointed by the Nizam and the Standstill 
Agreement was signed on November 29, 1947
76
 (74). According to the Standstill 
Agreement, agreements and administrative arrangements over matters of common 
concern such as external affairs, defence, and communications were to remain the way 
they had been between Britain and Hyderabad, and India did not have the right to station 
or even send troops to Hyderabad to help in the maintenance of internal order 
(Hyderabad’s Relations 27). The Agreement also involved the appointment of Agents-
General, and India appointed K.M. Munshi its Agent-General in Hyderabad in January 
1948.
77
   
However, the Standstill Agreement did not create the environment that would 
facilitate the process of devising a permanent arrangement. The atmosphere of hostility, 
intrigue, and suspicion only became worse. This is made clear by the highhanded tone in 
the White Paper, which aggressively lays the groundwork to argue that accession was the 
                                                          
75 The White Paper notes that the extent of Razakar power can be measured by the fact that they succeeded in 
preventing the Chhattari Delegation from leaving for Delhi to negotiate the Standstill Agreement by mobilizing 
thousands of people to stage a demonstration in front of Prime Minister Chhattari’s house. The Delegation was forced 
to resign. That the Nizam was powerless to prevent any of this from happening is interpreted as a sign of his weakness 
in both the White Paper (8, 25) as well as Ali’s account (73). Gour writes that after this demonstration, Hyderabad city 
became a ghost town and only armed Pathans, Arabs, and Razakars could roam on the streets after dusk (“Hyderabad” 
68). Working-class localities in Hyderabad and Secunderabad cities were attacked by Razakars; Majlis leaders and 
office bearers; local, immigrant, and refugee Muslims; and armed Pathans. The police either participated or looked the 
other way (68).  
 
76 Gour highlights the irony of the situation when he writes that on November 29, 1947, when Mountbatten, the 
representative of the Indian government, signed the Standstill Agreement with the Nizam, the Nizam’s police fired at a 
demonstration of four hundred in Alir (Bhongir taluqa). Two people were killed on the spot, while sixty were injured. 
Out of the sixty injured, three died in Bhongir hospital and one in Osmania hospital (“Hyderabad” 63).  
 
77 Ali writes that Munshi’s appointment as Agent-General was received with alarm by Hyderabad because he was “a 
rank communalist” (102). Gour indicts him as the man who had betrayed the people of Bundi and Udaipur by giving 
them an authoritarian constitution and who spoke of the Nizam “not as a murderer of people but as the ‘representative 
of that great Moghul tradition which Akbar founded in India’ (Times of India, 26 January)” (qtd in Gour, “Hyderabad” 
113). He also condemns Munshi for his conciliatory tone towards the Nizam, when he declared that he was in 
Hyderabad to “establish friendly contact. I only want to see that the Nizam takes his legitimate place among the order 
of our noble princes in free India” (The Hindu, 6 Jan. 1948; qtd in Gour, “Hyderabad” 114; see also Munshi 73-4).  
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only way forward for Hyderabad and gives away the Indian government’s fears of a 
foreign conspiracy between Hyderabad and anti-Indian parties (read Pakistan) against 
India. It elaborately discredits Hyderabad’s claims of having an independent history by 
pointing out that it was founded by “the agents of foreign invaders” (4) and that it, 
therefore, pales in comparison to princely states such as Udaipur, “whose history 
enshrines glorious deeds of chivalry and sacrifices in the cause of freedom or personal 
honour” (11). In doing so, The White Paper, as the official voice of the so-called secular 
Indian (Congress) government, betrays the complicity of the Indian government in 
perpetuating the ideas embedded in Hindu nationalist discourses created by nineteenth 
and twentieth century ideologues such as Bengali writer Bankimchandra Chattopadhyaya 
(1838-1894); V.D. Savarkar (1883-1966), who was the president of the Hindu 
Mahasabha (“Hindu Great Assembly”) from 1937 to 1943; and M.S. Golwalkar (1906-
1973), who was the General Secretary of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (“National 
Self-Volunteers’ Organization”; RSS) between 1940 and 1973. In his canonical novel 
Anandamath (1881-1882), Bankim represents Muslims as foreign oppressors and tyrants 
who deserve to be liquidated; Savarkar and Golwalkar write on exactly the same lines in 
their treatises Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (1923) and Bunch of Thoughts (1966) 
respectively.  
Furthermore, the White Paper continues to systematically demolish Hyderabad’s 
argument that it had existed as a sovereign state since the eighteenth century by claiming 
that Hyderabad was never independent. It points out that after Hyderabad had managed to 
covertly reject Mughal domination in the eighteenth century, it came under the complete 
political, administrative, and military control of the British through paramountcy (4-5). 
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The White Paper also exposes the oppressive feudal structure and inequitable taxation 
system of Hyderabad, the uneven communal representation in its administrative set-up, 
and its inferior currency and uncontrolled expenditure. These factors become 
justifications for the demand for accession (5). In addition to this, the White Paper claims 
that increasing communist activity in Hyderabad, which first acted as a check to Razakar 
terror, is now a “menace” since the communists have joined hands with the Razakars “to 
make common cause against India”78 (40, 8). The White Paper also emphasized that 
Hyderabad had no international status; it could not communicate or negotiate with any 
foreign state. Moreover, means of communications such as railways, airways, postal, 
telegraph, and telephone systems connecting North and South India all run through 
Hyderabad (17). The White Paper goes on to make valid points about how the popular 
aspirations of Hyderabadis and Indians have been the same, as seen in the enthusiastic 
response by Hyderabadis to the Khilafat Movement and in the formation of the HSC (19). 
However, it claimed, these aspirations were being suppressed by the Nizam’s government 
through various means such as bans on political parties and political literature as well as 
laws prohibiting public gatherings because the Nizam feared the impact democratic 
movements could have on his autocratic control over Hyderabad and Hyderabadis (24).  
                                                          
78 Sundarayya attributes this mistaken conviction to a press statement made in mid-1948 by members of the Hyderabad 
City Committee of the Communist Party, headed by Gour and Mahendra. The statement announced that since the 
Indian government was a bourgeois-landlord government and was allied with British imperialism, the imminent entry 
of Indian forces into Hyderabad must be opposed and that Hyderabad must remain independent and democratic (having 
rid itself of the Nizam). Other Party leaders such as Ravi Narayan Reddy, Baddam Ella Reddy, and Devulapalli 
Venkateshwara Rao immediately denounced this statement as being completely contrary to the Party’s stance on 
Hyderabad’s integration into a democratic, people’s India in the form of linguistically determined states. However, the 
damage was done, and the Indian Government in its radio and press ignored the Party statement and reported that the 
communists had joined the Razakars (179). The Indian government’s overlooking of the official statement of the 
Communist Party that explicitly denied any anti-India thrust behind its activities is a mark of how the Indian 
government deliberately distorted the news coming out of Hyderabad to suit its aim of compelling Hyderabad to 
accede. Because the Razakars were definitely anti-India in their pronouncements and activities, the Indian government 
cleverly aligned the communists with the Razakars in order to turn public opinion in India against the communists and 
the Telangana struggle.    
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The main argument of the White Paper is that the Indian Independence Act, 
which relieved the states of their obligations to the British rulers, also threatened India 
with disintegration (3). It suggests that while other states swiftly (ostensibly) cooperated 
with India and acceded without complications, Hyderabad alone refused. It also points 
out although the British Cabinet Mission’s Statement of May 16, 1946 clarified that 
British paramountcy would not be transferred to the succeeding Indian government, it 
presumed in addition to this that the princely states would accede to India in the matter of 
defence, foreign affairs, and communications. Other commentators have highlighted the 
fact that the princely states were declared free by the British to join India or Pakistan or 
remain independent both by the Cabinet Plan as well as the subsequent Indian 
Independence Act of 1947
79
 (Gour, “Hyderabad” 1; Ali, Tragedy 19). As Ali points out, 
the British had categorically specified in both documents that they would not transfer 
paramountcy to the Indian government (108). So the Nizam issued a firman on June 11, 
1947, declaring that after the lapse of paramountcy he would become a sovereign 
monarch (Hyderabad’s Relations 1). In response, the recently unbanned HSC launched 
its second satyagraha, in which nine thousand people participated (Munshi 57-8).  
The White Paper finds that the Nizam’s declaration of sovereignty was based 
upon “mere legalistic claims of doubtful validity” (6). In fact, it maintained that India had 
made a gesture of goodwill by adhering to the terms of the Standstill Agreement and 
removing its troops from Secunderabad. On the other hand, Hyderabad had breached the 
                                                          
79 To Smith, it was the interpretation of the Independence Act of 1947 by Prime Minister Clement Attlee in the House 
of Commons and Lord Listowel in the House of Lords that led to the conviction that the princes would be free to 
accede to India or to Pakistan or even choose to be independent (9). Eagleton writes that official statements by 
Listowel, Attlee, and Mountbatten show that the British government’s intention was to leave the princely states free to 
decide their own future. However, he points out, these statements were “usually coupled [with] the fervent hope that 
these States would choose to join with one or other of two new Dominions” (69-71). On his part, Winston Churchill 
thoroughly disapproved of India’s aggressive attitude and urged the Ministers of the House that Britain had a personal 
moral obligation to prevent India from subjugating a sovereign state (Eagleton 70-1). 
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Standstill Agreement by lending two hundred million rupees to Pakistan (White Paper 7, 
23; Ali, Tragedy 142). In order to repair the damage, Hyderabad, which explained that 
the loan was given to Pakistan before the Standstill Agreement was concluded (letter 
from Ali to Munshi dated March 30, 1948, Hyderabad’s Relations 34), requested that the 
Pakistani government not encash the securities as long as the Standstill Agreement was 
valid. Ali describes how he travelled to Pakistan as Hyderabad’s Prime Minister to 
personally make this request (Tragedy 153). The White Paper claims further that 
Hyderabad had violated the Agreement by increasing its army, and manufacturing, 
purchasing, and “smuggling” in arms and ammunition80 (7, 23). There had also been no 
check on Razakar power in spite of repeated requests from India and reassurances from 
the Hyderabadi Prime Minister (27).  
In response to these accusations, the Hyderabadi Prime Minister reminded 
Munshi in Hyderabad that the Nizam had been given to understand by Mountbatten that 
India would provide Hyderabad arms and ammunition to maintain internal order (letter 
from Mountbatten to Nizam dated November 29, 1947, Hyderabad’s Relations 28), but 
that Hyderabad had received no such supplies since July 1947 (letter from Ali to Munshi 
dated March 30, 1948, 34). In such circumstances and amidst such violations of the 
Standstill Agreement, Ali writes, Hyderabad could not deal on an equal footing with 
Indian raiders, “the whole raison d’etre of the Razakars” (41), who had been organized 
solely (ostensibly) to deal with Indian raiders terrorizing Hyderabadi border populations. 
                                                          
80 Ali confirms that arms and ammunition were procured from the British through the efforts of the Hyderabadi Agents-
General in Karachi and London (Tragedy 228-30). They were also manufactured in modest numbers under his 
supervision in Hyderabad (171). But the Nizam had made it clear to Mountbatten on November 29, 1947, the day the 
Standstill Agreement was signed, that if India did not supply arms and ammunition to him as it had promised to do so, 
he would approach “other sources of supply” (Hyderabad’s Relations 25; Ali, Tragedy 145).  
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He told India that if it were to provide arms to Hyderabad, the Razakars would be 
disbanded (Munshi 121). 
The White Paper also denied Hyderabad’s claims that India had violated the terms 
of the Standstill Agreement by upholding an economic blockade against it since 1947, 
which resulted in overseas consignments of goods destined for Hyderabad languishing in 
Indian ports, railway stations, and roads (Ali, Tragedy 95, 128; letter from Nizam to 
Mountbatten dated March 9, 1948, Hyderabad’s Relations 29), but instead claimed that 
Hyderabad had been hoarding essential items such as foodstuffs, salt, chlorine, and 
medical supplies
81
 (Hyderabad’s Relations 37). In fact, the White Paper claimed that the 
only obstacle to goods reaching Hyderabad had been caused by Razakar attacks on trains, 
as a result of which the number of trains passing through Hyderabad from India had been 
reduced (38). Finally, it alleged that Hyderabad’s June 1948 offer of plebiscite was “a 
farce,” for it was impossible to hold a plebiscite under the conditions in which the 
Razakars were openly terrorizing the populace
82
 (37). It pointed out that the Indian 
Government had originally suggested a plebiscite on August 27, 1947, but Hyderabad 
had rejected the idea. When India suggested a plebiscite again in April 1948, Hyderabad 
rejected it on the inexplicable grounds that the announcement of the intention to hold a 
plebiscite would cause law and order to deteriorate in the state (8, 36-7). 
Every argument for the accession of Hyderabad to India is prefaced or concluded 
in the White Paper with a vehement emphasis on the danger that a sovereign Hyderabad 
                                                          
81 However, Ali counters that even essential commodities such as X-ray films, penicillin, and baby food, which were no 
longer available in Hyderabad due to the blockade, had to be procured from the British through the Hyderabadi Agents-
General in Karachi and London (Tragedy 228-30). Narsing Rao points out that the Indian government placed 
restrictions on vital things such as petrol (gasoline) and diesel, thereby crippling Hyderabad’s transport and 
communication systems (DVD 9 1:23:17- 1:23:45).   
 
82 In his response to the White Paper, Desmond Young, writing in The Tribune, points out that during the negotiations 
in June 1948, the Indian Government had (paradoxically) refused to accept a plebiscite unless Hyderabad first agreed to 
accede to India (“India and Hyderabad” 10 Sept 1948). Ali elaborates on this in some detail (Tragedy 209-10, 212).  
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would be to India. It appears that the future of Hyderabad and Hyderabadis was 
something that had to be determined on the basis of what was good for India and 
Indians.
83
 This is why the White Paper emphatically claims that “India cannot accept 
Hyderabad’s claim to independence as an independent Hyderabad will be a grave threat 
to the defence, internal security and economy of India” (9). Furthermore, there is a clear 
sense of hostility and fear towards Hyderabad’s Muslims on the part of Indian officials 
and representatives, attitudes which Ali notes were the reason why an independent 
Hyderabad was so unpalatable to the “Hindu overlords” of India (Tragedy 28). Feverish 
and repeated arguments are made in the White Paper about how an independent 
Hyderabad will become “a base for foreign anti-Indian influence, or vested interests”84 
(10, 40).  
It can be safely assumed from the bitter context of Partition that the “anti-Indian 
influence, or vested interests” that India feared were located in Pakistan. However, these 
objections to Hyderabad’s supposed pro-Pakistan bias were launched in spite of the fact 
that the Nizam had already declared, as I have mentioned above, that he envisaged a 
close relationship with both India and Pakistan and emphasized repeatedly that because 
Hyderabad is situated within India, it would cooperate more closely with India than with 
Pakistan. Furthermore, it is known that M.A. Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, 
                                                          
83 Ali’s account reveals that this attitude was markedly visible in Nehru’s approach. Nehru told Ali that for India’s 
economic and social development, it was essential for Hyderabad to accede to it. Ali also claims that Nehru said that 
India was willing to bring this about by hook or by crook (140). This is confirmed by Nehru’s own theorization in his 
autobiography about the nuisance of separatist movements amongst marginalized groups and princely states, and how 
India could only progress if it remained undivided and defence, transport, and communications were centralized under 
one authority (78-80). Asim Roy attributes this need for a strong centre to Nehru’s socialist leanings (123), but Nehru’s 
open aggression and willingness to do almost anything to bring about Hyderabad’s accession to India suggests that his 
motivations and actions had more to do with his desire to increase India’s political power than with any socialist 
sensibilities.   
 
84 According to Ali, Nehru expressed this view in his public speeches in June 1948 (Tragedy 206). And Munshi writes, 
“India … could not have survived with an independent and hostile Hyderabad anchored to Pakistan” (252).  
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had refused to meet representatives of the Majlis and had reasserted his view that 
Hyderabad is an independent, sovereign state free to accede to India or remain 
independent. He also said that India should not resort to coercion or violence to compel 
Hyderabad to accede (British Information Services, “Extract from Opdom No.43 for 
period May 27
th
 to June 2
nd, 1948”). In addition to this, Ali writes that Jinnah did not 
believe that Hyderabad needed to accede to Pakistan or India at all (Tragedy 12), but that 
he believed that Hyderabad should no longer be an autocratic state, and the 
administration should pass into the people’s hands as soon as possible (11). He made it 
perfectly clear to the Nizam when he was privately asked for advice about who should be 
the Prime Minister of Hyderabad that he did not want to influence Hyderabad’s internal 
decisions while he was Governor-General of Pakistan (88). In early 1948, when India 
objected to Hyderabad’s act of lending a large sum of money to Pakistan and Hyderabad 
was forced to request that Pakistan not encash it, Jinnah assured Ali that the money was 
not a problem and that he would do whatever he could “to bring about a better 
understanding and build up a lasting and satisfactory relationship between India and 
Pakistan” (156). Hence, these sources reveal that the leadership of Pakistan was cautious 
about its interactions with Hyderabad, for it did not want to damage Pakistan’s relations 
with India any further. As it is, Partition had created long-lasting wounds in the hearts 
and minds of most Indians and Pakistanis. In addition to this, India and Pakistan were 
already at loggerheads over Kashmir; perhaps this is why Jinnah firmly refrained from 
touching any matter connected to the Indo-Hyderabad dispute. 
But the White Paper persists in outlining the threats that Hyderabad signified for 
India because it had a dominant Muslim ruling class. As both the White Paper and 
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Munshi argue, led by the Razakars’ communalist agenda, Hyderabad would become “a 
base for subverting the loyalty of the Muslims in India to the Indian Dominion” (White 
Paper 40, 10; Munshi 122-3). The White Paper claimed that the goal of the Razakars was 
ultimately “to create disaffection among the Muslims of India and to rouse them against 
the Government of India”85 (31). That the impact of the Razakars never extended beyond 
Hyderabad is a fact deliberately ignored by the White Paper. The communalist tint of this 
official statement is also seen in its observation that Razakar atrocities in Hyderabad 
“against the majority population naturally arouse great indignation in India” (40) and that 
they have “natural repercussions” (40) on the Indian side. Here, in what is a very 
questionable and dangerous assumption any self-professed secular government can make, 
Hindu violence against Muslims in India is depicted as a “natural” response to Muslim 
violence against Hindus in Hyderabad. The White Paper also refers to Muslim refugees in 
Hyderabad as the “so-called refugees” (23), asserting that those Muslims who were 
persuaded to come and settle in Hyderabad “are not strictly refugees, for the conditions in 
the Indian Provinces do not warrant such emigration” (32). It, therefore, suggests that 
there was no reason nor any existing condition for Muslims to feel threatened in India in 
1948.  
However, other sources suggested that there was a great influx of Muslims into 
the state and that they did indeed find reason enough to migrate to Hyderabad, widely 
considered to be a safe haven for Muslims. Anis Kidwai notes that Muslims from Ajmer 
fled to Pakistan and Hyderabad when riots struck that city (27). Gour writes that there 
were about two hundred thousand Muslims from India who migrated to Hyderabad 
                                                          
85 Indeed, accounts such as Anis Kidwai’s Partition memoir suggest that the violence in Kashmir and Hyderabad 
became an excuse to question the loyalty of Indian Muslims after Partition (218, 244-5).  
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during and immediately after Partition (“Hyderabad” 66). Ali’s account also makes note 
of the fact that during Partition riots, many refugees fled to Hyderabad in search of 
sanctuary (Tragedy v). After border raids by Indian raiders intensified just before 
Partition, there were also many Muslims from Hyderabadi border villages who had been 
advised by officials and Razvi himself to give up their homes, fields, and cattle, and 
move to larger centres (64, 67-8, 77, 142). Ali points out that the refugees from the 
border areas poured into Hyderabad city and “narrated the most woeful tales of the 
happenings there” (77). Partition turmoil also drove many Southern and Central Indian 
Muslims to Hyderabad. According to Ali, in the last quarter of 1947, almost a million 
Muslims had entered Hyderabad state from various routes (127).  
The perception that Hyderabad was a safe haven for Muslims was created by a 
certain section of the Hyderabadi Press, Hyderabadi government propaganda, and the 
Razakars. Aside from the progressive trend represented by Payam, Rayat, Imroze, Taj, 
and Nigar, there was another press faction in Hyderabad that represented the Nizam and 
the Majlis. Thus, in his Clarion, Syed Abdul Latif pointed out that there were linguistic 
provinces in the Indian dominion for upper-caste Hindu speakers of Marathi, Kannada, 
and Telugu, and that if they were unhappy in Hyderabad, “the Government of India may 
arrange with the government of Hyderabad for a peaceful exchange of Caste Hindu and 
Muslim populations …” (editorial, 17 Oct. 1947, qtd in Gour, “Hyderabad” 41). Gour 
informs us that this view was not an isolated one,
86
 because the government supported the 
                                                          
86 Nor was it a new one. As early as 1919, Prime Minister Ali Imam had developed “what he called a colonization 
scheme” to bring in more Muslims to Hyderabad to swell the Muslim minority. But this did not work except for 
attracting a few Muslim families who went into lucrative government posts (Ali, Tragedy 23). Bahadur Yar Jung, the 
force behind the Majlis’ openly politicized avatar, also believed that there should be a numerically stronger Muslim 
minority in Hyderabad (44). Smith too speculates about Razvi’s encouragement of Muslim migrations to Hyderabad 
and writes that following the immense exchange of populations in Punjab in 1947, Razvi may possibly have believed 
 99 
 
idea of the transfer of populations by broadcasting it on Hyderabad Radio (“Hyderabad” 
41). The White Paper also asserts that such a view existed and that the Razakars were 
behind it (32). It is present too in the daily Meezan, which warned that measures to 
prevent Muslims from leaving their homes in the wake of Partition “would only create 
greater distrust” between India and Hyderabad (editorial, 17 Oct. 1947, qtd in Gour, 
“Hyderabad” 41). The Clarion’s special political correspondent also noted that leading 
Muslim dailies such as Rahber-e-Deccan, the Nizam Gazette, the Meezan, and the Subha-
Deccan felt that the transfer of populations was the only solution to Hindu-Muslim 
problems (7
 
Nov. 1947, qtd in Gour, “Hyderabad” 41-2). Gour writes that, around this 
time, leaflets began to appear in places such as Vizagapatnam that reported that Hindus 
“have chalked out a plan to finish away with all the Muslims.” They advised Muslims to 
“leave off everything and proceed at once either to Pakistan or Hyderabad Deccan – it is 
not necessary to go to Hyderabad [city], settle in one of the districts” (qtd in Gour, 
“Hyderabad” 42). Muslims of Hyderabad are also addressed: “Get outsiders … and 
provide them with every facility you can. You will increase the Muslim population. This 
will help you to defend your country. You are already a minority” (42). Therefore, it is 
clear that propaganda circulated by the organs of the Hyderabadi state contributed to 
creating an environment where Muslims in British India began to look at Hyderabad as a 
place where they could seek asylum. 
Like other parts of India during Partition, there may have been an intensification 
of communal sentiments in Hyderabad based on the testimonies of suffering the refugees 
brought with them. Haunted by their experiences of violence, they became easy recruiting 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that Hyderabad could become a Muslim state in terms of population if only Muslim minorities could be attracted from 
India and the local non-Muslims driven out or outnumbered (19).   
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grounds for the Razakars, who manipulated them to reinforce their own ranks (Gour, 
“Hyderabad” 42; Smith 19; White Paper 32). In other words, Razakar violence against 
Hindus was charged with communal sentiment fuelled by the divisive contexts of 
Partition and violence against Muslims elsewhere. This fact is overlooked in Ali’s 
dishonest and misleading assertion that “despite tense feelings and bloody riotings all 
over the sub-continent, conditions in Hyderabad had remained peaceful”87 (Tragedy 11) 
and blatantly downplayed in the Nizam’s description of “little communal strife; indeed 
what there has been is negligible compared with communal discord in British India. 
Where it has occurred in the State, it has not been indigenous but an infection from 
outside” (Hyderabad’s Relations 11). While it is true that the violence in Hyderabad is 
not comparable to the carnage in Punjab, the Nizam’s pronouncement about the definitive 
role of outsiders is part of a larger narrative of Partition amongst officials as well as 
ordinary people in the subcontinent that maintains that it was always “outsiders” who 
created trouble (Pandey, “Community” 2037; Kamra 122-6). Such statements, which 
have been refuted by scholars, usually blame violence on “outsiders” in order to avoid 
acknowledging the culpability of “insiders” in rape, murder, loot, arson, and destruction 
(Pandey, “Community” 2037, 2041, 2044, “In Defence” 565; Butalia, Other 248). At the 
same time, the fact that refugees were recruited as Razakars also shows that “outsiders” 
did, to some extent, contribute to escalating violence in Hyderabad. 
 The Hyderabadi government built houses and large huts for the Muslim refugees, 
and it also prevented employment extensions to old employees so that the refugees could 
                                                          
87 This pattern is also visible in Ali’s consistent underplaying of the activities of the Razakars. He does not mention any 
instances of violence against non-Muslims by them, but does acknowledge that they did not adhere to the secular 
principles that had (ostensibly) been imparted to them and that “instances were reported of the highhandedness of the 
Razakars with the local population” (Tragedy 80). Another outrageous remark is that there was “no serious discontent 
amongst the masses,” for “enough food, some shelter and clothing was available to everyone and despite poverty” (29-
30). 
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be accommodated. Railway, electricity, public works, and rationing departments were 
ordered to give preference to these refugees and employ them without consideration for 
age or ability (Gour, “Hyderabad” 43). Industrialists were told to be ready to do the same 
and to be prepared to cut existing wages to accommodate these people (43). Refugees 
soon realized that the rosy pictures of Hyderabad that they had been fed by propaganda 
machinery were illusions. They could not find jobs easily and were instead met with 
cholera in their camp in Qazipet. Many returned to their homes (43-4). Not only was 
there a campaign by the Muslim League in the Central Provinces and Madras to assure 
Muslims that they were safe where they were and that they did not need to migrate to 
Hyderabad, but Makhdoom Mohiuddin, Ravi Narayan Reddy, and Baddam Ella Reddy 
issued a statement from Bezwada on October 11, 1947 on behalf of the AMS and the 
Communist Party that appealed to migrating Muslims “to see the trick behind this game 
of reaction” and return to their homes. They appealed to Muslims outside Hyderabad to 
not fall prey to “malicious propaganda by reactionary forces,” and beseeched their “non-
Muslim brethren in the Indian union to see that Muslims in their areas feel quite at home 
and no ground is given to the reactionary and disruptionist forces to provoke conflicts or 
misguide the Muslims” (qtd in Gour, “Hyderabad” 44-5) They pointed out that the main 
aim behind instigating this migration was to strengthen the social base of the autocracy in 
the towns and to provoke conflicts between different religious communities and 
undermine democratic struggles in Hyderabad (45).  
By June 1948, after many discussions and several drafts, India had produced a 
permanent settlement which left it free to station troops in Hyderabad not only during an 
external war, but during any situation that it deemed a state of emergency. Furthermore, 
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parity, the condition of constitutional safeguards for Hyderabadi Muslims that Ali felt 
was essential to assuage their insecurities in the face of the recent communal violence 
against minorities in British India during Partition,
88
 was rejected by India (Ali, Tragedy 
201, 205). Attempts to elect an executive council of ministers based on the ideals of 
responsible government (during both Ali’s tenure as well as that of his recent 
predecessors) were repeatedly boycotted by the HSC because of this issue (Munshi 31; 
Ali, Tragedy 58-9, 201, 205). An indicator of the hollowness of India’s professed secular 
credentials is that representatives of the Indian government said that Indian leaders would 
be embarrassed if they openly agreed to an arrangement where a minority (Hyderabadi 
Muslims) community would have the same rights as the majority community 
(Hyderabadi Hindus) (Ali, Tragedy 221).  
A few months later, the Economist was to observe that Nehru had  
rattle[d] the sabre at a press conference on June 17
th
, when he said that India had 
delivered its final terms ‘and the Nizam can sign on the dotted line as and when 
he likes … Hyderabad, situated as it is, cannot conceivably be independent and 
India can never agree to it, whatever happens and whatever may be the 
consequences.’ (18 Sep. 1948) 
Ali writes that a mark of how aggressive India had become towards Hyderabad around 
the middle of 1948 is seen in Nehru’s comment at the above-mentioned press conference 
that India was ready to use force to make Hyderabad accede to it (Tragedy 224-5). In 
                                                          
88 Ali writes that Muslims in government positions were also concerned about their career possibilities in India (122). 
The tables were about to turn in terms of industry and commerce as well, as Smith points out: after the “Police Action,” 
“the same device of government control which had previously discriminated to help Muslims now operated on the 
whole against them” (22). Educated Hindus, who were disillusioned with their limited choices where government 
employment in Hyderabad was concerned, were in favour of accession because they believed that being part of a 
majority Hindu India would bring them better professional opportunities (Ali, Tragedy 124). This is the section from 
which the HSC and other Hindu organizations drew their support (124). 
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fact, the idea that the Indian leaders believed that the influence of Muslims and Muslim 
culture on the politics, society, and economy of Hyderabad could be eliminated only if 
Hyderabad were to be “completely absorbed and closely knit into the general pattern of 
the future India” (125) is present in Ali’s account. Even after Partition, he argues, there 
were forty-five million Muslims in India who posed a threat to Hindu hegemony in the 
minds of Indian leaders. He accuses the Indian leadership of creating plans that would 
progressively “absorb … the Indian Muslims in the social and cultural fold of the 
Hindus” (125). These comments are pertinent and penetrating in light of the subsequent 
absorption of Hyderabad into India as well as the activities and attitudes of both the 
Hindutva right-wing as well as some Congress governments against the interests of 
Indian Muslims.       
By June 1948, many Indian newspapers also expressed impatience over the 
“protracted negotiations,” and “[t]otal economic sanctions or military action or both” 
(British Information Services, “Daily Press Summary – June 3-14, 1948 (Weekly)”) and 
“decisive action” was advocated by newspapers such as the Indian News Chronicle 
(“Daily Press Summary, June 10, 1948”). The Hindustan Times praised the patience of 
the Indian government, asserting that it was glad that it had issued instructions to the 
army and the police to pursue the Hyderabadi perpetrators (Razakars) of border raids into 
Indian territory, “even if it involves crossing Hyderabad territory” (“Daily Press 
Summary, June 10, 1948”). The Times of India wrote that India’s instructions to its army 
and police constituted “the writing on the wall” for Hyderabad (“Daily Press Summary – 
[date illegible] June 1948”). This metaphor suggests that The Times of India saw the 
accession of Hyderabad as imminent in light of the instructions given to the army and 
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police by India to pursue Razakar raiders even if it meant trespassing on Hyderabadi 
territory. The newspaper implicitly urged the government of Hyderabad to realize that the 
consequence of refusing to accede to India would end in India invading Hyderabad, 
thereby also insinuating that the onus for ensuring peace lay with Hyderabad. The 
Hindustan Standard pointed the finger for the Indo-Hyderabad dispute at the British 
Government and maintained that “[t]he Government of India cannot at all be blamed for 
it.” Finally, the Indian Express tantalizingly hinted that “[d]oubtful ‘friends’ abroad are 
already indulging in evil counsel.” By “evil counsel,” the newspaper probably refers to 
sections of the British press as well as politicians who were sympathetic to and tried to 
defend the Nizam’s position on the accession question. It adds ominously, “Whether 
negotiations are resumed or abandoned, Hyderabad cannot defy the forces of progress 
and democracy for all time. And India cannot nurse an enemy within her belly” (“Daily 
Press Summary – [date illegible] June 1948”). In this way, we see that the hysterical 
rhetoric built by official publications in India such as the White Paper about Hyderabad 
being in cahoots with the enemy (read Pakistan) and subverting India from within its 
borders also found its way into newspaper reports and editorial opinions. What is also 
significant in the Indian Express’s use of metaphor is that India is envisaged in the 
gendered terms of Hindu/Indian nationalist discourse, which worships the country as 
Mother. And the implication of the Mother containing an enemy within her is that the 
country is diseased. In fact, when seen in light of the abductions, rapes, and forced 
impregnations of several thousands of Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh women by men of the 
Other community during Partition, it appears as if the Indian Express is suggesting that 
(Hindu) India is carrying the illegitimate, malignant (Muslim) child of masculinized 
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(Muslim) Pakistan. This “sickness” or “pollution” within its body must be removed 
(aborted?) or made benign in some way for Mother India to be healthy and whole again.  
By the end of July 1948, flights and trains to and from Hyderabad were 
suspended, and telephone connections were tapped (Ali, Tragedy 238). Border raids by 
Indians into Hyderabad continued unabated,
89
 and alongside the larger raids, it was 
normal to have two or three small armed raids in which the lives and properties of 
Hyderabadi Muslims were attacked (269). Hyderabad approached the United Nations 
Security Council via cablegram on August 21 (Eagleton 64) and informed the President 
that it was being intimidated by India, that it was under serious threat of invasion, that it 
had already suffered the economic blockade imposed by India, and that its borders had 
been violated and border villages occupied by Indian troops (65). Hyderabad’s second 
complaint to the Security Council was made on September 12: it urgently requested the 
Security Council to put the dispute between Hyderabad and India on the agenda as early 
as Wednesday, September 15, 1948, since India had officially proclaimed its intention to 
invade Hyderabad (Eagleton 65).  
On September 7, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru announced to an 
enthusiastic Parliament that his government had sent its final ultimatum to Hyderabad, 
asking the Nizam for the last time to “disband the Razakars (volunteers) immediately and 
to facilitate the return of Indian troops to Secunderabad in such strength as is necessary to 
restore law and order in the State” (Times, “Indian Demands” 8 Sep. 1948). He claimed 
that seventy villages had been attacked by Razakars inside Hyderabad, about a hundred 
and fifty incursions made into Indian territory, a hundred people killed, a large number 
                                                          
89 For details of the infamous raid at Nanej in July 1948, for which two different Hyderabadi and Indian versions exist, 
see Ali (Tragedy 238-42) and White Paper (35). 
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injured, many women raped or abducted, twelve trains attacked, and property worth 
£750,000 looted (Bristol Evening Post, 7 Sep. 1948). Prompted by Nehru’s dark hints 
about the “grave consequences” of these events in Hyderabad, The Times correspondent 
speculated that there could be widespread communal violence in and migrations out of 
South India and maybe even across India (“Indian Demands” 8 Sep. 1948). When asked 
what the Indian Government would do if the Nizam refused to re-admit Indian troops into 
Secunderabad, Nehru said, “we march.” (Reuters, “Indian Troops” 10 Sep. 1948).  
By September 11, Indians were indeed marching to Hyderabad, and Nehru told 
Reuters that so far “the Government had been anxious to avoid doing anything which 
might lead to a communal conflict.” He now appealed for the cooperation of the press 
and the people in treating the Hyderabad issue on a non-communal basis (“Indian 
Troops” 11 Sep. 1948). Nehru’s concerns about taking action against Hyderabad that 
might cause communal violence in India were sincerely driven by the recent, 
unprecedented violence of Partition, which was often fanned by the knowledge that such 
violence was taking place in other areas of the subcontinent. For example, the atrocities 
on Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab were matched by atrocities on Muslims in Delhi, and 
vice-versa. On September 13, Reuters reported that the Indian government had 
announced that “for the restoration of law and order in the State – Indian troops crossed 
the State border at 0400 hours (local time) today.” The communiqué gave specific 
instructions to Indian troops: “You will therefore march into Hyderabad territory and 
bring back peace and prosperity to the law-abiding population of the State. You will 
crush with all the weapons at your disposal any resistance met” (qtd in Edinburgh 
Evening News). General Rajendrasinhji, General Officer Commanding (GOC), Indian 
 107 
 
Army (Southern Command), who was in command of the Indian troops, described the 
operation as a “police action undertaken for the purpose of maintaining law and order in 
Hyderabad,” and promised Hyderabadis that “as soon as the task is completed the people 
of Hyderabad will be given the opportunity to decide their future, both as regards their 
internal Government and their relationship with India” (Edinburgh Evening News, 13 
Sep. 1948). The General also called upon his troops to “protect all law-abiding persons, 
irrespective of their religion, caste or creed” (Reuters, “ADD” 13 Sep. 1948), and 
emphasized that  
[t]he tempo of murder, rape, arson and loot has been steadily mounting with the 
result that the honour, life and property of all citizens in Hyderabad State who do 
not obey the orders of the Razakars has become unsafe and this peril also 
threatens nationals of India in adjoining provinces.  
He offered reassurance that no law-abiding Hyderabadis should fear the Indian forces and 
that the Indian forces “seek the cooperation of all from the highest to the humblest Hindu 
and Moslem in fulfilment of our mission, which is not one of hostility but of friendship.” 
He also warned that “[a]ll communal strife will be sternly dealt with.” On the same day, 
Hyderabad informed the UN Secretary General via cablegram that it had been invaded 
(Eagleton 65) from five different sectors.
90
  
Reddy writes that Hyderabadis welcomed the invasion and garlanded Indian 
soldiers (59). The news had also caused much excitement in Indian cities, and the 
newspapers published special editions to discuss the event (Times, “Armoured Columns” 
14 Sep. 1948). The British-owned Indian newspaper the Statesman writes that 
                                                          
90 The Evening Standard reports on September 13 that the Pakistani Government sent Nehru a telegram about the 
invasion, but that the latter had not responded to it. Meanwhile, the “Moslem National Guard” of Pakistan adopted the 
slogan “War over Hyderabad means war over Pakistan” (13 Sep. 1948).  
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“[a]lthough the objectives of Indian action are limited, they should be secured not only 
quickly but permanently” and stresses that Hyderabad’s obstinacy had compelled Indian 
forces to face the “disagreeable necessity of fighting other Indian troops – for Hyderabad 
is part of India and such of her troops as are not foreigners are Indians” (qtd in Reuters, 
“Reaction” 14 Sep. 1948). The argument that Hyderabad was essentially Indian was 
advanced again and again to legitimate India’s claim to it. This point was made in spite of 
the fact that many sections of Hyderabadis, both Muslims and Hindus, considered their 
own shared, syncretic culture to be a unique one, with a historical trajectory connected to 
but decidedly separate from that of India. It is also important to remember that while the 
communal and class-based violence in Hyderabad was indeed a significant motivation 
behind India’s actions against Hyderabad, India was not the good samaritan it claimed to 
be. As I have mentioned earlier, India’s drive to conquer Hyderabad came from the desire 
of its leaders to form a strongly centralized state with tremendous power vested in the 
central government based in New Delhi. No mean consideration in its determination to 
force Hyderabad to accede was the fact that Hyderabad was rich in surplus raw materials 
(cotton, oilseed, castorseed, cement) and natural resources (coal) that India needed; it was 
alleged that Hyderabad had so far not shared these items with India the way India had 
shared its own surplus with Hyderabad (White Paper 19).  
On September 13, there was intense bombing of Hyderabadi aerodromes at Bidar, 
Aurangabad, and Warangal (Ali, Tragedy 271), and Osmanabad was taken with no 
resistance (273). There are reports of tension on September 14 in Indian-occupied 
Sholapur, where a curfew was put in place, assemblies of more than five people were 
banned, and sixty people were already arrested in this connection (Reuters, “Reaction” 14 
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Sep. 1948). News reports of Indian advances into Hyderabadi territory (Reuters, 
“Reaction”) stated that Indian troops claimed to be halfway to Secunderabad and that a 
large number of Hyderabadi regular troops, including several officers and Razakars, had 
surrendered on the advance on the Sholapur-Hyderabad road. Arms, ammunition, and 25-
pounder guns were taken from them (Evening Argus, 14 Sep. 1948). On the other hand, 
Hyderabad Radio claimed that “Indian troops were being held in the south and north-west 
and that 250 casualties had been inflicted on those advancing from Sholapur” (Evening 
Argus, 14 Sep. 1948). Radio Pakistan in Lahore reported that Hyderabad Radio 
constantly asserted heavy losses on the Indian side and maintained that Hyderabadi 
troops were holding their own and pushing back the invaders (Reuters, “Reaction”) and 
that the situation was “satisfactory” (Sussex Daily News, “Hyderabad Claims” 14 Sep. 
1948). Meanwhile, India’s permanent delegate to the UN, Dr. P. P. Pillai, defended 
India’s stance by saying that “private armies have been formed [in Hyderabad] to enable 
the continuance of feudal oppression of the vast majority by a small minority; and their 
border raids threaten the peace and security of India” (Reuters, “Reaction”). Aurangabad 
fell on September 14 (Ali, Tragedy 282). In spite of all the bravado Hyderabad expressed 
through its radio stations, it was clear that the Indians were advancing deeper everyday 
into Hyderabadi territory; they were met with little resistance. Hyderabad was now 
desperate. So was Razvi, and four battalions of poorly armed Razakars, including two of 
Razvi’s sons, were sent into battle (283).   
On September 15, Delhi Radio reported that the strategically important city of 
Bidar was within sight of Indian troops (284). That afternoon an appeal from Ali to 
Indian leaders that Hyderabad was willing to accept “whatever reasonable terms that 
 110 
 
India might yet offer” (287) was broadcast on Hyderabad Radio. He also informed the 
Agent-General in Karachi to request the Pakistani Government to mediate and urge the 
Indian Government to stop the bloodshed (288). Ali’s appeal was broadcast several times 
on Hyderabad Radio, but was not referred to in any of the Delhi broadcasts until late that 
night (288). It appears that India was bent on taking the bloody invasion to its conclusion; 
it was determined to march undeterred to Hyderabad, where it would depose the Nizam, 
put him and his ministers under house arrest, and set up a military government. The next 
morning again, no reference was made to it in Delhi broadcasts (291). On the afternoon 
of September 16, the Nizam blamed Ali for Hyderabad’s easy capitulation and asked him 
to resign so that he would be free to sort out on his own some political settlement with 
India (292-3). Ali resigned on September 17 (297), and he and Razvi were arrested by the 
Indian military soon after
91
 (Munshi 244).        
Meanwhile, the crisis was put on the UN Security Council agenda on September 
16, 1948 (Eagleton 65). While Hyderabad’s representative Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung 
argued that India’s premeditated actions constituted a violation of independence and 
equality as laid down in the UN Charter (66-7), India’s Ramaswami Mudaliar presented 
the Indian government’s official position that Hyderabad was not competent to bring such 
a case before the Council, since it was not a state at all, and had never been an 
independent entity
92
 (67). Therefore, he argued, anything to do with Hyderabad was a 
                                                          
91 Ali notes that he, the Muslim ministers in the Nizam’s mixed Cabinet, as well as Razvi were certain that they would 
be executed. Ali went about destroying confidential political correspondences and advised everyone, including the 
Nizam, to do so (Tragedy 303-4). He would subsequently be put under house arrest; Razvi was jailed. Both eventually 
managed to escape to Pakistan.   
 
92 When Ali had formally informed the Indian Prime Minister towards the middle of August that Hyderabad had 
decided to take its case to the UN, he had received a reply a week later that India regarded the Indo-Hyderabad dispute 
a purely domestic matter and that Hyderabad had no right to approach the UN at all (Tragedy 252-3). Munshi describes 
the Indo-Hyderabad dispute as “problems of internal law and order” (237). In 1949, India’s representative Benegal Rau 
asserted the same points again before the Council (Eagleton 67). 
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domestic issue for India to deal with on its own (73). Mudaliar requested a few days so 
that he could back up his case with documentary evidence, but Hyderabad had already 
surrendered by that time. The Security Council postponed action, and the case was never 
taken up again (67). In his investigation into the claims made by India about its legal 
rights over Hyderabad, legal scholar Clyde Eagleton points out that India had no claim 
over Hyderabad “for the simple reason that there was no India, as a state, before 1947” 
(68). Smith also points out that Hyderabad had the stronger case legally (24-5). Large 
sections of the British press also aired this opinion, with an editorial in the Morning 
Advertiser stressing that since the princely states were free to choose their allegiances, 
India did not have a “particle of legal ground to stand upon” (15 Sep. 1948). Eagleton 
writes that the UN Security Council did absolutely nothing to solve the problem. He 
clarifies that it was obvious that accession was the most likely and best option, but India’s 
military action was unpardonable, and the Security Council could have still intervened if 
they had paid heed to Pakistan’s intervention over this issue in the UN in May 1949 (64).  
Pakistani Foreign Minister and UN representative Mohammed Zafarullah Khan 
questioned the value of peace in the Commonwealth if everything was to be solved by 
armed force (Manchester Guardian, “A Laughing Stock” 18 Sep. 1948). Khan called for 
the Security Council to not accept Hyderabad’s accession, but instead order an 
investigation “of the method whereby it was extorted,” thereby drawing attention to the 
fact that the Nizam had agreed to accede to India only after Hyderabad was invaded and 
occupied by it (Observer, 9 Sep. 1948). Reuters reported on September 18 that comments 
in the Dawn reflected the general feeling in the Karachi Press of “bitterness against the 
Hyderabad surrender.” Comparing India to earlier invaders, the Dawn wrote that 
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“Hyderabad had surrendered to Huns” (Reuters, “Karachi” 19 Sep. 1948). Fifty thousand 
people are said to have protested in front of Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s 
residence on September 14, demanding that some action be taken to rescue Hyderabad 
from India’s “unwarranted aggression”93 (Liverpool Daily Post, 14 Sep. 1948). Hence, 
the occupation and forced accession of Hyderabad to India escalated the tensions between 
India and Pakistan and contributed towards the generation of public opinion in Pakistan 
that viewed India negatively. 
A large section of the British press was scathingly critical of India’s military 
action, especially of Congress leaders and the economic blockade (Morning Advertiser, 
15 Sep. 1948; Daily Telegraph, “A Grave Step” 14 Sep. 1948). The Times (“Hyderabad 
Surrenders” 18 Sep. 1948) and the Spectator (17 Sep. 1948) wrote eloquently about the 
questionable ethics implicit in the overpowering of a weaker neighbour who had also, 
until that time, been regarded India’s negotiating equal. In addition to this, the Spectator 
points out that this fact made the invasion “a war, not a police raid, and it also made India 
unequivocally the aggressor, in spite of all the extenuating arguments which may be 
produced”94. The Daily Telegraph (“A Grave Step” 14 Sep. 1948), the Sussex Daily News 
(“Hyderabad” 14 Sep. 1948), and the Manchester Guardian expressed what was 
                                                          
93 That Pakistanis interpreted India’s action as nothing short of bullying can be seen in a remark made by the Pakistani 
Inspector General of Police, Khan Qurban Ali, to Indian social worker Kamla Patel: “It is risky for us to disregard your 
wishes. Since you have the stick in your hands, you can wield it whenever you so desire” (Patel 119). Patel, a staunch 
Indian nationalist working with the Central Recovery Operation in Lahore at the time of the invasion, interpreted this 
“ironic remark” (120) as directed against Vallabhbhai Patel, with whom she shared not only political convictions but 
also a surname. She also noted a change in the attitude of ordinary Pakistanis who had normally been friendly and even 
welcoming towards her (120). She and the other social workers were put under virtual house arrest in the camp in 
which they worked, and no one was allowed to go in or out (121).   
 
94 Several scholars and writers have pointed out the inconsistency of the term “Police Action.” Sundarayya always puts 
it within quotations, as if to ironically question the discrepancy between a mere police action and a military action that 
in every way looks and feels like war. Theodore Paul Wright Jr. observes that the Indian invasion is “referred to 
euphemistically” as the “Police Action” (“National” 144) and writes that it bears an “embarrassing similarity … to the 
Pakistani invasion of Kashmir against which India was protesting in the United Nations” (“Revival” 132). William 
Dalrymple observes that the invasion was downplayed by the Indians, as if “all that had been involved was a few 
parking tickets and the odd restraining order” (“In Conversation” 57). 
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becoming a common conviction in many international quarters, that while Hyderabad 
could not possibly have remained independent, India’s action showed India in a terrible 
light (“Hyderabad”). On September 18, The Daily Telegraph noted the condemnation of 
India’s action by the United States and warned that Pakistan would see Nehru’s policies 
as communally motivated. Others shared this view, and Daily Herald correspondent 
Andrew Mellor, writing on September 14, condemned India’s attitude, observing that the 
conflict was “essentially communal,” and if the Nizam and the ruling government of 
Hyderabad had been Hindu, the ongoing war situation would never have arisen 
(“Background to India’s March”). On September 15, The Times called the Indian action a 
“deplorable resort to force.” The Times pointed out further that behind the “smoke screen 
of propaganda,” the Nizam had a “clear case” that should have allowed him to declare 
independence or accede to either India or Pakistan. However, since the Standstill 
Agreement was signed, the Indian government had “brought itself to believe that the 
Nizam’s insistence upon his legal rights is incompatible with the safety of the Indian 
Union” (“The Invasion” 15 Sep. 1948). These opinions make it clear that a large section 
of the international press saw right through India’s concerns about Hyderabad, which 
were motivated by the fact that the majority of its population was Hindu. This is why a 
Hyderabad ruled by Muslims was discursively constructed as a threat to India so that 
military action against Hyderabad could be morally justified.  
The Times correspondent also issued a word of warning, observing that India was 
determined to treat Hyderabad, like Kashmir, as a domestic issue, “in which it is entitled 
to use its own discretion.” S/he was correct in anticipating that India would face tensions 
with Pakistan, “where sympathy with the Nizam’s cause is lively” over this issue, and 
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that India had endangered not only communal harmony but also the peace of the 
subcontinent through its actions (“The Invasion” 15 Sep. 1948). Other editorials in 
British newspapers such as the Spectator also argued that, in fact, India had a 
“fundamentally poor legal case [which] has thus been abandoned in favour of the blunt 
assertion of superiority” and that the present-day nationalist rulers were comparable to 
the colonial rulers, so that “it is all very like an incident from the seedier days of the East 
India Company” (17 Sep. 1948). What India had done was even worse, according to the 
editorial, because British paramountcy in Hyderabad was never defined to anyone’s 
satisfaction
95
 and the only thing that was certain was Britain’s right to intervene, which 
would never have been grounds enough to justify the kind of regime that India had set up 
in Hyderabad. While the conviction that Britain would have acted differently in similar 
circumstances is impossible to substantiate, what matters is that the newspaper compared 
India’s government to colonizers. In doing so, it critically disrupted India’s self-righteous 
public image as a secular nation based on democratic principles of freedom and equality.  
The Spectator also pointed out that many princely rulers had found that their 
quick acquiescence to India’s demand to them to accede to it had brought a change for 
the worse; their people had no cause to celebrate. In this regard, what is most significant 
about the newspaper’s observation is that “such of them who have the misfortune to 
belong to Moslem minorities are lucky if they are still alive to regret the past” (17 Sep. 
1948). On September 18, the Economist observed that the “oratory [that] has been 
coming from the mouths of Indian politicians [is] curiously reminiscent of the Fuehrer’s 
exhausted patience.” It paraphrased the declaration of N.V. Gadgil, the Indian Minister of 
                                                          
95 Many commentators and scholars assert this point. See for instance, Ali’s Tragedy of Hyderabad and Margrit 
Pernau’s The Passing of Patrimonialism (2000). 
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Public Works, that it was time to complete the victory of Khadla won by the Marathas 
over Hyderabad in 1795, and cited Vallabhbhai Patel that “if Hyderabad did not behave 
properly, it would go the same way as Junagadh.”96 Patel’s statement referred to the 
Indian invasion, occupation, and forcible integration of Junagadh state after it had 
acceded to Pakistan. This declaration not only reveals that there was a precedent to 
India’s invasion of Hyderabad that India maintained was the right course to follow in 
case of princely states that refused to accede to it, but also that the decision of the 
sovereign ruler of a princely state to remain independent or accede to Pakistan did not 
matter if the ruler was Muslim and his majority population Hindu. What mattered was 
that the majority population was Hindu and wanted to accede to India. This stance of 
India on minority ruled princely states becomes very questionable when we realize that 
the ongoing dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan stems from the fact that the 
Hindu Maharaja of Muslim majority Kashmir was bullied into rescinding his bid for 
independence and acceding to India in 1947. In fact, when the Hyderabad and Junagadh 
invasions are juxtaposed with the accession of Kashmir, we realize that Nehru and other 
Indian leaders such as Patel were less interested in delivering justice to the people of 
these princely states, as they claimed, and more interested in the political power and 
material assets these states would bring to a Hindu-dominated Indian government. The 
marked communalist hue of this politics is also unmistakeable.     
Another telling detail that exposes the blatant disregard for ethics that India had 
where the accession question was concerned is that, after his arrival in Hyderabad as 
                                                          
96 Munshi also refers to this comment (181). Ali writes that Patel was firm that Hyderabad had to accede and that he 
was not willing to negotiate over this even if his colleagues were (Tragedy 151-2, 236). According to Ali, unlike 
Nehru, he was only concerned about how soon Hyderabad could be occupied and cared little about outside reactions to 
his forceful approach (191, 236). 
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India’s Agent-General in January 1948, Munshi made a speech in which he reminded the 
Indian troops at Bolarum of the heroic deeds of the Indian forces in Junagadh and told 
them that India expected similar heroism from them “elsewhere” (Ali, Tragedy 106). The 
Economist concluded that whatever may be India’s reasons, the fact remained that it had 
used force against an independent state in “circumstances which exclude the justification 
of self-defence” and emphasized that, while India called it an internal affair, Hyderabad 
was an independent state. In doing so, The Economist pointed out that, as an independent 
state, Hyderabad had sovereign rights and options for external legal recourse, which India 
sought to deny to Hyderabad by claiming that it was merely a part of India and, therefore, 
had no right to approach outside parties for help or support. In this way, India also 
implicitly rejected Hyderabad’s claim that it was and wanted to remain independent. 
Additionally, The Economist editorial warned that, as a result of this invasion, the conflict 
between India and Pakistan would get worse, and communal violence would ensue.  
However, there were supporters of the Indian government as well, and while 
British anti-war activist and labour politician Fenner Brockway condemned the military 
action as unworthy of Nehru, he emphasized the “accommodating spirit” of the Indian 
government in negotiating with the rulers of princely states and assuring them that they 
would remain the heads of their states if democracy were introduced (Brockway, 
“Hyderabad” 18 Sep. 1948). He explains how the Kashmiri ruler had made way for a 
democratic constitution with Sheikh Abdullah as Prime Minister. In doing so, he 
neglected to mention the role played in Kashmir by raiders allegedly supported or 
sponsored by Pakistan, and how India responded to the Maharaja’s urgent appeal for help 
against them only after he had agreed to India’s condition that Kashmir would accede to 
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India (Munshi 48). Other journalists observed some inconsistencies in the treatment of 
Kashmir and Hyderabad. For instance, the Daily Express, having opined that Indian 
politicians were taking a leaf out of Hitler’s book, questioned their moves by examining 
their claims to Hyderabad and Kashmir. It wrote that if, as Indian politicians claim, 
Hyderabad, with its largely Hindu population, belongs to India, then “what are they doing 
trying to take on Kashmir, where the reverse situation exists?” (“Abandoned” undated). 
Many other British newspapers and journals such as the Spectator (17 Sep. 1948), the 
Express and Star (13 Sep. 1948), and the Economist (18 Sep. 1948) also made blunt 
comparisons between the Indian leaders and fascist Italian and German leaders, French 
imperialists, and medieval crusaders.  
Furthermore, Brockway wondered if India would not have been wiser to accept 
UNO intervention and even asked Nehru, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and the 
Nizam an open question about whether the services of the British government might not 
help the situation.
97
 On September 13, the Grimsby Evening Telegraph also criticized 
India for not approaching the UN to solve the problem, and on September 18, the 
Manchester Guardian suggested that India itself should invite the UN to organize and 
supervise a plebiscite. This would guarantee that there was no communal intimidation 
                                                          
97 The heads of both the US and Britain had sympathized with the Nizam when he approached them for help, but also 
expressed their inability to intervene as long as Hyderabad remained bound by the Standstill Agreement, in which it 
had ceded foreign relations to India for a year from November 29, 1947 (Ali, Tragedy 235-6). Britain’s failure or 
refusal to come to Hyderabad’s aid met with both approval and disapproval in the British press and political opposition. 
Leader of the opposition Winston Churchill openly communicated his sympathies to the Hyderabadi Prime Minister 
(238). The Daily Express scathingly criticized Britain’s lack of response to the crisis suffered by one of the princely 
states, all of whom who had been “firm and steadfast friends of Britain” (“Abandoned” undated), the Spectator on 
September 17 pointed out that Britain had a “tremendous obligation” to prevent this “war” from spreading, and the 
Sussex Daily News went so far as to suggest on September 14 that “[t]he crisis has been precipitated by the feeling in 
both India and Hyderabad that the British Government would not support the Nizam in any appeal to the United 
Nations” (“Hyderabad” 14 Sep. 1948). The British opposition stated on September 13 that it wanted the government to 
make a statement on the Hyderabad issue. On the other hand, the Yorkshire Evening Press, which reported the 
opposition’s demand, noted that because the Indo-Hyderabad dispute was a “matter which involves India and 
Hyderabad … the British Government have no direct responsibility” (13 Sep. 1948). An editorial in the Morning 
Advertiser, while cautiously stating that Britain has no right to interfere, recommended that Britain should “use its good 
offices towards obtaining some sort of immediate settlement” (15 Sep. 1948). 
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from either side and also “take some of the sting out of the charge that India has acted too 
high-handedly” (Manchester Guardian, “Hyderabad Surrenders”). An editorial in the 
Spectator on September 17 also recommended a UN plebiscite, called India’s invasion an 
“unjust war,” and reminded Nehru of his own address to Indians in June 1947 after the 
British plan for the transfer of power was announced. On that occasion, Nehru had said, 
“The United India that we have laboured for … is not one of compulsion and coercion, 
but a free and willing association of free India” (qtd in Spectator, 17 Sep. 1948). 
Such criticism from the foreign press did not go unnoticed in official Indian 
quarters. Correspondents from foreign dailies such as The London Times, The Telegraph, 
The New York Times, and the New York Herald Tribune were sending such scathing 
reports back to their papers that the Indian government decided to censor them. Special 
censorship was also imposed on the dispatches sent to widely circulating publications 
such as Life and Time (Ali, Tragedy 141).  
The response by Indian newspapers to the British press’s barrage of criticism over 
India’s military action is also worth noting. Sukeshi Kamra has observed the important 
role of the Indian Press in the twentieth century; she stresses that its birth was 
coterminous with the arrival of Indian nationalism and in “help[ing] formulate the 
rhetoric of nationalism by offering the means to spread information about the many 
individual struggles taking place all over India in the decades leading to independence” 
(8). In fact, she elaborates, in the 1920s and 1940s, “[t]he press, the telegraph system, and 
the railways were central to the developing nationalist movement, for all facilitated flow 
of information and hence the possibility of ‘national’ sentiments and solidarity” (35). 
Furthermore, the Press relentlessly built up the momentum towards independence (37-8). 
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It is this united nationalist rhetoric that emerges when we note the report made by the 
Delhi correspondent of the Manchester Guardian on September 17 about the “Indian 
press, [which] without exception, expresses shocked surprise at Britain’s official and 
unofficial reaction to events in Hyderabad as expressed by Mr. Bevin in the House of 
Commons and by press comments published here” (“British Attitude”). Reuters reported 
from Madras on September 16 that British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s declaration 
in Parliament that week that a “warlike spirit” had developed in India had prompted The 
Hindu to write that he had “indicted a whole nation.” The Hindu asked what Britain 
would have done if it had remained in India and declared that “when … the world is in 
possession of all the facts, India’s action will be acclaimed as a notable contribution to 
peace” (Reuters, “‘Nation Indicted’”). The Manchester Guardian also noted that the 
“moderately nationalist” Hindu found Bevin’s attitude unexpected, bearing in mind 
Attlee’s previous declarations,98 Hyderabad’s constitutional status, as well as the recent 
events in that state. The Hindu criticized the Manchester Guardian’s own condemnation 
of India’s action and angrily asked the following questions: “What was the alternative? 
Was India to sit still while the Razakars and international adventurers attracted by 
Nizam’s gold went on playing ducks and drakes with the peace and happiness of millions 
of people?” (Manchester Guardian, “British Attitude” 18 Sep. 1948) The Manchester 
Guardian quoted the Statesman, which pointed out that while outside opinion focused on 
how the Indian action might lead to clashes in Pakistan and communal violence in the 
rest of India, “we here see as more important in the long run the steadily deteriorating 
effect on the position of Moslems in India and Hindus in Pakistan of the continued 
                                                          
98 Reuters reported on September 13 that Attlee had told the Nizam upon the latter’s request for support that Britain 
would not support Hyderabad in any appeal to the United Nations; he advised the Nizam to come to terms with India 
(“India Invades” 13 Sep. 1948). 
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uncertainty” (“British Attitude” 18 Sep. 1948). This remark implied that the lot of 
minorities in India and Pakistan would somehow improve if Hyderabad were invaded and 
made to accede to India. The fact that the invasion itself exposed the Hyderabadi Muslim 
minority to violence and brutality was clearly not a concern.  
Indeed, the newspaper also stressed that “[t]he ulcer of Kasim Razvi’s 
communalism must be removed” and that “[h]aving failed to persuade the Nizam to 
undertake it himself, India has decided on an operation quick and almost painless, it is 
hoped, rather than allow the spread of the malignant growth.” It exhorted British public 
opinion to take account of what previous administrations in India would have done;
99
 it 
emphasized that such “dangerous truculence” would never be allowed (Manchester 
Guardian, “British Attitude” 18 Sep. 1948). Reuters reported from New York that the 
Indian Ambassador had told Americans in a broadcast on September 17 that Britain 
would have done the same and that India had held off till September 1948 only because it 
wanted to reach an amicable settlement with the Nizam (“Britain” 17 Sep. 1948). There 
were also protests against critical British responses to the invasion in Indian cities such as 
Nagpur, where on September 18, over ten thousand people “of all parties” held a four-
hour long demonstration against what they called “anti-Indian Government propaganda 
broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation on developments in Hyderabad” 
(Reuters (Indian and Pakistani Service), “Indians Demonstrate”). Demonstrators in a 
mile-long procession also demanded the immediate stoppage of “the pernicious 
diplomacy” of leading politicians (“Indians Demonstrate”). These acts of protest by 
                                                          
99 An editorial in the New Statesman and Nation opined that the British would not have tolerated Hyderabad’s 
behaviour: “[a]n army would have been despatched, order restored, the Nizam deposed, a successor found and warned 
to be on his good behaviour, and the trouble would have been settled promptly” (17 Sep. 1948). By equating India’s 
action to what British action would likely have been, the newspaper questionably aligned the policies of a self-
professedly secular, democratic state with that of an imperialist one. Was the newspaper then implying that India too 
was an imperialist country after all, or that it had the right to act like one? 
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Indian newspapers as well as Indian citizens in some parts of the country against the 
criticism launched by international news agencies suggests that many Indian citizens 
stood by their government’s invasion of Hyderabad. While Razakar violence and the 
Nizam’s misrule had a great role to play in garnering such support for the Congress 
government’s actions, it is also probable that vengeful communalist sentiments against 
Muslims that were embedded in the memory of Partition violence were at work as well. 
 However, Indian newspapers also advocated caution, and on September 18, the 
Bombay Free Press pressed for the deposition of the Nizam, the Delhi Hindustan Times 
recommended leniency, and The Times of India urged the Government to tread carefully 
both in terms of the specific problems of Hyderabad and the “efficient maintenance of the 
new situation” (Reuters, “All” 19 Sep. 1948). It is possible that Nehru too had anxieties 
about Hyderabad because, while referring to the success of the operations on September 
19, he said, “We have faced many adversities and overcome them. We have to face 
success also without getting intoxicated by it.” Did Nehru anticipate violence and 
repression by his own forces in Hyderabad? Perhaps in order to reinforce India’s 
argument that Hyderabadis were, in fact, Indian and that, therefore, India had a right to 
tell them to accede, Nehru added, “I would repeat that we do not consider as we have not 
considered in the past, Hyderabad as something different or alien from us. Her people, 
whether Hindu or Moslem, are our kith and kin and share with us in the great heritage of 
India” (Reuters, “Nehru Broadcasts” 19 Sep. 1948). In this statement, while it is clear that 
he was certainly reminding Indian administrators and soldiers in Indian-occupied 
Hyderabad to treat all Hyderabadis equally, just as he would expect them to treat all 
Indians equally, he was also perhaps implicitly emphasizing that Hyderabadis, Hindu or 
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Muslim, must not be harmed because that would now be tantamount to the Indian state 
perpetrating violence against Indians. 
The Indian public was surprised at the swift defeat of Hyderabad on September 
17, and this became an indicator for journalists that Hyderabad State forces lacked not 
only modern arms and equipment, but also fighting spirit. By now, it was known that 
fighting was never on a large scale, and the fact that the number of casualties was 
exponentially larger on the Hyderabadi side placed under scrutiny the rhetorical thrust of 
Indian press and radio pronouncements about “strong opposition” and “stern resistance” 
with regard to Hyderabad’s military response (qtd in Times, “Cease-Fire” 18 Sep. 1948; 
see also Ali, Tragedy 280). The Razakars, whose fanaticism, military organization, and 
equipment had been greatly exaggerated by Indian propagandists in previous months, had 
proved to be largely ineffective against the Union Army. The Times reports that “not 
more than 5 per cent of their total number (which was also wildly exaggerated) were 
armed with firearms, mostly old muzzle-loaders, while the remaining 95 per cent carried 
staves and spears” and concludes that, “[n]aturally, they could do little against Indian 
armoured columns” (“Cease-Fire” 18 Sep. 1948). These revelations from correspondents 
indicate that India’s step to invade Hyderabad was based on an exaggeration of the 
capabilities of the Razakars. This does not mean that the Razakars were not dangerous to 
the non-Muslim populace, or that they did not commit tremendous atrocities against 
them, but that the extent of their supposed military preparedness or organization which 
the White Paper, for example, so hysterically reports, was exaggerated. The Razakars 
could not have prevailed upon India, as the invasion proved, in organized battles. Yet, 
again, the ethical and moral stance behind India’s decision to invade Hyderabad was 
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largely undermined in such contemporary news reports as the one mentioned above from 
The Times.     
On September 18, the Star reported that India’s Deputy Prime Minister 
Vallabhbhai Patel had congratulated the police for preventing Hindu-Muslim riots in 
India during the campaign and that All-India Radio (AIR) denied that there had been any 
Hindu-Muslim conflict in occupied Hyderabad territory. On September 20, The Times 
quoted Nehru as saying, “What has pleased me most during these past six days is the 
splendid response of our people, both Muslim and non-Muslim, to the call for restraint 
and discipline” (untitled report). Reuters also reported that he had said that the absence of 
communal violence throughout India “is full of good augury for the future” and for this 
he was deeply grateful. He further congratulated Hyderabadis who “during these days of 
trial, kept calm and helped the cause of peace” (“Nehru Broadcasts” 19 Sep. 1948). In 
addition to this, Chakravarti Rajgopalachari, the Governor General of India (GG), had 
issued an appeal from Delhi on September 19 calling for the observance of a national 
thanksgiving day on the coming Sunday to honour the absence of communal bloodshed 
during the invasion (Reuters, “National” 20 Sep. 1948). The GG also wrote to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, Sir Roy Bucher, commending the “exemplary 
discipline and restraint and the regard for honourable traditions which the Indian troops 
displayed” (Reuters, “Indian Governor-General”). On September 19, Reuters stated that 
General Rajendrasinhji had said that the Razakars would be treated as ordinary prisoners 
and not prisoners of war because they were not members of the Hyderabad State Forces 
(“All”). Munshi writes, “The behaviour of the troops towards the civil population, 
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whether Hindu or Muslim, was at all times correct and impartial and this in itself did 
much to restore confidence” (241).  
However, India’s self-congratulatory nationalist tone in the historical archive is 
somewhat shaken by the interrupting voice of the British communist newspaper the Daily 
Worker, which highlighted the role of the Indian forces in undermining and destroying 
the Telangana movement in Hyderabad through an account written by “Muslim Student” 
on September 20 (“The Threat”). “Muslim Student” writes that “[o]ur people in 
Hyderabad, particularly in the south, in the Telengana area, have written a glorious 
chapter in the history of Hyderabad by liberating a large area … where neither the 
Nizam’s autocratic rule nor the terrors of his Razakars have been able to penetrate.” S/he 
wrote that this was the only area where Hindus and Muslims live in amity, “jointly 
liquidating the feudal system and establishing for the first time a democratic regime.” 
“Muslim student” specifically attacked the strategy of the Indian Army in sending its 
main forces in from the areas around Telangana and Nalgonda, “which have been 
liberated by the people,” and wrote that this move as well as the Indian Government’s 
stand so far on the Telangana struggle showed that India wanted to crush the Telangana 
movement. “Muslim student” referred to the GG’s September 12 statement that India 
invaded Hyderabad because the Nizam had been unable to control the Razakars and 
communists. The writer claimed that a truly democratic Indian government would have 
supported the communists, not persecuted them. To this end, the writer quoted The Daily 
Telegraph on the Government’s intention to bring the Nizam’s grandson to power. The 
column ended with an appeal “to workers everywhere to lend their full support to the 
struggles of the Telengana people and protest against the attempts of the Indian 
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Government to suppress this movement in the name of fighting the Razakars” (Daily 
Worker, “The Threat” 20 Sep. 1948). This account by “Muslim Student” suggests that not 
only did sections of the international press as well as groups of British and Pakistani 
citizens see through the false pretext behind India’s invasion of Hyderabad, but so did the 
communists. In fact, it was clear to these people that the Indian state viewed both 
Razakars and communists as a joint nuisance because both threatened in some measure 
the authority of the centralized Indian state.      
On September 18, a special correspondent of the Daily Worker provided details of 
a Communist Party statement, which expressed alarm at the way the Indian Government 
was dealing with the Hyderabad problem. The Party protested that the aim of the invasion 
was to only disband the Razakars while maintaining the symbolic continuity of the 
Nizamate and that dismantling the Razakar organization alone, without ending feudalism, 
would not liberate the people (“Indian Communists”). The statement also pointed out that 
although Rajagopalachari’s comments on September 12 took the Nizam to task for not 
dealing with either the Razakars or the communists, he had also assured the Nizam of his 
position and regarded “the Telengana peasants’ resistance as anarchy, deserving to be 
crushed.” The Party stressed that the peasants resisting the Nizam must not be treated as 
enemies, but should be armed so that they could overthrow the Nizam and “mop up the 
Razakars” (“Indian Communists”). In this way, the Party rendered transparent India’s 
blatantly bourgeois leadership that had, in spite of their differences, found common 
ground with the Nizam. Furthermore, alignment with a ruler its leaders had previously 
denounced as a despot with ironically little or no power over the rabid Razakars, 
indicated the hollowness of India’s righteous outrage over the way Hyderabadis were 
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being treated during the Nizam’s misrule. This point was only reinforced when the Indian 
military government in occupied Hyderabad decided to persecute the small and big 
players of the Telangana struggle, the political movement that had provided a large 
population of Hyderabadis with a platform from which to resist the Nizam’s misrule and 
the Razakars’ brutality.   
Communist cadres and their leaders already knew by mid-1948 that the arrival of 
the Indian army did not augur good news and that the Congress government would not 
sympathize with their cause (Stree 53; Sundarayya 177). Even before the invasion 
happened, communist cadres had composed songs about the Congress government, how 
it would persecute them, and how they were not prepared to live under its rule (Stree 53). 
As the Daily Worker had pointed out, the struggle had already made significant gains in 
terms of chasing away the Nizam’s officials and replacing them with local, village 
administrations; doing away with vetti, illegal exactions, land evictions, usurious loans, 
torture, humiliation, and oppression; seizing and redistributing waste lands (for cattle 
grazing) and surplus lands along with agricultural implements and cattle; and enforcing 
fair wages and grain distribution for agricultural labourers (Sundarayya 113). The 
peasants had destroyed landlords’ houses and sowed the ruins with much-needed food 
crops (183). The movement was spreading fast, not only across Telangana but also in 
Madras Andhra (114). For Sundarayya, the real reason that the Indian government 
intervened at this point was to actually act on their “main declared purpose of suppressing 
‘Communist violence’” (114). Patel and Rajagopalachari had repeatedly declared that the 
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communists’ influence was likely to spread across the state and must be ended with the 
use of military intervention
100
 (Sundarayya 191).  
So, the Telangana Armed Struggle continued after the Indian Army came in 
because the land that had been seized from landlords and redistributed during the struggle 
against the Nizam had to be protected not only from the exiled landlords but also from 
the bourgeois Indian state (177-8). During this period, there were labour and agricultural 
strikes in many parts of the state against the Indian military government set up after the 
“Police Action” (215). These marked the people’s anger against continuing or new 
repressions slapped upon them by the new administration. Immediately after the “Police 
Action”, the people of Bellampalli (Adilabad district) raided the properties of Hindu and 
Muslim big merchants and other oppressors (Sundarayya 303; Reddy 59). In response, 
the Indian army imposed curfew, banned red flags, and molested Hindu and Muslim 
women. Workers staged demonstrations demanding withdrawal of forces and punishment 
for the perpetrators. Kothagudem and Bellampalli mine workers went on strike several 
times during the second (post-invasion) phase of the Telangana Armed Struggle. 
Sundarayya takes pains to point out that the Communist Party did not have the resources 
or the influence to mobilize them in these regions and that their initiative was entirely 
their own (303). This fact reveals that, even though the movement had been developed 
and guided by the leadership of the Party, it continued on the people’s steam during the 
                                                          
100 It appears that both the Indian and the Hyderabadi states and élites were united in their assessment of communists. 
For example, Munshi treats communists and Razakars on par and even indicates that both organizations were working 
together (91)! Furthermore, among many other similar instances, it was reported that the Indian police was searching 
on February 15, 1948 for Telangana communist leaders in Indian villages bordering the Hyderabadi taluqas of 
Khammam and Madhira (Gour, “Hyderabad” 115-6). The Times of India also urged New Delhi to render assistance to 
Hyderabad in dealing with its “serious trouble with communist agitators” (editorial, 29 Jan. 1948, qtd in Gour, 
“Hyderabad” 118). In Hyderabad, Ali considered the communists “armed raiders” (65). Élite supporters of the Nizam 
such as Akbar Ali Khan publicly appealed to the Majlis and the Congress to resolve their differences and come to a 
point where they could deal with the “communist menace squarely” (Rahber-e-Deccan, 31 Jan. 1948, qtd in Gour, 
“Hyderabad” 117). 
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times when the Party was weakened by constant repression. It also shows how relevant 
the struggle against oppression continued to be at a time when Hyderabadis were already 
supposed to have been liberated from tyranny by the Indian invasion and the subsequent 
accession of Hyderabad to India.   
Road transport workers, municipal workers, PWD workers, and textile workers 
under socialist and communist influence struck (303, 307). Mill workers in Warangal 
staged synchronized strikes starting in 1949 (304). A week after the “Police Action,” the 
Indian Army had begun to specifically strike at the roots of the movement, attacking 
guerilla squads and Party and Sangham organization (Sundarayya 181). The recently 
achieved gains were taken away by deshmukhs and landlords with the support of the 
Congress government and its armed forces
101
 (Sundarayya 1, 116, 189; Stree 236). Raids 
increased and many communists were arrested under the Prakasam Ordinance
102
 by the 
Indian Army, often with the help of the local Congress workers (Stree 48-9, 69, 81; 
Sundarayya 195-6), who (along with the rich landlords who had supported the struggle 
against the Nizam) withdrew their support to the movement after the “Police Action” 
(Stree 110, 203). People were tortured so that the locations of well-known communists 
could be extracted from them (Stree 119-20, 138; Sundarayya 197). Especially elaborate 
forms of torture were developed by the Indian Army and police against communists 
(Reddy 60; Sundarayya 96, 123). Families of known communists and communist leaders 
                                                          
101 However, there were some villages that managed to keep their lands permanently. For example, Telladarupalli, a 
Muslim jagir village and a strong AMS centre, was raided in August 1947 by the jagirdar’s men from Khammam. The 
attack was repulsed by the villagers who not only fought off the men but also managed to seize their weapons and 
retained possession of the land. Even after the “Police Action,” the peasants did not give up their land and were 
ultimately able to get patta (ownership rights) under the Hyderabad Tenancy Act of 1950 (Sundarayya 92). The 
Hyderabad Tenancy Act, “the most radical piece of land legislation till then,” came about in 1950 as a result of the 
people’s struggle against the Indian army’s constant attempts to seize the peasants’ lands (120).    
 
102 The Prakasam Ordinance was an emergency measure passed by the Congress Ministry in January 1947. It allowed 
the arrest and retention of many Communist Party cadres and leaders without trial (Stree 193). 
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were particularly harassed and publicly tortured (Sundarayya 197, 311). Young mothers 
who were involved in the struggle were arrested and then psychologically tortured with 
hints from policemen that they had also managed to capture their children (Stree 133). 
Separated from their infants, lactating mothers contracted milk fever (194).  
Thus, the self-proclaimed saviours of the people had turned into their oppressors. 
This repression accounts for the persistent vagueness in almost all the testimonies in We 
Were Making History about who exactly the enemy was. It is clear in the testimonies that 
it is the arms of the state, the army and the police, who are the guilty parties, but it is 
difficult to understand which state is meant, and both Hyderabad and India are 
implicated. The women marvel at how their enemies had metamorphosed overnight from 
the Razakars and the Nizam’s police into the Indian Army and the Indian Police103 (Stree 
53). Pesara Sattemma expresses anger at the fact that India told them that “the Muslims 
would just butcher us,” but that the Sikh military that arrived from India after the “Police 
Action” was no better, beating and killing people (226). She stresses, “[T]he Razakars 
and the [Indian] Union Army all did the same thing. The [Indian] Union got its work 
done through the Razakars” (223). In this way, she equates the ultimate purpose of the 
Razakars and the Indian Army, which was to suppress resistance against existing forms 
of feudal exploitation and violent communalism. She clearly considers both the 
Hyderabadi and Indian governments two sides of but one coin. Another example of the 
conviction that there was no difference between the Razakar/Nizam’s repression and 
India’s conduct in the eyes of those who participated in the Telangana struggle comes 
from Sundarayya, who repeatedly calls the volunteers who were active in promoting the 
                                                          
103 Even Munshi writes that both the communists as well as the Razakars considered the Nehru government their enemy 
(128). 
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Congress’ policies in Hyderabad after the “Police Action” “Congress Razakars”104 (197, 
281).  
For Sundarayya, the approach of the Indian government was not only aimed at the 
class struggle, but it was also misogynistic as well as communalist, and it dangerously 
undermined the people’s unity. He reports many instances when members of the Indian 
armed forces (220) and police (238) raped women, and that many women died “[b]ecause 
of raping” (238). Rape was especially common in areas where there were police or 
military camps (245, 252). Sundarayya writes that although there had been rapes by state 
apparatuses during the Nizam’s misrule, they were nothing compared to the actions of the 
arms of the Indian state, which were  
nothing less than what we read of what a foreign army of occupation does in an 
occupied country. But the whole Indian press controlled by the Congress 
Government and all those ‘great’ defenders of women’s honour did not raise even 
a feeble word against this monstrous crime that had become the pastime of the 
Congress police and army during all those three years. (341)  
It is probable that Sundarayya is referring here to the considerable pains taken by the 
Indian government to retrieve “dishonoured” women during Partition. He writes that 
using the information gathered from the movement’s underground centres at the time, it 
is possible to estimate that more than a hundred women died of rape during the 
occupation by Indian forces. In the very first year of the occupation, more than a 
                                                          
104 Sundarayya not only considers the actions of the Hyderabadi and Indian states comparable, but he also compares 
both states to the Nazi fascists. For example, not only does he call the Nizam the “Nazi Nizam” (317), but he openly 
equates the Indian government’s approach with fascism when he refers to the torture of young men in “hitlerite jails” 
after the invasion (311). He also inextricably connects the Indian leadership with fascism when he points out how 
people were herded into “concentration camps” named Gandhinagar, Asokanagar, Jawaharnagar, Kakatiyanagar and 
Bapunagar (253), and tens of thousands were beaten, tortured, starved, and made to dig their own graves (252). 
References to concentration camps are also made in “A Report on the Post-Operation Polo Massacres, Rape and 
Destruction or Seizure of Property in Hyderabad State,” which informs us that Muslims were dragged out of trains and 
sent to them to be tortured and killed (100).  
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thousand women were reported to have been raped (341). Scholars such as Peter Custers 
have also noted that the Indian army’s repression was “far more overwhelming than that 
by the Nizam’s forces had ever been” (158). As thousands of soldiers converged upon 
Telangana villages in what were called “draining operations,” atrocities were unleashed 
upon the people, with soldiers “dancing with military boots on the bodies of suspects, 
gang-rapes, etc., ‘unheard of even in the Razzakar period’” (158). Sundarayya writes that 
in one instance of a mass raid by six to seven thousand Indian Army and police personnel 
on striking villages in Warangal district, six thousand five hundred persons were tortured, 
three hundred women were raped, and forty of them were “done to death” (Sundarayya 
256-7). Some women were raped by four to five men, and many women were pregnant 
when they were raped (257). In many places, this gendered brutality extended to attacks 
on maternity, and women were not allowed to breastfeed their children. Often children 
were brutally killed in front of their mothers (245). 
 Custers points out that rape was an even more widespread weapon amongst the 
Indian Army than it had been during the time of the Razakars. Rape was used to subdue 
the Telangana peasantry. In Magaram, a communist who had been pointed out to the 
army by Congress agents was carried away in a lorry, raped to death, and then thrown out 
on the road (187). Custers’s research suggests that there were innumerable mass-rapes 
between 1948 and 1951. In fact, mass-rape was a common feature in every centre or 
village where police and military camps were established (187). Custers also states that 
the women of Telangana did not put up with this passively; they courageously tried to 
resist rape by the Indian Army. In some cases, rapists were beaten to death, while police 
attackers were chased with grain winnowing pans or rice-pounding rods (187-8).  
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Furthermore, initially, the coming of the Indian forces was welcomed as a release 
from Razakars’ terror, and “Hindu-Muslim tension maintained at the point of Razakar 
bayonets, disappeared” (Sundarayya 307). But soon after this, Congress representatives 
went from village to village pointing out to the people that, like them, they too were 
Hindus and would, therefore, not harm them. They tried to persuade the people to pay 
land revenue, grain levy, and excise taxes, and reassured them that the Congress 
government would soon introduce land reforms (195). Sundarayya points out while none 
of the Nizam’s officials were brought to justice (191), “ordinary Muslim people, who 
stood against the atrocities of the Nizam, were pounced upon and untold miseries were 
inflicted on them” (188-9).  
Omar Khalidi points out that while the Indian government has “adequately” 
documented the atrocities perpetrated against Hindus by the Razakars, and there has even 
been some work on Telangana, very little has been written on the confrontation between 
India and Hyderabad in 1948 (“Military” 199). Khalidi writes that, unlike Hyderabad 
city, the districts of Hyderabad “witnessed large-scale massacres, rape and destruction or 
seizure of Muslim property” in the wake of the Indian invasion. And while there were 
some vague reports that trickled in during and after the take-over, he notes that the full 
magnitude of this violence was only understood when Muslims fled from the villages to 
the “relative safety of Hyderabad” and related their experiences (95).  
A significant contribution that Khalidi has made to address this lacuna in publicly 
available information about the “Police Action” is that he has translated and published a 
part of a hushed up report
105
 compiled by representatives of the Indian government that 
lists in great detail the atrocities that were perpetrated against Hyderabadi Muslims 
                                                          
105 Khalidi writes that he obtained fragments of the report from people who wish to remain anonymous (99). 
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during and after the “Police Action.” The chain of events and persons that led to the 
drafting and subsequent ban on even acknowledging that the report existed is significant. 
State attorney Muhammad Yunus Salim, having heard of cases of brutality, approached 
the progressive Hyderabadi newspaper Payam’s editor, Qazi Muhammad Abdulghaffar. 
Abdulghaffar approached Abul Kalam Azad, the Indian Minister for Education, and Azad 
approached Nehru. Salim later told Khalidi in an interview that Nehru was persuaded to 
appoint a team to investigate the deeds of the invading forces in Hyderabad, and “in his 
personal capacity” (95), appointed Pandit Sundarlal, Abdulghaffar, and Salim to head a 
team and tour the affected areas. In his introduction to the report, Khalidi writes that Patel 
is said to have been reluctant about Nehru’s decision and was incensed by the report 
when it was completed (Khalidi 95, 97). He refused to acknowledge that any part of it 
could be true.    
Based on their investigations in November and December 1948, Sundarlal and 
Abdulghaffar’s team compiled a report in English and Urdu. According to Sundarlal’s 
secretary, Mujib Rizawi, parts of the report were smuggled out to Karachi in 1949 where 
they were broadcast over Radio Pakistan, causing India great embarrassment (98). Both 
Abdulghaffar and Salim suffered professional setbacks as a result of their involvement 
with the report (98). Khalidi informs us that, because of intimidation from official 
quarters, many people who were in possession of the report got rid of it. There is also 
supposed to be a complete copy of the report in India’s Home Ministry. Srinivas Lahoti, a 
communist leader from Hyderabad, was instructed by the Party to deposit his copy in the 
National Archives in Delhi, which he claims to have done.
106
 The treatment of this report 
                                                          
106 When I tried to locate it in the National Archives in May 2011, I was clearly told by the staff that there were 
documents connected to the Indo-Hyderabad dispute that I would not be able to view unless I could procure permission 
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as extremely sensitive has led to it being rigorously guarded and not allowed to be 
viewed by the public. Furthermore, the importance of the report is underscored when we 
realize that there is no other record of the actions of Indian forces in Hyderabad in 1948 
that has been published or is available in archives (98).  
The translation and reproduction of a part of the report in the volume of essays 
edited by Khalidi and called Hyderabad: After the Fall (1988) claims that not a single 
district of Hyderabad escaped from the violence and that the villages fared far worse than 
the district headquarters (Sundarlal and Abdulghaffar 100). Muslim homes and shops 
were destroyed or plundered in Marathwada and Telangana (100, 103, 110). In Gulbarga, 
where wealthy Muslim homes and shops were plundered by soldiers, an application for 
compensation was denied and the police accused one Sayyid Abdulbari of lying and 
threatened him with libel (106). Many people withdrew their complaints after this threat. 
There was no discrimination between rich or poor Muslims when it came to violence. 
Both the report (100) as well as Smith’s account (21) point out that a very large 
percentage of the Muslim population of the district fled in destitution to Hyderabad city 
or other cities in the state. They could never return to their homes. Those who did were 
“harmed or killed” (100). These claims seriously undermine those made by Nehru, 
Rajagopalachari, Patel, Munshi, as well as General Rajendrasinhji that there was no 
violence perpetrated by Indian forces and that they had acted in exemplary fashion, 
treating Hindus and Muslims equally well. 
In most of the testimonies collected by the investigators, it was either the (mostly 
local) goondas or the army, or a combination of both, that was responsible for the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to do so from the Prime Minister’s office. Narsing Rao emphasizes that such a report was indeed unofficially 
commissioned by the Indian government but was never released (DVD 9, 1:54:25-1:55:33).  
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violence. The investigators observe that hundreds of innocent Muslims were being 
arrested by the Indian police under the charge of being Razakars. For fear of being 
arrested like this, many were afraid to come forth and put forward their legitimate claims 
of persecution (115). In places such as Jalna, for example, people were rounded up, 
beaten, and shot based on accusations that they were Razakars (102). Smith’s account 
corroborates these events, and he points out that in some places, all the men were placed 
in a line and shot. His estimate suggests that “somewhere between one in ten and one in 
five of the adult males may have lost their lives in those few days” (21). Sundarlal and 
Abdulghaffar’s report says that in Moram (Osmanabad district), a Congress leader 
maintained that four to five hundred Muslims had been killed in that area (103). In Bid, 
local Hindus who had left the village returned and seized arms from Muslims (103). 
Mosques, tombs, and ashurkhanas (Shia congregation halls) were demolished (103, 106, 
110, 111), and there are allegations of forced conversions having occurred (104). Young 
women were abducted (102) and raped (101, 106) during the invasion. Smith’s account 
also attests to this (21). Cases emerged of Muslim women in Bidar district and Shahpur 
taluqa committing suicide (often along with their children) by jumping into wells at the 
threat of being “dishonoured” by rape or after being raped (Sundarlal and Abdulghaffar 
105, 113). In Ganjoti Paygah (Osmanabad), Pasha Bi told the investigators, 
The trouble in Ganjoti began after the army’s arrival. All the young Muslim 
women here were raped. Five daughters of Osman Sahib were raped and six 
daughters of the Qazi were raped. Three unmarried daughters of Muhammad 
Sultan were raped by the goondas. Ismail Sahib Sawdagar’s daughter was raped 
in Saiba Chamar’s home for a week. Soldiers from Umarga came every week and 
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after all-night rape, young Muslim women were sent back to their homes in the 
morning. This was repeated for weeks at Gujar Chand’s house. Mahtab Tamboli’s 
daughters were divided among Hindus, one is in Burga Julaha’s home … 
(Sundarlal and Abdulghaffar 103-4) 
In Shahpur, the report claims that two thousand people were killed, a thousand women 
committed suicide by jumping into wells after they had been raped, and five hundred 
children were killed and thrown into wells (114).   
Smith writes that while “[t]he behavior of invading troops is seldom pretty … in 
this instance the army personnel were emotionally involved in the communalism” (20). 
He is convinced, therefore, that the emotional investment of the Indian forces in the 
violence stemmed from communalist feelings, which were certainly embedded in the 
recent and gripping spectre of Partition. In addition to the violence perpetrated by Indian 
forces, there is also evidence of violence against Muslims by local non-Muslims. Thus, 
even Sundarayya and Reddy, who maintain throughout that the people were undivided by 
the Razakars as a result of the unifying influence of the Telangana struggle, concede that 
there were terrible reprisals in Marathwada (Sundarayya 9; Reddy 59), where “the 
populace widely rose against the local Muslim petty officials, against individual Muslims 
who had been browbeating them, or just against Muslims as Muslims; and wreaked 
agonizing vengeance”107 (Smith 21). However, Sundarayya also writes that it was Hindus 
who rescued and sheltered hundreds of Muslim families from the “campaign of rape and 
murder indulged in by the [Indian] Union armies” (189). There is some evidence of this 
in Sundarlal and Abdulghaffar’s report, which names a Pandit Rao Patvari who came to 
                                                          
107 Narsing Rao says that these extensive attacks by local Hindus against Muslims in Marathwada (and, according to 
him, Bidar as well, which was situated in the Kannada-speaking regions) took place with (and in spite of) the Indian 
army’s knowledge (DVD 9, 1:51:25).  
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assist the Muslims (101). Another Hindu from Jivargi, Patvari Baba Rao, told the team 
led by Sundarlal and Abdulghaffar that “[t]he Indian army and police were aware of the 
impending massacre, but they made no attempt to stop it” (105).  
By May Day 1949, people were calling for the end of the military regime and the 
establishment of a democratic government of workers, peasants, and members of the 
middle-class (Sundarayya 309). By 1950, civil liberties had been completely crushed in 
the state. Sundarayya writes about a “Congress autocracy” and explains that things were 
so bad that the police could pounce upon any locality, institution, or factory and 
indiscriminately arrest, terrorise, and torture people and detain them without warrant or 
trial. There was no individual liberty or privacy, sanctity of educational institutions, or 
respect for women (305). In a revealing move, the printing machinery of the Communist 
Party, trade unions, student, and youth organizations was confiscated (305-6). This act 
reveals the apprehensions of the Indian military government because the publications 
associated with the political groups mentioned above had been responsible for keeping 
the anti-Nizam struggle alive and kicking in the minds of the reading public and served as 
well as a morale booster for the resistance in Telangana. Between February and August 
1949, there were fifty-two people in Hyderabad city alone who were languishing in jails. 
Amongst these were communist leaders, organisers, and active workers, trade unionists, 
militant workers, students, professors, progressive writers, newspaper editors, 
government employees, and organisers and activists of the League of Democratic Youth 
(LDY) as well as the AHSU.
108
   
                                                          
108 Among the student leaders arrested were Narsing Rao, Vithal Kulkarni, Gangadhar Chitnis, Hanumant Rao, and 
Iqbal Ahmad. Sulaiman Arab, the popular Hyderabadi Progressive poet, Ghouse Mohiuddin, the editor of the 
progressive weekly Savera, Akhtar Hussain, editor of the popular daily Payam (which was now banned), and Razia 
Begum, lecturer at the Osmania University College for Women, were also arrested (Sundarayya 306-7). Sundarayya 
remarks, “Culture was being threatened by the Government of that ‘defender’ of culture – Nehru” (307). Elsewhere, 
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The extreme repression of the Telangana Armed Struggle by Indian forces,
109
 
which had set up military camps across the state (Sundarayya 195), resulted in the retreat 
of the movement to the forests by the end of February 1949 (246). With the concentration 
of larger forces, heavy bombing, frequent raids (299), unfair trials
110
 under oppressive 
conditions (defence lawyers for Telangana fighters and leaders were threatened, their 
witnesses beaten up, and comrades shot in forests while supposedly being taken to courts 
to stand trial) (321-2, 324), the Party leadership emphasized to its cadres that the Indian 
army was a bigger enemy than the Nizam’s forces and that it would not let them survive 
(Stree 53). Although the military regime had been replaced by a civilian administration 
with M.K. Vellodi, Secretary of States department, as its head in 1950 (Sundarayya 305), 
the Telangana Armed Struggle was finally called off on October 21, 1951 after 
considerable pressure from the high command and prominent leaders from Kerala and 
Bengal
111
 (Stree 15, 53; Sundarayya 1). In spite of this, the Congress government and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Sundarayya points out the magnitude of the arrest of Akhtar Hussain, his brothers, his dying brother-in-law Aziz 
Ahmed, and his sister Razia Begum by quoting the “bourgeoisie’s own Orient Press,” which reported it as the “biggest 
haul of intellectuals” in the city (qtd in Sundarayya 310). Urdu writer and professor and communist activist Zeenath 
Sajida was also amongst the arrested (Sajida, DVD 2.2, 2:41). For an extensive list of names of arrested people, see 
Sundarayya (306-7).  
 
109 For numbers and other extensive area-wise details of this repression (torture, rape, and murder), see Chapter 11 
(195-205) of Sundarayya’s book.   
 
110 People had refused to recognize the Indian government’s courts and ignored the patels and patwaris who had 
returned to the villages. They turned to the village committees to resolve their interpersonal disputes (Sundarayya 221). 
Furthermore, in early 1950, the government had sentenced to death twelve Telangana leaders. The outrage against this 
move was great, and renowned London-based British barrister, Labour politician, and Soviet sympathizer D.N Pritt 
immediately came to the assistance of the condemned, enlisting the help and support of prominent lawyers such as 
Danial Latifi, who had communist sympathies and belonged to the Punjab Muslim League. Pritt appeared before the 
Hyderabad High Court to defend many such cases. Overwhelmed by not only the reaction in Hyderabad but also 
telegrams of protest from the Czechoslovakian Youth League, Hungarian Freedom Fighters’ Federation, World 
Federation of Lawyers, World Federation of Trade Unions etc., the Indian Government decided to commute the 
sentences to life imprisonment (322-4).  
 
111 Many people felt a major sense of disappointment when the movement was called off because they had believed that 
true independence was in sight (Stree 136). For women, this was a particularly bitter end, since they were told to return 
to their husbands (or find husbands, if they were single) after having gloriously challenged various socially constructed 
glass ceilings in the struggle (93-4, 136, 170, 253-5). Sundarayya attributes the eventual split in the Communist Party in 
1962-3 to the calling off of the struggle in 1951 (5). For arguments that the conditions for revolution no longer existed 
after the Police Action, see Reddy’s Heroic Telengana: Reminiscences and Experiences (1973). For an unrelenting 
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Indian Army continued to shoot communists and former guerilla fighters
112
 (Stree 53; 
Chakravartty 130).  
  The saving grace of the Indian invasion was that there were some land reforms. 
Sundarayya admits that jagirdari lands, which had belonged to individual landlords, and 
sarf-e-khas lands, which had belonged to the Nizam, were abolished after the “Police 
Action” and incorporated into khalsa or diwani lands, which were owned and 
administered by the state (9). And although Reddy is critical of how the Indian 
Government behaved in Telangana after the “Police Action,” he also notes that the 
Razakar organization was dismantled, the jagirdari system abolished, and tenancy 
legislation enacted by the military regime after the “Police Action” (59, 65). Narsing Rao 
points out that the years 1952 to 1956 saw “positive action” by the Indian government, 
which established many new and much-needed polytechnics and colleges in Hyderabad 
(DVD 7, 29:22). And in spite of Urdu being removed as the medium of instruction in 
Osmania University, Urdu theatre flourished alongside a Telugu renaissance (28:50-
31:33).  
However, Usama Khalidi’s as well as Karen Leonard’s research has shown that 
after the “Police Action” and throughout the 1950s, entire Hyderabadi Muslim families 
left for Pakistan for better prospects. Omar Khalidi has also pointed out that there were 
                                                                                                                                                                             
critique of Sundarayya’s and other communist leaders’ and writers’ justifications of the Party’s decision to call off the 
struggle, see Devulapalli Venkateswara Rao’s Telangana Struggle and the Path of Indian Revolution (1974) and 
Refutation of Wrong Trends Advocating Withdrawal of Telangana Armed Struggle (1982).      
 
112 The lack of acknowledgement of the contribution of communists in overthrowing the Nizam continues to this day. 
Mallu Swarajyam is disenchanted as she talks about discrimination in favour of Congress freedom fighters who are 
honoured today with pensions, while communist fighters are turned away. She cites the case of Chaityala Ailamma 
(Stree 238-9), whose struggle against the landlords sparked off the Telangana movement, but who received no pension 
from the government, was dependent on her granddaughter until the day she died, and sang songs of poverty and 
despair (40-1). Chaudhary points out that programmes in Indian state capitals on the occasion of the silver jubilee of the 
country’s independence to honour freedom fighters and give them pensions and access to facilities specifically 
excluded those who participated in the struggles in the princely states, and only considered struggles on the “mainland” 
(126). He adds that “[a] query brought the official reply that struggle in Hyderabad was for ‘accession to Indian union’ 
and not for freedom!” (126-7) 
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many Razakars amongst these immigrants, who fled because they knew that they would 
be prosecuted for their crimes during the last Nizam’s rule (“From Torrents” 36). Those 
Muslim families that remained but had some members who had moved to Pakistan found 
that their homes were confiscated by the new government, in spite of the fact that the law 
held that property could be seized only if the title-holder had emigrated. Soon, there was 
not a single upper middle-class family that did not have some or most of its members in 
Pakistan (Khalidi, “From Osmania” 191, 193). Not only did they migrate to Pakistan, but 
many Hyderabadis (Muslims, Hindus, Anglo-Indians) also left for international locations 
such as the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and parts of the Middle East, as Leonard has 
shown in the extensive research she has undertaken in her book Locating Home: India’s 
Hyderabadis Abroad (2007). Papiya Ghosh points out that “the largest and most 
homogeneous group of Indian Muslims [in the USA] belong to Hyderabad” (134). The 
largest concentration of Hyderabadis in the US is found in Chicago (Mohammad 295), 
and in Canada in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Some of these diasporic Hyderabadis 
still contest the accession of Hyderabad to India; they prefer to create their own 
associations to differentiate themselves from Indian, Pakistani, Muslim, or Hindu 
associations. 
In fact, Syed Ali stresses that it is not only economic incentives or work, study, 
and travel opportunities abroad, but also a now established culture of migration that is 
responsible for the high rate of migration out of present-day Hyderabad. The dismantling 
of social stratification for Muslims in Hyderabad after 1948 has contributed to this 
culture of migration. Hyderabad’s pre-1948 social stratification “was a strict status 
system, based on one’s social distance from the Nizam. Social life in the city revolved 
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around his person” (42). When the Nizam was deposed and the landholdings of the 
nawabs confiscated, the upper-class lost their mutually reinforced support system. 
Furthermore, the lack of economic mobility and educational opportunities during the 
Nizam’s rule was replaced with greater opportunities and choices for people in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and the middle-class expanded. Individual achievement began to be prized as 
much or even more than caste or class affiliations (42). However, these developments 
were unequal, and Muslims and non-élite Hindus believe that they are discriminated 
against by upper-caste Hindus (43). This differentiation has fuelled migration, and Ali 
writes that Muslim men do not even apply for jobs in HITEC city, the ever expanding 
technological and software hub of the city, because they are certain that Hindus will not 
hire them. All these factors have contributed to the view that migration is the desired path 
for Hyderabadis, and “[m]igrants have come to be seen as something of heroes, people to 
be emulated” (43).   
In this chapter, I have outlined the material, social, and political realities of 
Hyderabad in the late 1940s, and explained how the context of Partition was undeniably 
embedded in the trajectory that Hyderabad state took. The communalist violence of the 
Razakars, the communal mobilization of the Arya Samaj and the Anjuman-e-Tabligh-ul-
Islam, and the repression and reprisals inflicted by the Indian state’s forces upon 
communists and Hyderabadi Muslims after the invasion of 1948 all find space in this 
chapter. The resistance to such divisive trends through the Telangana Armed Struggle 
have also been described. In addition to this, I have cited from and elaborated on how the 
Hyderabadi, Indian, Pakistani, and British press responded prolifically to the twists and 
turns taken by the Indo-Hyderabad dispute, as well as how the thrusts and parries 
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between the Nizam and his government and the Congress big players and their 
representatives became increasingly hostile and urgent as the invasion of Hyderabad 
became imminent. It emerges from my research and analysis that while concerns about 
communal violence were certainly uppermost in both the Nizam’s and Nehru’s minds in 
different ways, both were guilty (as were their governments, officials, and allies) of 
undermining the interests of many sections of Hyderabadis through their actions, which 
were motivated by the lure of political power. In this way was Hyderabad absorbed into 
India through rape, rupture, death, and dislocation. The purpose of the next three chapters 
is to examine how the experiences of Hyderabadis during this time are remembered in the 
fictions of three writers: Anita Desai, a secular and internationally canonized Indian 
writer; Samina Ali, a debut Indian-American novelist of Hyderabadi Muslim descent; and 
Kishorilal Vyas “Neelkanth,” an Indian writer of Hyderabadi background and Hindutva 
leanings.          
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Reading Between the Lines: The Representation of Hyderabadis and 
Hyderabad in Anita Desai’s Clear Light of Day 
In Anita Desai’s novel Clear Light of Day (1980), the character named Raja 
befriends a Hyderabadi Muslim family that later flees to Hyderabad from its house in Old 
Delhi during the turmoil of Partition. After their departure from Old Delhi, Raja is 
thrilled to receive a letter from the Hyder Alis informing him that they are  
[i]n Hyderabad – quite safe. In Hyder Ali Sahib’s home – his mother lives there, 
and his sister. They’re all safe. He says there is no trouble in Hyderabad. They are 
in hiding, but they are safe and well, and they even found a friend to post this 
letter to me … He even says Benazir sends her best wishes. (115) 
The first contradiction in Raja’s synopsis of Hyder Ali’s letter is the fact that the family is 
in hiding in spite of there being “no trouble in Hyderabad.” No explanation is given for 
this dissonance anywhere in the novel. Second, and far more important, is the mistaken 
idea that there is no trouble in Hyderabad during Partition. Indeed, Raja uses the word 
“safe” thrice, and very emphatically. As I have already shown in the last chapter, 
Hyderabad was far from being safe in the late 1940s. Amidst conditions of tremendous 
feudal exploitation as well as brutal repression by communalist Muslim Razakars, the 
Telangana peasantry had risen in 1946 to fight the Razakars and the arms of the feudal 
state ruled by Nizam VII Mir Osman Ali Khan, the hereditary ruler of Hyderabad. 
Razakar atrocities were terrible not only in the rural districts but in the capital city of 
Hyderabad as well. Although they found easy targets in poor as well as working-class 
people, they also persecuted élite Muslims who challenged their attempts to create 
divisions between Hindus and Muslims. For example, when retired Muslim officials 
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published a protest against the Razakars, they were harassed not only by the Razakars but 
also by the Nizam’s government (White Paper 16; Munshi 188; Smith 16). Even those 
Muslims in British India who thought Hyderabad would be a safe haven and made their 
way to the state (Kidwai 27; Ali, Tragedy 127) faced great dangers on their way to 
Hyderabad. In fact, former Delhi University professor and Partition survivor Ishtiaq 
Husain Qureshi (1903-1981) writes that “[t]he most ghastly killing took place when the 
Grand Trunk Express going to Hyderabad and Madras was stopped and every Muslim 
man, woman and child was slaughtered” (69). The massacre that took place aboard the 
Grand Trunk Express is represented with hair-raising psychological and material detail in 
an Urdu short story called “Kaali Raat” (“The Black Night”) by Aziz Ahmad (1914-
1978), in which a Hyderabadi Muslim man named Tahawwar shoots his wife Batool to 
prevent her from being raped and, consequently, “dishonoured” by the attackers before 
being killed himself by a Sikh man. 
In addition to this horrifying violence, élite Hyderabadi Muslims like the fictional 
Hyder Ali family were worried about their political, social, and economic futures amidst 
all the political upheaval around them. Organizations such as the Arya Samaj and the 
Hyderabad State Congress were calling for a merger of Hyderabad with India, while the 
Nizam stubbornly wanted Hyderabad to remain independent in spite of all the problems 
that years of misrule had created. Moreover, the medievalist feudal system from which 
the élite in Hyderabadi cities often derived its primary or secondary income was showing 
signs of crumbling under the strain of the Telangana Armed Struggle. Following the 
forced accession of Hyderabad to India after India invaded Hyderabad in 1948, not only 
was the Telangana struggle brutally suppressed; the Indian Army also carried out 
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reprisals against Muslims to punish them for Razakar cruelty as well as the violence 
perpetrated by Muslims against Hindu and Sikhs elsewhere during Partition. Although 
Hyderabadi Muslim élites were not in danger of losing their lives after the military 
government clamped down on Muslims, those in government positions were concerned 
about their career possibilities in India (Ali, Tragedy 122). The tables were about to turn 
in terms of industry and commerce as well, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith points out: after 
the “Police Action,” “the same device of government control which had previously 
discriminated to help Muslims now operated on the whole against them” (22).  
The almost simultaneous explosion of many political currents in Hyderabad 
around 1946 and the violent clashes that these movements invariably consisted of hardly 
qualify Hyderabad as a peaceful place as Hyder Ali’s letter to Raja seems to suggest. 
Furthermore, as 1947 drew closer and questions of accession and non-accession became 
fraught with tension, the news that was being circulated about Hyderabad from 
Hyderabad and India was wildly conflicting, as testified by the bewildering number of 
contradictory and opposing details emerging in contemporary newspaper reports and 
editorials, as well as official government reports. For example, an extract from the Daily 
Press Summary of the British Information Services, dated May 13, 1948, pointed out that 
Indian newspapers such as Hindustan Times, The Pioneer, and The Indian Express all 
prominently and “conspicuously” featured Razakar violence in and around Hyderabad 
(“Extract from Daily Press Summary, British Information Services dated 13th May, 
1948”); in its summary for June 3-14, 1948, the British Information Services reported 
that “[t]otal economic sanctions or military action or both” had been advocated by some 
newspapers to deal with the Razakar threat (“Daily Press Summary – June 3-14, 1948. 
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(Weekly)”). However, after the invasion of Hyderabad in September 1948, British 
newspapers reported from New Delhi that “Indian propagandists” had “wildly 
exaggerated” the numbers and military prowess of the paramilitary Razakars, who turned 
out to be “broken reeds” during the invasion (Times, “Cease-Fire” 18 Sep. 1948), and 
how “there is a strong suspicion that the magnitude of [the Razakars’] aggressive acts 
[before the invasion] has been grossly exaggerated in order to provide some kind of 
excuse for an Indian invasion” (Morning Advertiser, “Aggression” 15 Sep. 1948). In yet 
another case of absolutely opposing reports, during the invasion, the Evening Argus 
stated that the Indian troops, “pushing deeper into Hyderabad, claimed to-day to be 
halfway to Secunderabad” and that several Hyderabad troops as well as Razakars had 
surrendered, and their arms and ammunition had been taken, while “Hyderabad Radio 
claimed that the Indian troops were being held in the south and north-west and that 250 
casualties had been inflicted on those advancing from Sholapur” (14 Sep. 1948). Thus, 
the news coming from Hyderabad and the news coming from India was completely 
confusing and contradictory to anyone reading or listening to it in Hyderabad, India, or 
England.  
There was also gross ignorance and/or misrepresentation on the part of state 
officials and state apparatuses. For instance, immediately after the invasion, several 
Indian statesmen including the Prime Minister (Jawaharlal Nehru), the Deputy Prime 
Minister (Vallabhbhai Patel), and the Governor General (Chakravarti Rajgopalachari), 
military men, and All-India Radio were quoted as congratulating the Indian army on its 
restraint and morally correct attitude towards the Hyderabadis. These claims are directly 
refuted in Hyderabad Prime Minister Mir Laik Ali’s memoirs (Tragedy 43, 55). But Ali 
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himself is also guilty of misrepresentation because he notes that he had pointed out to 
India’s Agent-General K.M. Munshi that, unlike the atrocities unleashed by the Indian 
army during the invasion and “despite all the propaganda against Hyderabad of Hindu-
Muslim discord, there had not been a single communal clash anywhere throughout the 
State” (59). This is a direct denial of not only the terrible repression of non-Muslims by 
the Razakars in the state between 1946 and 1948 but also the role of Qasim Razvi, with 
whom Ali was more than familiar, in spewing venomous communalist propaganda 
against non-Muslims and India. Bearing this context of contradictory journalistic and 
media reports, as well as the assertions and denials amongst politicians and élites of both 
states, it is possible to speculate that what Raja knows about Hyderabad is what the 
average Delhiite knew and believed about Hyderabad at the time. However, Desai too is 
culpable, in terms of her careless construction of a “safe” Hyderabad for the Hyder Ali 
family to flee to, a representation that (as I argue in this chapter) becomes part of the 
erasure by mainstream Indian literature and history of Hyderabad’s Partition history. 
Furthermore, Raja’s myopia about the material conditions in Hyderabad, a place 
he thinks has “no trouble” at all, cannot be overlooked when it is seen in light of his 
passionate political ideals based in secularism and syncretism. Out of all the characters in 
Clear Light of Day, such as Raja’s siblings Bim, Tara, and Baba, who live in Old Delhi 
during Partition,
113
 Raja is the one through whom we receive the loudest and most vocal 
criticism of communalist politics. An aspiring Urdu poet who refuses to join a group of 
                                                          
113 Bim and Baba continue to live in Old Delhi after Partition, while Tara marries a diplomat and goes away and Raja 
departs for Hyderabad to be with Hyder Ali and his family. The fact that Raja leaves his own family in Old Delhi is 
resented by Bim, who feels that the responsibility for caring and providing for her raving, hallucinating Aunt Mira and 
the gentle, dependent Baba has fallen squarely on her shoulders, limiting her own opportunities and, to some extent, 
dismissing her dreams. A large part of the novel consists of Bim’s, Tara’s, and Baba’s individual and shared 
recollections of their experiences before and during Partition. The central concern of the plot appears to be Bim’s 
bitterness at being abandoned by Raja to grow old in a decaying Old Delhi; the narration moves from her anger (which 
she expresses in front of Tara, who is visiting Bim and intends to attend Raja’s daughter’s wedding in Hyderabad) to 
her forgiveness and acceptance of Raja, his wife, and his children.   
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communalist students in Hindu College that targets Muslims in Delhi during Partition, 
Raja marries a Muslim woman, Hyder Ali’s daughter Benazir. His marriage is arguably a 
radical act of secularism at a time when there had been unprecedented violence between 
Hindus and Muslims. Yet, I contend that this secularism masks the silence imposed by 
the text on Benazir, who does not speak in the novel. What serves to makes this silencing 
of Benazir even more acute is that Raja’s ignorance is mirrored in the short-sightedness 
that marks the self-preoccupation of other characters in the novel. This trend is best 
exemplified by Bim, whose perspective is important because it is through her eyes that 
we see Benazir. A profound example of Bim’s self-absorption emerges when Tara 
complains that nothing ever changes in the Das house in Old Delhi and everything goes 
on unperturbed just the way it always has; Tara hints that this is because Bim wants to 
live in the past. Bim is offended because she sees herself as being trapped in the house 
and tells Tara in a “hard voice” that 
Old Delhi does not change. It only decays. My students tell me it is a great 
cemetery, every house a tomb. Nothing but sleeping graves … Here we are left 
rocking on the backwaters, getting duller and grayer, I suppose. Anyone who isn’t 
dull and grey goes away – to New Delhi, to England, to Canada, the Middle East. 
They don’t come back. (13-4) 
This quotation marks a prominent theme in the novel: the pervasive self-pity of its Hindu 
middle-class characters who feel that they have been wronged by history. That Bim 
envisages departure from Old Delhi only in terms of greater opportunities that have been 
denied to her is significant because it shows that she fails to recognize that the greatest 
departure from Old Delhi in recent years had been the panic-stricken exodus of its 
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middle-class as well as working-class Muslim inhabitants to Pakistan and other sub-
continental “safe havens” such as Hyderabad during Partition. This gap is made 
especially strange by the fact that the novel’s narrative time and its construction of 
memory are firmly rooted in Partition, and because the Das family’s lives are intimately 
intertwined with the Hyder Ali family which escapes to Hyderabad during Partition. The 
Das family is not only a tenant and neighbour of Hyder Ali; Raja goes on to marry Hyder 
Ali’s daughter Benazir.  
In this chapter, I will focus on Benazir, the historically present but silenced 
Hyderabadi Muslim woman. I will argue that the “absent presence” (Didur, “At a Loss” 
67, Unsettling 156) of Benazir in the text encodes Desai’s patriarchal silencing of the 
experiences of Hyderabadi Muslim women during the upheaval of Partition. In doing so, 
I will go against the grain of scholarly assertions which maintain that literary texts enable 
the recovery of Partition experiences. Instead, I will argue that literary texts, in fact, can 
also be crucial to sustaining the silence in public culture and official narratives about 
entire histories of women and communities.   
This chapter does a Saidian contrapuntal reading of Clear Light of Day in terms of 
the “codified, if only marginally visible, presence” (Said 63, 66-7) of Benazir. The 
mediation of distance, which my location within the diaspora has enabled, demands a re-
rereading of the text in light of the tensions produced by the mainstreaming of a 
normative Indian culture as Hindu in recent years, tensions that enable a more 
complicated reading of Benazir and the position she occupies as a middle-class Muslim 
woman in a family forced to flee from Delhi to Hyderabad with the outbreak of 
communal riots. In this regard, it becomes important to “open [the text] out both to what 
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went into it and to what its author excluded” (67). In light of the particular fact that 
Hyderabadi Muslim women have acquired a thrice marginalized status in India since 
1948 through their gender, religion, as well as regional affiliation, it becomes even more 
relevant to apply to this analysis Said’s assertion that “the ‘what’ and ‘how’ in the 
representation of ‘things,’ while allowing for considerable individual freedom, are 
circumscribed and socially regulated” (80). With this in mind, as a middle-class Muslim 
woman from India, where Muslims are a marginalized minority and Muslim women are 
sidelined and often persecuted not only on account of their gender but also on account of 
their religious affiliations, I place emphasis on reading Clear Light of Day with “an effort 
to draw out, extend, give emphasis and voice to what is silent or marginally present or 
ideologically represented”114 (Said 66). In the absence of any self-representation of 
Benazir in the text, her voice and subjectivity are appropriated and represented by the 
other characters in the novel, and it is through their words and attitudes alone that we are 
resigned to knowing her. To this end, the narrative’s focus on Raja’s irresponsible 
departure from Old Delhi, which leaves Bim alone to take care of Aunt Mira and Baba on 
a small income, and, consequently, on Bim’s terrible anger towards Benazir as the 
imagined cause of her abandonment by Raja ensures that Benazir’s flight from Old Delhi 
during the violent upheavals of Partition is overshadowed in history.  
In fact, there are few direct references to Partition violence in Clear Light of Day. 
The period between March and August 1947, when communal violence was at its worst, 
is called only “that summer” (9, 70, 71). Elaine Ho observes that most of Desai’s works 
                                                          
114 While I generally endorse these aims of Said to give voice to silences of the marginalized in terms of how 
postcolonialists should re-read canonical texts, in this chapter, I will also temper carefully the idea of extracting voice 
from silent quarters. As I have suggested in my introduction, this is a strategy especially supported and practiced by 
recent studies in Partition testimonies and literature that aim to look at questions of silence and voice more sensitively 
and contextually.   
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do not address historic time and events directly, and historical transitions are embedded 
in character histories or “glanced at obliquely” as the background to the plot (4). 
However, on a couple of occasions in Clear Light of Day, the characters do consciously 
appreciate and discuss the life-changing impact Partition had on their lives. For instance, 
Bim muses about how life stagnates for long periods of time when nothing happens, and 
then “suddenly there is a crash – mighty deeds take place – momentous events – even if 
one doesn’t know it at the time – and then life subsides again into the backwaters till the 
next push, the next flood? That summer was certainly one of them – the summer of ’47” 
(71). In response, Tara reminds Bim, “For everyone in India … For every Hindu and 
Muslim. In India and in Pakistan.” Bim acknowledges that it was so for everyone, and 
remembers seeing fires burning in the city every night (71).  
Partition is thus remembered as a private history of the Das family, embedded in 
the lived and remembered experiences of the characters’ lives as well as in the 
background to those lives. Following Urvashi Butalia’s concept of private Partition 
history, Ho reads Raja’s story in the novel as Partition privately remembered, “an elegiac 
conjuration of lost realities, and also a remembrance, through a narrative of ambivalent 
family loyalty and disaffiliation, of the public memory of convulsion and catastrophic 
rupture” (38). Partition recalled as an 
intimate portrait of familial history allows Desai to counter the panoptic view of 
Indian history filled with generalizations and often inaccuracies. She centers on a 
woman who stays in Old Delhi, a woman who is the most connected physically 
and psychologically to a family’s past. It is within the geography of Bim’s private 
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space, her own house, that time is recorded and her own memories, or history, 
relived. (Thaggert 93)  
Private histories are, therefore, valuable because they show the local, human impact of 
Partition and do not attempt to singularly represent a “universal” face of Partition. Desai 
successfully constructs the concept of a private history of Partition by positing 
recollection as implicit and indirect, “work[ing] through her characters’ interaction, 
especially through dialogue and reminiscence” (Reimenschneider 197). She uses 
narratives modes like flashback, perspective, stream-of-consciousness, point of view, and 
associative thought processes that connect memories with meaningful symbols (205). 
Additionally, not only do we see this private history as the Das family’s story and Bim’s 
story, but also as Desai’s own story in light of her statement that Clear Light of Day is the 
“most autobiographical of all my books because it’s the house and the garden and the 
neighborhood that I grew up in” (Desai, “Against” 525). She has said too that she 
connects “a little bit with each of the different characters” (525). The danger, however, 
with such an intensely private text about an absolutely life-changing political event such 
as Partition is that it ends up becoming a preoccupied narrative with characters that are 
completely absorbed in themselves. For example, we see that in spite of the tremendous 
upheavals that are taking place right under their noses in Old Delhi, Bim does not “know 
it at the time” that Partition would be remembered as a momentous event, and Tara has to 
shake her out of her self-musings and remind her that it was a critical time for everyone 
in India and Pakistan (71). In this self-absorption, the harsh realities of Partition are 
completely elided, and Desai’s text only becomes part of the greater, official, mainstream 
silencing of Partition. 
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This neglect is vividly manifested in the fact that Clear Light of Day largely fails 
to represent the magnitude of Partition violence in Delhi, a city that was tense for almost 
a year until Gandhi’s assassination in January 1948, when the utter shock about the 
manner of his death somewhat calmed things down. As a result of Partition, Delhi 
underwent a complete demographic and cultural transformation within a span of a few 
years. It had a population of 950,000 in 1947, out of which 330,000 people, who were 
Muslims, left during Partition (Pandey, Remembering 122). 500,000 non-Muslim 
refugees arrived in Delhi during Partition. By 1951, the population of Delhi was 
1,740,000, and Partition refugees accounted for more than twenty-eight per cent of the 
population (122). More vivid and revealing than numbers, however, is social worker Anis 
Kidwai’s reaction to the mass exoduses of Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab. 
There were suddenly so many desperate, dispossessed Hindus and Sikhs in Delhi that she 
wondered whether there were any Hindus and Sikhs left in Pakistan at all (163). Delhi’s 
resources were strained to breaking point as traumatized Hindus and Sikhs and 
persecuted internally displaced (Indian) Muslims flooded its huge refugee camps 
(Dalrymple, City 44; Pandey, Remembering 128).  
First, Muslims sought refuge in September 1947 at Palam airport, in the Pak 
Transfer Office, the Jama Masjid area, Nizamuddin, Okhla, graveyards, abandoned 
Muslim monuments, the Pakistan High Commission, and the houses of Cabinet ministers 
Abul Kalam Azad and Rafi Ahmed Kidwai as well as other prominent Muslims in Delhi. 
When these places became unsafe, they went to the camps that were set up in the Purana 
Qila and Humayun’s Tomb (Pandey, Remembering 123). Within a few months, there 
were 164,000 internally displaced Muslims in Delhi, many of whom were waiting for a 
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chance to leave for Pakistan (123). It was estimated in mid-September that approximately 
sixty per cent of the Muslim population of Old Delhi and ninety per cent of those in New 
Delhi had fled their homes. Twenty to twenty-five thousand Muslims were said to have 
been killed. Furthermore, by October 1947, it was estimated that there were a hundred 
and fifty thousand non-Muslim refugees from outside Delhi. By January 1948, there were 
reported to be four hundred thousand refugees from Punjab alone (124).  
Violence was provoked in Delhi by many factors: uncertainty and calculations 
about the future which were contributed by the large number of government officials in 
Delhi; extremist propaganda and activities of different parties; news of riots and killings 
elsewhere; arrival of trains full of bodies of Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab, 
North West Frontier Province, and Sindh; and news from survivors about how Hindu and 
Sikh girls and women had been raped and abducted by Muslim mobs (Pandey, 
Remembering 130-1; Kidwai 28). Pandey points out that although looting, stabbing, and 
clashes had started between Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs in Delhi before 1947 
(Remembering 130), it was the violence in Qarol Bagh in September 1947 that marked a 
new stage in Partition violence against Muslims in Delhi. Individual acts such as 
stabbings and lootings were replaced by systematic attempts by organizations such as the 
RSS of locating “enemy” houses and driving them out from all over Delhi (Pandey, 
Remembering 130, 136-7; Qureshi 69-70). There were large scale killings in 
neighbouring towns and villages (Qureshi 69). Qureshi writes that whichever village 
Delhi’s Deputy Commissioner M.S. Randhawa visited with RSS leaders in tow, the very 
next day its Muslim population would be exterminated (69). Pandey has also noted that 
Randhawa was extensively involved in the violence (144). In fact, Kidwai writes that 
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Randhawa colluded actively with Muslim League officials to ensure that life was made 
so difficult for Muslims that they would leave Delhi and its surrounding areas and go to 
Pakistan, thereby making room for Hindu and Sikh refugees
115
 (181-90).    
The impact of the torn social fabric of Delhi that is barely acknowledged in 
Desai’s text is seen in the eloquent words of Kidwai, who worked in camps and other 
locations in Delhi to provide help and support to both internally displaced Muslims as 
well Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab. To her disappointment, Kidwai found 
that “[n]o place was safe, no heart secure” (23). Kidwai also worked as a social worker 
for the state’s Central Recovery Program. She tells her readers that fifteen hundred 
women were abducted in Delhi during Partition (146). Two hundred were later 
“recovered” (146), and by March 1948, camps and homes for recovered women were 
established in Delhi, such as one in Daryaganj (160). The riots had also caused losses of 
several lakhs to Jamia School, Publication House, and Library, all in Qarol Bagh (22). 
Dead bodies lay rotting on the streets and hospitals were in imminent danger of being 
attacked because they had Muslim staff and servants (Pandey, Remembering 128). Armed 
Sikhs tried to prevent Muslim officials who had opted for Pakistan to leave for Pakistan 
(129). Muslim students writing the Matriculation examination in a school in Qarol Bagh 
were segregated from their non-Muslim classmates and butchered (129). Muslim 
businesses including tailoring establishments and boutiques in affluent areas such as 
Connaught Place were looted. Shopkeepers were murdered, and passers-by helped 
themselves to the stocks (Tuker 493; Dalrymple, City 43). Civil servants living in Lodhi 
Colony were murdered by Sikh mobs (Dalrymple, City 43-4). Trains arrived in Delhi 
with dead bodies of Hindus and Sikhs, and left with Muslims who also met the same fate 
                                                          
115 In many villages around Delhi, Muslims were converted and allowed to stay on as Hindus (Kidwai 219-20, 233-46). 
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somewhere along their difficult journey to Pakistan (Tuker 495). Lieutenant General 
Francis Tuker (GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, 1947-1948) writes in his Partition 
memoirs that Muslims were chased and killed by armed Sikhs, one of whom was a 
military officer, in broad daylight on Delhi railway station (493-5).   
Many Muslims who survived managed to do so by barricading themselves in 
areas of the Old City, such as Turkman Gate and the Jama Masjid (Dalrymple, City 44, 
190). They fortified the gates, armed themselves with mortars and heavy machine guns, 
and not only held off the rioters, but also the Indian Army (Dalrymple, City 44; Qureshi 
67). In the words of Qureshi, “[o]ne could see that an undeclared and unofficial civil war 
was in the offing” (67). Even academic communities could not escape “the poisoned 
atmosphere of the city of Delhi or for that matter of the subcontinent as a whole” (67). 
Furthermore, not only were communal sentiments inflamed in the minds of the university 
staff and students, but the university itself became a target because it had many Muslim 
professors and students. As persecuted people poured into Delhi College (present-day 
Zakir Hussain College affiliated to Delhi University) from orchards around the university 
campus, the campus itself was attacked, and although there were no killings, Muslim 
homes, including Qureshi’s, were ransacked and looted (70). Students and teachers were 
evacuated with difficulty; women put on caste-marks on their foreheads to pass as 
Hindus. Qureshi took everyone to the Pakistan High Commission. He particularly rued 
the loss of his academic manuscripts, as well as his personal library, which consisted of 
rare manuscripts and miniature paintings and was destroyed in the attack (70).  
 Socio-economic relations between Hindus and Muslims were disrupted because 
of the demographic and cultural reshuffle Delhi experienced. Metal workers, artisans, 
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cattle-grazers, salaried workers, silversmiths, and jewelers thronged the camps in Purana 
Qila and Humayun’s Tomb, waiting for a chance to leave for Pakistan (Kidwai 54). The 
arts, crafts, and skills that throve amidst and were patronized by Old Delhi society all but 
faded or even died out (Qureshi 69; Dalrymple, City 50). Interviewing calligrapher 
Shamim Khan in the late 1980s in Old Delhi, William Dalrymple discovered that a 
sophisticated tradition of Urdu calligraphy used to write out title deeds, wills, and 
marriage documents, and which not only called for artistic talent but also knowledge of 
Islamic law and Old Delhi customs, was disappearing because Urdu had consistently lost 
ground to Hindi after Partition. But the fatal blow to this art came from the loss of 
clientele because most of Khan’s customers either died or fled to Karachi during Partition 
(City 53). The long tradition of Muslim crafts such as gota (lace made of gold and silver 
thread) also suffered during Partition because dealers stopped supplying raw materials or 
purchasing goods from the Muslim craftsmen. In addition to this, varq (gold or silver 
foil) makers, brass and copper craftsmen, brocade makers, and ivory craftsmen 
experienced serious loss of business (Qureshi 68). Delhi’s zardozi and kamdani 
embroidery industries came virtually to a standstill after the mass exodus of embroiderers 
(Kidwai 103). Chefs, drivers, and mechanics also left, throwing these businesses into 
crisis
116
 (104).  
Gandhi was assassinated at the end of January, 1948, and the fact that it was a 
right-wing Hindu nationalist who had killed the Mahatma, angered by his “concessions” 
                                                          
116 Delhi was also a city where Muslim architecture had flourished. Partition saw the loss and destruction of some of 
that heritage. During the violence of September 1947, the shrine of the Sufi saint Qutubuddin Bakhtiar Kaki had been 
desecrated (Pandey, Remembering 144). In Paharganj, Qarol Bagh, Muttani Dhanda, Sabzi Mandi, Chandni Chowk, 
and Chuna Mandi, houses were burnt, graves battered, and idols were installed in mosques (165). Other mosques, 
dargahs, and mazars were occupied by refugees who had nowhere else to live. Many of these places had been 
vandalized by RSS youth before the refugees moved in; examples of such places include the fourteenth century 
Chiragh Delhi shrine in Mehrauli, and the Dargah-e-Shah-e-Mardaa in South Delhi (Kidwai 248, 254, 256). 
Graveyards were dug up by people with the active assistance of the CRC and PWD (250). 
 158 
 
to Muslims and Pakistan, largely silenced the demand to throw out all Muslims from 
Delhi. Many Muslims were able to return to their homes and localities, and for the first 
time in almost two years, people were able to turn their attention to “the business of 
living and rebuilding their lives, their uprooted city and their future” (Pandey 143). The 
Indian (Congress) government moved swiftly to ban the RSS after this event; Hindi 
newspapers, which had been conspicuously silent about violence against Muslims during 
Partition, began to report these incidents more fully (144-5). For Muslims, the world 
changed after Gandhi’s assassination, as communal violence in Delhi came to a halt; they 
could walk around freely again, and the administration and atmosphere of Delhi was 
totally transformed (145). However, the ghettoization of Muslims continued in Delhi, and 
Hindus and Sikhs expressed resentment for the fact that the Indian government was 
encouraging Muslims to return to their homes in India, while the Pakistani government 
had expressed no such concern for the lives and properties of Hindus and Sikhs who 
belonged to Pakistan (146). In addition to this, Muslims who remained in Delhi were 
reduced to being an impoverished minority (Dalrymple, City 37). And for less privileged 
Hindu and Sikh refugees, who struggled and tried to rebuild their lives with enterprise 
and determination, there was great resentment on the part of Delhiites, who looked down 
their noses at their small roadside businesses (Kidwai 104). Homeless refugee women 
were treated with disdain because they had to live and perform their daily ablutions in the 
open (272-3). The refugees also included newspaper editors, businessmen, and politicians 
(Dalrymple, City 41-2). Many refugees left houses and property in West Punjab and then 
took over Muslim property, in many cases similarly abandoned, in Delhi (42).  
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Clear Light of Day has one reference to refugees “swarm[ing] and crawl[ing] with 
a kind of crippled, subterranean life that made Bim feel that the city would never recover 
from this horror, that it would be changed irremediably, that it was already changed, no 
longer the city she had been born in” (137). This image, however, becomes yet another 
reminder to Bim of her own wretchedness, which, basically, amounts to her being left 
alone after her parents’ deaths to care for an ailing Raja and a delirious Aunt Mira (137). 
There is one more reference to Partition refugees, which does not focus on the refugees 
themselves, but serves to show how Bim does manage to live her life on her own terms. 
She returns to college to finish her degree in history, and volunteers at a clinic for women 
in the Kingsway camp that was set up to house Hindu and Sikh refugees from West 
Punjab. All we are told is that “[i]t was close to the University and she could go there 
after the lectures and help hand out vitamin drops to pregnant women and mix powdered 
milk for the babies” (139-40). It is only the individual Bim who matters in these 
references to the consequences of Partition violence, and the development of her 
character is outlined; the magnitude of Partition for the refugees is completely elided. The 
momentous events taking place in the city of Delhi, both Old and New, are not 
acknowledged in any way other than in their relevance in the life of a middle-class Hindu 
woman, whose experience of that life-altering communalist violence is minimal and who, 
therefore, cannot be understood as representative of women in Delhi generally. 
Thus, while scholars have celebrated the contribution Clear Light of Day has 
made in terms of highlighting the role played by private histories in destabilizing 
universalizing narratives of Partition, as well as showing by example how historical 
memory operates, we must remember that this achievement is accomplished at the cost of 
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valuing the individual over the collective. In fact, Ho’s as well as Rajeswari Mohan’s 
celebration of the novel’s parallel reading of the birth of India as a nation and the position 
of women in the nation through its engagement with personal memory and collective 
memory, family history and national history, is compromised when we realize that the 
personal memory or history of people like Bim and Raja does not at all correspond to the 
majority of the collective memories or histories of Partition respectively. Bim and Raja 
belong to a middle-class Hindu family safely based in Old Delhi and have the luxury to 
be self-preoccupied even during an event like Partition, when many working-class as well 
as middle- and upper-class Muslims in Old Delhi were struggling to just physically 
survive. As Pandey’s and Dalrymple’s research and Kidwai’s, Qureshi’s, and Tuker’s 
accounts have shown, most Delhiites were either at the delivering or receiving end of 
violence or relief. Furthermore, this lacuna in the text does not end with Delhi. As I have 
already hinted at the beginning of this chapter, Hyderabad is an even greater victim of 
this narrative silencing than Delhi in Clear Light of Day.   
Hyderabad is first mentioned by Tara in connection with the approaching 
wedding of Raja and Benazir’s daughter Moyna in Hyderabad. Having married Benazir, 
Raja has inherited the wealth and cultural capital of her father, Hyder Ali. The prominent 
and recurrent image of Hyder Ali in the novel is based on a childhood incident which is 
remembered differently by the four Das siblings. The children remember encountering 
the majestic Hyder Ali riding his beautiful white horse on the banks of the Jamna river; 
he, however, does not even notice their presence. Raja, on the other hand, is and remains 
enthralled with him: “It is Hyder Ali Sahib on the horse. He looks like a general! Like a 
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king!”117 (193) Hyder Ali’s inaccessible sense of power is conveyed best by the image of 
the anthropomorphized pampas grass, which bends and parts for him on the riverbank as 
if it has subjective agency and willingly bows in deference before his regal figure (192). 
He is also connected to Partition in the children’s minds not only because he is Muslim 
and is forced to leave Delhi during Partition, but also because of this episode on the 
banks of the Jumna, which remains the only “event” to have occurred in their lives, until 
Partition happens (193). The episode comes to form a distinct temporal entity in their 
lives, separated by and distinguished from the long hours and days of nothingness before 
and after it takes place. It is the first scene in the narrative that cleanly disrupts the tedium 
of their daily lives, lives in which time seems to crawl and nothing ever happens to claim 
their attention or interest.  
The next such event is Partition, and its significance and impact on their lives is 
best expressed in Bim’s opinion, albeit completely suffused with her own narrow 
fraternal concerns, that it was the “great event of our lives – of our youth. What would 
our youth have been without it to round it off in such a definite and dramatic way?” (71). 
Once again, it is Hyder Ali and his family who dominate their thoughts and concerns 
during Partition, on account of Raja’s attachment to and involvement with them. Thus, 
the Hyder Ali family has a central presence in the novel. Yet there is no 
acknowledgement of the political complications and social strain that Hyderabad went 
through during Partition, from which, arguably, it has never quite recovered. In the 
                                                          
117 Raja’s infatuation with the “strong masculine figure and presence of Hyder Ali” (Ray 143) has been interpreted as 
his need to replace his largely inaccessible father, who is rarely present, calls his son a “dunce” when he tells him he 
wants to specialize in Islamic Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia, and dismisses his wishes as “rubbish” and “bunkum,” 
believing that it would be dangerous for Raja in the immediate context of Partition to go to a “college for Muslim boys” 
(Desai, Clear 83-4). On the other hand, even when some of Hyder Ali’s Muslim guests express hostility towards Raja’s 
adolescent eagerness to learn more about Urdu literature, Hyder Ali himself is kind to Raja (92). In fact, Hyder Ali 
becomes “the apotheosis of masculinity in relation to which [Raja’s] Hindu family (including his father) appears 
emasculated … The alliance between Raja and Hyder Ali assumes a homoerotic cast that is not negated by Raja’s 
marriage to Ali’s daughter” (Ray 143). 
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absence of such recognition, the novel only perpetuates the continuing mainstream as 
well as official silence about the traumatic experiences of many Hyderabadis during the 
violent upheavals that took place in that state during Partition.  
Instead, the text is soaked with Raja’s fascination with Urdu romantic poetry. As 
critics have pointed out, Raja’s fascination with Hyder Ali’s household is founded “on 
the bounty of its cultural capital” (Ho 37). Poetry, sophisticated company, and the easy 
flourish and mesmerizing grandeur of upper-class patronage bewitch Raja, as he whispers 
to Bim at night about mushairas at Hyder Ali’s place: “‘There was a poet there tonight,’ 
he whispered, too tense with excitement to sleep. ‘A real poet, from Hyderabad, who is 
visiting them. He read out his poetry to us – it was wonderful – and Hyder Ali Sahib gave 
him a ring with a ruby in it’” (Desai, Clear 81-2). Boosted by Hyder Ali’s encouragement 
and his own fertile imagination, Raja “cultivates a self-identity in Urdu” and decides to 
become an Urdu scholar (Ho 37). Desai’s representation of Raja as an eager Urdu student 
around the time of Partition marks her concern about the fact that Urdu language, 
literature, and culture were also casualties of Partition politics and violence.
118
 It is 
because of the inextricable connection between Urdu and Muslims, and Hindi and 
Hindus, the result of a process of communalization of culture and lifestyle that began in 
the nineteenth century and saw its zenith during Partition (when even drinking water sold 
                                                          
118 In fact, Desai went on to devote her next novel, In Custody (1984), to the decline of Urdu poetry in India after 
Partition. For a complete overview of the birth and development of the Hindi-Urdu language debates in the nineteenth 
century, see Christopher King’s One Language, Two Scripts: The Hindi Movement in Nineteenth Century North India 
(1994) and Amrit Rai’s A House Divided: The Origin and Development of Hindi/Hindavi (1984). For a critique of the 
Indian nationalist perspective on Hindi and Urdu embedded in Rai’s work, as well as the failed attempts by sections of 
the Congress to bridge the rift between Hindi and Urdu through Hindustani, see David Lelyveld’s “The Fate of 
Hindustani: Colonial Knowledge and the Project of a National Language” (1993) (199-202). For a detailed analysis of 
the social, institutional, and parliamentary debates about the position of Urdu vis-à-vis Hindi before, during, and since 
Partition, see Jyotirindra Das Gupta’s Language Conflict and National Development: Group Politics and National 
Language Policy in India (1970) and Selma K. Sonntag’s “Minority Language Politics in India” (2002). For more on 
the marginalization of Urdu on account of its connection to India’s Muslims, and the active participation of state 
governments as well as political parties in this form of communalism, see Mushirul Hasan’s Legacy of a Divided 
Nation: India’s Muslims since Independence (1997) (115, 156-160, 191). 
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on railway stations came to be called “Hindu water” and “Muslim water”), that Raja is 
prevented by his father from pursuing Urdu at Delhi’s Jamia Millia Islamia. It is also for 
these same reasons that Raja’s sisters cannot read Urdu because Hindi has replaced Urdu 
in North Indian schools.  
However, Raja is a Romantic and approaches Urdu literature and life in general as 
a Romantic. In fact, his loyalty is more to the Romantic aesthetic that he connects with 
Hyder Ali and his luxuriant lifestyle than to a political ideal of secularism or religious 
tolerance (Mohan 54). This Romantic sensibility is represented through his approach to 
Urdu poetry.
119
 And Raja’s decision to go to Hyderabad in pursuit of poetry and 
patronage stems from the position Urdu has historically enjoyed in Hyderabad.
120
 
Furthermore, when he marries Benazir, Raja “discards one cocoonlike existence for 
another” (Ray 143) because he leaves the protective isolation of the family house in Old 
Delhi, where he had lived on his father’s money until his father died, to enter the 
privileged world of the wealthy Hyder Ali and his family. After his marriage, his neglect 
of practical realities in Hyderabad and Delhi continue. Years later, Raja inherits Hyder 
Ali’s tasteful wealth after the latter’s death and indulges in the artistic pleasures it enables 
him to have. For example, he organizes his daughter’s wedding as an elaborate, lavish, 
and showy affair (229). What is most significant, however, is that Raja is later able to 
project his cherished image of the regal Hyder Ali on his white horse (79) onto Riyaz, his 
                                                          
119 Even Iqbal (1877-1938), whose early twentieth century nationalist poetry put him at the centre of the ongoing 
debates around independence and Partition, is read by Raja as a Romantic poet. There is no mention of Raja ever 
reading any of Iqbal’s political poetry; he reads Iqbal’s verses superficially for their “impassioned, sensuous, mystic” 
content, and not for their inevitable political, nationalist, and anti-colonial bent (Mohan 57).  
 
120 For more on the extensive political and institutionalized patronage of Urdu language and literature in the Deccani 
sultanates and the Asaf Jahi Nizamate (often at the cost of other local languages such as Telugu, as I have already 
explained in the last chapter), see Annemarie Schimmel’s Classical Urdu Literature: From the Beginning to Iqbal 
(1975) (127-155), Muhammad Sadiq’s A History of Urdu Literature (1984) (50-86), and Ram Babu Saksena’s A 
History of Urdu Literature (1927) (32-44, 172-204).  
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only son, whom he dresses likewise in fine clothes and to whom he gives a horse as a 
present. It is again Bim who shrewdly makes the connection between the deeply 
embossed image in Raja’s mind of Hyder Ali on his white horse and the subsequent 
superimposition of this image upon Riyaz. In doing so, she suggests, Raja bequeathes this 
image to his son as a legacy of memory, turning him into a little version of Hyder Ali, “a 
prince in a Persian miniature” (227), as the proud father himself says.  
In this way, Bim is represented as a foil for Raja; through her perspective, Raja’s 
empty grandiloquence is thrown into relief. Yet, the implications of this representation 
are not pursued any further by Desai. Although it is implicitly as well as explicitly 
conveyed at different points in the text that Bim sees right through the superficiality of 
Raja’s poetic and political ideals associated with the Hyder Ali family, there is no attempt 
to remedy the absence of the Hyderabadi perspective on Partition in the text. There is 
instead a focus on mocking and parodying Raja. His refuge in the aesthetic of 
Romanticism during Partition is certainly criticized as the way certain sections of the 
middle-class and the cultural élites, who were part of majority communities in different 
parts of the subcontinent, sanitized themselves from the lived realities of the world (56). 
But it is the prolonged attention given to this ironic representation of his Romantic 
tendencies that ends up deflecting attention away from the way Partition politics were 
played out in Hyderabad.   
This silence on Hyderabad and silencing of Hyderabadis becomes most starkly 
visible when we recognize Desai’s complicity in this mainstream project through her 
representation of Benazir as a shadowy, barely-there figure. While Desai devotes 
extensive time to outlining Bim’s gendered struggles and her thoughts about her brother’s 
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extravagant professions of his beliefs, Benazir remains silent. The text dwells repeatedly 
on the predicament Bim’s family puts her in by forcing her to assume the role of Baba’s 
caregiver, a role which results in her having to stay in Old Delhi and look after the family 
business. Bim rejects Dr. Biswas’ unsaid offer of marriage and prefers to hold on to her 
independence as a single working woman. In this regard, Arun Mukherjee concludes, 
“[b]y creating a heroine who wants autonomy rather than domestic bliss, and having her 
turn down the Bengali doctor, Desai creates a new script for Indian women at the same 
time that she mocks the earlier ones” (200). Mukherjee is right about the representation 
of Bim; however, whatever happens to Benazir? While Desai has certainly fashioned a 
new script for a certain section of Indian women, it is clear that women like Benazir 
remain silenced. As a young Muslim girl fleeing from a Delhi surrounded by the raging 
fires of Partition, Benazir exemplifies women who were at the receiving end of Partition 
violence. In spite of this, there is no insight or reflection in the text about how she feels 
about, thinks about, or experiences Partition as she escapes to her father’s house in 
Hyderabad. 
Furthermore, if, as Miriam Thaggert writes, the act of recollection on Bim’s and 
Tara’s part represents how they interpret and produce history (Thaggert 91) and, if 
indeed, women provide in this novel “the frames of reference in which to relate history, 
for the power in recording history lies in the ability to choose from which perspective it 
will be told” (92), then Benazir is situated outside history with no possibility of 
interpreting or producing history within the discursive platform of the narrative. And not 
only is Benazir located at a point beyond history, so is Hyderabad, as I have already 
explained through Raja’s portrayal of it as a place which is fixed in his static vision as a 
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safe haven where there is no political tension during an event as far-reaching and 
turbulent as Partition.  
Since Benazir has no words in the novel, a situation which in itself is an indicator 
of her erasure from history, we can only resort to knowing her through Raja’s and Bim’s 
perspectives. From Raja’s point of view, what emerges is a befittingly aestheticized, 
finished, and poetic image of the life Benazir leads. For example, the extent and quality 
of her father’s wealth is minutely constructed through elaborate imagery that points to 
carefully collected and cultivated affluence. We are told about the envied roses that grow 
in Hyder Ali’s garden in geometrically precise flower beds; the rare flowers such as 
jasmine and oleander that bloom in his garden, which also has a fountain; his tall house 
with its coloured fanlight above the front door; the china tiles and coloured glass 
chandeliers along the veranda walls; and the rich sweets that are sent around on Eid, 
covered with fine silver foil and placed on a tray along with embroidered napkins (117, 
92, 48). It is amidst such sweet and comfortable abundance that Benazir lives. During 
Partition, when Raja is ill and faced with the possibility that the Hyder Alis may be 
targeted by communalist groups such as his classmates at Hindu College, who repeatedly 
try to convert him to their divisive politics, he thinks of  
Hyder Ali, of Hyder Ali’s library, of Hyder Ali’s Begum and daughter quietly 
humming and chattering as they embroidered their veils together, and all those 
cool, calm evenings in their garden that had made his spirit rejoice by offering it 
all he craved, he felt giddy with rage at these boys and what they stood for. (95)  
While Raja’s righteous anger is justified by the violence his colleagues want to commit, 
his thoughts about Begum Hyder Ali and Benazir and his memories of enlightened 
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pleasure and domestic harmony in the Hyder Ali household reveal the idealized image of 
the life Raja covets; in the upper-class, Muslim, patriarchal world imagined by Raja, he 
would be free to pursue his aesthetic, intellectual, and philosophical preoccupations, and 
the women would contribute only by adding harmony and beauty to the surroundings. 
This kind of life would be unlike the one Raja has to suffer with his own scrawny, 
alcoholic, nervous Aunt Mira; silly, baby Tara; and Bim, with her fierce and earnest 
intellectual convictions. In other words, this representation of Benazir tells us more about 
Raja than Benazir. This, then, is the naïve impression of the lives of Muslims in Old 
Delhi in Raja’s mind in the late 1940s; this is also the impression Desai eventually leaves 
her readers with because she does not attempt to redress it by situating the experiences of 
Muslims in the political context of the happenings in Delhi and Hyderabad, as well as the 
fraught relations between India and Hyderabad, both of which came to be absolutely vital 
in determining the trajectory of the lives of Hyderabadi Muslims.   
In fact, the sole reason why Benazir exists in the margins of the plot is to 
conveniently and neatly tie up the loose ends of Hyder Ali and Raja’s filial bond by 
cementing it permanently through matrimony. Raja’s personal feelings for Benazir are 
never explored in detail in the narrative. We are privy to Raja’s attitude towards Benazir 
only thrice: first, when he receives a letter from Hyder Ali, in which, as he delightfully 
informs Bim, Benazir sends her best wishes to him (115); second, when he refuses to be 
party to any criminal design his communalist colleagues at university have towards the 
Hyder Ali family (95); and, third, when Baba brings Benazir’s gramophone home and 
Raja is reminded of how he had once seen Benazir playing records and dancing with her 
friends in her room on his way to Hyder Ali’s library (122). Thus, much of what we 
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know about Raja’s interactions with Benazir comes from mere glimpses of her from a 
distance.  
Bim too hardly knows Benazir because she “was a good deal younger, still at 
school, a pretty child with a round porcelain face, always clinging close to her mother 
like a young pigeon that still needs to be nourished” (96). On the other hand, Bim is the 
only character who is represented with distinctive emotions towards Benazir. She has a 
prejudiced image of Benazir’s married lifestyle in Hyderabad, which is based on three 
things. Bim relies on what little she knows about Benazir as the pretty porcelain-faced 
child who used to cling to her mother. Next, she imaginatively fills in the gaps and thinks 
of her as a “spoilt only child,” whom she imagines with a “pouting voice” (118), and for 
whom she feels contempt. Finally, she allows her vehement dislike of Benazir’s affluent 
and over-protected life to be fed and sustained by her memories of the single trip Raja 
makes to Old Delhi with his wife and daughter; it is on this trip that Bim founds all her 
resentment against Benazir for many years. Based on this single interaction with Benazir 
under one roof, Bim thinks about Raja’s only son, and wonders  
[w]hat a dumpling he must be, what a rice-ball – with all the feeding that goes on 
in that house, Benazir cooking and tasting and eating all day, and in between 
meals little snacks arriving to help them on their way. Imagine what he must look 
like, and Raja! Imagine eating so much! (225) 
Throughout this conversation with Tara about Raja and his family, Bim disgustedly 
makes negative remarks while Tara objects and asks her if she really knows anything 
about Benazir and her children or is just assuming what they are like.  
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Tara, who clings to her siblings and her family home “out of the habit of affection 
and her own insecurity” (Desai, Clear 256), pines to see the whole family together again 
(243) and, therefore, takes the trouble to cultivate and maintain a vague friendship and 
sisterhood with Benazir. Tara’s relationship with Benazir appears to be built on their 
shared experiences as wives and mothers across the borders of communal difference and 
geographical distance (228). Bim assures Tara that she does know what she is talking 
about since she has witnessed their way of life when Raja and Benazir visited her after 
Moyna’s birth. While talking about Moyna, who is about to get married and whose 
wedding Tara, her husband Bakul, and their daughters plan to attend, Bim says, 
I wonder if she’s as plump as Benazir used to be? Benazir must be huge. She 
never liked to get up or move if she could get someone to fetch and carry for her. 
And she fed that baby all day long. Little silver dishes of milk puddings would 
arrive – she’d brought along a woman to cook for them, she didn’t trust Janaki or 
me – and she would spoon it into her mouth, fattening her up. And Raja – how 
he’d grown to enjoy Benazir’s food – (226) 
At this point, Tara interrupts Bim and emphasizes that Benazir’s food is really very good. 
But Bim brushes her off, saying,  
Yes, I know, but it’s disgusting to enjoy it so much, and eat so much of it. Such 
rich foods. They must be bad for him, I kept telling him that, but of course he 
wouldn’t listen … It’s unhappy people who eat like that … I read that somewhere. 
They compensate themselves with the food they eat for the things they missed. 
(226) 
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This image of mindless gluttony that Bim creates of Benazir, Raja, and their children 
seems to be premised almost on a puritanical abhorrence of any form of excess. It is clear 
that Bim considers the way they cook and eat sinful. Her endorsement of a sense of 
economy in lifestyle and material existence seems to be predicated on some prim notion 
of middle-class Victorian morality (that aligns well with Bim’s interest in nineteenth and 
early twentieth century English poetry) that rejects transgression of all sorts; she certainly 
considers Benazir and Raja’s way of life decadent and, therefore, transgressive. For Bim, 
fact trumps imagination, and practicality trumps luxury. Bim’s viciousness towards 
Benazir is also ultimately connected to her anger towards her brother for abandoning her 
and Baba in Old Delhi. However, such a representation of Benazir by Desai only 
perpetuates a lack of understanding where Muslims and Hyderabadis are concerned. 
What makes Desai’s representation even more open to question is the fact that such a 
representation of Benazir and her Muslim household is meant to be read as a 
representation of Muslim homes in general. This point is implicit in the static, 
stereotypical symbols that I have already listed and which are connected to the material 
existence of the Hyder Ali family. The memorable, aestheticized, opulent references to 
chandeliers, fountains, roses, and poetry suggest an Orientalist approach to constructing 
the essential “Muslimness” of these characters, which is predicated on their upper-class 
excesses.  
What makes this approach deeply problematic is that Desai’s text constructs the 
élite Hyder Alis as representatives of all Muslims in spite of the great diversity along 
class, caste, sect, language, customs, and region amongst Muslims in the subcontinent. 
Hyderabadi Muslims are also very different within themselves in terms of socio-
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economic class and linguistic affiliations as well as political ideology. Desai’s text, 
therefore, does little to critique mainstream North Indian prejudice and ignorance about 
Hyderabadi Muslims, especially in the context of Hyderabad’s forced accession to India. 
Journalistic reports from the late 1940s show that the domination of Muslims in the 
Nizam’s Government and in the Hyderabadi ruling class became a synecdoche for the 
entire Muslim community of Hyderabad, which was believed to be rich and powerful 
without exception. For example, the Manchester Guardian noted on September 14, 1948 
that the main problems of Hyderabad lay 
in the social and racial structure of Hyderabad, in the indefensible claim of the 
small Moslem minority to preserve their privileges, and above all in the readiness 
of the extremists among the Moslems to enforce the point of view by ruthless 
intimidation, directed as much against the more conciliatory Moslems as against 
the Hindus, who form about 90 per cent of the population. (“Hyderabad”) 
The fact that more than half of Hyderabad’s Muslim population was desperately poor and 
lived in both towns and villages (Smith 4; Copland 368-9) is completely ignored in the 
Manchester Guardian’s generalization of the ruling class in Hyderabad.  
The newspaper’s implicit assumptions about the Muslim ruling class are 
undermined by the fact that besides working-class and poor Muslims, there were also 
many progressive Muslims from various socio-economic backgrounds who opposed the 
Nizam’s misrule and participated actively in resisting it. I have already explained in the 
previous chapter the contributions made to democratic struggles in Hyderabad by Muslim 
students, journalists, peasants, and workers who participated actively in resisting the 
Nizam. There were also middle-class Muslim women such as Jamalunnisa Baji and Razia 
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Begum, who supported and wore only indigenous swadeshi cotton textiles in support of 
the Gandhian anti-colonial struggle (Stree 172); joined the Communist Party; stored arms 
and sheltered comrades who had gone underground (174), in spite of being threatened by 
the Razakars (Chakravartty 134); attended and hosted clandestine meetings of the 
Progressive Writers’ Association after communist poets such as Makhdoom Mohiuddin 
(1908-1969) were forced to go into hiding
121
 (Stree 173, 175; Chakravartty 134-5); and 
hosted all-India communist leaders such as A.K. Gopalan, who had come to Hyderabad 
to visit leaders of the struggles in Hyderabad city and Telangana (135). Razia Begum, 
who was also a lecturer at Osmania University College for Women, was arrested in 1949 
by the Congress government when it cracked down on communist intellectuals who 
challenged its repressive military regime in Hyderabad (Sundarayya 306-7, 310).  
Another example of damaging generalizations in newspaper articles in the 1940s 
about Hyderabadi Muslims that completely erase people such as Jamalunnisa Baji and 
Razia Begum is seen in an editorial in the Spectator, which toes the line of the 
Manchester Guardian and its narrow view of the interests of “the Muslim community.” 
                                                          
121 The Hyderabad chapter of the Progressive Writers’ Association was established by Makhdoom along with Akhtar 
Hussain Raipuri and Sibt-e-Hasan in 1936 (Gour, “Struggle” 170). Other mid-twentieth century Hyderabadi writers of 
the left persuasion who were active in Hyderabadi politics were Zeenath Sajida (d. 2008), a noted communist, Urdu 
poet, and professor of Urdu; and Wajeda Tabassum (d. 2010), known for her frank portrayals that questioned the norms 
associated with female sexuality and inter-class relations in Hyderabad. Jeelani Bano (b. 1938) is another writer 
associated with the Progressive Writers’ Association in Hyderabad, who has written novels, novellas, and short stories 
about themes such as bonded labour and patriarchal oppression. At the time when Raja leaves for Hyderabad, the 
ongoing Telangana Armed Struggle against the Nizam was glorified in the revolutionary verses of Makhdoom, who 
was Hyderabad’s most well-known communist and poet. Confronted by the realities of communal violence perpetrated 
by Razakars against Hindus, Makhdoom wrote his poem “Midnight” (Gour, “Makhdoom” 2-3). His critique of the 
oppressive feudal structure of Hyderabad and his hope that it would soon be replaced by a new people’s government is 
represented in “The Rebel,” “Haveli,” “Song of Death,” and “The New World” (“Makhdoom” 3; “Struggle” 171). He 
was arrested and put in jail repeatedly for his anti-colonial and anti-Nizam speeches (“Makhdoom” 5); he helped to 
form various working-class unions to organize workers against the Nizam’s government (“Struggle” 181); and after the 
Communist Party was banned in Hyderabad in 1946, Makhdoom went underground with other communist comrades 
and continued to write and circulate his dynamic poetry (“Makhdoom” 6). In early 1948, when the Party was banned 
again after Gandhi’s assassination, he wrote his famous poem “Telangana” in Bombay to boost the morale of the 
fighting peasant and worker cadres in Telangana (“Makhdoom” 7-8). In addition to this, Makhdoom was also known 
for his romantic verses and ghazals. For a screen representation of Makhdoom and the revolutionary literary and socio-
political climate in which he lived and to which he contributed through his poetry and communist activism, see Ali 
Sardar Jafri and Jalal Agha’s Kahkashan: A Galaxy of Modern Urdu Poets (1991-1992), an Indian television series that 
represented the lives and oeuvres of six prominent Urdu poets, one of whom is Makhdoom.  
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The editorial recommends that a UN plebiscite would be the perfect solution to the 
dispute between Hyderabad and India because it would ensure that while India feels 
assured that there is no hostile area within its territory, Hyderabad would also have the 
“continuity of its dynasty and the security of her Moslem minority” (“India’s 
Aggression” 17 Sep. 1948). Yet again, none of this suggests that any thought was given 
to where those Hyderabadi Muslims who did not belong to the ruling class or who 
protested against the hegemonic power of the ruling class were situated in these 
problems; there is not even any acknowledgement that such Muslims existed. The 
Nizam’s legendary wealth, which he jealously and eccentrically guarded (Copland 365), 
came to be understood as representing the general condition of all Hyderabadi Muslims. 
In addition to this, there is no indication that any of the Indian newspapers reported or 
theorized the constitution of this demographic differently. In fact, my archival research 
suggests that Indian newspapers actually went a step further than British newspapers and, 
while maintaining caution about directly naming and singling out religious communities 
by avoiding the use of the words “Hindu” or “Muslim,” clearly equated the Nizam, his 
policies, and his person, unequivocally and incontrovertibly with the entire “Hyderabadi 
Muslim community.” This considerable leap in ideology in the national and international 
outlook towards Hyderabadi Muslims, which represents all Hyderabadi Muslims as if 
they were socially and economically privileged, is represented in Clear Light of Day in 
the highly generalized yet elaborate éliteness of Hyder Ali and his family and their 
singularly stereotyped, homogeneous, and unconflicting subjectivities.  
I am not trying to suggest that there were no veiled Muslim women like Begum 
Hyder Ali and Benazir in Hyderabad in the 1940s, who embroidered veils and cooked 
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elaborately rich delicacies, but that there were other kinds of Hyderabadis too, who were 
politically active and/or belonged to working-class and poor communities and who seem 
to have dropped out of collective and narrative memories entirely. Furthermore, even 
within élite Hyderabadi spheres, unlike the stereotypical Hyder Ali family women, there 
were conflicts and complexities within women’s subjective views of their religion, class, 
community, and society. A depiction of this fraught, multidimensional, élite Hyderabadi 
subjectivity is found in the mid-twentieth century novelist Zeenuth Futehally’s 
autobiographical English novel Zohra (1951). Like Benazir in Desai’s novel, Futehally’s 
protagonist Zohra belongs to a conservative, upper-class Hyderabadi Muslim family with 
a history of poets and poetic patronage, but she is complexly represented in terms of her 
personal struggles as a gifted and aspiring poet and artist against social, patriarchal norms 
of propriety that prevent her from writing poetry or joining the freedom struggle under 
Gandhi’s leadership. Similarly, Hyderabadi upper-class Urdu writers Wajeda Tabassum 
and Zeenath Sajida have represented Hyderabadi women from different religious 
communities and social strata as radical and opinionated individuals who confront 
patriarchy, communalism, and casteism and deal with them complexly and creatively. 
Sajida herself was not only an Urdu professor and writer of prose and poetry; she also 
played an active part in the communist struggle against the Nizam and, later, the Indian 
military government. In addition to this, I have already outlined the crucial role played by 
peasant and working-class women from Hyderabad in the Telangana Armed Struggle that 
rocked the Asaf Jahi Nizamate and fought against the Indian occupation. In the struggle, 
besides traditionally gendered role such as caregivers, nurses, and teachers, Hyderabadi 
women also carved out new political roles for themselves as guerilla fighters, protestors, 
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couriers, orators, and propagandists. This role is memorialized by the women themselves 
in Telugu revolutionary literature such as songs, lullabies, and plays. 
These fraught and often diverse strands of politics amongst Hyderabadi Muslims 
and Hyderabadi women remain unexplored in Desai’s novel. Thus, the limited 
perspective on Hyderabadis, who are seen through the eyes of the Delhi and Hindu Self 
that is constructed in opposition to the Hyderabad and Muslim Other,
122
 undermines the 
crucial role of women in Hyderabad in the 1940s. It erases not only the radical struggles 
by the peasantry and the working-class against the Nizam’s and, later, the Indian 
government’s oppression, but also the political action of female activists and intellectuals 
from Hyderabad. Depictions such as Desai’s ensure that the violence that was unleashed 
against Hyderabadi Muslims by the Indian forces when they invaded Hyderabad in 1948 
will remain unrecognized in mainstream Indian culture because these stereotypical 
portrayals of Hyderabadi Muslims who are wealthy and privileged Others stand in the 
place of more historically nuanced portraits. This problem in Desai’s work becomes more 
acute when we realize that Desai’s representation, in light of her canonical status not only 
in India but also in the global North, overshadows lesser known but potentially more 
powerful and poignant creative representations of Hyderabadi women, such as 
Futehally’s Zohra or the performative arts of the women participants of the Telangana 
struggle.
123
 
                                                          
122 This is particularly true in case of Bim, who clearly marks herself out as different from Benazir, whom she blindly 
reconstructs as decadent, spoilt, and even unscrupulous. 
123 The intense international visibility of Desai’s writings in English markedly differs from the obscurity to which 
revolutionary Telugu performative genres and literature are relegated, on account of the fact that much of this oeuvre is 
oral and also remains untranslated from the vernacular. And Zohra, which is written in English and received positive 
national and international reviews upon its publication in 1951, simply disappeared until it was republished in 2004 at 
the initiative of the author’s daughter. In spite of this, however, Zohra has received little scholarly attention.  
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The impressions that the text leaves readers with are reinforced by the fact that 
protest against Bim’s negative perceptions and assumptions about Benazir comes only 
from Tara, whose cautious objections in the face of Bim’s fierce prejudice and stubborn 
ignorance emerge as weak and feeble. Furthermore, it is finally Bim’s representation of 
Benazir, flawed though the narrative acknowledges it to be (through Tara’s 
protestations), that has the most authority in the novel because a large chunk of the novel 
is narrated from Bim’s perspective. Bim does not listen when Tara argues with her, 
reminding her that Raja has everything that most people want to be happy – a wife, 
children, a house, a business, and a hobby. Bim angrily replies that Raja has ignored his 
“vocation,” his true calling to be a poet, and made it into a “silly, laughable little hobby.” 
She tells Tara, “That is why he needs to console himself with food and more food. Don’t 
you see?” (227) Bim is disappointed that Raja’s high calling and ideals have been 
transformed into a mere hobby to be casually indulged in on special occasions. She sees 
no depth in Raja’s aesthetic or political ideals and mocks the fact that he is invited to 
weddings, engagement parties, and anniversaries to recite poetry, imagining a scene 
where  
they spread out carpets and cushions for him to recline on, like a pasha – and he 
recites his poems.’ She made a clownish face, ridiculing such pomp, such show, 
such empty vanity. ‘I can imagine the scene – all those perfumed verses about 
wine, the empty goblet, the flame, and ash …’ she laughed derisively” (224-5).  
These impressions of Hyderabadi social life stem from the imagination of a hurt, angry 
woman, who draws from the widely circulated courtly images of poetry, grandeur, and 
decadence that were available at the time and which came to be lodged in the popular 
 177 
 
imagination. Bim, a history professor schooled in an Orientalist and colonialist history, 
uses such images to construct her bias against Benazir. And while the novel undermines 
these impressions of Hyderabadi social life by showing that they stem from the 
imagination of Raja’s bitterly hurt younger sister, it does not replace them with anything 
that is more historically detailed or accurate. Consequently, it is only these simplistic 
impressions with which readers are left. Hence, while Clear Light of Day seems to 
scrutinize this vision of Muslimness, by allowing Bim’s view to be questioned, it also 
ultimately affirms this vision because it does not show an alternative to it. 
 
These images of Urdu poetry also show that while Raja believes that English 
poetry masks its “absence of meaning with an excess of words,” Bim, as a middle-class 
reader of English poetry who is educated in principles of post-Enlightenment originality 
and Victorian restraint, feels that it is Urdu poetry that is empty because of its profuse 
effluences and its trite, exhausted imagery (Mohan 57). And yet, even as she critiques 
these tired images of Urdu poetry through Bim’s disdain, Desai herself does not refrain 
from using the same in her representation of Hyderabadi Muslims.  
Bim’s vicious tone as she talks about Benazir is represented in such a manner that 
as readers we are able to locate it in its proper context of anger at Raja’s betrayal. The 
hurt that she feels at the way her brother has treated her is behind her obsessive and cruel 
remarks on how overweight Benazir is, and how much she cooks, eats, and feeds her 
family. Because she finds a scapegoat in Benazir to displace her resentment against her 
brother, Bim does not even notice little gestures of kindness or concern by Benazir. We 
see an example of this in a part of Raja’s infamously patronizing letter to Bim, in which 
he writes that “Benazir herself spoke to … [Hyder Ali] about the house and asked him to 
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allow you to keep it at the same rent we used to pay him when father and mother were 
alive” (47). Bim sees this gesture simply as an indicator of Raja’s condescension, and her 
own long-simmering resentment against Benazir only grows. There is also another act, 
only tangentially referred to in the compromised text of the novel, when Bim narrates to 
Tara how Baba had been afraid that Benazir would ask him for her gramophone when she 
and Raja visited them after Moyna’s birth. Bim completely neglects to mention the fact 
that Benazir, in fact, does not ask for the gramophone again. If anything, she is thoughtful 
and kind because she and Raja bring Baba a hi-fi set, believing that maybe he would 
prefer the latest technological innovation in music players (225-6). Once again, a possible 
extension of an olive branch that might have been read as an attempt to mend the breach 
between the two families and create new understandings is only interpreted as flaunting 
of wealth.  
In this way, in the different layered silences that the text imposes upon Benazir, 
we see that Desai’s endorsement of egalitarian social and hybrid aesthetic ideals is 
undermined by her strategies and choices as a writer. She makes a powerful case in Clear 
Light of Day for Urdu and highlights its systematic erasure from the mainstream of Indian 
culture and public life. However, Desai’s underscoring of the weeding out of culture 
connected to Muslims is rendered less effective when Raja performs the ultimate betrayal 
of kin by abandoning his sister and brother in order to join Hyder Ali in Hyderabad. 
Because a large part of the narration is devoted to Bim’s recollection of her experiences, 
particularly during the time when Raja ignores the family business and leaves Bim alone 
to care for Baba, readers are led to sympathize with Bim and see Raja and his actions and 
attitudes in a negative light. In this way, Raja’s enthusiasm for Urdu and his marriage to a 
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Muslim woman at a time when memories of horrific Hindu-Muslim violence were still 
alive fade away in the face of his alleged injustice towards his sister. And the fact that 
Hyder Ali and Benazir are configured in Raja’s imagination as synecdoche for the 
Muslim community
124
 means that the prejudice that the narrative sanctions against them 
extends the novel’s attitudes against the larger Muslim community as well. It is Desai’s 
pronounced and relentless focus on micropolitics at the domestic level in Clear Light of 
Day that obscures macropolitics at the public level. In the subcontinental political 
context, where debates on Partition have been snatched by staunch right-wing politicians 
and ideologues out of the hands of liberals, secularists, and to some extent, even the left-
wing, the magnitude of this silencing by a committed secularist such as Desai cannot be 
understated.   
Furthermore, the scholarly reception of Desai’s novel has largely overlooked this 
crucial lacuna about Partition in the text. In fact, scholars have incautiously and 
unquestioningly celebrated its turning away from larger, crucial questions associated with 
the public and collective face of Partition by commending its almost stubborn focus on 
the domestic and the private. For example, Mohan writes that through its engagement 
with “personal memory and the collective memory recorded in history, the novel 
encourages a parallel, even allegorical, reading of the story of the nation and the status of 
its women” (48). Sangeeta Ray takes this idea further, when she writes that the 
macropolitical is reflected in the micropolitical; Desai holds up for critique the 
“hegemonic discourse of Indian nationalism [which] presents itself as an equalizing, 
                                                          
124 This is clearly illustrated in Raja’s desperate worry for Hyder Ali and his family when Gandhi is assassinated. He 
sobs, “they’ll slaughter every Muslim they can find,” but is later relieved when he finds out that the assassin was not 
Muslim and so assumes there will be no reprisals against Muslims. In his relief, he exposes his real reason for concern 
by telling Bim, “I thought of the Hyder Alis – what they would have to go through –” (149). Thus, Raja’s concern for 
Muslims is actually limited to only Hyder Ali and his family.   
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progressive force wresting authority from colonial government by obfuscating its own 
complicity in the replication of the paternal signifier in the name of national survival” 
(138). This is all very well where Bim, Aunt Mira, Jaya, Sarla, and even Tara are 
concerned; but what about Benazir? I contend that, while the novel might, as Mohan and 
Ray have argued, critique the way in which patriarchal, nationalist discourse silences 
some women, it does not encourage a parallel or allegorical reading of the way the nation 
treated Muslim women at the time of its birth.  
On the other hand, Ho’s analysis does recognize that it through the friendship 
between Hyder Ali and Raja that “memory reconnects the family’s history – both its 
affiliation and separation in time – to the larger history of the Partition, and the 
dislocation of family to the separatist dynamic that orients, or disorients, the early history 
of the Indian nation” (37). In other words, because of the relationship between Raja and 
Hyder Ali, the relations between the Das family and the Hyder Ali family represent pre-
Partition friendships between Hindus and Muslims; Hyder Ali’s migration to Hyderabad 
(and, subsequently, Raja’s as well) symbolizes the ruptures caused by Partition between 
communities that had coexisted relatively peacefully.  
However, except for a few instances that reveal a deeper and more complex 
understanding of the novel, there is much that is questionable about scholarly analyses of 
Clear Light of Day, particularly with regard to celebrations of its intense privateness: 
Ho’s delight at the “elegiac conjuration of lost realities” and her overstated connection 
between the family’s falling apart and the rupture of communities at Partition (38); 
Thaggert’s glorification of the intimate portrayal of family history, which “allows Desai 
to counter the panoptic view of Indian history filled with generalizations and often 
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inaccuracies” (93); and Dieter Reimenschneider’s claim that Desai posits recollection as 
implicit and indirect, “work[ing] through her characters’ interaction, especially through 
dialogue and reminiscence, thus building up a concept of history in an indirect and 
implicit manner” (197). These commendations are guilty of overlooking how the 
connection between the family’s history and Partition history in the text does not account 
for the experiences of marginalized and silenced groups, who faced the worst of Partition 
violence and displacement. Scholars have also gone to the extent of suggesting that the 
central thematic of Clear Light of Day is “the point at which the individual life and the 
collective life of all intersect and the uniqueness of personal experience begins to 
exemplify a whole cultural pattern, one validating the other” (Hashmi 56; cf. also, 
Thaggert 91, Reimenschneider 200). The sheer naïveté of this claim that the individual 
lives of the Das family “exemplifies a whole cultural pattern” causes enormous damage 
to any attempt to highlight how Muslims came to acquire second-class citizenship in the 
Indian nation, and how, therefore, their experience is very different from the larger 
cultural pattern (if there is even such a thing as one cultural pattern for India).  
What is more, no scholar has seriously addressed the role of history in terms of 
the representation of the Hyder Ali family’s house. The scanty references in scholarly 
articles generally comment on its stateliness (Thaggert 95; Prasad 369), or speak about its 
threatening presence throughout the novel, which is 
characterized by an explosive silence and a recurrent image of Baba grinding the 
old gramophone and listening to the cracked, scratchy records of the forties. It is 
this static image of the house that looms large in the mind of the reader, 
suggesting Bim’s suppressed anger and bitterness. (Prasad 369)  
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While one way of looking at the abandoned house is, as suggested above, to see it in the 
context of Bim’s abandonment, anger, and isolation, such a reading fails to note the most 
plausible and pertinent point in connection with the house. Surely, the empty, silent house 
is particularly significant because it is both a literal indicator as well as a metaphor for the 
dispossessions and dislocations of millions of people from their homes during Partition; 
surely, we must read it as an example of the losses of Partition, the emptying out of 
minority communities in both India and Pakistan, and the silent, poignant absence of 
often entire minority communities in the newly born nations.  
Even the text acknowledges this connection that scholars have failed to make, 
albeit (and yet again) only through the self-preoccupied concerns of Bim about herself 
and her siblings. Bim senses the effects of the Hyder Ali family’s abandoned house in 
conjunction with the sinister, suppressed tension of Partition that she experiences in her 
isolated world. For instance, in spite of knowing that Tara is perfectly safe socializing at 
the club with the Misra sisters, Bim feels uneasy, “for unease was in the air like a swarm 
of germs, an incipient disease. The empty house across the road breathed it at them. Its 
emptiness and darkness was a warning, a threat perhaps” (101). The house reminds Bim 
that danger is still around and that Tara might be affected by it.
125
 Later, when Bim and 
Baba go to check on the empty house upon Hyder Ali’s request to Raja to do the same, 
“[a] mirror on the wall flashed a blank, empty glare at them – the heathen, unwanted” 
(118). It is as if the house has taken upon itself the anger and pain of the refugees who 
                                                          
125 The menacing emptiness of the house also gestures towards the fear with which Bhakta, Hyder Ali’s groom, 
continues to live in the premises after his master’s departure. Bhakta worries that he will be punished by Hindu 
communalists for letting the Muslim Hyder Alis escape. Although Desai represents Bhakta as a despicable, cringing 
man who regrets the fact that he did not do anything to prevent Muslims from running away from Old Delhi to safer 
places, through the depiction of his fear, she certainly throws light on the experiences of working-class people who 
were left behind (by their employers), bereft of the measure of political protection they enjoyed while they were 
connected to powerful élite homes. 
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were forced to leave Delhi. While the experience of the Hyder Ali family, who were 
assisted by their Hindu friends to escape and find refuge in their house in Hyderabad, 
does not even approach the bodily, mental, emotional, fraternal, and financial crises 
experienced by millions of people during Partition, nevertheless, the house with its 
almost tangible, textural silence and emptiness becomes a stage for the enactment of 
Partition in the novel. It becomes a metaphor for the absence of more than half of the 
Muslim population that had lived in Delhi till 1947, and perhaps also for the elaborately 
codified Old City way of life that all but died with their departure. In this sense, 
Hyderabad is seen as the new site of Indian Muslimness in the novel; Muslims are 
displaced to another city outside North India where they have a better chance of living in 
peace. Perhaps this problematic representation of late 1940s Hyderabad as a refuge for 
Muslims has to do also with the way Hyderabadi élites represented themselves around 
this time. For example, the last Prime Minister of Hyderabad state wrote in his memoir in 
1962: “Hyderabad acquired more and more importance as the seat of Muslim culture and 
political power and after the so-called Mutiny of 1857, became the main sanctuary of the 
Muslim culture for the whole of the sub-continent” (Ali, Tragedy 17). Such problematic, 
overarching, retrospective self-representations certainly seem to have played a role in 
Desai’s representation of Hyderabad, where life was actually very uncertain for everyone 
in the 1940s, including élite Muslims.   
Critical scholarship on Clear Light of Day fails to note in Desai’s text an example 
of the public politics in which Muslims are stereotyped in an attempt to imaginatively, 
narratively, and practically deny them the right to be a part of the Indian nation. Such 
interpretations only serve to textually recreate the Partition of India at a time when it is 
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being emphasized by Hindutva adherents (through the use of narratives about violence 
committed by Muslims during Partition) in both India and amongst diasporic Indians that 
Indian Muslims are not and cannot be Indians; they do not merit this membership because 
they are believed to not subscribe to the mainstream idea of nationness, which is ironic, 
since the conditions for nationality that were being touted in the India Desai writes about 
were designed from the very start to keep Muslims out (see Savarkar 113, 139; 
Golwalkar 127, 321). Even though Bim may have lofty secular ideals and, arguably, may 
not be self-conscious in her prejudice or suspicion of Benazir, her designated Other, 
Bim’s ideals are not followed through in thought and deed beyond token grand gestures. 
In fact, Bim’s attitude towards Benazir only contributes further to the mainstream refusal 
to accept Muslims as members of the secular Indian family.
126
 By representing Bim’s 
great anger towards and almost complete rejection of Benazir, by embodying in Raja the 
ultimate betrayal of kinship, and finally, by denying Benazir the compliment of 
psychological, textural, and textual complexity that she bestows on her other characters, 
Desai renders her own secular efforts largely futile.  
Scholars have failed for the most part to remark upon these points. Indeed, they 
have gone to the extent of elaborating that Benazir, who is “coded as the upper-class 
consumer who surrounds herself with ribbons and lace, with glossy magazines and 
American records,” becomes the lens through which we see Raja’s ultimately 
consumerist and dilettantish approach to culture come full-circle (Mohan 54). It is 
through this connection to Benazir that Raja becomes defined. Yet Mohan does not 
                                                          
126 This sense of an irreparable breach is especially driven home in the text when Tara compares a history book on 
India and Pakistan to the recent history of her family after Raja leaves for Hyderabad on straitened terms with Bim and 
marries Benazir. The narrator informs us that “[s]he turned the pages of Sir Mortimer Wheeler’s Early India and 
Pakistan and thought how relevant such a title was to the situation in their family, their brother’s marriage to Hyder 
Ali’s daughter” (49). 
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question how Benazir is only a means for the novelist to achieve her end of delineating 
Raja’s character. How such a representation of Benazir as an upper-class consumer as 
well as the elaborate depiction of her father’s “Muslim” wealth constructed along 
Orientalist lines mark a continuation of the silencing of the Hyderabadi Muslim woman 
and a pointed neglect of the Partition experiences of Hyderabadi Muslims eludes Mohan 
in her analysis. In this way, because Desai subtly and smoothly encodes the inferiority of 
Muslims to Hindus in terms of the former’s excessiveness and consumerism, and because 
scholars have not remarked upon this persistent thread in the novel, both Clear Light of 
Day and the scholarly response it has elicited can be read as only apparently and 
superficially egalitarian and secular.
127
  
The function of the last scene in the text, where the Das family’s musician 
neighbour Mulk holds a concert, seems to be to soothe old wounds like a balm. It is 
meant to console the reader that even if political events rend asunder the interwoven 
                                                          
127 Desai’s failure in Clear Light of Day to represent the experiences of Indian Muslims whose lives were upturned by 
Partition becomes a glaring exclusion when we take into account how convincingly she manages to weave together the 
atmosphere of a decaying Urdu literary climate and the position of Muslim women in the post-Partition socio-political 
and historical milieu represented in In Custody. Thankfully, however, we do not have to rely on Desai to learn about 
the experiences of Muslim women during Partition. These experiences have been dealt with in some detail by writers 
such as Attia Hosain (English), Ismat Chughtai (Urdu), and Jamila Hashmi (Urdu). For example, Hosain’s anthology 
Phoenix Fled (1953) contains two short stories, “Phoenix Fled” and “After the Storm,” that engage with this subject. 
“Phoenix Fled” represents the refusal of many people to succumb to the demands of Partition-related upheavals in the 
1940s. This resistance is achieved through the characterization of the protagonist, an old woman who stubbornly 
refuses to leave her home in the face of imminent death at the hands of communal rioters. Chughtai’s Urdu short story 
“Roots” (1983) also narrates Partition through the experiences of an older female protagonist who refuses to leave the 
house that has been her home since she was brought there as a bride. Hosain’s “After the Storm” examines the impact 
of Partition violence on a little girl, who appears to remember nothing specific about the violence in which she loses 
her family. An otherwise loquacious girl, Bibi’s traumatized mind takes refuge in the silence of strategic, subconscious 
forgetting. In doing so, “After the Storm” deals with common themes in Partition literature, such as silence and trauma. 
Such themes are also represented in Hashmi’s short story “Banished,” which is a first-person account of the thoughts, 
memories, and experiences of an abducted woman who decides not to be “recovered” because she does not wish to be 
separated from the children she has had from her abductor; yet she suffers from a great sense of loss as she pines for 
her natal family. Hosain’s novel Sunlight on a Broken Column (1961) also deals extensively with the politics of 
Partition as well as the anti-colonial struggle from the point of view of élite Muslims from the United Provinces. Not 
only does it depict the anger of the protagonist Laila who is threatened with rape and death during communal riots (but 
is saved along with her daughter by her Hindu friends Sita and Ranjit), the novel also represents the fear that families 
experience when their members go missing during riots. In contrast to Desai’s novel, Hosain’s text constructs Laila’s 
family home, which later belongs to a Hindu family, as a place populated with the private memories of Laila and her 
past experiences with her family members. It also furnishes the house with Laila’s intricately woven memories of the 
high politics of the upper-class, upper-caste landlords (taluqdars) of the United Provinces and their engagements with 
the Muslim League, the Congress, and the departing British Raj (275-319).     
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fabric of Indian society, the work of art, memory, and creative memorializations of a 
shared Hindu-Muslim past will persist and help stitch together the separated fabric. They 
will help continue hybrid traditions where coexistence, albeit “conflictual coexistence” 
(Spivak, Nationalism 7), between communities is possible. Critics have celebrated the 
last scene as an example of how “the very divisions which split the country, the family, 
and the individuals within it may eventually contribute to a greater sense of mutual 
understanding,” and that this is why they are not “irremediable losses” (Huggan 15). 
Graham Huggan writes that  
a new allegiance is … formed between silence and music in which the 
‘consenting’ silence of Baba and Bim, as they sit enraptured by the songs of their 
neighbour, Mulk, and his venerable guru, contributes to the expression of a 
collective culture framed by the figure of the extended Hindu family. (Huggan 15) 
A harmoniously shared mood of silence through the action of music certainly emerges in 
the last scene. However, what is disturbing is that the mutual silence of Bim and Baba 
and their acceptance of their lot amidst this aura of understanding, as well as Huggan’s 
assertion that understanding can persist in spite of divisions, completely lets slide the 
point that the scene smoothes over the sudden absence of Muslims in Delhi as a result of 
violence. Huggan’s exultation over the outline of a “collective culture” framed by the 
“figure of the extended Hindu family” is problematic because, in line with Desai’s 
representation, it allows the Hindu family to stand in for the syncretic, collective culture 
in Old Delhi that in pre-Partition India used to include Muslims.  
Huggan also writes that unlike the awkward interplay of profound silence and 
raspy, canned gramophone music that Baba represents, Mulk’s concert ensures that   
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[m]usic no longer entails the morbid recollection of, or fruitless escape from, an 
unwanted history, and silence no longer seeks to repress what cannot, or should 
not, be told. Instead, both cooperate … in the imaginative conversion of a story of 
violence and despair into a tentative call for hope. (15-6)  
Perhaps the tentative call for hope can be read as Bim’s belated but nonetheless 
significant attempts to bridge the gap between Raja and Benazir and herself in the end. In 
the same vein can be read the music that Mulk and his guru perform, which is infused 
with Iqbal’s poetry and syncretic Indo-Islamic musical techniques that draw from a 
shared, hybrid Hindu-Muslim artistic heritage. However, this does not make up for the 
fact that in the physical absence of Muslims from a city in which they had lived for many 
centuries, Mulk’s concert appears to enact the appropriation of a common heritage; his 
concert then becomes a weak attempt to claim a harmonious coexistence with non-
existent Muslims and has no tangible consequence as far as mending damaged relations is 
concerned.  
It is only Ho who interprets the concert as a reminder of Hyder Ali’s cultural 
gatherings, and she reads a sense of experienced loss in it: “The setting, scene, and action 
recall the lost culture of Hyder Ali’s household and, in the pleasure of the present 
community, this memory runs as the subterranean current of another community’s 
displacement and exile, and the nation’s fractured legacy” (42). Ho’s point that the last 
scene is infused with a bitter-sweet entanglement of pacifying music and painful 
memories is also suggested in the fact that Mulk’s guru sings a couplet by Iqbal; amidst 
the atmosphere of the concert and the retrospective bent of the plot that builds up to this 
point, when some form of reconciliation finally becomes possible, Raja’s Iqbal finally 
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becomes meaningful for Bim. It is here that Iqbal does not resound with the empty echo 
of Raja’s impassioned, idle recitation, a symptom of his “heroism without a cause” 
(Mohan 55), but is imbued with trauma and history.  
In this chapter, I have examined how Raja’s largely myopic vision of Muslims, 
Hyderabad, as well as Urdu poetry is parodied through the critical gaze of his sister Bim, 
who is also, however, guilty of prejudice against Raja’s Hyderabadi wife Benazir. I have 
explained how we only know Benazir through the jaundiced hostility with which Bim 
views her, holding her responsible for her brother’s departure from his home and 
responsibilities. Benazir’s silence throughout the text, and Bim’s negative views of her, 
which receive only a feeble protest from her sister Tara, ensure that Benazir’s 
experiences as a Muslim woman fleeing from Delhi to Hyderabad remain outside the 
purview of the text. In this way, even though Partition literature has been generally 
credited with bringing to light the forgotten private and collective trauma of partitioned 
communities and violated, dispossessed people, Desai’s novel actually encourages the 
mainstream Indian silence on the question of Partition, Hyderabad, and Hyderabadis.  
However, it is important to remember that Desai published Clear Light of Day at 
a time when historiography was, for the most part, silent about Partition violence. Her 
contribution, therefore, lies in bringing to literature the context of Partition in terms of 
Delhi and Hyderabad. Inadequate and highly problematic though they are, the shadowy 
representations of Partition in Delhi and Hyderabad in this novel at least create a 
discursive platform that allows for discussions about the experiences of Partition violence 
in these regions. Even though Benazir is barely present in the text, her existence is 
acknowledged and enables us to think about the experiences of Hyderabadi women 
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within the context of Partition. Similarly, not only Benazir but also Hyderabad is 
introduced into the equation through Desai’s concern about the fate of Urdu. It was in the 
background of the fierce three-language formula debates and official language disputes of 
the 1970s and 80s that Desai wrote Clear Light of Day. Although Urdu was included in 
the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which consists of the fourteen major 
languages used in India, in 1950 (Das Gupta 33), it remained on the margins in Uttar 
Pradesh, widely considered to be the heartland of both Hindi and Urdu. After being 
wilfully neglected since Partition by the proponents of Hindi (Sonntag, “Minority” 175-6; 
Das Gupta 142-9; Hasan, Legacy 158, 160, 191), who associated it exclusively with 
Muslims, Urdu stood to benefit from the three-language formula, which was introduced 
nationally in 1961, because one of the languages students could choose in school could 
be their mother tongue (Hasan, Legacy 244). But the third language that was taught in 
most schools, in addition to English and Hindi, was Sanskrit. In the 1970s, when the state 
government made attempts to cautiously promote Urdu in education by appointing Urdu 
teachers and opening up options in the third language category to include all the 
languages in Schedule VIII as possible choices, Hindi supporters went to the extent of 
accusing Urdu of partitioning the country and threatening the national unity of the 
country (Sonntag, “Minority” 175). The state government was forced to back down,128 
and the case against Urdu has only strengthened since the alarming growth of 
communalism and communalist political parties such as the Hindutva-adhering Bharatiya 
Janata Party (“Indian People’s Party”; BJP) in the 1980s (175). It is this consistent 
                                                          
128 At a symbolic level, the Bihari (Congress) government proved to be more successful than the UP (Congress) 
government was towards the end of the decade; Urdu was granted second official language status in Bihar in 1980. The 
UP government had to struggle and back down several times and, finally, in spite of anti-Urdu riots in which at least 
twenty-six were left dead in Badaun, UP was able to grant Urdu second official language status in 1989 (Sonntag, 
“Political” 234). For more on these debates and disputes in the 1980s, see Selma Sonntag’s “The Political Saliency of 
Language in Bihar” (1996) (224-34).  
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decline in the fortunes of Urdu that Desai represents in Clear Light of Day. And it is 
because of her preoccupation with Urdu that we get to hear about Hyderabad, Hyderabadi 
Muslims, Delhi, and Delhi’s Muslims in the context of Partition at all, however restricted 
and distanced those depictions may be from the perspectives of those whom they 
represent. In the next chapter, I will move from studying the representation of 
Hyderabadis during Partition by non-Hyderabadis to examining a text by an American 
Muslim woman of Hyderabadi origin; the next chapter will explain the nature of the 
contribution her voice makes towards redressing the relative absence of the Hyderabadi 
perspective in Partition Studies and Partition literature such as Desai’s Clear Light of 
Day.  
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Staying Within the Lines: The Representation of Rape and Silence in Samina Ali’s 
Madras on Rainy Days 
A first-person narrative, Samina Ali’s Madras on Rainy Days (2004) is situated in 
late 1980s and early 1990s Hyderabad. The protagonist is nineteen-year-old Layla, a 
naturalized American citizen who was born in Hyderabad city and has been brought to 
India from the US to marry Sameer. The novel explores not only Layla’s thoughts about 
her impending marriage, but also represents an insight into the post-Partition lives of her 
extended family, who live in Hyderabad city after having been driven away from their 
ancestral property during Partition. Layla’s maternal grandfather, a Nawab, loses his 
feudal estate in Miryalguda in the Nalgonda district of the erstwhile princely Hyderabad 
state during the late 1940s; it was seized by his own workers during the Telangana 
Armed Struggle and, subsequently, appropriated by the Congress government. Layla’s 
family lives in exile, haunted by displacement and loss. This sense of injury persists for 
decades, and is sharply highlighted and its expression violently and suddenly silenced 
with the gangrape of Layla’s cousin Henna during a communal “riot” in the late 1980s.129  
Ali’s position as a diasporic author is seen in two significant interventions made 
by her novel. First, as I argue in this chapter, it participates in the “aesthetics of 
postmemory” of Partition (Hirsch, Family 245), where postmemory is a term coined by 
Marianne Hirsch, and refers to a kind of memory which is acquired as inheritance. It 
alludes to the memory that is compiled by children of individuals who are part of a larger 
group that experiences an event of great suffering, because these children live in the 
                                                          
129 Gyanendra Pandey points out the incongruity of the euphemism “riot” to situations that are increasingly and 
alarmingly beginning to look more like pogroms (“In Defence” 569) or even a form of communal genocide. Sudhir 
Kakar writes that “an outbreak of violence in Hindu-Muslim conflict should no longer be called a riot, with the 
anarchical connotations of the word. Less planned than a battle yet more organized than a riot, communal violence lies 
somewhere between the two” (70). In the absence of a more specific word, I will stick to “riot” and put it in quotation 
marks as an ironic reminder of how inadequate it is to describe communal violence in India. 
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permanent shadow of their parents’ narrations of trauma (127). Ali’s construction of 
Partition, its losses in terms of Layla’s family’s ancestral home, as well as the death of 
Henna as a result of present-day communalism, falls within the ambit of Hirsch’s 
envisioning of location in exile as a characteristic condition of postmemory. It serves to 
illustrate Hirsch’s theorization that the aesthetics of postmemory are actually “a diasporic 
aesthetics of temporal and spatial exile that needs simultaneously to (re)build and to 
mourn” (245). Therefore, because literature can serve as “a site of postmemory and 
mourning” (257), Madras on Rainy Days becomes the means to creatively memorialize 
the deaths of people during Partition as well as the deaths of people today from 
communal violence (Hirsch, Family 247; Gera Roy and Bhatia xiv). Furthermore, Hirsch 
argues in the context of visual texts of the Holocaust (Family 254-5; “Surviving” 9-10) 
that postmemory is not necessarily restricted to families
130
 and, therefore, may actually 
help build broader networks of people who can share, mourn, and memorialize the 
trauma caused by Partition. Thus, Partition literature such as Ali’s novel also allows 
readers who have their own postmemories of Partition, or those who do not have any 
connection to Partition whatsoever, such as some of the American readers Ali hopes to 
attract (Ali, Rediff), to value the memories of Layla’s Uncle Taqi and mother-in-law Zeba 
and the postmemories of Layla, thereby broadening awareness and advancing the 
understanding of Partition and the traumas it generated for so many. Such reading 
practices would then contribute to what Veena Das hopes for: the creation of “therapeutic 
spaces” of socially shared expressions of the trauma of Partition (Critical 192-3, 196). 
                                                          
130 It is an “intersubjective transgenerational space of remembrance, linked specifically to cultural or collective trauma” 
(Hirsch, “Surviving” 10). In other words, postmemory involves interactions with people of different generations, but 
this may not necessarily mean that only people related by blood to people who have experienced trauma can have 
postmemory.  
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Besides this, novels like Madras on Rainy Days not only undo the official silences on 
Partition, but they also help to rebuild through the medium of creative writing South 
Asian communities that were dislocated during Partition and whose members can 
personally relate to the book for that reason (Hirsch, Family 255).  
Indeed, another significant contribution of Ali’s novel to new as well as existing 
Partition discourses is that it narratively mediates in Partition-related politics in the 
subcontinent as well as the South Asian diaspora based in North America. Papiya Ghosh 
has shown that the context in which nations are narrated and acted out in South Asia is 
becoming “increasingly transnational” (xix). She writes that diasporic Indians are 
extremely attentive to the trajectory taken by the idea of the nation in the subcontinent 
and, in fact, intervene and influence the path the nation takes (xxxi). Her research reveals 
that Partition is a major reference point in diaspora, “both in installing and resisting 
Hindutva” (xxi). She writes about the extension of the subcontinent into the diaspora, 
particularly after the 1970s, and calls attention to the role played by the “exclusionary 
everyday experiences of nation-building” (xxix) in this trend. Hence, communalist hate 
ideologies that were born in the subcontinent are “increasingly being found mirrored 
amongst the substantial communities of Indians and Pakistanis living abroad” (Bates 2).  
This happens in two ways: first, in terms of “the post-eighties subcontinental 
majoritarianisms” (Ghosh 175), such as the rise of right-wing Hindutva ideology amongst 
some sections of Hindu society and, second, “the oppositional efforts at recontouring the 
subcontinent structured by partition” (175), such as the contribution of South Asians in 
the diaspora towards repairing the social bridges that collapsed during Partition and that 
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Hindutva now seeks to wipe out permanently. So, while diasporic Sangh Parivar
131
 
networks fund Sangh organizations and activities in India, other groups focus on foiling 
these attempts and contribute to democratic processes. Such efforts have become more 
and more urgent because Hindutva organizations are expanding the field of their 
influence not only across India, but also amongst Hindus in the diaspora. Thus, the RSS 
has branches in forty-seven countries (126) and the VHP in eighty. These organizations 
are particularly active in the US, Canada, and the UK, and they propagate the message of 
Hindutva through widespread networks run by middle-class Hindus on the web and on 
university and college campuses (through Hindu students’ associations and councils) 
(128-30). For example, the American chapter of the VHP works closely with the Hindu 
Students’ Council, which in turn, has set up the Global Hindu Electronic Network 
(GHEN). The rhetoric of GHEN is found to circulate the idea of a monolithic, dangerous, 
and violent Islam, and its followers have called for the annihilation of Indian Muslims 
and Pakistanis (130). Citizens’ organizations such as the Campaign to Stop Funding Hate 
(CSFH), which was launched in the US after the horrific attacks on Muslims during the 
2002 Gujarat riots, and the Forum for Indian Leftists (FOIL), which was formed in 1995 
specifically in response to “Yankee Hindutva” (Mathew and Prashad), have reported that 
large funds are collected and sent to India by the seemingly innocuous India 
Development and Relief Fund (IDRF) for the benefit of Sangh networks and 
organizations. These funds are then used in the service of a violent, divisive cause for 
educating communities such as the adivasis in hatred of communism and Islam and by 
                                                          
131 The Sangh Parivar (“Family Organization”) consists of several right-wing Hindutva organizations affiliated to the 
“mother” organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (“National Self-Volunteers Organization”; RSS). Amongst 
many others, these prominently include the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti (“National Women Volunteer’s Committee”; 
Samiti), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (“World Hindu Council”; VHP), the Bajrang Dal, the Durga Vahini, and the Shiv 
Sena. 
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promoting communal pogroms (Ghosh 200-1; Campaign, “Project”; Mathew and 
Prashad).  
However, there are also Muslim organizations in the diaspora, such as the Indian 
Muslim Federation (IMF) in the UK, the Indian Muslim Relief Committee (IMRC) of the 
Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)
132
 in the US, and the Consultative Committee 
of Indian Muslims in North America and Canada (CCIM) in Canada, that are focused on 
preventing “the idea of India from being claimed for Hindutva” (xxx). The activities of 
these organizations include financially helping the victims of communal riots in India 
(136), mobilizing opinion on issues concerning the treatment of Muslims in India (such 
as the indiscriminate detention of Muslim youth under the Terrorist and Disruptive 
Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA)), and registering their protest with Indian politicians 
who frequently visit North America (144). There are also alliances between organizations 
representing Muslims and those representing left-wing professionals and thinkers, 
women, gay communities, students as well as Dalits. Examples of such organizations 
include FOIL, Manavi, Sakhi for South Asian Women, South Asian Lesbian and Gay 
Association (SALGA), the International Dalit Sena, and the South Asia Solidarity Group 
(SASG).
133
 In the aftermath of the 2002 Gujarat riots, the SASG and Asian Women 
Unite! protested the growing influence of organizations such as the VHP in front of the 
head offices of the British Charity Commission in London and called for the removal of 
                                                          
132 For insights into the kind of issues brought up by ISNA members and the steps taken to implement measures to 
protect the interests of Indian Muslims in India, see the dated but still relevant proceedings of the IMRC’s conference 
“North Americans in Support of Indian Muslims” (March 25-26, 1989) in Indian Muslims in North America (1991), 
edited by Omar Khalidi. 
 
133 For an analysis of how second-generation Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis have rallied around the idea of a 
South Asian identity, “implying in a diasporic context the erasure of the boundaries resulting from Partition” (306), see 
Aminah T. Mohammad’s “Relationships between Muslims and Hindus in the United States: Mlecchas versus Kafirs?” 
(2001) (301-4). For a range of writings that show the resonances and dissonances associated with this solidarity, see 
Our Feet Walk the Sky: Women of the South Asian Diaspora (1993) by Women of South Asian Descent Collective.   
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the charity status of the VHP. FOIL is also part of the Coalition Against Genocide 
(CAG), formed in February 2005 to protest the proposed business visit of Gujarat Chief 
Minister Narendra Modi to the US in March 2005. Modi’s complicity in the communal 
violence in Gujarat in 2002 is established. Yet he has to date got off scot-free on all 
charges and has not been brought to book. In addition to this, what drives home how 
strong the grip of Hindutva is on the subcontinent and why it is even more urgent for 
diasporic interventions to continue in subcontinental politics is that Modi will most likely 
be the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate for India’s central elections in 2014. As a result 
of a fierce mass media campaign that enlisted support from diasporic South Asian 
women’s groups and Amnesty International, Modi was finally denied a US visa in 2005 
(220-1). This policy has remained unchanged despite attempts, such as the recent ones by 
Republican Congressman Joe Walsh in April 2012 and September 2012 (NDTV, “New,” 
“US Congressman”), to get the decision revoked.134  
As I will show in this chapter, in representing the impact of Partition on 
Hyderabadi Muslims today, who suffer loss and displacement in each wave of communal 
violence that sweeps their city, Ali’s novel becomes part of these greater diasporic 
interventions into the politics of the subcontinent. Through mediations like Madras on 
Rainy Days, diasporic subjects have not only engaged with the politics of post-Partition 
                                                          
134 Other diasporic interventionist initiatives include an exchange of goodwill and cooperation, such as when Dalit 
politician Ram Vilas Paswan was invited to speak at the fourth annual convention of the American Federation of 
Muslims from India (AFMI) in 1994. In 1994, the AFMI was invited on Paswan’s initiative to the first International 
Dalit and Minorities Conference in New Delhi (Ghosh 145). There are other strong networks of solidarity such as the 
Lease Drivers Coalition (LDC) in the US, which has organized South Asians, who constitute fifty per cent of New 
York’s thirty thousand yellow cab drivers (190-1). Indian and Pakistani cab drivers, who negotiate the mean streets of 
New York and face racism on a daily basis, have united in a way that middle-class Indians and Pakistanis have not; 
disregarding subcontinental cartographies, they are trying to rebuild social networks that existed before nationalisms set 
in and Partition happened (190-1). Organizations such as the Pakistan-India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy 
(PIPFPD) have also focused on working-class members of the Indian and Pakistani diaspora, who “display little or 
none of the jingoism evident within the region … [and] retain their pre-partition social links, thrive on reflexivity and 
remain in a mentality of exile” (Samaddar, “Plural” 162). 
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South Asia as a whole, but also with specific localities such as Hyderabad, which were 
transformed during Partition. It is here that Ali’s novel makes its valuable contribution.135 
I argue in this chapter that by focusing on Partition and, of course, on communal politics 
and the significant physical, emotional, and financial injury caused by it to Indian and 
Hyderabadi Muslims, Ali, an American of Indian and Hyderabadi descent, disrupts the 
confident stride of Hindutva. She also creates a literary framework, a socio-political 
milieu, within which the related issues of compensation for internally displaced 
Hyderabadi Muslim refugees, citizenship of Muslims, and communalist discrimination 
against Muslims in Indian job markets can be discussed. In doing so, she aligns herself 
with similar initiatives made by other groups in the diaspora to redress wrongs 
perpetrated against local and regional communities in India. In the process, she also 
becomes part of a politically active community of diasporic Hyderabadis,
136
 such as 
Omar Khalidi, who used his relatively safe and empowering diasporic location in the US 
                                                          
135 To date, there is no scholarly analysis of this aspect of Madras on Rainy Days. In fact, the novel has received hardly 
any sustained critical attention. Jaspal Kaur Singh has examined Ali’s binary representation of the “East” and “West” in 
this novel in the last section of her book Representation and Resistance: South Asian and African Women’s Texts at 
Home and in the Diaspora (2008) and Roksana Badrudojja has done the same on the lines of the tradition and 
modernity dichotomy in her dissertation (unpublished) The ABCD Conundrum: What Does It Mean to be a South 
Asian-American Woman? (2008). Ali’s novel has also been named (but not studied as): a “Re-Orientalist” text by Lisa 
Lau in her essay “Re-Orientalism: The Perpetration and Development of Orientalism by Orientals” (2009); an example 
of “Muslim literature” by Karine Ancellin in her “Hybrid Identities of Characters in Muslim Women Fiction post-9/11” 
(2009) and Mohja Kahf in her “Teaching Diaspora Literature: Muslim American Literature as an Emerging Field” 
(2010); and an instance of fiction that engages fleetingly with female same-sex sexuality in Megan Sinnott’s essay 
“Public Sex: The Geography of Female Homoeroticism and the (In)Visibility of Female Sexualities” (2009).   
 
136 As opposed to pre-1948 trends, when Hyderabad was a preferred destination for professionals, current rates of 
migration from Hyderabad remain high. Many Hyderabadi Muslims left Hyderabad for Pakistan after 1948, citing or 
fearing discrimination at the hands of the new Indian administration as their reasons for leaving. For more on this 
migration to Pakistan, see Karen Leonard’s “Hyderabadis in Pakistan: Changing Nations” (2001). Many of these 
Pakistani Hyderabadis as well as other Hyderabadis (both Muslim and non-Muslim) who had stayed back in Hyderabad 
later moved to other locations such as the USA, UK, Canada, Australia, and the Middle East. See Leonard’s Locating 
Home: India’s Hyderabadis Abroad (2007) and “Construction of Identity in Diaspora: Emigrants from Hyderabad, 
India” (1999) for more on this subject. Many diasporic Hyderabadi Muslims prefer their Hyderabadi identity over other 
kinds of identity such as religious or national ones and like to have their own associations in the US (Mohammad 295; 
Leonard). For an analysis of the culture of migration in Hyderabad city (particularly about but not exclusively limited 
to Muslims) and how migration is associated with raised status and greater desirability in terms of marriage, 
irrespective of gender (Layla represents this prestige in Ali’s novel, and the fact that she is the source through which 
Sameer gets his American citizenship is important), see Syed Ali’s “‘Go West, Young Man: The Culture of Migration 
among Muslims in Hyderabad, India” (2007). 
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to locate, translate, and publish parts of the “Report on the Post-Operation Polo 
Massacres, Rape and Destruction or Seizure of Property in Hyderabad State,” compiled 
by Pandit Sundarlal and Qazi Muhammad Abdulghaffar a few months after the invasion 
of Hyderabad by India (September 13-18, 1948). Khalidi’s achievement is made even 
more significant in light of the fact that the Indian government does not acknowledge that 
the report was ever commissioned or even exists. Additionally, there is Mir Laik Ali, the 
last Prime Minister of Hyderabad, who published his memoir Tragedy of Hyderabad 
(1962), a damning critique of India’s actions in 1948, from his safe haven in Karachi.  
Finally, Ali’s novel also points out the uncanny ability of communalism to swiftly 
instill firm notions of “us” and “them” in even the minds of those unfamiliar (at an 
experiential level) with Hindu-Muslim violence, such as the protagonist Layla, who 
catches herself thinking of Hindus and Muslims as two polarized, irreconcilable 
communities after her cousin Henna’s death. This is an important contribution in light of 
the urgent need to halt the advance of communalism across diasporic South Asian 
communities, particularly amongst first-generation or second-generation immigrants who 
are most vulnerable to the rhetorical power of this self-proclaimed “authentic” Indian 
voice. It is in these socio-political contexts that Ali’s Madras on Rainy Days makes its 
most valuable intervention.  
In light of the urgency with which we must confront the advance of communalism 
in India, I focus in this chapter on the scene of Henna’s gangrape and murder and its 
subsequent impact on those around her. As part of this process, I examine where the 
contemporary Hyderabadi Muslim woman’s body stands in connection with the 
patriarchal, nationalist discourses that define the rhetoric of communalism in India as 
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well as abroad and that are ultimately and incontrovertibly enmeshed with Partition. In 
doing so, I show how even a novel published in 2004, whose plot is situated 
approximately four decades after Partition, is part of the Partition genre and how it 
represents the ongoing significance and centrality of Partition in patriarchal state and 
community discourses; these discourses not only closely affect people living in India, but 
also chase transnational subjects like Layla,
137
 who are too young and distanced from the 
socio-historical milieu of Partition to understand its full magnitude. My argument is that 
the rape and death of Henna not only sharply, dramatically, and irrevocably imprints 
upon the face of the present a link to its partitioned past, but also determines the way 
Partition-related property disputes and troubling memories are resolved in the novel. I 
describe how this resolution of Partition trauma and injustice takes place in the novel in 
the form of silence and/or silencing, specifically with regard to Henna, Layla’s nanny 
Nafiza, and Layla and Henna’s Uncle Taqi (or Taqi Mamu). And in my discussion on 
Nafiza, I argue that the implicit silencing of the Partition testimony of this working-class 
character in the text duplicates in terms of class the official and mainstream silencing of 
the experiences of Hyderabadis during Partition.   
In June 1948, three months before the “Police Action,” a euphemism for the 
invasion of Hyderabad by India that year, an arresting metaphor appeared in an Indian 
Express editorial on the dispute over Hyderabad’s reluctance to accede to the Indian 
Union. Although I have quoted this passage in a previous chapter, I believe it bears 
repeating here because of its special relevance to my analysis of Henna’s rape:  
Doubtful ‘friends’ abroad are already indulging in evil counsel. There are no 
doubt leaders among Muslims who resent much evil counsel, but others still emit 
                                                          
137 Layla’s parents ensure that she splits her time between India and the US every year. 
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more heat than light….. Whether negotiations are resumed or abandoned, 
Hyderabad cannot defy the forces of progress and democracy for all time. And 
India cannot nurse an enemy within her belly. (British Information Services, 
“Daily Press Summary – [date illegible] June 1948”; emphasis added) 
This sinister image of Hyderabad, ruled by a hegemonic Muslim minority, an enemy 
within India’s belly who is perceived to be loyal to predominantly Muslim Pakistan, runs 
parallel to the language expressed by some state workers, journalists, and columnists on 
the problem of “recovering” women who had been abducted and impregnated by men of 
the Other community during Partition. The hysteria in political and governmental 
discourses over the potentially dangerous consequences of such mixed sexual encounters 
is also reflected in the metaphors of reproduction and birth that crop up again and again 
in comments by prominent statesmen of the day.
138
 The official rhetoric suggested that 
children born to Hindu or Sikh women, but of Muslim paternity, were unacceptable in 
India
139
 (Butalia, Other 128, 213-9; Menon and Bhasin 119-22). Shail Mayaram observes 
that during Partition there was “no room for liminal categories” where communal identity 
was concerned. This liminality is exactly what a child born of a mixed union would 
represent in the state’s view, its existence “blurring … the margins” and “def[ying] 
knowledge (as intelligence) and corrod[ing] control” (161). Therefore, the state’s solution 
                                                          
138 Vallabhbhai Patel is known to have said that Hyderabad was “a cancer in the belly of India” (Munshi 1, 172). In an 
extension of the metaphor of reproductivity and maternity, the Nizam impatiently informed India on March 9, 1948 
after protracted negotiations that “Hyderabad is not a nest of Pakistan in India nor a possible source of danger to your 
Dominion” (Hyderabad’s Relations 29).   
 
139 Veena Das argues that the state’s position on “mixed” children was derived more from its own nationalist ideology 
against Muslims and Pakistanis, for communities themselves often included the possibility of mixed children being 
accepted and absorbed within established norms of kinship (Critical Events 76). She clarifies that this does not mean 
that the role of the community in constructing rigid norms of sexual and reproductive purity is in anyway undermined 
(81), but emphasizes that while communities could stretch their codes to receive and accommodate mixed children, 
“there is evidence of state intervention aimed at maintaining norms of honour and purity in violation of the practical 
exigencies of kinship in the community” (77-8). 
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for pregnant women presented them with the option of either delivering their children at a 
discreet location and putting them up for adoption, or aborting them and (thereby) getting 
“cleansed” completely140 (Butalia, Other 128). This purification process was called 
safaya (Hindustani, “cleaning up,” “clearing up”) and, significantly, was also used to 
refer bluntly to the physical and/or ritual removal or elimination of Muslims and 
Muslimness in the Mewat region of present-day Rajasthan. A former Alwar army captain 
who was deputed for “operations” to the Tijara sector in June 1947 tells Mayaram that he 
worked with the RSS and received orders from Vallabhbhai Patel. He says, “The killings 
of Hindus at Noakhali and Punjab had to be avenged. We called it the ‘Clearing Up 
campaign’ (safāyā). All the Meos from Firozpur Jhirka down were to be cleared and sent 
to Pakistan, their land taken over” (Mayaram 139). Mayaram’s research reveals that ten 
thousand Meos, who professed a hybrid faith dominated by Hindu and Muslim rituals and 
practices, were killed in this particular army operation in Alwar (140). Thirty thousand 
Meos were also killed in Bharatpur (129), and thirteen thousand were converted ritually 
to Hinduism. Thus, the metaphor of safaya, indicating a systematic ridding of not only 
sexual and reproductive contamination by Muslims but also Muslims themselves, was a 
commonly known concept at the time. Significantly, the taboo of being born of a 
Muslim’s womb still thrives, as the BJP and Sangh Parivar’s mobilization of backward 
classes in Gujarat in 1990 shows. In tribal areas such as Bharuch, people were pushed to 
contribute token amounts of money to the Ramjanmabhoomi cause and were told, “If you 
do not contribute that would prove you are from a Muslim womb!” (qtd in Shah 232).  
                                                          
140 How important this cleansing was to the state can be seen in the fact that abortions were covertly organized by state 
workers and performed by doctors in state hospitals (Singh, “Lady” 190-1; Menon and Bhasin 177-78, 83; Butalia, 
Other 128).  
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When the state’s solution to purify sexually and reproductively contaminated 
women is extended to accommodate the Indian Express quotation, Hyderabad becomes 
figuratively constructed as the malignant child of the enemy residing inside a previously 
pure, now violated Hindu body. The imagery is striking. Embedded in its landlocked 
position within India, Hyderabad is seen as an illegitimate, dangerous child growing in 
the belly of Mother India, with clearly visible genetic characteristics of its father, a 
masculinized, menacing, Muslim Pakistan who has violated India and deposited its bad 
seed in her womb. When the state’s solution (enabling the retrieval of national honour 
and the restoration of Mother India to its legitimate Hindu fold) is applied to Hyderabad, 
there emerge two options. India-as-mother and the Indian men protecting, or more 
precisely, controlling her maternal body, should allow Hyderabad to come into its own 
(or be “birthed” into its own?) in terms of its primary Muslimness and also grant it the 
option to accede to Pakistan or be an ally of Pakistan. The other option is that Hyderabad 
must be “aborted” and its allegedly pro-Pakistan (because Muslim) identity must be 
eliminated in some way. It was the metaphor of abortion that was used against 
Hyderabad, through the assimilation and subsequent official erasure of its Muslim culture 
from public domains. Instead of the term “Partition,” which is applied to the socio-
historical milieu represented by the partition of Punjab and Bengal in 1947, or 
“Accession” or “Integration,” which are used for Hyderabad and other princely states in 
general, the terms that work best to describe Hyderabad’s special case are “Absorption” 
or “Assimilation.”141 The Muslim identity of Hyderabad, an important part of Hyderabadi 
                                                          
141 However, the characters of Madras on Rainy Days are unanimous in calling this defining phase in their lives 
“Partition” (149, 76, 125-6). This strange nomenclature is an indicator of, first, the overwhelming resonance that the 
word “Partition” has in South Asian historical narratives; second, the verbal aspect of the conformity to Indianness 
expected from Hyderabadis since 1948; and third, the extension of the Partition of 1947 to the subsequent break-up of 
Hyderabad state in 1956 into three linguistically determined states – Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra. 
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and Deccani culture, was uprooted from its bearings, affecting a kind of figurative 
abortion. After Hyderabad’s “Absorption” into the Indian Union in such a way that it lost 
all semblance of its independent Deccani cultural identity, the safaya of India-as-mother 
was complete, and her body became whole and inviolate again.  
Furthermore, just as debates in the Indian Parliament over the recovery of women 
became an opportunity to slander the moral character of Pakistan and visualize India as a 
benevolent, protective, moral state (Butalia, Other 140) – the opposite of its malevolent, 
dangerous, immoral Other – the Indian invasion of Hyderabad in September 1948 sought 
to do the same for India in relation to Hyderabad, owing to Hyderabad’s friendship with 
Pakistan and the Muslim religious affiliation of its minority ruling class. In other words, 
to speak in the rhetoric of sexual reproductivity current at the time, on account of its 
Pakistani, Muslim “paternity,” Hyderabad became Othered too.142 What this meant in 
everyday terms was that Hyderabadi Muslims became doubly Othered because, first, they 
were Muslim and, second, they were Hyderabadi. This had serious implications for the 
way they were treated by the Indian government, as Ali’s novel shows.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
Another reason for this usage may be that the experiences of Hyderabadis during Partition – sexual violence, land 
grabbing, and struggles to extract adequate compensation from the new states for property lost or destroyed – are in 
some ways similar to that of people in other parts of the subcontinent. Furthermore, perhaps “Partition” also refers 
metaphorically to a constellation of smaller partitions, such as the dam that denies Taqi Mamu access to his ancestral 
land and the enforced separations that prevent Zeba from seeing her childhood playmates until many decades later. In 
addition to this, the word in the Hyderabadi context also challenges the commonly held notion (Kaul 9; Pandey, “In 
Defence” 560; Hasan, Inventing 30) that Partition affected only border states such as Punjab and Bengal, or only North 
India. 
 
142 That “Pakistani” and “Muslim” have been often conflated in nationalist perceptions since Partition is significant. 
Anxieties about Muslim loyalties suffuse the account of events in Hyderabad by K.M. Munshi, the Agent-General of 
India in Hyderabad, who writes “I was clear in my mind that if India was to live, the Muslims in India must cheerfully 
accept to be an integral part of the Indian nation, making no separate claims, owing no expressed or unexpected loyalty 
to Pakistan, harbouring no antagonism to the other elements in the country” (80). Mushirul Hasan points out how 
during the “massive upsurge” over the Babri Masjid in 1989-1992, it was “widely argued that Muslims, having divided 
the country, should migrate to Pakistan or live in India on terms laid down by the Hindu parties,” and informs us that 
the “Pakistan or Qabristan” (“Pakistan or the Graveyard”) slogan was widely raised by Hindus in Muslim-dominated 
areas at this time (Legacy 54). For more on this, see the popular perceptions about Muslims that emerge in research 
conducted by Pandey in his article “In Defence of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today” 
(1991); see also Kakar (106-7, 127) and M.J. Akbar (19, 28). In addition to this, see for the condemnation of this 
conflation “Pakistan and the ‘Loyalty Test’” in the “Founding Declaration” (2003) of the Bombay-based Muslims for 
Secular Democracy (MSD). 
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In Madras on Rainy Days, the metaphor of the abortion of Hyderabad, i.e. the 
symbolic annihilation of its identity by its forced integration into India, is transformed, 
but results in the same ramifications for Hyderabadis when Henna, a pregnant Muslim 
woman, dies along with her unborn child after being gang-raped and mutilated. Ali has 
explained in an interview to Shauna Singh Baldwin that the scene is based on the rape 
and murder of a Muslim woman during the communal riots that happened in Hyderabad 
city in 1990. The woman’s husband was also murdered. Ali recalls how the gang never 
made it to the house in which she was living with her husband and in-laws. She feels that 
it was at the cost of “a fellow Muslim sister’s life” that she herself was saved (Ali, 
“Every”).  
Sudhir Kakar writes that the riot of December 1990 happened after a period of 
relative calm in Hyderabad city. For about six years previous to 1990, there had been no 
“riots.” From 1978 to 1984, riots had occurred every year. And no major communal 
violence had occurred in the city between 1948 to 1978 (47). The 1978 riot was triggered 
off by the rape of eighteen-year-old Rameeza Bi by three Muslim and one Hindu 
policeman in the Nallakunta police station.
143
 Ahmed Hussain, Rameeza Bi’s husband, 
was beaten to death. Initially, the mobs who protested against police brutality were both 
Hindu and Muslim, but then Hindus and Muslims became pitted against one another after 
a minor incident involving Hindu and Muslim boys (47-8). Between 1978 and 1984, over 
four hundred people died and thousands were injured in the communal riots (48). The 
                                                          
143 The case of Rameeza Bi and the riots that followed have proved to be a watershed moment for Muslims in 
Hyderabad city. For example, Nissar, a young man who was responsible for committing violence and probably also 
killing people during the 1990 riots, explained to Kakar, “I decided to work for the [Muslim] nation after all I saw 
during the riots following Rameeza Bi’s case” (71). Kakar found that Hindu-Muslim relations have significantly 
deteriorated in certain parts of Hyderabad city since the incident and that old Hindu-Muslim friendships have all but 
ended (125-6). For more details about the case and a feminist critique of how the case was handled by dispensers of 
legal justice, see Kalpana Kannabiran’s “Rape and the Construction of Communal Identity” (1996). 
 205 
 
countdown for the 1990 riots in Hyderabad city began with BJP President LK Advani’s 
communally provocative rath yatra (“chariot procession”) from Somnath to Ayodhya.144 
The riots started with the killing of a Muslim auto-rickshaw driver called Sardar by two 
Hindus and lasted ten weeks, during which three hundred people died and thousands were 
wounded (51). Kakar writes that the recent communal violence has caused Muslims from 
other areas of Hyderabad city to migrate to the old city, where there is already a large 
population of Muslims, while Hindus are moving outwards (10-1).  
Indeed, the 1980s were a decade of bloody communal violence in India, and many 
political agendas that gained ascendancy then continue to haunt Indians today. Mushirul 
Hasan traces the fall of the Nehruvian secular consensus after Partition and informs us 
that riots were at their lowest since Partition in 1960, that they escalated in number and 
violence in the late 1960s, finally reaching an all-time high in the 1980s in terms of lives 
lost (close to four thousand) (Legacy 258-9). Hasan points out that while communal riots 
were not uncommon during Nehru’s life time, they were still localized and controllable. 
However, subsequent “riots” were deadlier, more widespread, and extended over weeks 
or even months. They spread to rural areas, involved the active complicity of the police 
and paramilitary forces, and more and more people participated in looting, arson, and 
killings (260). He attributes the steady rise of communalism in the 1980s to Indira 
Gandhi’s wooing of Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh communalists in order to buy electoral 
gains for the Congress (261-3) and to Rajiv Gandhi’s maintenance of this status quo after 
                                                          
144 Somnath is the site of a temple that was destroyed by Mahmud Ghaznavi, a Muslim ruler from Ghazni, during one 
of his many expansionist military campaigns in the eleventh century. The Babri Masjid in Ayodhya became the focal 
point for the convergence of violent communal sentiments in the 1980s because it stood on what was believed to be the 
location for a temple that had existed from the time of Ram and that had been destroyed by the Mughal ruler Babar. 
Ayodhya is also the city where Ram was born. The Babri Masjid was demolished by members of the Sangh Parivar 
during its Ramjanmabhoomi movement (1989-1992). 
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his mother’s assassination145 (266). This violence culminated in the demolition of the 
Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992, and “riots” rocked Bombay, Surat, Bhopal, and many 
other places in India. Hasan compares these events to Partition, in terms of their 
experiential value for the post-Partition generation (307-8). Ten years after Ayodhya, in 
2002, Gujarat burnt. And in the ten years that have elapsed since the Gujarat riots, we 
have witnessed the meteoric rise of Modi, who not only continues to be the popularly 
elected Chief Minister of Gujarat, but is confident enough of support from the masses 
that he actually aspires to be Prime Minister of India.  
At the receiving end of this violence stand Muslim women like Henna, who are 
raped and murdered to illustrate and propagate the ultimate ends of Hindutva ideology, 
i.e. the subjugation of Muslims and other minority and subgroups such as Christians, 
Jews, and people with non-heteronormative sexualities. The centrality of the female body 
in the patriarchal discourses and religious fundamentalisms such as Hindutva and 
Islamism is represented by persistent references to the female body in Madras on Rainy 
Days. In fact, it is the constant factor in Layla’s and Henna’s subject constitution. Bart 
Moore-Gilbert has shown that postcolonial life-writing texts, especially those written by 
women, make the body “a central element in the construction of auto/biographical 
identity” (48), expressing affiliation, rebellion, and other features of subjective identity 
through its representation. Madras on Rainy Days, in addition to representing how the 
female body is construed by Hyderabadi Muslims as the locus of patriarchal domination, 
also makes direct references to how it is systematically theorized as the repository of 
                                                          
145 Hasan points out that the secular consensus was set aside as Hindu and Muslim fundamentalists were each mollified 
by the Congress in turn, with the Muslim patriarchs winning the Shah Bano case against the interests of Shah Bano and 
other Muslim women, and the Hindu fanatics succeeding in getting the judiciary to resuscitate the dormant Babri 
Masjid issue (266). 
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family and community “honour” and how the loss of that “honour” brings personal and 
social shame that points to the culpability of the individual female or females in question. 
The female body is thus formulated as the object of a crystallized, codified patriarchal 
narrative of tyrannical regulation, where the most effective way to not only strip a woman 
but her community of dignity is to do it verbally and/or physically through her body. For 
instance, Layla’s parents’ verbal slurs against her, occasioned by her attempts to resist 
their total control over her, reinforce such oppressive norms that connect sexual chastity 
to dignity and honour
146
 (4, 90).  
The strict policing of Layla’s body by close family members, narratively 
elucidated in the very first pages of the novel, is further reinforced by collective memory 
that constructs and preserves community notions of honour. Therefore, in addition to 
pressures exerted by her parents’ immigrant anxieties, Layla also feels the weight of the 
overwhelming legacy of honour when she visits Golconda Fort near Hyderabad city. 
Here, she is made aware of local folklore that contextualizes within a wider framework 
the oppressive, patriarchal restrictions she lives with. Referring to the defeat of the 
Deccani Qutub Shahi dynasty by North Indian Mughal armies in 1687, she writes, “I 
overheard a guide saying, the women of the harem, the women of the Qutb Shahi family, 
had drowned themselves, unwilling to let their bodies also be invaded. This was the 
heritage I carried” (180). This collective memory serves to situate the centrality of honour 
in Hyderabadi (patriarchal) traditions as well as provide an example for present day 
                                                          
146 The total control of Layla’s sexuality by denying her the option to date, and the attempt to keep her rooted to 
Hyderabadi Muslim culture by bringing her to Hyderabad city every year, are literary representations of common 
strategies of parental surveillance in diasporic Muslim communities in the US (Haddad and Lummis 138-9; Haddad et 
al 74, 87) and Canada (Khan, Aversion 19), such as Hyderabadis (Leonard, “Construction” 59). Furthermore, it is the 
role of the mother to ensure the chastity of the girl child (Khan, Aversion 74, 114). Shahnaz Khan has argued that 
religion becomes desirable for diasporic Muslim communities not only because it addresses their spiritual needs, but 
also because it grounds people in an alien place where immigration processes generate insecurity and exclusion from 
mainstream life makes it difficult to put down roots (“Veil” 149-50). 
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Hyderabadi women to emulate.
147
 It also goes to show how Layla’s subjectivity is 
conceived in relational and not monadic terms. In this patriarchal world-view, it is the 
women who uphold family and community honour better than any other symbol can, and 
it is the “[e]xclusive control of … [female] sexuality by the legitimate ‘owner’ [that] is 
the practical aspect of … [this] notion of honour. That is why it is expected that an ideal 
woman should end her life, which is incidental anyway, if her chastity has been defiled” 
(Agarwal 38), or if there is even a threat of its defilement. 
The Golconda scene is also prophetic because Layla’s heavily pregnant cousin 
Henna, who has accompanied her on the excursion, is subsequently gang-raped and 
murdered by eight armed young men during a communal “riot.” Her pregnant body is 
mutilated with a broken whiskey bottle (290-91), and her child is “whole” when it is 
“sliced out” by her attackers (293). Layla’s husband Sameer witnesses the event and 
reports that the men were “snickering at her body. They said her breasts were engorged, 
all juicy like mangoes – and just as sweet. Baby, they drank her milk!” (293)      
Henna’s situation is both different and similar to the rapes and pregnancies that 
women endured during Partition. Unlike many of these women, Henna is raped after she 
                                                          
147 Purshottam Agarwal points out that “[r]ather than look at how closely legends approximate to actual historical 
happenings, we need to look for the matrix of anxieties, fears and attitudes reflected in the construction and cultural 
acceptance of a particular legend or a myth” (36). Referring to the legend of the jauhar, or mass suicide, of Rani 
Padmini and her retinue when faced with the reality of invasion by Muslim conqueror Alauddin Khilji in the fourteenth 
century, Agarwal writes that what is important is not whether or not lust for Padmini was the real cause for Khilji’s 
attack on Chittorgarh, but that many Hindus have chosen to preserve this “memory” and believe it (36). Kakar makes 
the same point about the destruction of the Somnath temple (50). It is important to note here that the (in)famous Thoa 
Khalsa mass suicide by Sikh women during Partition was interpreted widely as “sacrifice” and “martyrdom,” and 
Rameshwari Nehru, a Congress Party personality and worker, went so far as to incorporate it into the Hindu idea and 
“history” of jauhar. Comparisons were made between the women of Thoa Khalsa and Rani Padmini and her retinue. 
Nehru also wrote fervently of them as satis, describing how she and her colleagues felt honoured to have the chance to 
worship these satis (Pandey, “Community” 2043). The oral transmission of such legends from generation to generation 
contribute to the internalization of stereotypes and prejudices (Agarwal 36; Kakar 42), so much so that such 
stereotyping progressively devalues the Other community to the point of dehumanization (Kakar 43), making the task 
of creating a democratic, dialogic discourse very difficult, especially when there are forces that have vested interests in 
perpetuating and reinforcing fears and anxieties (Agarwal 37). Similarly, both the Padmini legend as well as the legend 
of the Qutub Shahi women’s mass suicide gesture towards patriarchal anxieties about female sexuality and its 
symbolical value for community honour and provide an approved patriarchal template of personal conduct that women 
are meant to internalize and adhere to in times of political crisis and threats to communal honour. 
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becomes pregnant. She is a married Muslim woman carrying a Muslim child, so there is 
no communal or official anxiety over the taboo of violated virginity or “mixed” 
reproductivity as there was during Partition. Furthermore, Henna’s rape takes place 
during communal riots about four decades after Partition. But Layla’s mother-in-law 
Zeba compares the danger that Layla herself is in during this riot with the danger Layla’s 
mother faced as a child, when she witnessed the decisive attack on her family’s feudal 
estate in Miryalguda by workers and/or invaders in the 1940s. Zeba tells Layla how her 
mother was much younger than she when “this happened to her” (285). In Zeba’s mind, 
the current threat of violence against Muslims by Hindus in the late 1980s is directly 
comparable to the violence in Hyderabad State in the 1940s, committed by communist 
peasants, political workers as well as some likeminded landlords during the Telangana 
uprising (1946-51), as well as Indian state forces during their invasion of Hyderabad in 
1948. She connects the rapes, looting, and murders that were perpetrated by various 
groups against each other in the 1940s to the threat of rape, looting, and murder that 
looms over them now. Elsewhere in the novel, she refers to the events of the 1940s in 
Hyderabad specifically as “Partition” (125-6).  
Scholars such as Butalia (Other 4), Amrit Srinivasan (310-1), and Hasan (Legacy 
307-8) have noted that post-Partition events, such as the 1984 anti-Sikh communal “riots” 
after Indira Gandhi’s assassination, and the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the 
subsequent communal “riots,” have been connected in traumatized survivors’ memories 
to Partition. Older Sikhs told Butalia as she assisted in citizens’ relief efforts in 1984 that 
the recent murderous attacks were “like Partition again” (Other 4). This connection to 
Partition in collective memory is not only borne out by survivor testimonies, but also in 
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the ideological propaganda distributed by aggressors. In his discussion of how violence 
against Muslims is justified by Hindu communalists as a pre-emptive measure to curtail 
what is imagined to be imminent Muslim aggression, Gyanendra Pandey has reproduced 
a leaflet meant to mobilize Hindus against Muslims in Bhagalpur in late 1989 and early 
1990. This document refers repeatedly to issues connected with Partition, such as the 
dispute over Kashmir as well as the creation of Pakistan, which is where, it is suggested, 
all Indian Muslims should go, leaving India for Hindus
148
 (“In Defence” 566-7). 
Srinivasan also reports rumours amongst Hindus after Indira Gandhi’s assassination when 
Sikhs were, ironically, suspected and accused of crimes that were actually being 
committed against them. These rumours neatly evoked formulaic images of Partition 
crimes, for they alleged that trainloads of dead Hindus were coming in from Punjab, and 
that Sikhs had poisoned the water in Delhi (314-5).  
Purshottam Agarwal argues that the perspective of “nations-at-war” that 
communalism maintains usurps collective memory and creates a historical narrative that 
justifies its present political practice
149
 (32). This is certainly the case with Partition 
memory, which is selectively appropriated and deployed by right-wing forces in their 
own interests. Thus, the testimonies of the Sikh survivors of 1984 as well as communalist 
propaganda against Sikhs in 1984 and Muslims in 1989 show that current communal riots 
draw upon the events of Partition for their program. Partition is, therefore, very much 
                                                          
148 This is a common refrain in Hindutva propaganda. After the 1989 riots, Kakar interviewed a Muslim woman called 
Ghousia in Hyderabad city, who told him that “‘they’ are saying all over the country, ‘Go to Pakistan. That is yours. 
This is for Hindus’” (127). He also adds, “‘Babar ki santan, jao Pakistan’ [offspring of Babar, go to Pakistan] … is 
today one of the most popular slogans of Hindu mobs during a riot or in the preceding period of rising tension between 
the two communities” (127). 
 
149 Agarwal’s context is the Hindu communalist reiterations of the legend of Padmini’s jauhar.  
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alive in collective memory, and some recent events may be read and understood in its 
context.  
It is in this framework that Henna’s gangrape and murder – a crime committed 
during a “riot” that Zeba compares to Partition – must be analyzed. Gayatri Spivak’s and 
Rajeswari Sunder Rajan’s theoretical formulations about sati are particularly relevant in 
this regard. Spivak treats nineteenth century sati and contemporary dowry deaths by 
burning as “displacements on a chain of semiosis with the female subject as signifier” 
(“Can” 313). Following her cue, Rajan treats nineteenth-century sati, contemporary 
dowry related deaths, as well as contemporary sati as different but related phenomena 
(Real 33). I propose to treat the gangrape and murder of Henna in a similar fashion, and 
my argument proceeds from the premise that the rape, mutilation, impregnation, and 
murders of women during Partition, and the gangrape, mutilation, and murder of a 
heavily pregnant Henna are two different points on the same semiotic chain, with the 
maternal female body as signifier. The argument that rape is a political statement is 
indispensable to this analysis. 
Alongside other scholars (Bidwai et al 7; Kakar 13), Agarwal points out that 
communalism is essentially a political project, a battle between two nationalisms – 
authoritarian and democratic (32). Needless to say, communalist identification is 
accompanied by the firm conviction that the interests of one nation “not only diverge 
from but are in actual conflict with the interests of other[s]” (Kakar 13). Communalism is 
motivated more by politics than by religious or socio-economic strife and, for the 
participants, “every riot is actually a battle in the unfinished war not between two 
religious communities, but between two racially defined nations” (Agarwal 32). 
 212 
 
Furthermore, this “nations-at-war” theorization constructs parallel notions of morality so 
that the morality of war is different from the morality of normal times (32).  
Agarwal attributes the transformation of the religiously constructed identity of 
Hindus – i.e. Hinduism – into Hindutva, a politically constructed, racially and territorially 
defined, and historically shared identity, to the discourse of V.D. Savarkar (1883-1966), 
the oft-quoted, chief ideologue of the contemporary Hindutva right (40-1). It is this 
stripping of morally, religiously conceived consciousness from the traditional Hindu 
identity by forcing the abdication of God or a divine head, and the subsequent coronation 
of the nation as the absolute divine, that serves to eliminate any qualms about rape as a 
political weapon against “an internal enemy who can be blamed for the humiliations and 
defeats of the nation”150 (43). In fact, communal discourse is marked by an “obsession 
with the semiotics of sexuality” (44), so that the logic behind patriarchal world-views that 
locate women like Layla and Henna as defining symbols of family and communal honour 
leads to the metamorphosis of women into metaphors of both sacredness and humiliation 
in struggles between communities.
151
 The virility of the community (“read men”) thus 
hinges upon defending one’s honour by protecting one’s “own” women and humiliating 
the Other by abusing “his” women (38). Harbans Mukhia notes that this masculinity of 
violence in communalism is, therefore, “doubly emphasized: the male image of the 
Muslim perpetrator of dishonour as well as of the Hindu avenger” (26). In other words, 
the historical and legendary rape of Hindu women by Muslim men as well as the 
                                                          
150 This conception of nation is singularly rooted in territorial origins and loyalties (Kakar 39). The nation is perceived 
to be always under threat by Muslims, who are aliens living within the territory of the nation (40).  
 
151 This governing anxiety about female sexuality and communal honour is visible in the fact that many riots are ignited 
after reports are circulated of Muslim men laying sexual claim to Hindu women’s bodies. These reports may be real or 
fabricated with the purpose of triggering a premeditated pogrom. For the extensive preparations in this context, see 
Mukhia (31). For examples of instances of the alleged sexual harassment of women setting off a riot, see Ashish 
Banerjee’s “‘Comparative Curfew’: Changing Dimensions of Communal Politics in India” (1990) (53-4). 
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supposedly imminent rape of Hindu women by Muslim men in a foreseeable future must 
be avenged and prevented (respectively) by Hindu men raping Muslim women 
(Kannabiran 33; cf. Sarkar, “Semiotics” 2874).  
So rape becomes a political weapon with which to attack and undermine the Other 
community (Agarwal 31; Mukhia 31). Furthermore, in an organized aggression (as all 
contemporary “riot” situations are in India), rape becomes a spectacular ritual of victory 
in which the solidarity of the perpetrators is publicly established through collective 
participation and witnessing,
152
 and the solidarity of the vanquished, enemy community is 
demolished through physical disempowerment and the ultimate defilement of its honour 
(Agarwal 31; Mukhia 31). Agarwal observes that this internal enemy community is “the 
Muslim community,” which is singularly defined (unlike many other racial or religious 
groups in India) in spite of great regional diversities and differences, so as to aid the 
construction of Muslims as the well-defined, principal enemy of the Hindu nation
153
 (46).  
For Savarkar, who elaborately constructs the sexual preoccupation angle of 
medieval Muslim conquests of India, there are two perverted virtues amongst Hindus in 
                                                          
152 Disagreeing with the Freudian and Jungian traditions that maintain that once personal identity dissolves in a crowd, 
a regressive, primitive state of mind (where the violent side of human nature resides) is unleashed, Kakar points out 
that these formulations are limited and speak to their own space and time and are, therefore, not applicable to Indian 
“riot” scenarios (46). Instead, he argues that identity in a crowd gets refocused, as each emotion and each sensory 
perception is amplified, “heightening a feeling of well-being into exaltation, fear into panic” (46). The loss of personal 
identity in the crowd makes individuals act according to the behaviour expected from an anti-Hindu or anti-Muslim 
mob. Thus, the individual is “not operating at some deeply regressed, primitive level of the psyche but according to the 
norms of the particular group. The violent acts are thus not random but represent the expression and adaptation to a 
novel situation of a historical tradition of anti-Hindu or anti-Muslim mob violence” (46). The fervor of religious 
processions is a particularly hospitable place for the stirring up of polarized feelings, which is why so many riots, like 
the one in Madras on Rainy Days, take place in the immediate temporal vicinity of religious festivals such as Ganesh 
and Muharram (46, 48).   
 
153 This construction of a national enemy stems from Savarkar’s body of so-called historical scholarship, which is rife 
with narrative elucidations of how Hindu women were repeatedly ravaged across history by Muslim conquerors 
(Agarwal 47) who thought of rape as an essential tactic in order to increase their numbers. Thus, besides being 
considered the medium through which communal honour is preserved or desecrated, women are the medium for 
communal reproduction and growth (49). For Savarkar, this is a consistent pattern, in spite of the fact that the sexual 
motif of conquest connecting land, religion, and women does not exist in representations of the medieval Muslim 
conquest of India and its governance in Persian court chronicles for nearly six centuries starting with the twelfth 
century CE, and appears to have been constructed later (Mukhia 29). 
 214 
 
relation to Muslims that must be urgently discarded: religious tolerance and misplaced 
chivalry towards “enemy” womenfolk (Agarwal 48). He views the perceived “weakness” 
and passivity of Hindu men in acting virtuously towards Muslim women from an upper-
caste Hindu self-perception that envisages Hindus as historically always tolerant and 
virtuous and (therefore) also always at the receiving end of unrelenting, unilateral 
Muslim aggression, which is innately present in all Muslim men (47). For Savarkar, this 
aggression is the reason why Hindu men need to become ferocious and violent. And it is 
because Savarkar carefully constructs this patchwork narrative of history about the 
atrocities of Muslim rulers and soldiers upon Hindu women dialectically, through 
reference to stereotypes and subconscious prejudices, that the past tense collapses into the 
present in the minds of a receptive audience and furnishes them with a present course of 
action (49). This conviction is adopted by present-day Hindutva commentators on 
Savarkar, in whose communal fascist outlook it is typical to propose the humiliation of 
Other women as retribution or as a pre-emptive measure to prevent the violation of “our” 
women (43). Hindu nationalist discourse, therefore, contextualizes rape “consciously … 
[and] exclusively in the problematic of the contest between two communities or nations, 
thus transforming it into a morally defendable act, in fact into a much needed political 
strategy” (39). Hence, rape is not a crime and is, in fact, a valid weapon in battles against 
Muslims. It is Savarkar’s take on rape as a necessary political act in the service of the 
Hindu nation that explains why even women, such as Krishna Sharma of the Women’s 
Wing of the VHP, see rape as retribution justified, when she says, “Hindus must make 
sure that they are feared by others. We have to prove our mettle. If they rape 10-15 of our 
women, we must rape a few to show them that we are no less” (Anitha et al 332). It is 
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also this conviction about rape as a political weapon that is revealed when we look at the 
most recent pogrom in Gujarat in 2002, where the accounts of hundreds of rapes and 
murders are “chilling reminders of how young men can be trained in violence against 
women, as part of a political culture that uses the mask of religion for secular activities” 
(Shiva 52). 
It is in this context of rape as a permissible, even encouraged, political act during 
Partition and in present-day communal violence that Henna’s gangrape can be read. 
Agarwal’s observation that not only is rape important as a retributive or pre-emptive 
measure, but it is also a “nationalistically moral method to achieve ethnic cleansing” (43), 
is also relevant here. Impregnating a woman from the enemy community through rape 
ensures that the community’s lineage is genetically “contaminated” or “diluted.” Tanika 
Sarkar has also observed in the context of the horrifying acts of torture that rape and 
gangrape consisted of during the Gujarat “riots” of 2002 that beatings, and mutilations of 
the vagina and the womb indicated the literal and symbolical destruction of reproduction 
amongst Muslims (“Semiotics” 2876). This pattern is also seen in the extraction of 
unborn foetuses from women’s pregnant bellies with swords and the killing of children 
during the Gujarat riots (2875-6). The drive to commit such horrendous acts comes from 
deeply engrained Hindutva narratives that breed fear about the supposedly superhuman 
virility of Muslim men and the incredible fertility of Muslim women that will result in 
Muslims taking over India and driving out or annihilating Hindus. Indeed, sexual torture 
also becomes a way of punishing Muslim women for their fertility and consequent ability 
to ensure the community’s future (2875-6). Kakar, who uses the Hindu-Muslim 
communal riots that happened in Hyderabad in 1990 as a case study to develop a 
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psychoanalytical explanation of communal conflict, points out that the castration of males 
and the chopping off of female breasts during Partition “incorporate[s] the more or less 
conscious wish to wipe the hated enemy off the face of the earth by eliminating the 
means of its reproduction and the nurturing of its infants” (30). He points out that in 
addition to this conscious wish, there is also a more subconscious perception occasioned 
by the fear of violence to one’s own self, that “the castration of the enemy may be viewed 
as a counterphobic acting out of what psychoanalysis considers as one of the chief male 
anxieties: that is, a doing unto others – castration – what one fears may be done to one’s 
self” (30). Rape, then, becomes an elaborately conceived gendered form of genocide or 
ethnic cleansing.
154
  
This historical pattern of rape as ethnic cleansing is seen in the language of the 
violence inflicted upon Henna, i.e. its modus operandi, which parallels the violence 
suffered by women during Partition as well as present-day communal violence. Rape or 
gang-rape is not the only common factor, but the mutilation of Henna’s body, the 
marking of her Othered (female and/or Muslim) body by men, the violent extraction of 
her whole, unborn female child, and the comments and actions that focus on her lactating 
breasts as an indication of her sexuality, reproductivity, and maternity, are remarkably 
similar to the specific formulae adopted by sexual perpetrators during Partition as well as 
                                                          
154 The comparison of communal violence in South Asia (especially with reference to its viciousness in Gujarat in 
2002) to genocide has been persuasively made by the Coalition Against Genocide (CAG). The CAG is located in the 
US and Canada and consists of thirty-eight Muslim, Christian, secular left-wing organizations (such as the Forum of 
Indian Leftists (FOIL) and Amnesty International), and ten supporting organizations (such as Saheli for Asian Families, 
Sakhi for South Asian Women, etc) (Ghosh 221). It has charged the Modi government with “actively and covertly 
encourag[ing] violence against women during the Gujarat pogroms when sexual mutilation and rapes of women and 
children” were used as ethnic cleansing devices (qtd in Ghosh 221). The CAG has called for Modi to be prosecuted for 
crimes against humanity and has expressly and pointedly called the Gujarat massacre a genocide of Muslims 
(Coalition, “Media”). The International Initiative for Justice has also compared the Gujarat violence against Other 
women, “symbols of the community’s honor … the ones who sustain the community and reproduce the next 
generation,” to genocide, and drawn parallels between the way women were treated during conflicts in Gujarat and 
Rwanda, Bosnia, and Algeria (Panel, “International”).  
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today to isolate, identify, and mark women within their specific social value as 
biologically, sexually, and reproductively female, as distinguished from men in all three 
categories.
155
 Furthermore, the function of nurturing and sustenance provided by lactating 
female breasts to children, the future of a community, is arrested by the violence done to 
the breasts. In Henna’s case, by drinking her milk, her rapists blaspheme against her 
motherhood and, consequently, mock and humiliate her community, usurping her breasts 
and depriving the future community of sustenance.   
So, this attack on the future of a community (its ability to reproduce itself) by 
raping its potential mothers is certainly a feature of both Partition and also contemporary 
communal violence.
156
 Layla’s father-in-law Ibrahim’s concern over Layla and Sameer’s 
proposed trip to Madras is an articulation of the anxiety born out of or contained in this 
formula of violence: “‘A young couple,’ he paused, his eyes drifting away, his fingers 
tapping the table, ‘a young couple is always a good target for these gangs. They 
symbolize hope to a community; killing them is like putting out a candle flame’” (259). 
Youth, which carries the possibility of reproduction of communities, is threatened in the 
increasingly genocidal motivations of communal violence. While Layla and Sameer are 
spared, Henna is at the receiving end of this violence. She becomes a synecdoche for the 
Muslim community, for “[t]he enactment of violence targets the whole through the part; a 
                                                          
155 The communal affiliations of Henna’s attackers are not made clear in the novel and this does not matter. What 
matters is Henna’s experience as a woman, and how her family and community respond to it. The reality and history of 
violence against Muslims in India, and the prejudice that is arguably born or reinforced by this and by the immediate 
context of an imminent communal riot in the novel, are such that her family and community automatically consider her 
attack as being motivated by her Muslim identity. If we consider Henna’s fate from simply the perspective of a woman 
and not specifically a Muslim woman, as Layla does (291), it acquires significance in a larger subcontinental context of 
women affected by male sexual violence during communal riots, both during and since Partition. 
 
156 The fact that demands were made by several members of India’s Constituent Assembly that more Hindu and Sikh 
women within reproductive age (and not just old women and little children) should be recovered from Pakistan by the 
Central Recovery Operation (Das, Critical 68-9) only reinforces the point that rape and impregnation were interpreted 
as attacks not only on national and communal honour but also on the ability of the nation and the (Hindu/Sikh) 
community to reproduce itself.  
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few or more victims became substitutes for the community” (Mayaram 149). Layla 
vividly recalls Ibrahim’s metaphor of an extinguished candle after Henna’s death and 
remarks, “The light of a community had been blown out” (296). Thus, the rape of a 
woman is interpreted as a decisive attack upon the identity of a social group, which 
consequently falls into crisis.  
Hence, Ali locates Henna’s death within the larger ideological context of 
communal genocide through the specific targeting of youth, women, and children. Henna 
and her child die after being raped, thereby reducing the Muslim community in number, 
while during Partition, the community was “weakened” genetically by (generally) non-
Muslims usurping Muslim wombs and appropriating paternity. In addition to this, her 
mutilation and death as well as the death of her unborn child function as a spectacular 
warning to the Hyderabadi Muslim community in the novel, whose profound 
demoralization figures prominently as one of the closing images of the novel.     
Furthermore, the concrete immediacy of her rape in the narrative means that 
Henna’s end is seen by her family exactly as it is: rape and murder.157 Her pain and terror 
are felt by her parents, who go into severe shock, and the entire family experiences a deep 
                                                          
157 It is through rendering rape representable that Madras on Rainy Days makes it real. By literalizing the 
representation of rape through the perspective of Layla’s husband Sameer, who witnessed the incident, Ali resists 
mystifying rape, making it (therefore) urgent to address (Rajan, Real 77). So, in spite of his initial confusion, Sameer 
remembers fragments of concrete and horrific details about the incident and tells Layla about them. Madras on Rainy 
Days does not relegate rape to the realm of mystifying, fetishized unrepresentability, thereby making it possible for 
intervention to happen at both practical and theoretical levels. Rajan points out that the absolute distinction between 
real rape and the representation of rape by scholars such as Terry Eagleton in the case of Western master texts such as 
Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1748) or popular genres such as romance “breaks down in a historical situation where 
the literary text and feminist politics are engaged upon the same terrain and engage with each other through the 
dialectics of ‘representation’ and the ‘real’” (78). While there is a valid point in post-structuralism that any 
representation is mediated and, so, should not be equated with natural reality, the suggestion that it is impossible to 
represent rape would also render impossible any move to morally and politically oppose rape (10-11). Thus, the reality 
of rape through representation in Madras on Rainy Days makes intervention possible; the text critically disrupts the 
official, hegemonic narratives of Partition that have attempted to silence the protest of Hyderabadi Muslims against the 
treatment meted out to them (which has prominently involved rape and murder) during and since Partition by the Indian 
government as well as adherents of Hindutva. 
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sense of loss.
158
 Significantly, contrary to everything we have seen so far in the novel, 
there is no sense of violated honour that her family and kin believe must be avenged. The 
details Sameer eventually provides about the rape serve to demystify Henna’s experience 
and enable the recognition of her pain. Not only does this pain constitute Henna’s 
experience, but it also defines the horror that Sameer feels as he gradually begins to 
comprehend what he has witnessed and the trauma that afflicts Layla as she realizes what 
Henna’s last moments were like. The acknowledgement in discourse of the “subject of/in 
pain” (Real 34), writes Rajan in the context of sati, is what makes intervention possible. 
Thus, the acknowledgement of pain in the discourse on rape demystifies rape by bringing 
home its reality and physicality. As a result, the representation of Henna’s pain makes it 
possible for other characters as well as readers to experience moral and political rage. Her 
pain becomes an indicator not only of her victimhood but also becomes, paradoxically 
and significantly, a “specific, gendered ground for subjectivity” (35), indicative of the 
agency located in her body (34). Hence, it is possible to generate an interventionist 
feminist politics from a conception of female subjectivity “generalized from the 
inherence of pain in the female body”159 (34).  
After Henna’s horrifically graphic death, besides Sameer and Layla, Henna’s 
family and community are also traumatized. They appear to be suffering from the kind of 
                                                          
158 Because she dies during Muharram, a holy month in the Islamic calendar during which Shias mourn the martyrdom 
of the Imams, mourning for Henna becomes intertwined with old Shia traditions of ritual mourning. This is also another 
indicator that Henna’s loss is understood by Layla not only in personal terms, but also in terms of the loss it signifies 
for the community. Layla says that the mourners at Henna’s funeral were “grateful … that the entire Old City was in 
black. As we were in black” (308). She also imagines that “[i]t was as though the whole of India was mourning these 
deaths” (308). Anees Jung points out how the tradition of Azadari, mourning for the imams, supplies Shia Muslim 
women in Hyderabad city who have lost loved ones in communal riots with a grief that has focus and provides relief 
(59). 
 
159 The danger of identifying in such pain a necessary condition for the attainment and/or expression of female 
subjective agency is deflected by the isolation of context, so that we look at each instance of women in pain separately 
and on a case-by-case basis (Rajan, Real 35). 
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trauma Kai Erikson describes as issuing not only from a discrete event, but also from a 
“constellation of life experiences,” sustained consistently over a period of time (185). 
Others have also formulated trauma as an insidious, long-term phenomenon that afflicts 
certain groups who suffer marginalization in history and society on account of their 
religion, ethnicity, gender, race, sexuality, and class (Root 240; Burstow 1308; Brown 
107). Erikson argues that traumatized communities are not aggregates of traumatized 
people. Instead, traumatic wounds inflicted on individuals in a group can “combine to 
create a mood, an ethos – a group culture, almost – that is different from (and more than) 
the sum of the private wounds that make it up. Trauma … has a social dimension” (185). 
This collective trauma “damages the texture of community” (187), the “tissues of 
community” (185), making it weaker with each blow it receives. This social dimension of 
trauma is represented in Ali’s novel in the utter dejection and powerlessness Muslims 
feel, as the memory of repeated onslaughts on their political, social, and economic 
existence during and since Partition grows stronger and stronger with each successive 
blow to the community. Although poorer Muslims are more vulnerable to these 
offensives launched by sections of mainstream Indian society and polity, members of the 
middle-class are also very much at the receiving end of such crushing discrimination.
160
  
As a consequence, for Layla and her family, Henna’s unpunished rape and 
death
161
 emphasizes the state’s failure to recognize or protect Muslims as full citizens; it 
also depicts the sense of oppression Indian Muslims feel at the hands of hateful 
                                                          
160 For example, besides Henna’s rape and death, Ali’s novel also represents other forms of discrimination that the 
middle-class characters face in terms of property rights and professional careers. Sameer is obsessed with the idea of 
immigrating to the US, for he believes that the prejudice he faces in India in the engineering job market will not exist in 
the US. As an informed piece of writing by a diasporic writer located in the US, the text renders Sameer’s naïve 
convictions problematic; however, it also represents with great persuasive power that Sameer’s reasons for his lack of 
faith in Indian democracy as a Muslim are justified. 
  
161 The culprits, who have influential political connections, get away scot-free.  
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communalist ideologies. This sense of being let down by the Indian state in the text is 
amplified by its context and inspiration: as Ali has said in an interview (“Every”), the 
fictional rape of Henna is based on the rape of a Muslim woman during the communal 
violence triggered off in Hyderabad in 1990 by the ongoing, unabashedly anti-Muslim 
rath yatra undertaken by BJP President Advani from Somnath to Ayodhya (Kakar 51). 
As I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, three hundred people died and thousands 
were wounded in Hyderabad during these “riots” (51). The aim of this campaign across 
North India was to garner widespread support for the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 
order to build a temple dedicated to Ram at the same site. That Hindu nationalist 
organizations were eventually successful in demolishing the mosque in 1992 and the 
Indian state was powerless to stop them or bring the chief actors such as Advani to book 
explains why Muslims are and do feel persecuted in India. 
This awareness of a trauma that extends beyond the self and is shared by and 
affects many is most vividly represented in Layla’s meditations about the layout of the 
family cemetery and the way it memorializes her family’s history, starting from her 
grandfather, shifting to her brother who died in infancy, and ending with Henna and her 
unborn child. She notes, “Next to my aunt’s feet lay Nana’s grave, and I stared at it, 
silently informing him that this was what was left of his hopes for the future” (311). 
Layla also meditates upon the fact that for the family, she is now “the sole heir of their 
collective sorrow” as well as their only hope (311). Thus, Layla recognizes that the 
family, which shares the trauma of Henna’s death as well as other injustices that it has 
experienced over the years since Partition, sees her as a repository of hope, as the only 
person left who can carry the bloodline forward and represent them. This 
 222 
 
acknowledgement is another indicator that Layla not only sees her own experiences as 
synecdoche for the experiences of Muslims, but also realizes that she is the “holder of the 
family’s postmemory” (Hirsch, Family 30) of Partition.  
Hirsch defines postmemory particularly in terms of the children of Holocaust 
survivors, who live in the perennial shadows of their parents’ narrations of their traumatic 
experiences (127). Although postmemory differs from memory because of its 
generational distance from the traumatic event (22), it is extremely powerful because “its 
connection to its object or source is mediated not through recollection but through an 
imaginative investment and creation” (22), through “representation, projection, and 
creation”162 (“Surviving” 9). Postmemory is indirect, displaced, vicarious, and delayed163 
(Family 13; “Surviving” 9), mediated by the survivors’ narrations but determinative for 
their children and other people of the next generation, who grow up “dominated by 
narratives that preceded their birth, whose own belated stories are evacuated by the 
stories of the previous generation shaped by traumatic events that can be neither 
understood nor recreated” (Family 22). These images and narrations that transmit trauma 
are “so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right” 
(“Surviving” 9). This is why Layla’s problems and concerns, which are otherwise 
obsessively pursued in the text, become relegated to the fringes of the narrative whenever 
Zeba or Taqi Mamu eloquently voice their traumatic experiences during Partition.  
                                                          
162 Hirsch clarifies that it is not that memory of the Holocaust generation itself is unmediated, but that it is “more 
directly connected to the past” (Family 22) than the postmemory of the next generation. 
 
163 Hirsch writes that the notion of postmemory derives from the fact that traumatic memory is itself delayed in its 
recognition of trauma as having occurred, a point made by Cathy Caruth (10). Thus, perhaps it is only through the 
transmission of trauma across generations as postmemory that trauma can be witnessed and worked through (Hirsch, 
“Surviving” 12).  
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The work of postmemory is a “particular mixture of mourning and re-creation” 
(251). Like the ambivalence of Art Spiegelman in his graphic novel Maus towards his 
father’s memories of the Holocaust, as understood by Hirsch (13), Layla too is both 
interested and affected by the injustices narrated by her family as well as inevitably 
distanced from them and unable to understand them. Like the children of Holocaust 
survivors, her postmemory of Partition is also conditioned by exile from “the space of 
identity” (243), “a world that has ceased to exist, that has been violently erased” (243), 
where there now stands a dam, and which, for her parents’ generation and Taqi Mamu in 
particular, is no longer there. In this way, Layla is twice-exiled: not only does she live in 
exile in the US, away from Hyderabad, but she also cannot return to the Miryalguda of 
her mother’s time, simply because it physically does not exist anymore. And even if she 
were to return to Hyderabad permanently, Layla would still psychologically remain in 
exile, interminably affected by her family’s persistent memories of displacement and 
trauma. In Hirsch’s words, “[t]he children of exiled survivors, although they have not 
themselves lived through the trauma of banishment and forcible separation from home 
and the destruction of that home, remain marked by their parents’ experiences: always 
marginal or exiled, always in the diaspora” (243). Like Hirsch, who has not visited her 
parents’ Czernowitz, Layla too never goes to Miryalguda (268).   
Furthermore, Madras on Rainy Days also “represents the aesthetic of the trauma 
fragment, the aesthetic of the testimonial chain” (Hirsch, Family 39-40), which is found 
in the intermittent and occasionally vague testimonies about Partition reproduced by 
Layla. The “unassimilable loss” (40) incurred by people during Partition is appropriate in 
its incongruity to the “aesthetic of postmemory” (40), which involves both 
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“incomprehensibility and presence, a past that will neither fade away nor be integrated 
into the present” (40), a “practice of mourning [that] is as determinative as it is 
interminable and ultimately impossible” (245). Thus, Layla’s representation of Partition 
belies who she is, a young woman born in post-Partition Hyderabad who cannot fully 
understand what Partition was about nor escape the obsessive memories her uncle and her 
mother-in-law have about that event. In addition to this, her Partition-related 
postmemorial trauma is sharply qualified and reinforced by the fresh, fatal outbreak of 
communal violence in which Henna dies. Since this violence now affects her so 
intimately (on account of her closeness to Henna), Layla’s mind is imprinted not only 
with her postmemories of Partition, but also her memories of present-day communal 
violence. Both memory of contemporary violence and postmemory of past violence 
buttress each other, only aggravating Layla’s trauma.  
 Moreover, not only is Henna’s gangrape a terrible manifestation of this 
continuation of Partition trauma into the 1980s (which was, as mentioned before, a 
terribly bloody decade in India’s history), but Partition trauma is also represented in 
material loss associated with Partition. Taqi Mamu is embroiled in a legal battle against 
the government over reasonable compensation for his ancestral estate in Miryalguda. 
Seized from Taqi Mamu’s father during the upheavals of Partition and passed through 
various hands, the estate is finally taken over by the government. This echoes the general 
trend in property loss during Partition in other parts of the subcontinent as well; people 
were forced to migrate under pain of death amidst communal violence, and many left 
behind everything they owned. Some middle-class people in other parts of India such as 
Delhi were able to exchange their standing property with departing people in their new 
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country and were, therefore, compensated relatively easily; the state too lent a hand and 
often helped these refugees to get compensation for their loss.  
However, Taqi Mamu’s situation is different. What is politically significant here 
is that the logic of the persistent claims of the Congress government in the late 1940s that 
Hyderabad was a part of India, and the subsequent forced integration of Hyderabad into 
India, renders Taqi Mamu an Indian citizen displaced within India. By this logic, the 
Indian state should have helped Taqi Mamu because he is, after all, an Indian. But 
internally displaced Muslims like Taqi Mamu were not considered refugees by the Indian 
state. According to the Indian Government’s Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act 
(1948) and the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act (1950), a “displaced person” is “a person 
who, being displaced from any area (now forming part of Pakistan) on account of civil 
disturbances or fear of such disturbances, has settled and is engaged or intends to engage 
in any business or industry in India” (qtd in Ananthachari 100). So, these Acts do not 
include any provisions for internally displaced persons like Taqi Mamu to demand 
compensation from the state.
164
 Indeed, reports exist of displaced and looted Hyderabadi 
Muslims being denied compensation and threatened with libel by Indian policemen after 
the Indian forces took over Hyderabad in September 1948 (Sundarlal and Ghaffar 106). 
Taqi Mamu’s inability to extract compensation from a state which has not only refused 
                                                          
164 None of the South Asian national states are signatories to the UN’s 1951 International Convention for the Protection 
of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. Refugees are treated as per the laws pertaining to foreigners in India under Article 
21 of the Indian Constitution, and ad hoc measures are taken for specific cases (Kaarthikeyan 118; Rizvi 208; Nair 92-
3), although courts do intervene to protect the interests of the refugees (Kaarthikeyan 118; Nair 93-4). Several 
commentators have pointed out that the situation of internally displaced persons is far worse than that of refugees since 
they cannot receive international aid and may not even qualify for any assistance from national governments (Chari 23; 
Bose 53). Tapan K. Bose and Rita Manchanda write that the fact that India has not acceded to the UN Convention or 
Protocol means that even though the UNHCR has extended its mandate to cover internally displaced persons, there is 
no legal framework in place in India for their protection (13). Amongst national organizations that have made efforts 
towards the rehabilitation of refugees and internally displaced persons is the National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC) (Kaarthikeyan 122). For the legal dimensions of not having a national law for refugees and an outline of 
possible options for India (acceding to the UN conventions, and/or developing a national law for refugees), see Sumbul 
Rizvi’s “Managing Refugees: The Role of UNHCR in South Asia” (2003) (208-10) and D.R. Kaarthikeyan’s 
“Resolving the Refugee Problem: A Role for Human Rights Organizations” (2003) (118-21). 
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thus far to accommodate him, but has also usurped his estate, represents the callousness 
and communalism of post-Partition administrations towards internally displaced 
Muslims, who were discriminated against with regard to protection and rehabilitation 
(Kidwai 42, 65, 110, 197; Pandey, Remembering 139). In fact, in many cases, local 
administrations actively colluded in aiding refugees to occupy property that belonged to 
internally displaced communities and persons (Kidwai 250, 181-90).    
In connection with internally displaced persons, Tapan K. Bose and Rita 
Manchanda have tellingly pointed out that “[t]he dilemma is how to ensure humanitarian 
aid and respect for human rights of the displaced in a hostile domestic environment where 
the state is an active perpetrator of violence” (13). Ranabir Samaddar argues that this 
violence is seen in the nationalizing impulse of South Asian states, which pushes for the 
creation of majorities and minorities, in which the categories of minorities and migrants 
are conflated and subjected to terrible and recurring violence (“Understanding” 78). In 
fact, Bose writes that communal violence is a “refugee generating factor” (60) and cites 
as examples the exodus of Bengali Muslims from Bombay, Surat, and Ahmedabad after 
riots in the early 1990s, Sikhs from different parts of India in the wake of the 1984 
massacres, and Kashmiri Pandits as a result of the perpetual war footing maintained in 
Kashmir (60). Another large group of displaced persons are the survivors of the 
communal violence that took place in Gujarat in 2002 (Verma 15). And as I have already 
explained in the second chapter, Hindus were displaced in and from Hyderabad during 
the last, tumultuous years of the Nizamate, and Muslims were displaced as a result of 
reprisals by the Indian forces. Bose also argues that besides communalism, it is the other 
by-products of nation building and consolidation, such as unprincipled development 
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policies and unnecessary hype over national security that create situations where people 
become refugees, migrants, or internally displaced persons
165
 (57-62). Taqi Mamu is at 
the receiving end of this discrimination as legislation and communalism converge to foil 
his chances of extracting a legitimate compensation.
166
 
This treatment at the hands of the Indian state is the reason Taqi Mamu always 
bitterly resents his father’s refusal to migrate to Pakistan during Partition. Disgusted, he 
says, “Even after they’ve stolen his home he says this is his home” (298). This statement 
indicates that as a Muslim, Taqi Mamu feels that he would have more rights and justice 
as a citizen in Pakistan; his predicament validates Partition by suggesting that India does 
indeed treat its Muslims as second-class citizens and that, therefore, Muslims should have 
a separate homeland. In spite of living in a house that belonged to his father and that he 
has rightfully inherited as his home, Taqi Mamu exemplifies the sense of rootlessness 
that many Partition survivors experience, so that “[n]either at home in the space of 
relocation nor in the defamiliarized homeland … [they] felt displaced whether they 
migrated or not” (Gera Roy and Bhatia xviii). In fact, for Taqi Mamu, the dam the 
government has built on his land is Partition (148-9). His statement – “Ar’re, that’s not a 
                                                          
165 For a rejection of the grossly exaggerated and problematic thesis of the threat posed by refugees to national 
(political and social) security of the host nation, see Suba Chandran’s “Refugees in South Asia: Security Threat or a 
Security Tool?” (2003) 
 
166 However, while the discrimination Taqi Mamu faces as an internally displaced Hyderabadi/Indian Muslim at the 
hands of the Indian government must be registered, any reading of his justified anger must also be tinged with the 
acknowledgement of his considerable class privilege. Taqi Mamu is a member of the old Hyderabadi aristocracy, and 
he and his siblings live in their house in Hyderabad city after they escape from Miryalguda. His lot is, thus, far better 
than the two hundred thousand adivasis, Dalits, women, and the landless, small, and marginal farmers in Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh, who are threatened with forced displacement and loss of livelihood, sustaining 
social networks, and shared community resources if the Sardar Sarovar Dam project on the Narmada river, designed in 
the “national interest,” goes through (Basu, “Development” 225-6, 229). In fact, government estimates show that the 
adivasis, who constitute a little over 7.8 per cent of India’s population, account for more than forty percent of those 
displaced during the construction of dams (225). Furthermore, in light of the fact that his estate was originally seized by 
workers fighting against landlord oppression and brutality in Telangana, Taqi Mamu’s sense of injury must also be 
considerably mitigated in any radical reading of Ali’s novel. The compensation issue is also sharply qualified when we 
realize that only landowners receive compensation for land taken away by the government for development projects. 
What, then, happened to the workers on Taqi Mamu’s estate? 
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dam. It’s Partition. That is what Partition looks like” (149) – suggests that the edifice of 
modern Hyderabad city with all its advanced technological paraphernalia is built upon the 
open wounds and unsolved problems of Partition. He is hurt and disappointed to find that 
his Muslim identity hinders the process of extracting a reasonable compensation from the 
government, thereby reinforcing the prolonged, modern history of communal 
discrimination on the part of the state.  
Henna’s violent death turns out to be the last straw for Taqi Mamu, and in spite of 
fighting ceaselessly for years, he makes an abrupt decision to accept whatever 
compensation, no matter how inadequate, the government wants to give him. The attack 
on his, his family’s, and the community’s identity finally breaks his strength, ridding him 
of his righteous anger and allowing a submissive impotence to set in.
167
 And so, he 
“bowed his head and announced, ‘I’ve taken the money. Just now, I phoned. I told them, 
two lakh, three lakh, whatever they want to give me for my land, I’ll take it. No more 
fighting,’ he mumbled, backing out of the room” (298). In what is clearly a very sad state 
of affairs, Taqi Mamu succumbs to his disadvantaged place in the scheme of things, and 
his final decision to accept whatever compensation he is offered without a fight suggests 
that those wounds and problems of Partition will remain unsolved. It is made vividly 
clear to him both by the compensation dispute and Henna’s violent death that he belongs 
to a minority that “might be allowed to be part of the nation, but ‘never quite’” (Pandey, 
“Citizenship” 101). In this understanding, Muslims stand in direct opposition to the 
                                                          
167 The representation of Muslim men in the novel generally runs counter to the communalist stereotype of Muslim men 
as aggressive, tyrannical, insatiably lustful, and sexually violent towards non-Muslim women (Agarwal 37-8, 47, 49; 
Basu et al 29). This is despite the fact that there is plenty of violence towards “their own” women, such as the beatings 
Layla is subjected to by her father. However, not only is there no attempt to avenge Henna’s death with counter attacks 
against Hindu women as communalist stereotypes would predict, but, in fact, when it comes down to it, none of the 
men are able to help “their” woman – Henna – against the aggression of the Other. Both Sameer and Henna’s husband 
Hanif witness her gangrape and murder, and both flee the scene and fail to fetch her help. Abu Uncle is helpless in his 
grief to seek any recourse to justice, and Taqi Mamu gives up entirely. 
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“invisible” Hindus, whose belonging is taken for granted and needs no emphasis, since 
they are “the nation’s natural condition, its essence and spirit. Their culture is the nation’s 
culture, their history its history. This needs no stating”168 (120). In other words, unlike 
Muslims, Hindus are automatically Indian and, consequently, automatically entitled to 
the nation-state’s compensation and justice, the normal privileges of citizenship in a 
democratic polity.  
Taqi Mamu’s utter dejection is seen when he hands over to someone else the 
wooden litter carrying the bodies of Henna and her child. He steps aside, falls to the 
ground, crawls to the edge of the road, and sits there staring and mumbling (308). In this 
way, what happens to Henna not only connects the present to the past, but also seems to 
finalize the family’s future through the way the present unfolds. After witnessing Taqi 
Mamu’s capitulation, and reflecting upon the layout of the family graveyard, Layla 
registers the ineluctable connection of their present to their past. She traces the tragic 
trajectory traversed by her family since Partition in Taqi Mamu’s passionate struggles 
and ultimate resignation in the dreadful finality of Henna’s violent death. Finally, even 
though Madras on Rainy Days does not confront questions of how life unfolds after 
rape
169
 and what strategies women, their families, and communities use to cope, such an 
                                                          
168 Similarly, with regard to minority (read Muslim) women, Kannabiran writes, “Women of minority communities are 
located outside the Indian State, as it were. Constructing their ‘otherness’ then is the beginning and end of constructing 
the ‘otherness’ of their community vis-à-vis the ‘Indian community’” (33). 
 
169 Novels like Madras on Rainy Days that weave the turbulence of sustained gendered aggression across the plot 
cannot avoid a “certain tension, not unlike sexual titillation, and on the other a certain relaxation of tension, resembling 
post-coital boredom, around that point” (Rajan, Real 74). In fact, the novel is set up in such a way that Henna’s rape 
becomes inevitable. But Rajan recommends the location of rape at the beginning of a narrative, because this pre-empts 
the reader’s expectation of it later in the plot and also diminishes it, stripping it of fetishism and mystique, according it 
“a more purely functional purpose in the narrative economy” (73). This also ensures that “narrative interest becomes 
displaced upon what follows” (73). So, what becomes most important is that the raped woman is represented as one 
who becomes a subject “through rape rather than merely one subjected to its violation” (77), thereby not becoming 
completely relegated to the dark as a “victim,” but exercising agency. This is not what happens in Madras on Rainy 
Days, where the relentless, prolonged, and sustained focus on the bodies of Layla and Henna, the tyrannical 
domestication of their sexuality through parental control and marriage, the violent threats they face – rape at the hands 
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end does echo the experience of women who were raped and killed during Partition riots 
as well as during communalist violence in Hyderabad in the late 1980s. It reminds us of 
the crushing and irreversible reality of loss incurred, of the impossibility of knowing such 
experiences via personal testimony, and of the fact that the historian’s or the scholar’s 
archive or research will always be incomplete (Didur, Unsettling 139). The finality of 
Henna’s death and her consequent silence, therefore, caution us to inflect our projects to 
“recover” the silences of women with care.  
And silence operates as the deciding factor not only in the way things shape up 
for Henna, or in the resolution of Taqi Mamu’s concerns, but it also looms over the 
character of Layla’s wet nurse and ayah Nafiza. While Henna’s and Taqi Mamu’s 
silences are imposed, Nafiza’s silence is both imposed and voluntary. In view of the facts 
that the Telangana districts of Hyderabad witnessed an extensive class struggle against 
landlords and state apparatuses from 1946 to 1951, and that people’s experience of 
Partition violence in other parts of India was also determined by their class affiliations, 
the characterization of Nafiza demands our attention. Shrouded as it is in silence, her 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of others, or death at the hands of kin – and which centre on honour as vested in the female body, the social censure 
that Henna faces as she indulges in forbidden sex with her husband during the Shia holy month of Muharram, and even 
the outlawed, intimate, sensual moments that Layla and Henna share in hushed whispers under cover of darkness, all 
serve to pre-determine or even over-determine the imminence of tragic violence in their future. Such narratives seek “a 
further (post-coital) erotic goal … offered in the ‘trials’ – the death or disappearance – of the raped woman” (74). 
Henna dies, and the narrative offers no possibility for a post-rape narrative for her, where the strategies for survival 
employed by raped women in the aftermath of communal violence may be traced. A more productive, radical 
representation where “the cost of rape for its victims [is seen] in terms more complex than the extinction of female 
selfhood in death or silence” (77) is absent. The raped woman has been completely silenced. What is even worse is that 
Layla’s own future and freedom seem to be premised on Henna’s rape and death; she escapes from her in-laws because 
Sameer gives her up in an act of contrition for having witnessed Henna’s rape and death and not trying to prevent it. 
This is a profoundly disturbing exchange of one woman’s freedom for another’s silencing, death, and/or degradation, 
though it is not an uncommon one even in feminist novels. This feature of Ali’s novel illustrates Spivak’s theorization 
in “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism” (1985) that even interventionist feminist texts are not free 
from this bartering of one woman’s life for another. However, there are more promising Partition texts in the 
subcontinent that explore the impact of rape in the lives of women who do not die because of being raped. These 
include: Amrita Pritam’s Punjabi novel Pinjar (“Skeleton”) (1950), where the struggle of the raped protagonist to 
rebuild her life after abduction and attendant violations of family and community honour constitute the main action of 
the novel; and Saadat Hasan Manto’s Urdu short story “Khol Do” (“Open It”), that represents the horrific experience of 
a girl who, in her traumatized state, obligingly gestures towards her body as “open” for rape, and lets everyone know 
she is alive. 
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personal history is easy to ignore amidst the self-engrossed and bitterly vocal 
preoccupations of the élite characters in the novel. This neglect is also reinforced by the 
narrator’s tendency to perceive and report Nafiza’s silences and curt comments on 
Partition but never reflect on them to ascertain their significance. For instance, the 
narrator explains that Nafiza came to work for Layla’s grandfather on his estate when she 
was about four. She is described as 
a child who’d been born to villagers on Nana’s land in distant Miryalgurda. 
During Partition, when the servants and villagers had risen up against … nana, 
using the chaotic time to claim his haveli, his land, as their own, she had been one 
of three servants to remain loyal to the family, fleeing with them to Nana’s city 
cottage in Vijayanagar Colony. She was a year or two older than Amme and 
remembered no family of her own other than ours. (48)   
With the exception of one more instance, Nafiza’s decision to reject the revolt and stay 
loyal to her master is never brought up again in the novel.  
However, Nafiza’s rejection of solidarity with her peasant brethren stands out 
starkly when we take into account Ranajit Guha’s point that peasant insurgency relies on 
emulation and solidarity between its participants for its success (Elementary 167). The 
communal character of a rebellion dictates that to rebel is good, and not to rebel is bad. 
To undermine this would mean flouting the leaders’ authority (189), and not supporting a 
rebellion could result in both cultural (being “put out of caste” through caste defilement 
or social boycott that prevents caste relations (190-1)) and physical (intimidation, 
beatings, and ostracism (193)) sanctions against the guilty party. P. Sundarayya (65, 212), 
Raj Bahadur Gour (58-9), and Ravi Narayan Reddy (59), leaders of the Telangana 
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movement, have documented that “traitors” were warned, humiliated, tortured, and killed 
by revolutionary squads consisting of peasants and workers.
170
 Guha also points out that 
there is usually one affinity among many that predominates in a rebellion to produce 
solidarity. Class, or a “congeries of class” (169), was the strongest in the Telangana 
uprising. However, the fact that the minority ruling culture was Muslim and affirmed its 
hegemony via strict institutional restraints on language and religion also makes ethnic 
and sectarian affinities an important aspect of this struggle. Thus, while the rebel peasants 
fought against both Muslim and Hindu landlords and “musclemen” (Stree 4, 33), and 
while there were many progressive Muslims fighting against the Nizam’s oppressive 
regime (9), it is probable that the struggle became, for some, connected to ethnic and 
sectarian identities. For instance, Gajjela Balamma, a participant in the Telangana 
uprising and a survivor of a mass rape committed by Razakars in the communist village 
of Akkirajupalli, believes that it was a Muslim villager who betrayed them to the police 
and that, therefore, “[i]t’s because the Muslims came in that such a thing happened. It 
was the Muslims who did this” (Stree 59). So the relevance of ethnic and sectarian 
solidarities must not be underestimated in case of the Telangana uprising. In fact, Guha 
cautions that ignoring the religious aspect in rebel solidarity and “ascrib[ing] it to a 
phoney secularism” (Elementary 173) is tantamount to falsification of the “intellectual 
history of the peasantry” (173).  
The possibility of such affinity between rebel peasants on the basis of class 
belonging also allows for the possibility of sectarian and ethnic affiliations between 
landlords and peasants. Such considerations show Nafiza’s choice in an entirely different 
                                                          
170 Sundarayya assures us that the Sangham and the Communist Party “discouraged and later prohibited such primitive 
forms of torture and wild revenge” (65).  
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hue. It becomes possible to interpret her loyalty as stemming from a belief that she would 
be safer with the Muslim landlord family she has been with since her childhood, rather 
than aligning herself with a group of agitated peasants who might see her religious 
affiliation as part of the enemy’s identifying insignia. And such a choice would entail 
Nafiza’s categorization as a traitor in the eyes of the peasants. The representation of such 
a character also allows for the literary creation of a socio-cultural milieu where it 
becomes possible to discursively and hypothetically question the insistence of Telangana 
leaders that peasants and workers did not care about sectarian affiliations, but were 
almost unanimously and consistently united against the ruling class.  
Therefore, while Guha is summarily dismissive of “traitors,” calling them “the 
irreducible dregs of a backward consciousness” (198), it is important to temper such 
pronouncements by accounting for factors such as gender, religion, and fraternity. 
Nafiza’s sense of community and self-consciousness and, consequently, her loyalty, may 
stem from her Muslim identity, as well as the fact that she, in Layla’s words, 
“remembered no family of her own other than ours” (48). However, her betrayal would 
be defined by her class brethren as her “persisting in the traditional political relationship 
between master and servant” (Guha, Elementary 202). Her active collaboration with 
landlords strikes at the very root of the inversive process triggered by peasant rebellion, 
“[s]ince it is the object, in fact the fundamental object, of a rebellion to destroy this very 
relationship” (202). This means that the peasant’s enemy is not identified solely as the 
insignia of the landlord’s authority, but also as the peasant-collaborator, who in spite of 
being as poor as the peasant-rebel, becomes an enemy because she is “the carrier of a 
corrupt consciousness in their own ranks” (219). Guha’s study does not extend to 
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analyzing how peasant-collaborators themselves experience such alienation and isolation 
from their own class based on their choices.  
Nor does Madras on Rainy Days do any such thing. What is instead highlighted in 
the narrator’s introduction of Nafiza is the implicit praise of her loyalty to her masters; 
furthermore, while Nafiza’s acts of insubordination are also noted in the novel, the 
context and/or rationale behind them are not explored. In this partial but crucial elision of 
Nafiza’s subjectivity, the narrative betrays its classed character. A prominent example of 
the élite censure of Nafiza’s defiance and resistance, which does not take her perspective 
into account, is seen in the alleged “seduction” of Taqi by Nafiza many years ago; this 
supposed seduction is represented as unbearable audacity on Nafiza’s part because it is 
equated with the violation of the absolute, essentialist hierarchies and separations of 
class.   
Besides the short introduction of Nafiza quoted above, another instance that sheds 
some light on Nafiza’s experiences during the upheavals in Hyderabad in the late 1940s, 
and when Layla might be expected to comment or express curiosity or interest in Nafiza’s 
experiences, occurs when Layla mentions to Zeba, in Nafiza’s presence, that she has 
never seen her ancestral estate. Nafiza replies, “No need to see it … All gone, you nana’s 
land. No-thing left to see. Even his haveli burn down – they burn it down,” after which 
the narrator adds, “She turned back to the beans, cursing the invaders under her breath”171 
(127). At no point does Layla, who otherwise feels deeply the oppressive weight of her 
                                                          
171 The agents of aggression and injury remain undefined in the novel, morphing first from “workers” to “invaders” and 
then “government” (65, 127). Only the land, a metaphor of Partition, and associated with injury, remains a continual 
reminder of violence and dislocation. Specific sources of aggression are found to be undifferentiated also in the 
narratives of women who participated in the Telangana uprising, which often do not specify whether it was the 
Hyderabadi or the Indian state apparatuses that were responsible for violence (Stree 48-9). In fact, many women see the 
two states as two sides of the same repressive coin, and one even asserts that “the Razakars and the [Indian] Union 
Army all did the same thing. The Union got its work done through the Razakars” (223). 
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family’s aristocratic legacy and is laden with postmemories of Partition, ask Nafiza for an 
eye-witness account of the sacking of the family estate. This illustrates Hirsch’s point that 
narrative violence and destruction of archives can occur within the family, revealing “the 
power of the father to silence the mother’s voice, the power of the son to rewrite the 
father’s words” (Family 13). Thus, while Layla’s postmemory of Partition is generated 
through the repeated narrations of Taqi Mamu’s experiences, and later, Zeba’s retellings 
of what happened during Partition, there is no attempt on Layla’s part or her family’s part 
to draw Nafiza, who is also a survivor of Partition, into the work of memory and 
postmemory. It is Taqi Mamu’s and Zeba’s memory, and Layla’s postmemory that 
“generates” (Hirsch, Family 31) Layla’s sporadic narration of Partition experiences in the 
novel.  
This neglect of Nafiza becomes especially puzzling when we realize that Nafiza 
progresses from being a minor presence in the novel to a character whose thoughts and 
acts acquire great significance in retrospect. Her stubborn instincts and her insistence on 
reporting Sameer’s lack of sexual interest in Layla to both his family and Layla’s family 
shows that she is the only character who really loves and cares about Layla and who is 
shrewd enough to spot the cause behind Sameer’s odd behaviour. Furthermore, the male 
characters with whom she had played as a child are emotionally attached to her, as we 
can see from Taqi Mamu’s and Ibrahim’s sadness when she dies, and yet, bafflingly, we 
do not learn anything more about Nafiza. Her inferior class and gender status, therefore, 
work in tandem to keep her history outside the collective, élitist memory and postmemory 
of Layla’s family, even though it is the only family she has known.  
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 What makes the novel’s silence about Nafiza as well as other working-class 
characters even more telling is the way their speech is rendered in the novel. The words 
of SAWNET reviewer Susan Chacko, who calls it a “painful pidgin” (“Madras”), go a 
long way in explaining the awkward and condescending tone of Ali’s rendition of Dakhni 
Urdu into English. So, Nafiza and Raga-be say things like “I no can help you!” (48, 56), 
“Still, he man who no real man. Still, you wife who no real wife” (159), “Me you Mama, 
me no care what you say, me no servant to you” (190), and “What you say, Bitea? You 
trap-trap!” (307). Such an offensive depiction implies that Dakhni Urdu, widely spoken 
by working-class people in Hyderabad, has no grammar or organizing principle, and is, 
therefore, inferior to the Urdu spoken by élite Hyderabadis.
172
 It suggests that working-
class people are incapable of declining nouns and conjugating verbs and that their 
language lacks basic linguistic development. By extension, these rigid, halting 
representations of their speech also imply that Nafiza and Raga-be are unable to speak, or 
that they do not know how to speak at all.
173
 Hence, only the middle- and upper-classes, 
                                                          
172 Urdu was brought to the South by way of North Indian military campaigns in the thirteenth and fourteenth-centuries 
(Saksena 32; Schimmel 130; Sadiq 50; Zahir 1). Dakhni Urdu, which developed in the Deccan as a result of the 
confluence of North Indian Urdu/Hindi and South Indian vernacular languages, differs from North Indian Urdu/Hindi 
in many ways. It is influenced more by Arabic than Persian, and reveals a more thorough and harmonious interweaving 
of local Indian vernaculars such as Telugu, Tamil, and Marathi (Schimmel 131; Saksena 32). It appears to contain more 
Punjabi words than North Indian Urdu/Hindi (Sadiq 51). The two most noticeable grammatical differences between 
Dakhni and North Indian Urdu/Hindi lie in the absence in Dakhni of the agent case (indicated by the postposition न,े 
“ne”) in the past perfective tense, and in the usage of the oblique genitive as a base for declension in phrases such as मेरे 
को, “mere ko,” or मेरे कु, “mere ku,” instead of मुझ को, “mujh ko,” or मुझ,े “mujhe,” which are used in the North Indian 
variants of the language (Saksena 32). Ali Zahir points out that after Aurangzeb’s conquest of the Deccan in 1687 CE, 
and the collapse of the Adil Shahi and Qutub Shahi Sultanates who were known for their significant patronage of 
Dakhni language and culture, North Indian Hindavi/Rekhta (present day Urdu), began to gain ascendancy (3). The 
military conquest of the Deccan made Dakhni the language of the defeated, and it became a point of ridicule to speak or 
write it. The ruling class began to think of it as a lesser medium of expression. Thus, Dakhni was no longer the 
preferred language for literary expression or even written communication (5). However, it remains dominant till the 
present day as the spoken language of Hyderabad city (3).   
  
173 In a different but similar context, Stree Shakti Sanghatana express the difficulties they faced while trying to translate 
the Telangana Telugu spoken by older peasant women who participated in the Telangana uprising. This language does 
not have a standard written form, and has, therefore, become so obscure, unfamiliar, and marginalized that alongside its 
linguistic aspect, the gendered socio-political milieu that finds expression in its spoken form also faces the threat of 
extinction (283). 
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with their refined forms of Urdu, can aspire to grammar and, therefore, speech, and by 
extension, voice.
174
 This narrative logic indicates that the dislocating experiences of 
Nafiza and the other working-class characters in the 1940s are not valid; it is only the 
Partition testimonies of the élite characters that matter. Alternatively, it also suggests that 
even if Nafiza has anything worthwhile to express about Partition, she is handicapped 
because she has no means (or only inferior means) to articulate her opinion.  
The perception that speech is an indicator of voice stems from the political norms 
of a democratic polity, where speech is understood to be a fundamental right, and 
suppression of speech is a denial of that right (Rajan, Real 84). Thus, “the access to 
speech has defined social hegemony, just as its lack has defined subalternity in unequal 
social structures and situations” (84). This makes silence, any and all silence, a 
persuasive measure of subalternity, an efficient indicator of the impossibility of 
agency.
175
 Rajan as well as Mayaram rigorously question the view that silence and speech 
are absolutely distinct categories, and while Mayaram uses the effective metaphor of 
“[l]ayers of silence [that] mask both inscription and speech” to show that the issue of 
speech as the rupture of silence is not so straightforward (161), Rajan writes that the 
equation of speech as transparent and silence as imposition is a reiteration of old, 
exhausted truisms (Real 84).  
Ali’s approach of representing the speech of the working-classes and peasants 
using diglossia, a socio-linguistic phenomenon that involves the simultaneous prevalence 
                                                          
174 The representation of Nafiza’s daughter Roshan is, in this regard, revealing. Roshan marries a tea-shop proprietor 
and, therefore, climbs up a few rungs on the socio-economic class ladder. So, unlike her mother, she does not speak in 
broken sentences, nor does she sit on the floor when she comes to meet Layla, preferring instead to perch uncertainly 
on the edge of a chair (156).       
 
175 Kamala Visweswaran offers clues about the provenance of this belief in her identification of speech-based agency as 
a strategy of dominance in colonial and nationalist (read élite) historiography, which aims at silencing women who 
resist colonial aggression and nationalistic determinations of womanhood. First, such a strategy denies speech to most 
women, and second, it sets into motion feminist attempts to recover “lost enunciatory positions” (92). 
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of two dialects in one language community, only asserts the classed nature of her novel. 
As Guha points out, in a country like India where school-based education is still in many 
ways a privilege few can afford, “the formal or high style [of language, which] is often 
closely associated with education … [becomes] an unmistakable sign of elite culture and 
authority” (Elementary 44). Thus, by creating a halting, “low” working-class speech 
pattern in stark opposition to an articulate, “high” form of expression for her élite 
characters, Ali claims for the latter “an elite standing which is, of course, denied to the 
subaltern” (44). Hence, speech becomes an indicator of superiority.  
What further complicates the issue of subaltern speech in the novel is the question 
of “truth” because not only is Nafiza’s speech cumbersome and unwieldy, it is also often 
interpreted as lies and mischief making. Both these negative representations have been 
connected to dominant discourses about gendered speech (Rajan, Real 88; Visweswaran 
113, 90) and classed speech (Visweswaran 90-1, 121). By representing women’s speech 
as “lies, hysteria, comic volubility, empty gossip, or ignorance” (88), patriarchy affirms 
silence as a desired “feminine” attribute. Thus, women’s speech “fails as statement, 
testimony or communication chiefly as the result of the successful operation of two kinds 
of strategies: one, by being pre-empted, i.e. invalidated in advance; and two, by being 
discredited, i.e. rebutted after the event” (88). The latter point explains why nobody 
believes Nafiza when she articulates her suspicions about Sameer. In an earlier but 
connected context, Kamala Visweswaran points out that colonial historiography, which 
has contributed greatly to the fundamental assumptions of the secular, democratic, 
nationalist polity that is India, reduced women satyagrahis’ words and speeches to 
formulaic utterances, noises, or the effect they produced on audiences (“disturbance,” 
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“excitement”) (90). Furthermore, the erasure of poor women in these records is rendered 
complete by the mutually exclusive, binary distinction in “women and the poor” or 
“women and the masses,” which implies that “women” signifies middle-class women, 
and “poor” signifies poor men (91). Hence, “poor women” fall in-between two stools and 
exist only in the margins of margins, coded as observers and silenced as participants in 
the freedom struggle (121), or forgotten as they remain quiet shadowy sites where 
Partition violence was enacted.     
 In light of the fact that Nafiza’s silence is never a point of contemplation for the 
narrator, and that her speech is skewed and her thoughts dismissed as lies, it is safe to say 
that Ali’s novel presents an “interested and precarious construction” (Didur, “At a Loss” 
54) of the past, one that only accounts for a middle-class Muslim understanding of 
Partition and where class as a category of struggle is not represented. Ali’s novel 
certainly highlights the predicament of middle-class Hyderabadi Muslims and how they 
still experience the violence of Partition and its regurgitations in communalist 
propaganda, but it also relegates to oblivion the experiences of working-class Muslims. 
Jill Didur argues that the role of historical memory in literary contexts is to consider how 
“texts act as a call to witness by disrupting ‘our’ understanding about ‘the past’ and its 
relationship to the present each time the reader engages in the act of reading as 
remembrance” (55). While Madras on Rainy Days certainly throws a spanner in the 
works of official history, which ignores the trauma suffered by displaced Hyderabadi 
Muslim families during Partition, it also replicates the official censorship imposed on the 
history of class struggle in Hyderabad. I have already documented in my second chapter 
the attempts by official and mainstream sections of Indian society to silence Hyderabadis 
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by banning and later denying the existence of important reports and books testifying to 
the violence that gripped Hyderabad around the time of Partition. Such an erasure is, I 
argue, replicated in the implicit devaluation of Partition testimonies of working-class 
characters in Madras on Rainy Days.  
How, then, are we to read Nafiza’s silence? What possible insights does a text that 
registers but does not reflect on her silence offer us? Rajan argues that silence has a 
presence, such that while “the content of silence cannot signify – being only silence – its 
space, its temporality and its facticity give form to its existence” (Real 86). Hence, its 
formalism “permits its representation in texts as a presence rather than as unrepresentable 
non-being” (86). Perhaps, to appreciate the significance of such meaningfully present 
silences, we need to learn to listen differently, like Butalia does, to “the hidden nuance, 
the half-said thing, the silences which are sometimes more eloquent than speech” (Other 
Side 12). In connection with women’s narrations, Stree Shakti Sanghatana has also 
written about the desirability of “read[ing] against the grain of the text’s volubility and 
listen[ing] for the gaps, the hesitancies, the silences, the evasions. In other words, 
attend[ing] as much to what the stories reveal, as what they say”176 (32). Therefore, 
perhaps we can learn something more if we only learn to listen to Nafiza’s silence about 
Partition, which is thrown into sharp relief by Layla’s meticulously self-preoccupied 
narration and Taqi’s obsessive loquacity.  
One possible reading emerges if we take into consideration Didur’s critique of the 
tendency of historiographers to approach realist literature on Partition and its “reflective 
and mimetic representational strategies” (“At a Loss” 55) as a window allowing us to 
                                                          
176 Pramila Mahendra, who participated in the Telangana struggle in Hyderabad city, clearly distinguishes between the 
way men (like Taqi) and women (like Nafiza) speak about the political upheavals of the 1940s, saying that “it is 
different speaking to them [men] – they pour out everything. We keep it to ourselves” (Stree 117). 
 241 
 
“directly” access the past. This approach reveals a strategic desire to “recover” the 
experience of abducted women, in order to expand or correct our understanding of history 
into a seamless record of the past, which risks transforming women who testify about 
their Partition experiences into informants who permit us to remember the past in 
“comfortable ways and to move on” (“At a Loss” 55; Unsettling 50). To suggest that 
literature can somehow fill in the blanks of knowledge with the missing pieces of 
women’s testimonies is also to deny the magnitude of loss incurred (“At a Loss” 59). 
Scholars, who no doubt have good intentions, are complicit in this recovery project 
because we all believe to some extent that to “recover the speech of victims is, in a sense, 
to reinvest the victim community with subjectivity” (Mayaram 150). On the other hand, 
Didur resists this urge to recover subaltern speech as a “‘corrective’ condition” (Rajan, 
Real 88) to the “definitional condition of the subaltern” (88) as silent and suggests 
through her reading of Jyotirmoyee Devi’s novel The River Churning (1995) that 
surrendering to the silences or gaps in women’s accounts of Partition alerts the reader to 
“what is effaced from modernist accounts of history in order to allow (masculine) Indian 
subjects to emerge as autonomous citizens” (“At a Loss” 67). Accordingly, in the absence 
of Nafiza’s testimony, we are obliged to think of her liminal, ambivalent, marginal status 
in her family, community, and nation and reflect on how the ambiguity of her silence 
about her past questions the élite, patriarchal conventions that seek to frame her within 
established gendered and classed vocabularies or even erase her entirely.  
Furthermore, along with other scholars, Didur argues that not only is the silence 
of women on Partition an indication of their difficulty in speaking about the traumatic 
events they experienced and/or witnessed, but it is also indicative of their tactful 
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withdrawal in light of their best interests. In other words, in many cases, women know 
that it is better not to reveal what they know about Partition, for what they know often 
implicates the men they are related to and/or are dependent on (Didur 57; Das, “Act” 
221-2; Hardgrove 2430). Silence, then, becomes a means for women to regain control 
over their lives. Moreover, silence is an exercise of subjective agency that is not only 
observed in case of women, but also marginalized groups such as poor and/or lower-caste 
Muslims who struggle to navigate in inter-communal (and in Nafiza’s case, inter-class) 
waters after Partition in order to survive (Mayaram 151, 161). Perhaps this is why Nafiza 
remains silent, because what she knows about Partition may contain the guilt of the only 
family she knows. Extreme repression of peasants in the form of torture, rape, and 
murder by landlords, their armies, and state-sponsored Razakars during the Telangana 
struggle is a commonly known fact and may apply to the actions of Layla’s family as 
well. Revealing what she knows would then jeopardize Nafiza’s livelihood and also 
separate her from her family. In this way, Nafiza’s agency, exercised through silence, is 
indirect, unlike Taqi Mamu’s direct agency, which consists of “the actions of individuals 
that are public, self-conscious, and unfettered by social structures – actions taken by an 
autonomous subject” (Didur, Unsettling 80). 
The exercise of agency through silence is also suggested in Nafiza’s silence about 
her sexual encounter with Taqi. Nafiza is blamed by Zeba for seducing Taqi on the estate 
when they were both young, yet Nafiza herself never refers to this incident. In retellings 
of this incident by his élite associates, Taqi is represented as completely innocent and 
Nafiza, completely guilty (of violating class hierarchies).
177
 This clearly demarcated 
                                                          
177 Guha’s point about the negative and hostile language in which peasant subalternity is described in élite accounts of 
insurgencies may be relevant here. He writes that “[t]he antagonism [in such accounts] is indeed so complete and so 
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allocation of guilt is thrown into question when we take into account the novel’s own 
representation of truth as a relative phenomenon. What seems to be the truth may not 
always be the truth, it is suggested. So, Layla agonizes over her miscarriage and blames 
the non-consummation of her marriage on her ill-judged nocturnal tryst with Nate, her 
American boyfriend, while the real reason for Sameer’s lack of interest in her is that 
Sameer is gay. So, truth can be simultaneously constructed from different perspectives, 
and often what masquerades as truth is not truth at all.     
In light of the complexities of truth behind silence, and the desirability of silence 
for some survivors, recovery as a process associated with Partition should be approached 
with caution. Attempts to unproblematically “recover” women’s history in “a definitive 
way” (Didur, “At a Loss” 60) reduce women to mere objects of knowledge, whose 
information serves only as self-confirmation for historiographers and their readers. 
Instead, Didur argues in favour of “a staged dialogue between literary and 
historiographical narratives [that] puts pressure on totalizing constructions of the self, 
experience, and agency and their relation to the notion of citizenship in the modern 
nation-state” (Unsettling 44). To read Partition texts as mediated by craft and in relation 
to other discourses would be a more productive way to remember Partition than direct 
identification of the text’s content to “reality” (“At a Loss” 60-1; Unsettling 139-40). In 
doing so, she writes, the modern and patriarchal assumptions behind the official project 
of recovering women that serve to accord them object status, can be dismantled.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
firmly structured that from the terms stated for one it should be possible, by reversing their values, to derive the implicit 
terms of the other” (Elementary 16). Therefore, it becomes possible for historians to use “this impoverished … 
language as a clue to the antinomies which speak for a rival consciousness – that of the rebel” (16). Madras on Rainy 
Days and the manner in which Taqi’s “seduction” by Nafiza is represented by the élite characters can be read in this 
way. 
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In literary narratives that are sensitive to such discourses, Didur explains, women 
resist incorporation and absorption into a reductive and destructive official archive that 
has produced or desired their silence in the first place. Their silences should not, 
therefore, be “resolved, accounted for, translated, or recovered” (“At a Loss” 67; 
Unsettling 156), but read as resistance to the attempts by state and community to account 
for the gaps in their testimonies, which only serve to enact further violence against these 
women (“At a Loss” 65). So, decentred, fragmented literary representations of women’s 
experience through “a realist narrative that is constantly interrupted” (“At a Loss” 63) 
may signify women’s resistance to the casual dismissal of their experiences through 
simplistic, violent appropriation (63). After all, by extending the argument that speech is 
an expression of the self, silence becomes a barrier to another knowing or penetrating the 
self (Rajan, Real 84). Hence, Rajan argues, in certain contexts, “the operation of silence 
becomes an operation of power rather than powerlessness” (87) because silence moves 
from being an enforced ban on speech to a “freely chosen refusal to speak” (87). To 
Rajan, then, “the conversion of socially imposed silence into a deliberate and voluntary 
statement, and the subversive ‘reading’ of silence as meaningful communication” (87) is 
a strategy used by feminist theorists, writers, and filmmakers to exploit silence as a form 
of political resistance.
178
 In fact, Didur goes on to assert that it is in such fragmentary 
narrations that Cathy Caruth’s formulation about the possibility of history (particularly, 
                                                          
178 Here, there is a danger of “romanticizing and thereby acknowledging alterity as the female condition” (Rajan, Real 
89). Rajan recommends that the feminist theory and practice of “reading” silence must neither commit to confidently 
pronouncing the inability of the subaltern to speak, nor must we romanticize silence as the agentive refusal of the 
subaltern to speak. While speech is “contaminated” as far as research into women’s subjectivities are concerned, it is 
not politically invalid, provided it is not treated as a transparent medium (89). Rajan points out that “as feminist 
theorists who are not ourselves subaltern we are then led to speak ‘for’ the subaltern, or to provide them access to the 
social forums of speech, or to enforce the social receptivity to their verbal articulations” (87-8). She recommends that 
“[c]ritical strategies of interpretation … [be] crucially called into play in negotiating the complexities of subaltern 
speech” (89). 
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history of/as trauma) emerging out of the gaps in representation (11, 18) becomes 
relevant (“At a Loss” 63).  
Thus, Nafiza’s silence, to the extent that it is self-imposed, becomes a strategy of 
subaltern resistance, for it comes to represent Nafiza’s reluctance or refusal to volunteer 
information that would fix and formulate her within defining patriarchal and hegemonic 
discourses. The long, unbroken silences thick with unspoken opinions and testimonies, 
and the short, clipped sentences in which Nafiza economically conveys information about 
the upheavals on the family estate are a common trend in the speech of people and 
communities also traumatized by Partition. Like Nafiza, others too drop their pronouns, 
as if resisting painful memories of persons and things lost or refusing to allocate blame 
where it may rightfully belong (Mayaram 151). Nafiza’s silence is, therefore, a covert 
resistance, one which desists from “a spectacular demonstration of the subaltern’s 
independent will and self-determining power”179 (O’Hanlon 99). It serves as an example 
to illustrate Didur’s suggestion that to find history, not only must we question the 
ostensible transparency of language, but we must also knock on the opacity of language, 
and listen attentively to its solid silences.       
Bearing all these things in mind, we have to focus not on the details of Nafiza’s 
encounter with Taqi Mamu, but instead we must be sensitive to the uncertainty created by 
her complete silence on the matter. Nafiza’s agentive silence marks a firm resistance 
against the discriminatory explanations of élite characters, whose attempts to recreate 
what happened and accuse her of wrongdoing become attempts to recover her history 
within a classed and patriarchal framework. This strategy of maintaining the family’s 
                                                          
179 O’Hanlon outlines how one of the shortcomings of the Subaltern Studies project is that it focusses on spectacular, 
overt forms of peasant resistance (99), highlighting the “masculine form of a full-blooded rebellion” (100) by an 
autonomous subject-agent, and ignoring liminal and more complicated, less visible forms of struggle, such as Nafiza’s.  
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“honour,” class status, and class distinction by berating the poor as agents of their own 
moral destruction is also seen in the vilification of Nafiza when she complains about the 
non-consummation of Layla and Sameer’s marriage to their respective families. It is then 
that Zeba, anxious to hide the truth and bring her homosexual son to the “correct,” 
“Islamic” path through a heteronormative relationship, suggests that little more can be 
expected by the trouble-maker who once seduced Taqi in the attempt to gain influence 
and access to his family’s power.180 But when Nafiza’s suspicions about Sameer are 
confirmed, we are forced to rethink not only what we know about Sameer, but what we 
know about Taqi’s “seduction” by Nafiza and what we have been told about the family’s 
experience during the turmoil of Partition.  
However, the narrator herself does not express doubts about the totalized 
constructions of Nafiza’s guilt and Taqi’s innocence by other characters. In spite of 
Nafiza’s refusal to reconcile herself to the élitist version of any story of the past by 
confirmation, and also the tactful sense of self-preservation contained in her refusal to 
reject comfortably established narratives, the novel does not pick up on this “absent 
presence” (“At a Loss” 67; Unsettling 156). It is this insidious, narrative silence that often 
lurks behind the otherwise prominently loquacious text of the novel. By neglecting to 
reflect upon or analyze Nafiza’s silences and the ambiguities surrounding her past on the 
family’s estate, the narrator and author exercise their choice to not see, hear, or imagine 
Nafiza’s history. In such an absence, Nafiza is clearly and incontrovertibly identified and 
condemned as an unscrupulous, immoral woman, her views and perspectives thoroughly 
undermined.  
                                                          
180 This is an example of how women, who are the main recipients of oppressive and violent patriarchal codes such as 
“honour” and “purity,” are also complicit in patriarchy. They perpetuate patriarchy “in order to maintain their 
patriarchal patronage at the expense of the women concerned” (Didur, Unsettling 148).  
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As Mayaram has pointed out, the texture of the official records about Partition 
violence against the Meos proves that neither language nor speech precludes silence 
(127). Referring to the communal violence in Mewat in 1947, she says that the 
administrative record “masks the creation of terror with terms such as ‘communal strife’ 
and ‘disturbances’” (138), while local journalistic accounts from Alwar reversed the 
nature of forced religious conversions when they testified that Meos were “offering 
themselves for conversion” (150) to Hinduism. In this way, writing becomes a means to 
obliterate violence from collective memory by choosing what to articulate and quelling 
any voice that threatens to create a rupture in the preferred narrative.
181
 Furthermore, 
deference in speech by subalterns, the most explicit and overt form of feudal authority, 
matters even more in demarcating class divisions than kinship or sexual status (Guha, 
Elementary 41). Guha theorizes about the “zero sign of utterance” (47), which he derives 
from Panini’s idea of lopa and conditions using Saussurian linguistics as well as Roman 
Jakobson’s notion of zero degree. He argues that if a member of the lower classes or 
castes uses an insulting word or a language idiom considered inappropriate for usage by 
lower classes or castes, then s/he violates the “zero sign of utterance – that is, silence 
used formally and yet eloquently enough as a ‘significant absence’ of speech” (47). As a 
result, language comes to be known “only by virtue of its elision so that the ban imposed 
by custom on various kinds of discourse could announce and display the subordination … 
of low caste to high caste and generally of the underdog to the elite” (47). Using this 
theorization, Nafiza’s silence can also be interpreted as “significant absence,” the correct 
protocol for her interactions with her masters. She knows her “proper place” and adheres 
                                                          
181 Mayaram writes that this silencing is also extended to appropriate the silence of marginalized people and groups. 
Their silence, whether self-imposed or imposed by others, is incorrectly seen to mean by hegemonic groups that violent 
discrimination has ceased to affect “victims” and does not matter anymore (161). 
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to it, and this is why the élite narrator takes it for granted and chooses not to reflect on it. 
Nafiza’s condemnation of the workers who overrode the estate is a condemnation of the 
inversion of dominant feudal codes by insurgents. So, the silly language that Ali uses for 
Nafiza in the novel becomes a covert strategy to keep Nafiza in her place and, thereby, 
maintain class hierarchies. Her speaking subjectivity is halting, suggesting its subalternity 
within dominant discourses of agency and power, and her eloquence and insights on the 
rare occasion when they are proffered are unwelcome. Thus, we walk away from the 
novel only with élite accounts of Partition and seduction. It is the patriarchal, middle-
class, and élite Hyderabadi Muslim narrative that is endorsed as normative and credible 
in the novel.   
In Guha’s terms, what is needed in historiography, and what is also conspicuously 
absent in many literary representations of historical events, such as Madras on Rainy 
Days, is “a re-writing that heeds the small voice of history [and that] will put the question 
of agency and instrumentality back into the narrative” (“Small voice” 11). It is of direct 
relevance to my argument that Guha’s immediate context consists of the “small voices” 
of women who fought in the Telangana movement and whose own agenda for women’s 
liberation and emancipation was undermined by the communist leadership of the 
struggle. Guha points out that the reason women had joined the struggle in the first place 
was because, in addition to united resistance to the repressive ruling classes, it also 
promised to free them from the shackles of a rigidly patriarchal society (9). But as I have 
already explained earlier, women felt betrayed as social reform took a backseat on the 
pretext that fighting against class oppression was a more urgent and legitimate concern 
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(Stree 236, 240, 245). And peasant and working-class women were relegated, once again, 
to being “small voices” that did not matter much in the larger scheme of things.  
Even though it is successful in highlighting one form of marginalization – 
communalism – by focusing on Partition and present-day experiences of Muslims in 
Hyderabad city, Madras on Rainy Days does the exact opposite in terms of its class 
discrimination. In a better representation, the small voice of Telangana’s history, even 
that of a “traitor” such as Nafiza, who refused to conform to the demands made on her by 
the rebelling workers on the Miryalguda estate, will get a hearing only “by interrupting 
the telling of the dominant version, breaking up its storyline and making a mess of its 
plot” (Guha, “Small Voice” 12). It will not be sacrificed as it is in Ali’s novel, where “the 
diversities of character and event … [are] controlled according to the logic of the main 
action” (12).   
It is also important to reflect upon who performs the task of interpretation of 
silent/silenced subalterns like Nafiza. Rosalind O’Hanlon has argued that subaltern 
subjectivity is always relational and never autonomous because it is recovered 
(conditionally, partially, problematically) by élites through many refractions (87). 
Drawing on O’Hanlon’s argument, Visweswaran concludes that any recovery of 
subaltern female subjectivity is contingent upon relations of power and must be 
acknowledged to be so (90). She highlights the fact that Spivak has also stressed this 
point, stating that “the subaltern cannot exist without the thought of the élite” 
(Visweswaran 91). Subaltern agency is dependent; it does not have “originary autonomy: 
it is the underside of the subject which seeks to contain it” (125). However, O’Hanlon 
writes that one possible strategy for Subaltern Studies might be to resist essentialism “by 
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revealing that presence to be one constructed and refracted through practice, but no less 
‘real’ for our having said that it does not contain its own origins within itself” (87). 
Visweswaran elaborates upon this possibility further:   
If we agree that the point of retrieval marks the subaltern’s silencing in history, 
and that it is at the point of erasure where the emergence of the subaltern is 
possible, then this analysis transits the lines of enfranchisement and 
disenfranchisement, oscillating between nationalist agency and subaltern agency. 
It is in this tension, this moment of oscillation, I would argue, that we recognize 
the effect where the gendered ‘subaltern’ is felt. Woman as subaltern; subaltern 
women. (125) 
Put differently, the subalternity of gender is felt at the moment of recovery, and it is at the 
point at which erasure becomes imminent that the presence of the gendered subaltern is 
felt through her effect. Similarly, while discussing the exercise of subaltern agency 
through peasant rebellion, Guha has noted that while historiographical records by 
policemen, soldiers, bureaucrats, landlords and “others hostile to insurgency” can be read 
as representations of the official, hegemonic will, they can also be read indirectly as 
representations of the will of insurgents because they are predicated on that will. Thus, it 
is possible to read in these documents “the presence of a rebel consciousness as a 
necessary and pervasive element within that body of evidence” (Elementary 15). This 
rebel consciousness makes itself felt through the reporting of rebel utterances in snatches 
of conversation, reproduced statements by captives under police interrogation or before 
courts, as well as rumours. Guha writes that “intercepted discourse of this type testifies 
no less to the consciousness of the rebel peasantry than to the intentions of their enemies 
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and may quite legitimately serve as evidence for a historiography not compromised by 
the latter’s point of view” (16).  
Using O’Hanlon’s, Visweswaran’s and Guha’s arguments about the indirect, 
multiply refracted subaltern presence via its effects, it is possible to ascertain the 
significance of Nafiza’s views as they are represented in her élite charge’s account. Taqi 
Mamu’s pained and self-preoccupied loquaciousness over his displacement and 
disenfranchisement in the Indian nation becomes a foil for Nafiza’s silence. Both Nafiza 
and Taqi Mamu witness the seizure of the estate, but the fact that Taqi Mamu angrily airs 
his views whenever he can, and Nafiza chooses not to, makes for a stark contrast; her 
silence marks the place where the novel is restricted by class difference and cannot or 
will not go. It also indicates that there is a zone of voluntary silence in personal narratives 
of Partition as it affected Hyderabad, about which there have been some hints, but which 
has not been fully understood as an example of gendered subaltern agency. I have also 
examined in this chapter the silence of Henna, whose gang-rape and death violently re-
opens the old wounds and memories of Partition; when she dies, Taqi Mamu stops 
fighting for his rights, and the weight of Layla’s postmemory of Partition is overladen 
with new and vivid memories of communal riots. Thus, Ali also makes crucial 
connections between how such violence not only affects Hyderabadis on the 
subcontinent, but molds and remakes as well the postmemory and memory of diasporic 
Hyderabadis like Layla. In this way, while Ali undeniably elides the perspective of the 
Hyderabadi classed subaltern on Partition, she successfully represents the horrific 
violence inflicted on the bodies of women during communal riots and how such violence 
traumatizes over a long period of time the entire community. 
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True Colours: The Representation of Durga, Sikhs, Cows, and Women in the 
Service of Hindutva in Neelkanth’s “Durga”  
As I have shown in the last chapter through my analysis of the representation of 
rape and silence in Samina Ali’s Madras on Rainy Days, the events and experiences of 
Partition still have an alarming degree of social, political, and personal impact on the 
lives of Hyderabadis. In this chapter, I take that discussion further through an analysis of 
the Hindi novel Razakar (“Volunteer of God”) (2005) by Kishorilal Vyas “Neelkanth.”182 
Razakar is a Hindu nationalist text that serves as an example of how the Hindutva right-
wing represents the history of sexual violence perpetrated by Muslim Razakars against 
Hindu women in Hyderabad in the late 1940s as a pretext to justify present-day Hindutva 
violence against Muslims, especially Muslim women and children. In doing so, as I show 
in this chapter, Neelkanth conflates the Razakars, who were powerful only from 1946 to 
1948 and whose influence was largely limited to princely Hyderabad, with (almost) all 
Muslims in present-day India. In fact, Neelkanth declares that the Hindu/Indian state 
must not let its guard down; it must watch Muslims constantly in order to ensure that new 
Razakars are not born amongst them. Furthermore, the problematic Hindu nationalist tilt 
of Neelkanth’s text also extends to the attempted cooptation of Sikhs into the Hindutva 
fold, as the representation of the Sikh woman in his text suggests. This, as I show, is a 
subtle but forceful strategy employed by the Hindutva right-wing in an effort to close 
ranks against minorities such as Muslims.   
Neelkanth’s Preface to Razakar begins with references to the gendered violence 
of Partition and reproduces the oral testimony of an elderly Punjabi neighbour, who tells 
                                                          
182 “Neelkanth” is the writer’s takhallus (“pen name”). A Hindi word, Neelkanth means “the blue-throated one,” and 
evokes conventional poetic images of songbirds like the koel (“cuckoo”) as well as the god Krishna. 
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him that she witnessed her three young daughters commit suicide in order to escape 
imminent rape at the hands of Other men. Emphasizing that traumatic memories of 
Partition still linger in the hearts of survivors, Neelkanth writes that one of his reasons for 
writing this book is that his family was also affected by Partition violence (xiii). His 
parents and paternal uncle and aunt were displaced from their home in Nizamabad district 
in Hyderabad and sought refuge in Barshi (in present-day Maharashtra). They returned 
“after the storm went silent” and had to resume their lives again. But the “broken branch 
of life could never be put back again. A chain of tragedies kept following us”183 (xiii). 
Neelkanth writes that his book is based on actual events that took place in Hyderabad. He 
points out that there is both an autobiographical and a biographical element in his novel: 
“What has befallen oneself and what has befallen the world – this novel of mine is an 
attempt to juxtapose an individual’s sorrow with the people’s distress. Most of the 
incidents in it are true” (xiii). The clarification that Razakar is autobiographical and yet 
also biographical is a common feature of many literary narratives associated with 
Partition.  
Referring to the intertwining of the autobiographical and biographical in 
postcolonial life-writing,
184
 Bart Moore-Gilbert has emphasized that the postcolonial 
autobiographical subject does not construct her/himself in sovereign, autonomous terms; 
in fact, s/he constructs subjectivity in relation to the group(s) to which s/he professes 
belonging. Therefore, life-writing, or autobiography, becomes as much a “biography” of 
                                                          
183 All translations are mine.  
 
184 Moore-Gilbert uses the word life-writing “to describe work which is autobiographical without necessarily observing 
the classical rules of the genre, as is often the case in the Self-narration of western women and postcolonial subjects” 
(131). Furthermore, other scholars such as Sandra Lila Maya Rota have suggested that we look at (canonical) 
autobiography in terms of the same rhetoric that previous commentators have presented it: “self-absorbed individualism 
that exalts the white male citizen” (52). She writes that life-writing, then, becomes a means to subvert this ideal by 
postmodern and postcolonial subjectivities (52). 
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the group(s) as it is a personal endeavor expressing individual experiences. Moore-
Gilbert also points out that while there might be a  
general absence or marginalisation of immediate ‘significant Others’ in male 
postcolonial life-writing … [this is,] however, often compensated for by 
identification and solidarity with a variety of groups in relation to which the 
writer constructs his sense of Selfhood … [such as] political claims to 
representativity and relationality at a national level. (31)  
Therefore, an important axis of individual/collective (self-)identification in male 
postcolonial life-writing is, frequently, national or, to extend Moore-Gilbert’s argument 
to the case of Neelkanth, communal identity (31). While Neelkanth does not exactly erase 
his own immediate family from his construction of his selfhood, particularly in terms of 
his justification for writing Razakar, the larger emphasis he places on how his text 
represents both “the individual’s sorrow with the people’s distress” (xiii) situates his 
work as an attempt to represent the experiences of Hindus who faced terrible violence 
and traumatic dislocation at the hands of Razakars in Hyderabad during Partition. This 
portrayal fits in well with what we know about the historical reality of the persecution of 
religious minorities during Partition. However, as I show in this chapter, the traumatized 
Hindu community that reaches out to us from the pages of this text acquires a sinister hue 
as it begins to take shape in Neelkanth’s hands as a watchful group that must pre-empt 
the ostensibly imminent violence by alleged “leftover Razakars” (xii-xiii) amongst the 
Muslims of present-day India (2000s) by committing violence against them.    
  The “novel” (उपन्यास) itself is divided into discrete, independent sections that are 
dedicated to narrating specific legends, anecdotes, and/or historical episodes from 
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Hyderabad.
185
 Aware that his text does not conform to the conventions of Hindi novel 
writing, Neelkanth writes, 
This novel is different from the traditional arrangement of Hindi novel writing. In 
this novel, it is the people who are the protagonists, the state that is the subject-
matter, and the shaping of the incidents that are occurring is the craft. Literary 
purists will be disappointed if they try to look for an artistic essence in this novel. 
(xiv) 
By disavowing the artistic or aesthetic aspect of novel writing, Neelkanth draws attention 
to the deeply political nature and intent of his “novel.” It is because of this primacy of 
political content and purpose that Neelkanth names a literary text representing many 
different kinds of episodes from Hyderabad’s history Razakar and nothing else. Indeed, 
Neelkanth’s assertion that his text is more political than artistic only underscores the 
political meaningfulness of the title of Razakar.   
This chapter is devoted to analyzing the Preface to the “novel” and its first 
episode, which is named “Durga.” This restricted choice is made necessary in the interest 
of doing justice to what is a very diverse and complicated text. I have also chosen 
“Durga” specifically because it is a literary text that represents Razakar violence towards 
Hyderabadi women during Partition. As I have already described in detail in the second 
chapter, the Razakars were the paramilitary wing of the Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen 
(“Council of United Muslims”); the Majlis is a political party in Hyderabad that reached 
its violent, communalist potential in the late 1940s under the leadership of Qasim Razvi, 
who became its President in 1946. In a climate that was already politically and 
                                                          
185 There is no connection between many episodes in terms of plots, characters, or even time frame. For example, one 
section deals with Ronald Ross and his pioneering work on malaria in Hyderabad; another is devoted to the flood relief 
efforts by Nizam VI in 1908. 
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communally fraught, Razvi instigated the Razakars against Hindus by referring 
repeatedly in his public speeches to the sexual violence perpetrated against Muslim 
women in India during Partition (Munshi 143). Under his leadership, Razakars raped 
women (Sundarayya 65, 68, 73; Gour, “Hyderabad” 15), looted and burnt houses, killed 
people, and forcibly collected levy and excise duty on behalf of landlords and other state 
apparatuses (Sundarayya 65; Hyderabad State Congress 9). Razakar terror forced Hindu 
exoduses to the villages (Stree 77) as well as outside the state (Hyderabad State Congress 
3; Ali, Tragedy 81). It also caused irreparable tears in the syncretic social and economic 
fabric of Hyderabad; these ruptures in interpersonal relations also encouraged migrations 
of dispossessed and traumatized Hindus out of Hyderabad (Gour, “Hyderabad” 70; Smith 
19; Munshi 1, 137).  
No other section of Neelkanth’s Razakar deals with the theme of Razakar 
violence in quite the same way as “Durga” does. A peaceful residential locality called 
Jampanna Gate in the neighbourhood of Brahmapuri in the Nizamabad district of 
Hyderabad is threatened by Razakars. Since the men have left for work, only women and 
children remain at home. The women cower in fear, certain that the Razakars will break 
down the iron gate and rape and murder them. In the end, it is a Sikh woman called 
Balwinder Kaur, a refugee from partitioned Punjab, who adopts the warlike demeanour of 
the goddess Durga, confronts the menacing Razakars, and saves the women from being 
abducted, raped, and/or killed. This chapter focuses on the present day political context, 
motives, and implications of Neelkanth’s literary conception of Jampanna Gate as a little 
idyllic India defined in purely Hindu and significantly gendered terms; the relevance of 
the choice of Durga as the women’s saviour; and the threat posed to this idyll by the 
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attack on two of its most sacred symbols, women and cows. I show how Neelkanth 
justifies his ominous calls for “decisive action” against Muslims in his Preface by 
subsuming all Muslims under the category of potential Razakars and narrativizing 
incidents of Razakar violence that date back to the Partition experiences of many 
Hyderabadi Hindus. In doing so, I also explain how the fact that it is a Sikh woman who 
saves the day represents the attempt to use Sikhs as instruments for further communal 
violence. I argue that Neelkanth’s narrativized appropriation of Sikhs to a violent cause is 
a literary attempt to mend relations between Hindus and Sikhs after the intensification of 
the Sikh militant movement in the early 1980s and the anti-Sikh riots in 1984 caused the 
annihilation of trust and understanding between these two communities. However, what 
mediates this seemingly well-meaning endeavour on Neelkanth’s part is the fact that it 
belongs to a larger Hindutva narrative that aims to subsume Sikhs within “the Hindu 
community” in order to reinforce its own cadres in the violence it perpetrates against 
Muslims. To sum up, this chapter shows how Hindu nationalist writers such as Neelkanth 
reconstruct the communal violence perpetrated by (some) Muslims in Hyderabad in the 
1940s as an ideological tool to propagate fear, sentiments, and violent action against 
Muslims in India in the 2000s, and as the narrative pretext to recruit Sikhs, even Sikh 
women, to their rabid, divisive cause. 
The most important and insidious strategy through which Neelkanth narrativizes 
his Hindu nationalist agenda against Muslims is through the representation of Balwinder 
Kaur as the goddess Durga. This image is carefully crafted through a focus on 
Balwinder’s appearance and her visage, both of which recall Durga as a warrior-goddess. 
The earliest representation of Durga in this military avatar occurs in the “Devi 
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Mahatmya” in the Markandeyapurana (circa 400-500 CE), which portrays Durga as a 
weapon-wielding, ten-armed goddess who strides purposefully into an occupied Heaven. 
Heaven has been usurped by the asuras (“demons”) and their leader Mahishasura 
(“Buffalo-demon”). Durga destroys the demon army and Mahishasura himself and 
restores Heaven and worldly order to the gods. In Neelkanth’s story, as the Razakars 
threaten to break the door, Balwinder takes on the mien of Durga as she is depicted in the 
“Devi Mahatmya”: she leaps up and snatches a sword hung on a nail on the wall, draws 
the sword from its scabbard, and loosens her long hair so that she looks like Durga about 
to slay the demons. The narrator tells us, 
When the sun’s rays fell on the naked sword, it flashed like lightning. The 
terrified women were simply unable to believe it. Balwinder’s face had an 
unflinching and sacrificial expression. Her face was lit with a strange glow. Her 
big eyes and open hair recalled Durga of Bengal. She moved forward with steady 
steps … she went and stood near the gates … sounds of incessant blows upon the 
door could be heard continuously. (8-9) 
Balwinder shouts at the Razakars to stop the din, and total silence ensues. She then opens 
the smaller door in the huge gate with a jerk and challenges the Razakars ferociously and 
dares them to enter the premises (8). The Razakars scatter (9).  
While there are many other attributes and aspects of Durga,
186
 the only one that is 
propagated by right-wing Hindutva organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (“National Association of Self-Volunteers”; RSS) and other affiliates of its 
                                                          
186 Durga is described in the “Devi Mahatmya” as kind, nourishing, content, tranquil, patient, and gentle. She is also a 
bringer of good fortune (471) and offers boons of faith, intelligence, and modesty, among other things (483). She 
dispels poverty and pain (485). Her creative capabilities are honoured when she is called “original Nature” by the gods 
and also when she is credited as being the “cause of all the worlds” (483). 
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“family” (“Sangh Parivar”) such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (“World Hindu Council”; 
VHP)
187
 is that of her ferocity, aggression, and anger as she slays the demons. This is also 
the case with present-day mainstream Hindu culture in Bengal, for example, which leads 
India in its worship of Durga every autumn during the Durga Puja festival. Idols that are 
temporarily erected for the ten-day duration of Durga Puja always depict Durga as 
Mahishasuramardini, “she who slays the Buffalo-Demon” (Kovacs 374). This particular 
image of Durga suppresses “the available pastiche of Durga myths and attempts to 
emerge as a totalising narrative which renders its material as coherent, continuous and 
unified” (Pathak and Sengupta 288). Moreover, this chosen image becomes even more 
problematic when we remember that Hinduism is not a unified religion with a founder or 
ecclesiastical organization and that, consequently, “Hindu deities are … constituted 
through plurally authored, multiply motivated myths which must be read not only as 
alterations and reinterpretations but also as appropriations and contestations” (288). It 
                                                          
187 The RSS was founded in 1925 (Basu et al 12; Jaffrelot 33), and claims to be a cultural and social organization, not a 
political one (Basu et al viii). It is significant that the Majlis was formed in Hyderabad at around the same time (1927) 
and that it too pretended to be a cultural and social organization till about 1938. Like the Majlis in 1940s Hyderabad, 
the RSS too played and, in fact, continues to play a significant political role in Indian politics through its total 
indoctrination of its adolescent recruits into a majoritarian conception of Hinduism (13, 34-9); its expansion of its 
ideology through its more overtly political affiliates (collectively known as “Sangh Parivar,” or “family of the 
organization”) has betrayed its true intentions of taking over the Indian polity by molding the way successive 
generations of Hindus approach history, culture, society, politics, and religion. Thus, while the RSS continues to work 
in insidious ways, “pursuing … long-term goals through quiet but sustained physical-cum-ideological training of 
cadres” (24), its “guiding hand … simultaneously concealed – and subtly displayed” (95), the VHP, a Sangh Parivar 
affiliate, was created in 1964 to forge “a corporate Hindu identity, to unite all Hindu sects in opposition to Islam” (Basu 
et al ix, 64; Jaffrelot 193). It is through the VHP that Hindutva ideology has truly acquired its expansionist dimension, 
and women, youth, and sadhus (“ascetics”) have been mobilized against Muslims through the ingenious, flexible, and 
extremely dangerous use of technology, such as video films, audio-cassettes, stickers (Basu et al ix, 93, 99-101), and 
now, DVDs and internet resources. It is also the VHP that makes the most effort to engulf communities that have 
professed a distinct identity, such as Sikhs and Dalits, into their homogeneous community of “Hindus” (59-60, 63). To 
understand to what extent the Sangh Parivar has infiltrated Indian political and public life, and how much it has 
influenced the way Indians live and die, we only need to take Gujarat as an example. This state, which witnessed a 
government-sponsored, month-long orgy of rape, gangrape, and massacre of Muslims in 2002, had at the time, the 
following Sangh-trained officials: the Chief Minister (Narendra Modi), the Governor, the Lokayukta (chairman of the 
state public service commission), the Vice-Chancellor of Gujarat University, the senior government pleader at the 
Ahmedabad High Court, senior police officials, etc (Sarkar, “Semiotics” 2872-3). What was also very helpful in giving 
a free hand to the Gujarat government in the atrocities it perpetrated was the fact that the then Indian Prime Minister, 
Atal Behari Vajpayee, as well as the Indian Home Minister, L.K. Advani, are RSS veterans and major BJP leaders 
(2873). In addition to this, the state radio and a section of the Gujarati press, led by Sandesh and Gujarat Samachar, 
were actively used by Modi to manufacture and freely circulate stories of Muslim violence against Hindus (2873). 
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becomes imperative, therefore, to explore the objectives behind the privileging of one 
specific attribute of Durga through repeated and constant narrative reiterations of the 
same in Hindutva representations as well as mainstream Hindu representations of this 
goddess. 
However, we must first examine Neelkanth’s choice to represent Balwinder Kaur 
as Durga, which appropriates for the author’s own sinister ends the way Durga is referred 
to in Sikh martial tradition. Finding himself and his followers in an increasingly tense 
conflict with successive, oppressive Mughal administrations, Sikh Guru Guru Gobind 
Singh (Nanak X) inaugurated the Khalsa in 1699 as a logical culmination of the military 
and revolutionary impetus provided by earlier Sikh gurus. The Khalsa were “a casteless 
and self-abnegating commonwealth of Sikhs ready to take up arms to fight for justice and 
equality” (Singh, Feminine 119). Initiation into the Khalsa involved the baptism of Sikh 
men and women with water churned with a double-edged sword. Male khalsas, who 
renounced their earthly responsibilities and lives, were called “Singh” (“lion”), and 
females were called “Kaur” (“princess”) (119-20). Balwinder Kaur’s name, then, firmly 
situates her in the history of Sikhism. This total military transformation in Sikhism was 
also inspired and encouraged by Guru Gobind Singh’s poetry, which fuses the devotional 
and the martial (120). It has two focal points: to sing praises of God and to infuse new 
energy into a listless and oppressed society (120). The Guru chose themes from Hindu 
sacred literature to produce verse that was charged with military feeling (121). Durga was 
his favourite literary subject, and the myth of her battle with demons is narrated in his 
Braj composition Chandi Charitra (“The Exploits of Chandi”),188 and in Punjabi in Var 
                                                          
188 In his writings, Guru Gobind Singh refers to Durga by her many names and forms: Kali, Chandi, Chamunda, and 
Bhadrakali (Singh, Feminine 121). 
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Durga Ki (“The Ballad of Durga”) (121). A panegyric devoted to Durga’s immense 
prowess is also present in his Akal Ustati, a hymn written in praise of God (122).  
Nikky-Guninder Kaur Singh argues that Durga is present in all her Puranic glory 
in Guru Gobind Singh’s writing, but that the Guru does not profess to be her devotee. 
Instead, she is recalled as a mythical and literary figure and metaphor (122, 123). She 
points out that while the “Devi Mahatmya” situates Durga as the subject of ritual, 
devotion, and cult, the Guru’s narration does not189 (124). What the Guru does is effect a 
transformation of mythos into ethos. In other words, he uses the archetypal potential of 
myth to set up Durga as a role model for what he saw as an inert society that needed to 
fight for justice (126) because the myth of Durga as Mahishasuramardini “held 
possibilities for the present, for the future” (127). He “singled her out as a model of moral 
force and martial prowess for both men and women” (127). It is easy to see why such an 
idea appealed to the Guru. Durga is the only goddess in the Puranas who is independent 
of male partners. She also impressively personifies the battle against injustice and evil 
because she is the central figure fighting the demons who threaten to destroy the world 
(127). She contains in her powerful person the united strength of many gods, “so that she 
alone [and not the gods] is able to defeat the demons” (127). Singh points out that the 
                                                          
189 In fact, Singh argues that both the Chandi Charitra and the Akal Ustati are specifically addressed to the Sikh idea of 
God, a beginningless, formless, infinite being (124). So, she asserts, the recalling of Durga by the Guru does not entail 
veneration, but a literary reconstruction of her heroic deeds (125). The fact that Singh makes a considerable effort to 
explain that the Guru does not worship Durga as a goddess but represents her as a mythical or literary figure worthy of 
emulation stems from Singh’s own stance as a Sikh scholar. As she tells us herself, there is a controversy amongst 
Hindu and Sikh scholars over the Guru’s poetry about Durga. Hindu scholars such as S. Radhakrishnan have 
interpreted the significance of Durga in the Guru’s oeuvre as indicative of the profound influence Hinduism has had on 
Sikhism, thereby suggesting that, like the Hindus, Sikhs too worship Durga. However, Sikhism is expressly against the 
worship of idols. In reaction to such interpretations of the Guru’s poetry by Hindu scholars, some Sikh scholars have 
gone to the extreme of completely denying the Guru’s authorship of the above-mentioned works featuring Durga (122). 
I will argue further in this chapter that such an appropriative stance by Hindus and a correspondingly defensive position 
adopted by Sikhs is but one example from academic circles of a larger political, social, and cultural move by Hindutva 
to involve Sikhs in its communalist, hateful movement. While Singh herself certainly does not deny the Guru’s 
authorship of these works, the fact that she takes great pains to emphasize the non-devotional aspect of Durga’s 
character in the Guru’s poems situates her within this attempt of Sikh scholars to distance the Guru from any hint of 
idolatry suggested by Hindu scholars. 
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Durga of the Puranas is not a Durga who will go on a rampage and annihilate the world. 
On the contrary, she writes,  
the immense energy and fury of Durga are thoroughly disciplined: these are 
directed towards annihilating and destroying only the demons, symbolic 
representations of evil and negative forces in the individual psyche and in society. 
Durga is indeed a destroyer, but she simultaneously saves humanity from the pit 
of hell. (128-9)  
The centrality of Durga and her sword continues to this day in Sikh religious practice, 
and the first verse of Var Durga Ki is recited by Sikhs at the beginning of their prayers 
twice a day (123).  
Hence, because of the precedent in Sikh religious tradition that places significance 
on the figure of Durga and her sword, it would appear at first glance that it is not unusual 
for Balwinder to be connected to Durga. Balwinder in the form of Durga is successful in 
protecting the helpless Hindu women. Like Durga, Balwinder scatters the violent Muslim 
Razakars without any male assistance. The historical parallel between the Sikhs of the 
seventeenth century fighting Mughal oppression and Balwinder in the mid-twentieth 
century fending off the communal paramilitary forces of a state ruled by a Muslim despot 
is clear. The decision to lay the responsibility of protecting the Hindu women in 
Balwinder’s hands is also made apt by the information we are given earlier in the text 
about Balwinder’s refugee status. Balwinder and her husband have experienced personal 
and financial loss during Partition and have fled from the communal violence in Punjab. 
So when Balwinder becomes the one who dispenses with the Razakars, it appears as if 
justice is served.  
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But although there is a precedent in Sikh religious tradition that would make such 
a representation plausible, this portrayal has to be read in its immediate context: the 
attempted cooptation of Sikhs into the violent project of Hindu nationalism. Besides 
claiming to represent all Hindus, Hindutva ideology threatens to engulf certain other 
minority communities such as Sikhs, many of whose members frequently resist these 
attempts because they wish to maintain a separate political identity from Hindutva
190
 
(Moliner 312). However, Hindu nationalist organisations from the Arya Samaj to the RSS 
“have been consistent in their claim that Sikhs are an integral part of the Hindu social and 
religious structure”191 (307). Since Partition, which positioned Sikhs and Hindus against 
Muslims, Hindu nationalist discourses have claimed with greater and greater insistence 
that Sikhs are Hindus (313) because Muslims killed Sikhs along with Hindus during 
Partition (314). These discourses also maintain that the urgency to be united comes from 
the fact that if “the Hindus” split up into Sanatanists, Sikhs, Jains etc., they will cease to 
be a majority against “the Muslims” (314). But in spite of the fact that identities of 
Hindus and Sikhs were conflated by Muslims during Partition, a point exploited by Hindu 
                                                          
190 For example, it is this tone that emerges as significant in Panthic.org, an “online Sikh news and views publication” 
that has been active in uncovering the “unscrupulous activities” of the RSS and other Sangh Parivar affiliates (Singh, 
Panthic.org). 
 
191 This strategy appears to have its roots in the writings of Hindutva ideologues such as V.D. Savarkar (1883-1966), 
particularly in his pamphlet Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (1923), as well as M.S. Golwalkar (1906-1973), in his book 
Bunch of Thoughts (1966). Both ideologues insist that Sikhs are Hindus (Savakar 39, 45); that Nanak was a Hindu 
reformer and comparable to Ram, Krishna, and Chaitanya because of their connection through jati (in Savarkar’s 
discourse, “brotherhood”) (Savarkar 41, 89; Golwalkar 67); that Guru Tegh Bahadur was a Hindu leader and liberator 
(Savarkar 54-55, 94); and that Sikh religious thought is a part of the great body of Hindu religious thought 
(Hindudharma) (Savarkar 108; Golwalkar 105). Bankimchandra Chattopadhyaya (1838-1894), one of the founding 
fathers of Indian nationalism, was also responsible for triggering off the attempted appropriation of Sikhs into the 
Hindu fold through his glorification of “Hindu” (read Rajput, Maratha, and Sikh) resistance against medieval Muslim 
rulers (Basu et al 4). In addition to this, even though there was some cooperation in the late nineteenth century between 
the Arya Samaj and Sikh groups to prevent the conversion of Hindus and Sikhs to Islam and Christianity, it ended in 
1900 when, according to Sikhs, the Arya Samaj betrayed them by converting lower caste Rahtia Sikhs to Hinduism 
(Moliner 309-10; Basu et al 10). Around this time the Arya Samaj also adamantly tried to prove that the Sikh Gurus 
were inferior to their own founder Dayanand Saraswati (1824-1883) and that Sikhs were nothing else but Hindus 
(Moliner 311). 
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nationalists since then, tensions between Sikhs and Hindus continued in independent 
India, most prominently during the Khalistan movement.  
Seeking to establish a separate homeland for Sikhs, the Khalistan movement 
reached its zenith in terms of militancy in the 1980s. Veena Das has argued that the Sikh 
militants’ discourse at this time consciously developed a language that would realize a 
politically united group of Sikhs with a separate, unchanging identity; she points out that 
Sikh militants stressed that for this distinct identity Sikhs have always had to and 
continue to struggle against great odds (Critical 121, 128). Their discourse consisted of 
“a series of rigorous dualisms in which masculine and feminine, Hindu and Sikh, and 
state and community function as counter-concepts” (118). In fact, the militants saw “the 
Hindu character” and the Indian state, which came to stand for each other, as the biggest 
threats to Sikh identity
192
 (121). Hindus were represented by Sikh militants as “weak, 
effeminate and cunning” Others who have tinged the state apparatuses in similar hues 
thanks to their large representation in this area (122); Sikhs were depicted as having 
always historically despised yet bravely protected the feminized Hindus
193
 (122). Das 
points out that this discourse was afflicted with the anxiety that Hindus seek to 
                                                          
192 Thus, restrictions on carrying the kirpan (“sword”), which is a mandatory item in Sikh traditional attire, on Air India 
international flights and Indian Airlines domestic flights were seen as the attempt by the “Hindu” state to rob the 
masculinity of Sikhs (127-8). In fact, any alternative definition of Sikhism, such as the religious practices of Nirankari 
Sikhs, became interpreted as a conspiracy of the Hindu state to wipe out Sikhs (133-4).   
 
193 This martial self-representation of Sikhs is connected not only to the military history of Sikhism but also to the post-
1858 definition of Sikhs by British military men (serving in India) as one of the “martial races” of the country. For 
examples of this characterization in the aftermath of the Sepoy Rebellion (1857-1858), see A. H. Bingley’s Sikhs 
(1899) and Lieutenant-General George MacMunn’s The Martial Races of India (1933). See also Pradeep Barua’s 
“Inventing Race: The British and India’s Martial Races” (1995) and Heather Streets’s Martial Races: The Military, 
Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914 (2005). In the construction of (male) Hindus as feminine 
and Sikhs as martial and masculine, Sikh militant leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale particularly targeted Gandhi. He 
said that Sikhs were insulted at the thought of being included in a nation that considered Gandhi, a man who mobilized 
people around feminine symbols like the charkha, to be the Father of the Nation (Das, Critical 126). The present-day 
Hindutva overtures towards Sikhs as the “sword arm” of the Hindu community seem to have drawn not only on 
colonial stereotypes and Sikh militants’ discourse, but also on Hindutva ideologue Golwalkar’s writings. It was 
Golwalkar who insisted that Sikhs were the “sword arm” of “the Hindus”; he even stressed that the Khalsa were created 
for the protection of Hindu society (105-6).  
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emasculate Sikhs and make them effeminate and weak like themselves and, in this way, 
erase them from history (126-7). The escalation of the tension maintained by this 
discourse, which pitted Hindus and Sikhs against each other, culminated in Operation 
Bluestar (3-6 June 1984), a state military operation designed to weed out militants hiding 
in the Sikh Golden Temple at Amritsar. This attack by what was seen by Sikh militants 
and their followers as “the Hindu state” on the most sacred shrine in Sikhism was 
followed by the assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984 by two of her Sikh 
bodyguards. The assassination in turn triggered off anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and its 
surrounding areas in which three thousand Sikhs were killed by Hindus, many of them 
Congress leaders and workers, in Delhi alone (Grewal 2). It is estimated that a total of 
five thousand Sikhs were killed during these “riots,” which affected mostly North Indian 
states that were being governed by the Congress (Singh, I Accuse 30). 
Political efforts to mend the Hindu-Sikh breach after 1984 include the alliance 
between the BJP and the Akali Dal in Punjab in 1996. The result of the BJP being given 
access to Punjab is seen in the government patronage of the Sangh Parivar, a patronage 
which has allowed Hindutva organizations, such as the RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal, and Shiv 
Sena, to develop Hindu nationalist activities in Punjab
194
 (Moliner 308). The RSS also 
created an organization called the Rashtriya Sikh Sangat (“National Sikh Association”; 
Sangat) in Delhi in the aftermath of the 1984 pogrom. What is deeply objectionable about 
this organization is that it is meant exclusively to drive home to rural Sikhs the point that 
they are, after all, Hindus, and must reintegrate with their brethren to serve the violent 
                                                          
194 Although these organizations had been active earlier as well, they had to lie low during the militant movement of the 
1980s. In line with Hindutva operations elsewhere, these organizations have different functions in Punjab: the 
Rashtriya Sikh Sangat focuses on the religious sphere; the Bajrang Dal acts as the cultural police; the Shiv Sena 
sustains the Sangh Parivar’s anti-Muslim rhetoric; and the BJP tries to hold on to electoral power (Moliner 317). 
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cause of Hindutva against Muslims (Moliner 317-8; Pandher, “RSS”). Through its door-
to-door campaigns and personal contact programs, the RSS has tried to recruit young 
Sikhs to the Hindutva movement (Pandher, “RSS”). These mobilization drives were 
strategically begun in 1999 before Sikhs began to celebrate the three hundredth 
anniversary of the inauguration of the Khalsa.
195
 Through these outreach programs, the 
RSS and the Sangat have tried “to impress on villagers in Gurdaspur and Amritsar 
districts that Sikhs are only a sword arm of the Hindu faith” (Pandher, “RSS”). The RSS 
also took considerable pains to emphasize to Sikh villagers that those who seek to 
institutionalize a separate identity for the Sikhs are nothing but “Pakistan-sponsored 
terrorists” (qtd in Pandher, “RSS”), thereby revealing the perennial anxieties of the 
Hindutva right-wing about further post-Partition “vivisections” of the “motherland.” Such 
fears not only permeate the advances Hindutva organizations make towards Sikhs, but 
they also become rhetorical justifications for persecuting Indian Muslims, who are 
constantly being suspected of conspiring to divide the country.         
In order to “return” Sikhs to the Hindutva fold, the Sangat’s activities include 
manipulating religious imagery shared by all Punjabis. It cleverly mixes Sikh and Hindu 
symbols on banners, posters, and pamphlets in such a way that it appropriates Sikh 
identity and inserts it into a larger, dominant Hindu identity. For example, on one poster, 
representations of the ten Sikh Gurus are squeezed into the body of a cow, held sacred by 
many Hindus (Moliner 318). Sikhs are also enraged by the suggestion in a 2006 RSS film 
                                                          
195 An indicator of how much the RSS is committed to making inroads into Sikh communities in Punjab is that they are 
in touch with Akali Dal leaders and that their “awareness” meetings and social functions feature Sikhs who have held 
prominent posts in public office. For example, Joginder Singh, the former Director of the Central Bureau of 
Investigation, and Sarabjit Singh, the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Amritsar), have been known to attend such 
meetings as honoured chief guests. Besides reaching out to powerful officials, the RSS is also trying to craft its own 
future presence in Punjab by keeping note of how many Sikh youth have joined the Indian army, Central Security 
Forces (CSF), and the state police (Pandher, “RSS”). The fact that the RSS seeks out and attempts to influence young 
and ideologically malleable individuals who are part of the state’s military apparatuses shows that it aims to build 
durable channels into the vital functioning and political control of the Indian state. 
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that Golwalkar told Sikhs to protect Hindus during Partition because it implies that Sikhs 
are at the beck and call of the RSS, which may order them to protect Hindus as and when 
it likes
196
(322). In addition to this, the RSS actively strives to rewrite Sikh history in 
ways that confirm their claim that Sikhs are the sword arm of the Hindu nation (318). For 
example, Sikh martyrs such as Haqiqat Rai, Udham Singh, Guru Nanak, and Guru Tegh 
Bahadur are turned into Hindu heroes and given special pride of place on walls in the 
Jalandhar office of the RSS (318-9). In fact, scholars have pointed out that the discourse 
of Hindutva ideologues such as Savarkar and Golwalkar sees Sikhs as an important part 
of the long struggle for the birth of the Hindu nation (Pandey, “Hindus” 242).   
Needless to say, Sikh groups such as the Shiromani Akali Dal, a radical faction of 
the Akali Dal which links the plight of Indian Sikhs to that of other Indian minority 
communities, the Dal Khalsa, the Khalsa Panchayat, and the Damdami Taksal have 
fiercely opposed recent RSS activities in the state (Moliner 321). There are also 
individual actors such as the editor of a Sikh publication, Sant Sipahi, and the Director of 
the Institute of Sikh Studies in Chandigarh, who are involved in mobilizing people 
against the RSS in Punjab (321-2). Furthermore, the Akal Takht, the supreme religious 
authority of Sikhs, has banned the Rashtriya Sikh Sangat in a hukamnama (“edict”) in 
July 2004, which forbids Sikhs from being involved in any way with that organization 
(322).  
Divisive ideologies have also been undermined by citizens’ groups who have 
joined together to reconstruct pre-Partition cross-community bonds between Sikhs, 
                                                          
196 Many orthodox Sikhs also consider the ongoing debates about the status of the Dasam Granth, in which Guru 
Gobind Singh refers to Durga, as yet another attempt by the RSS to undermine Sikh religious identity and Hinduise 
Sikhs (Moliner 326). As I have already explained above, this point also explains why Nikky-Guninder Kaur Singh, in 
her analysis of the Guru’s poetry on Durga, takes great pains to establish that the Guru does not consider Durga an 
object of veneration or worship.  
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Hindus, and Muslims in Punjab. For example, rural Sikh and Hindu landlords, priests, 
farmers, school and college going boys, and migrants who came to Punjab during the 
violence of Partition have recently “repaired, rebuilt or built from scratch” two hundred 
mosques across Punjab that were damaged in the Sikh/Hindu-Muslim violence during 
Partition (Dogra, “Shades”). This work marks an important achievement in Punjab in 
light of the divisions the Sangh Parivar is determined to create and sustain. At the 
reopening of one such mosque, Maulana Habibur Rahman Sani Ludhianwi, the grateful 
Shahi Imam of Punjab to whom the mosque was formally handed over by a member of 
the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, said that the reconstruction is “a good 
lesson for those communal leaders who often trigger riots in the country in the name of 
religion” (Rahman, “Sikhs”; Khan, “Sikhs”). These ongoing efforts to rebuild 
communities rent asunder by Partition are steps towards jointly getting over the trauma of 
Partition and focusing on rebuilding crumbling pre-Partition communities, interactions, 
and alliances.
197
  
However, what makes the presence of the Sangh Parivar in Punjab dangerous is 
the sheer versatility and innovation of Hindutva ideology
198
 (Moliner 315). It is this 
                                                          
197 Since Partition, there is no longer any significant population of Muslims in Indian Punjab. According to the latest 
edition of the Statistical Abstract of Punjab (2010), there were 14,592,387 Sikhs, 8,997,942 Hindus, and 382,047 
Muslims in Punjab in 2001 (Government, Basic). Muslims account for 1.5% of the population of Punjab, “mostly 
migrant labour from UP and Bihar and some Gujjar families from Jammu and Kashmir who have settled here, in 
addition to small pockets of Muslims, such as those belonging to Malerkotla, who did not go to Pakistan in 1947” 
(Dogra, “Shades”). Thus, there is no possibility of direct joint confrontation of Sikhs and Hindus against a numerically 
negligible population of Muslims that the Sangh Parivar can exploit in Punjab for its political objectives. Instead, it 
tries to sustain its nation-wide political agenda against Muslims by constructing and maintaining in Punjab “a 
vehemently anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistani discourse” (Moliner 308). 
 
198 The ability of the Hindutva movement to act opportunistically can be seen in the fact that the RSS stood by the Arya 
Samaj and adopted its pro-Hindi stance during the Punjabi Suba movement of the 1950s until it realized that the central 
government in Delhi would meet the Sikh-dominated Akali Dal’s demand and indeed create what is now called Punjab. 
The RSS then promptly dropped Hindi as a cause and adopted a pro-Punjabi stand. It appealed to Punjabi Hindus to 
return Punjabi in Gurmukhi script as their preferred language in the census and based this appeal on its constant refrain 
that Sikhs are Hindus after all (Moliner 315). Another example of political expediency is the fact that the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (“Indian People’s Party”; BJP), which focuses on the electoral sphere of Hindutva (and, consequently, 
cannot alienate Sikh voters), tactfully maintains that while Hindus and Sikhs have “cordial” relations, they have 
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remarkable ability of Hindutva to act expediently that we see in the insidious narrative 
strategies in Neelkanth’s “Durga.” Through the martial representation of a Sikh woman, 
the armed saviour of the Hindu women, Neelkanth subtly and meaningfully employs 
mainstream narratives of Partition, which incorrectly maintain the perception that 
Partition violence exclusively consisted of inter-communal (and not intra-communal) 
violence against women.
199
 He places Hindu and Sikh women in binary opposition to 
predatory Muslim Razakars in yet another politically interested attempt by Hindu 
nationalists to build bridges with Sikhs against Muslims in the aftermath of 1984. He 
does this by applying to Balwinder the template of the warlike aspect of Durga, which, as 
I will discuss later in this chapter, is being used by Hindutva organizations to recruit 
Hindu women to commit violence against Muslims during periods of communal tension. 
By referring to the context of Partition, when many Hindu and Sikh women were raped 
by Muslim men, and aligning a Sikh female character alongside Hindu women against 
Razakars, Neelkanth is emphasizing what Hindu nationalists have been stressing for a 
century or more: Sikhs are, after all, Hindus and must fight alongside Hindus against 
Muslims, all of whom, according to Neelkanth, have the potential to be Razakars.      
Thus, couched in a familiar and convenient Partition story about the possible 
abduction of women by violent men of the Other community, the upright and righteous 
Balwinder as Durga represents yet another Hindutva attempt to mobilize Sikhs against 
                                                                                                                                                                             
separate (but not different!) identities which can be accommodated in Hinduism, which is “not a religion but a way of 
life” (qtd in Moliner 321). What the BJP probably also uses to its benefit is the point that Indian legislation too 
considers Hindu “all denominations of Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs” (Singh, Against 66). And the divide 
between these “Hindus” and Muslims is compounded by the fact that India has two sets of personal law relating to 
marriage, divorce, adoption, maintenance, and succession: one law for “Hindus” based on secular ideas and another for 
Muslims based on sharia, the Islamic law code. 
 
199 For refutations of and evidence against this widespread perception, see Butalia (Other 153-71) and Menon and 
Bhasin (45-60). 
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Muslims.
200
 Neelkanth’s sustained focus on Balwinder’s sword, which “flashed like 
lightning” (8), can be read as an appropriation of the kirpan (“sword”) that Sikhs are 
meant to carry as a mark of their faith. The ardas, a supplicatory prayer recited at the end 
of daily prayers and before the start of a significant undertaking, also starts with 
“remembering the sword” (Singh, Feminine 143). Remembering the sword is a 
meditative process that starts with the inspirational material reality of the sword, which 
encourages contemplation beyond its own physical body and upon the formless, infinite 
being of God. Associated with Durga, the sword becomes a point of contemplation for 
Sikh men and women. Durga’s feats and the deeds of her sword become interchangeable 
(146). Both are referred to as bhagauti, and this is taken to signify that “[t]he means for 
the restoration of an ethical order, as envisioned by Guru Gobind Singh, is the sword” 
(147). The sword is meant to resist tyranny, and like Durga, “was to be invoked only in 
self-defense and as a last resort” (147). So the sword and, by implication, Durga become 
symbols of self-respect and freedom in Sikhism (148). While it is this connection 
between the sword and the way to freedom under tremendous odds that is behind 
Neelkanth’s extensive focus on Balwinder’s sword, we must also situate this 
representation in terms of the Hindutva attempts to appropriate Sikhs for a cause that has 
little to do with freedom or justice.  
What reinforces this point is the Preface, where Neelkanth’s own motives emerge. 
In it, Neelkanth offers a brief history of Hyderabad that concludes in praise of 
                                                          
200 And there are other examples of this attempted mobilization through narratives in Neelkanth’s “novel.” In another 
episode that also deals with Razakar violence, the idea that Sikhs are the sword arm of Hindus is emphasized. 
Reference is made to an older practice amongst Hindus of dedicating the eldest son of each Hindu family to Sikhism; 
this practice is sought to be revived in the story so that each Hindu family has a Sikh bodyguard, as it were (128). For a 
multi-dimensional, highly nuanced literary representation of this tradition amongst Hindus, and the development of 
Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh communal politics on the eve of Partition from both a private as well as high political 
perspective, see Shauna Singh Baldwin’s What the Body Remembers (1999). Furthermore, Hindus are criticized by 
Neelkanth in yet another episode in his novel for not learning “the language of the ‘sword’” from the Sikhs (134).  
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Vallabhbhai Patel’s “foresight and courage” in dealing with the Indo-Hyderabad dispute 
during Partition, which was resolved in 1948 through the violent invasion of Hyderabad 
by the Indian army. That the political approach and language of Patel, who was the 
Deputy Prime Minister of India, led to the systematic persecution and killings of many 
Muslims as well as communists fighting against feudal and communalist oppression in 
Hyderabad does not appear to bother Neelkanth (Munshi 181; Ali, Tragedy 151-2, 191-
236). In fact, Neelkanth’s admiration for this decidedly communalist statesman marks 
Neelkanth himself as a communalist. Further, he points out that “today Hyderabadi 
Muslims are ashamed of the past anti-national violence perpetrated by the Razakars” 
(xii). Such a statement considers all Hyderabadi Muslims today complicit in the guilt of 
the Razakars, who were active and influential mostly in Hyderabad and only between 
1946 and 1948. It holds all Hyderabadi Muslims, from the 1940s till today, accountable 
for the violent actions of the Razakars in Hyderabad and suggests that there is a need for 
all of them to explicitly denounce the Razakars
201
 in order to establish their loyalty to the 
nation. The ahistorical, deceptive sense of a homogeneous Muslim community with a 
single, fixed political outlook is reinforced. No allowance is made for internal differences 
in political opinion stemming from diversity of sect, class, caste, gender, sexuality, 
language, or region. As I have shown above with reference to Sikhs, such a collapsing of 
a large demographic of people into one group with a uniform and singular identity, which 
can then become politically useful as a symbol of good or evil, is a strategy Hindu 
nationalists use not only to deal with Muslims, but also in the way they relate with Sikhs 
and other minority communities such as Buddhists, Jains etc.   
                                                          
201 This is in general connected to the question of the loyalty of Indian Muslims to India, an expression of which 
Hindutva organizations and even many Hindus who do not profess Hindutva affiliations repeatedly demand. I have 
noted this point in some detail in a footnote in the previous chapter. 
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Neelkanth goes on to write that “[t]he age of the Razakars is over. The Razakars 
are finished. But who knows, some leftover Razakars may have become active again – 
having changed their name and guise! They may be boring holes in the court of 
republican values again!” (xii-xiii) He stresses the need to “investigate” whether or not 
there are still active Razakars around, “if only in the context of bomb explosions! If only 
in the context of terrorist activities!” (xiii). The repeated use of exclamation marks at the 
end of these sentences conveys an unmistakable sense of urgency and is intended to 
encourage watchfulness and even fear of Muslims amongst Hindus. Neelkanth 
emphasizes that bigotry has not ended and that it is challenging humanitarian values 
across the world, “its thousand [snake] hoods raised” (xiii). At first glance, Neelkanth’s 
concerns with terrorism seems unremarkable, given the recent context of the attack by 
Islamist terrorists on the Indian Parliament in 2001 as well as the many incidents of old as 
well as recent and ongoing militant violence that pepper the fraught history of Kashmir, 
yet another much disputed erstwhile princely state. However, his warnings to his readers 
to remain alert for the signs of bigotry take on an entirely new hue when we consider the 
specific context of Razakars, Hyderabad, and Muslims in which he situates his writing in 
2005. In a country where there is already widespread persecution of Muslims, the most 
recent and most horrifying example being the state-sponsored genocide of Muslims in 
Gujarat in 2002, Neelkanth’s comments become another source of justification for the 
aggressive violence that Hindutva organizations promote and perpetrate against Muslims. 
Indeed, because Neelkanth holds all Muslims guilty for Razakar violence, thereby 
effecting a smooth narrative fusion between the terms “Razakar” and “Muslim,” so that 
 273 
 
both become synonymous in his writing, every Muslim becomes a justified target for 
surveillance and persecution. 
Thus, to preface a literary narrative containing a martial representation of a Sikh 
woman who protects Hindu women from Muslim Razakars with an implicit call for the 
need to watch and persecute Muslims amidst a climate of rapid Hindutva expansion is 
tantamount to pointing out to Sikhs their instrumental function within Hindutva as those 
who will lead Hindutva violence and oppression of Muslims. Let me clarify that I am not 
suggesting that there is no possibility of there being plural, fluid notions of community in 
which Sikhism and Hinduism flourish side by side. My concern is that the kind of 
Sikhism Hindutva is interested in seeks to erase any ambivalence that Sikhs may profess 
towards Hindutva and aims to instead use them as weapons in an aggressive, expansionist 
cause that is not in the interests of democracy or any kind of secular, egalitarian thought. 
What is significant is the fact that this move to incorporate minority groups into one 
singularly defined Hindu nationalist identity attempts to engulf everyone into the service 
of a violent ideology that has no claim to fighting the kind of oppression it claims Hindus 
are suffering. This Hindutva strategy amounts to the misappropriation of the teachings of 
Sikh Gurus engaged in fighting a kind of oppression that does not exist today. To suggest 
that a confrontation of Sikhs and Hindus against Muslims that is comparable to the 
conflicts that arose in the later Mughal period (or even during Partition) exists today in 
India, and that Sikhs need to contribute to the cause of Hindutva and fight some imagined 
spectre of “Muslim tyranny” is, quite simply, a total fabrication which tries to 
fraudulently manipulate Sikh history, an attempt that many Sikhs are actively resisting. 
Indeed, there is little threat of Hindus or Sikhs getting wiped out by a Muslim community 
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that is much-reduced both numerically and politically since Partition, “in real life a 
minority, grossly under-represented in the bureaucratic, military, professional and 
business elites” (Basu et al 113).  
The insidious manner in which Hindutva ideology functions to create these myths 
is also visible in the dedication of Razakar. Out of many Hyderabadi heroes such as 
Chaityala Ailamma, Acchamamba, Doddi Komarayya, Raj Bahadur Gour, and 
Makhdoom Mohiuddin, who also fought against the Razakars, Neelkanth chooses 
Shoebullah Khan, a radical journalist slain by the Razakars, for his dedication. The book 
is meant to be a tribute to  
the bright pillar of keen national consciousness, correspondent of Imroze, the 
immortal journalist martyr Mr. Shoebullah Khan, who was murdered in broad 
daylight on August 20 [sic], 1948 by fundamentalist Razakars, and who has been 
completely forgotten by state as well as national governments.  
While these words appear at first glance to attest to Neelkanth’s secular credentials, I 
contend that it is yet another right-wing attempt to appropriate the figure of a communist 
journalist who defiantly published his support of the Telangana struggle as well as other 
democratic movements against the Nizam and boldly challenged the Razakars in his 
writings. Enraged by Khan’s refusal to stop his written propaganda against the Razakars, 
the Razakars sought to prove that the pen was not mightier than the sword by attacking 
him and chopping his hands off. Not only does Khan’s terribly violent, graphic, and 
symbolically meaningful death serve as fertile ground for Neelkanth’s literary talents as a 
writer, it also suits his purpose of reminding his readers how dangerous and cruel the 
 275 
 
Razakars were and, therefore, because he conflates the two, how violent and menacing all 
Muslims can be.  
Khan’s death is also a better platform for Neelkanth’s literary and political 
purposes because it markedly differs from the relatively unremarkable deaths of 
Chaityala Ailamma, Raj Bahadur Gour, and Makhdoom Mohiuddin. However, the fact 
that Neelkanth ignores Doddi Komarayya’s equally violent death during the Telangana 
Struggle and dedicates Razakar solely to Khan also points to the BJP’s attempts to 
manufacture an identity for Muslims that would be tolerable in a foreseeable Hindu 
nation.
202
 The most important part of this proposed “Muslim” identity is, in line with the 
thought of Savarkar (113, 139) and Golwalkar (127, 133, 321), the disavowal of any 
other identity (religious, linguistic, cultural, historical) over the nation. In a related 
context, Rajeswari Sunder Rajan has pointed out that Hindu nationalist politics is 
“expansionist and adaptable, and shows itself to be (selectively) incorporative of various 
‘progressive’ elements in the political interests of enlarging its appeal to women, lower 
castes and, even, other minority communities” (“Is” 38). It is this attempt to expand the 
influence of the right-wing by feigning a secular identity through the strategic 
recuperation of a Muslim figure such as Khan that is seen in the tone of Neelkanth’s 
dedication, which fits in very well with the increasing attention the BJP is showering on 
Khan as a nationalist hero from Andhra Pradesh. For example, on August 21, 2012, a day 
before his sixty-fourth death anniversary, the state BJP honoured Khan in Hyderabad as a 
nationalist martyr who died for the sake of the freedom of the Indian nation (“BJP Paid”). 
By a simple, seemingly innocuous slippage, the freedom struggle of Hyderabadis from 
                                                          
202 This is also why the BJP has puppet Muslim politicians such as Sikander Bakht, Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, and Syed 
Shahnawaz Hussain and why it also has a Minority Morcha (“Minority Front”).   
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the Nizam’s autocratic misrule and the Razakars’ terror is reinterpreted as the struggle to 
defend the Indian (read Hindu) nation against “Muslim tyrants.”     
Neelkanth’s rhetoric continues on the same lines in the Preface as he reminds his 
readers that it is those who remain silent who are responsible for the rise and 
strengthening of such forces as the Razakars. This is why it is necessary to “look every 
now and then in the mirror of history. Because ‘we have only learnt from history that we 
have learnt nothing from history’”203 (xiii). He counts Razakar as an attempt to peep into 
history through the novelistic medium. Once again, this intention to create a literary 
memorial of the history of Partition violence (Gera Roy and Bhatia xiv) appears to make 
sense in light of the official silences on the subject, until we take into account the context 
in which Neelkanth writes, and quite possibly, the readership that he addresses. In a 
tellingly familiar tone, he writes that his novel “is a challenge to the appeasing policy of 
governments; towards the flimsy, weak, selfish administrative rule and hole-ridden law of 
the government, in which the guilty escape scot-free and law-abiding gentlemen, 
common folk are continuously suffering and abused” (xiii). Neelkanth’s reference to the 
“appeasing policy” (तुष्टीकरण नीतत) of governments replicates the exact words of the 
BJP and the RSS in their permanent refrain against successive non-BJP governments 
(such as the present Congress government that defeated the BJP in 2004 and has been 
ruling from the centre since then) and their supposedly biased policies with regard to 
Muslims (Basu et al 37).  
                                                          
203 Cf. the repeated point made by RSS Supremo M.S. Golwalkar (1906-1973) in 1966 that  
“[t]he fault lies with the person who does not exercise caution and protect himself against the possible danger 
… [D]uring the last thousand years of our history [‘the Muslim period’], even after repeated experiences of 
disgraces and disasters, we failed to learn the one basic lesson that we alone are responsible for our downfall 
and unless we eradicate that fatal weakness from ourselves we cannot hope to survive as a nation” (206-7). 
 277 
 
A recent example of this perennial complaint was seen in April 2012 when the 
BJP called a new bill to revoke false terror cases against Muslims, proposed by the ruling 
Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, an instance of “minority appeasement.” Uttar Pradesh 
BJP President Surya Pratap Shahi was upset because “[t]he move to leave [sic] those who 
are held for their involvement in terror activities is against the national interest. It is an 
act of Muslim appeasement for vote bank politics” (“UP Government”). Therefore, 
serving justice to Muslims is seen by the BJP as an example of undermining the national 
interest. In other words, the interests of Muslims and the interests of the nation are seen to 
be mutually exclusive.
204
  
This idea of appeasement of Muslims in India by non-BJP governments, which is 
implicit in Neelkanth’s choice of words and context, is followed by his view that  
[g]overnance is, after all, always carried out through hard punishment. A doctrine 
that is rendered unfruitful by polite protection … this is the culprit of history. For 
an administration that has justice and discipline, assertiveness and foresight like 
that of Sardar Patel are requisites. History never forgives those who ignore the 
good of the nation as a result of their own weakness. Razakars have no religion; 
consequently, the first duty of any good administration is to harshly crush their 
                                                          
204 The centrality of the BJP’s refrain about “minority appeasement” can be seen in the conviction expressed in 
scholarly circles that it was the BJP’s sustained protests over the Shah Bano case in the late 1980s that gave it a fresh 
lease of life in Indian politics (Hasan, Legacy 264). All hell broke lose after the Supreme Court verdict favouring 
Muslim divorcee Shah Bano was released in 1985. Shah Bano’s ex-husband was legally ordered to pay her 
maintenance, which he had earlier ceased to provide. Angered by the verdict that favoured the interests of Muslim 
women over Muslim men, orthodox Muslim organizations claiming to represent the interest of all Indian Muslims 
forced Congress Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to reverse the Supreme Court verdict and create a separate Muslim law 
vaguely based on sharia to deal with Muslim marital and family-related issues (Basu, “Women’s” 110). This injustice 
has become an excuse, as Amrita Basu points out, for the BJP to attack Muslims and thwart attempts by Congress 
governments, however misguided, to maintain legal safeguards for Indian Muslims (“Women’s” 110-1). In other 
words, the BJP feigns secularist concern and outrage in its opposition to the patriarchal Muslim Personal Law, while all 
the time it opposes Muslim Personal Law precisely because it was intended to work in the interests of Muslims. By 
removing Muslim Personal Law, the BJP wants to take away safeguards that were intended in good faith to protect a 
vulnerable religious minority. 
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hoods of ill-intention. The age of Razakars was a nightmare that has passed. What 
must be ensured is that it is never repeated. (xiii-xiv)  
It is clear from the context of Razakar violence in “Durga” that Neelkanth’s ideas of good 
governance and the “good of the nation” revolve around the central tenet of Hindutva: 
national security and territorial integrity, which are, as I have explained above, seen to be 
incompatible in Hindutva politics with the interests of Muslims. Both the security and 
territorial integrity of the nation can only be ensured by the ideal government, whose 
contours are delineated in two ways. First, the glowing references to the (mis)deeds of 
Patel in the context of Hyderabad suggest that Neelkanth condones aggressive state 
strategies such as armed invasion and the subsequent crushing of minority demographics 
in fulfilling the agenda of territorial integrity of the Hindu nation. Second, the 
prescription of hard punishment for perpetrators and criticism of “polite protection” in 
present-day politics are implicitly directed against all Hyderabadi Muslims through his 
reference to Razakars, who are, as I have shown above, depicted as representative of all 
Muslims.
205
 Thus, through a narrative blurring of the crucial difference between 
Razakars, a paramilitary group active in late 1940s Hyderabad, and Muslims, who were 
then and today a part of subcontinental society and polity, the maintenance of national 
security is portrayed as integrally involving the repression of Muslims. Tanika Sarkar has 
summed up this attitude that we see in Neelkanth’s Preface as well as in the rhetoric and 
actions of Hindutva organizations as stemming from the drive to seek revenge on present-
                                                          
205 Indeed, there is not a single Muslim character represented in a favourable light in Neelkanth’s “Durga,” a fact that 
distinguishes it from many other examples of Partition literature. The right-wing thrust of Neelkanth’s writing is also 
seen in the striking similarity between Golwalkar’s thought, which has thus far determined the trajectory of the RSS, 
and Neelkanth’s ideas. For example, Golwalkar’s solution for “dealing with all such subversive elements [Muslims] is 
to treat them on par with the enemy and put them down with an iron hand” (280).     
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day Muslims, who are understood as being a permanent threat to both faith and nation 
(Sarkar, “Semiotics” 2874; Basu et al 74-5). 
 Furthermore, in Neelkanth’s declarations of the need to “harshly crush” present-
day “Razakars,” we see the Hindutva conviction that Sarkar outlines thus:  
revenge must be taken on present-day Muslims both for historical wrongs and for 
the future danger they embody … For the Muslim of today embodies all past 
offences and future threats that have been allegedly committed and could be 
committed. Therefore, revenge may be taken on any Muslim anywhere for 
anything that any Muslim could do or had done. (“Semiotics” 2874) 
And Neelkanth’s Preface indeed encourages the perception amongst readers that 
Razakars represent all Hyderabadi Muslims at all times, past or present. Therefore, 
according to Neelkanth, it logically follows that if history is not to judge us (read 
Hindus/Indians) harshly, we must hold responsible all present-day Hyderabadi Muslims 
for the Razakars’ actions and make them bear the consequences for what the Razakars 
did more than sixty years ago. To suggest the ineffaceability of the crimes perpetrated by 
Razakars, Neelkanth quotes a Hyderabadi Muslim professor whom he does not name:
206
 
“The history of the Razakars is an indelible blot on the forehead of Hyderabadi Muslims” 
(xii, emphasis mine).   
The central contradiction in these statements is that although Neelkanth professes 
secular thoughts such as “Razakars have no religion,” thereby refraining from blaming 
Islam or Muslims as a whole in this particular instance, he also goes on to write in 
adoring and glorifying terms of Patel. What further implicates Neelkanth is his uncritical 
                                                          
206 By not naming this source, Neelkanth makes it impossible for his readers to verify the information that he gives to 
them. 
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approval for Patel’s approach to the Indo-Hyderabad dispute, which culminated in India 
invading Hyderabad. The many rapes and murders of Muslims that happened at a result 
of the invasion were actively hushed up by Patel and other prominent figures like 
Nehru.
207
  
In addition to this, what makes Neelkanth’s suggestive fear mongering even more 
troubling is that there is ample evidence to suggest that there is nothing spontaneous 
about communal riots in India; narrative constructions of Muslims as innately and 
spontaneously violent and dangerous contribute a great deal to the atmosphere in which 
riots are prone to occur. Indeed, these narratives have become part of the elaborate 
preparations that go into riots. For example, a joint delegation of the All-India 
Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA), Centre for Women’s Development Studies 
(CWDS), Mahila Dakshata Samiti (MDS), and the National Federation of Indian Women 
(NFIW) notes in its report that it was the concentrated campaign of hate launched by the 
Sangh Parivar that led to the terrible crimes perpetrated against Muslims in Bhopal, 
Ahmedabad, and Surat in the aftermath of the Babri Masjid demolition in 1992 (AIDWA 
et al 305). Rumours circulated during these riots through word of mouth and media 
coverage included, for example, “news” about the kidnapping, rape, and detention in a 
mosque of the residents of a working women’s hostel in Bhopal (307). The delegation 
concludes in this regard: “This seemed to be a design to make a section of the [Hindu] 
community active participants in the carnage and devastation that followed” (328). When 
the delegation interviewed the warden and residents of the hostel in Bhopal, they 
categorically denied the incident and said that life had continued normally for them since 
they lived in an élite, high-security area of Bhopal (316). The joint delegation reports that 
                                                          
207 For more on this, see my discussion on the Operation Polo report in Chapter 2. 
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these rumours then became the grounds for violence against Muslim women and 
children, whose suffering was then underplayed in newspapers, while traumatic 
experiences of Hindu women were highlighted, emphasized, and news of these spread 
like wildfire
208
 (307).  
And in the most recent communalist violence in Gujarat in 2002, in which official 
estimates suggest nine hundred people were killed and unofficial assessments suggest 
that anywhere between two thousand and five thousand may have been killed (People’s 
Union 1), Sarkar points out that the Gujarati press had invented the rape and murder of 
eighty Hindu women travelling on the Sabarmati Express at Godhra railway station 
(“Semiotics” 2875). Details such as the chopping off of women’s breasts, a trope that 
goes back to the reality of Partition violence against women, were also fabricated. Sarkar 
points out that the falsity of such “news” was established by the fact that even the Gujarat 
police, which was notorious for its involvement in the violence, denied any such rape or 
murder of the women travelling on the Sabarmati Express (2875). Such narratives created 
a situation where the impalement, disembowelment, rape, gangrape, torture, burning 
alive, and burying alive of Muslim infants, children, and women were considered 
justified
209
 (2875).The public acts of sadism that constituted the violence in Gujarat were 
                                                          
208 Sections of the Hindi as well as English press actively contributed to spreading propaganda and rumours during the 
post-demolition riots in 1992-1993. The English press tried to justify the violence from a Hindutva perspective. For 
more on this point, see Basu et al (102-106). In yet another example of how narratives about violent Muslims are used 
as justification for sexual aggression against Muslim women, researchers report that Asha Sharma of the Rashtriya 
Sevika Samiti, a sister affiliate of the all-male RSS, claimed that Hindu women are paraded naked in Kashmir. When 
asked to substantiate this information with proof, she could offer none. She then went on to say that kinsmen of Hindu 
rape victims must take revenge against Muslims by raping Muslim women (Anitha et al 332).   
 
209 I was studying in Baroda (Vadodara) in Gujarat in 2002. Baroda was at the heart of the communal violence. When I 
was able to go to my parents’ home in Gandhinagar, which was relatively safer than Baroda by about March 10, I 
noticed that their cable operator made it a point to play the film Gadar: Ek Prem Katha (“Mutiny: A Love Story”; 
2001) twice a week for at least a month. The film is loosely based on the real life experience of Zainab, who was 
abducted by Buta Singh during Partition; Zainab and Buta Singh fell in love with each other and wanted to remain 
together. But Zainab was forced to return to her parents in Pakistan; Buta Singh committed suicide after she refused to 
return to him (Butalia, Other 101-4). Gadar is marked by its virulent anti-Pakistani and implicit anti-Muslim hate 
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not only unprecedented, but they were of such a magnitude that Sarkar is forced to 
conclude that “we have exceeded the achievements of Nazi terror, Bosnian atrocities, our 
own partition violence – if not in scale or numbers, then in the intensity of torture, the 
sheer opulence and exuberance in forms of cruelty” (2872). In addition to such narratives 
that immediately precede riots or fan riots that have already begun, many scholars besides 
Sarkar, such as Paola Bacchetta, Anja Kovacs, and Amrita Basu (amongst several others), 
have explained how Hindutva organizations school their young, usually adolescent, male 
as well as female cadres in historical narratives of Muslim tyranny and violence against 
Hindus and Hindu women. In such a volatile situation, where narratives of historic 
wrongs, real or imagined, can feed such terrible violence, Neelkanth’s tone in the Preface 
to Razakar appears more and more politically interested, ideologically motivated, and 
terribly dangerous.   
It is this very “interested and precarious construction” (Didur, “At a Loss” 54) of 
Partition narratives such as Razakar violence that emerges with particular force when we 
scrutinize how Neelkanth’s representation of Durga situates itself in terms of Hindu 
nationalist discourse. Scholars such as Kovacs (375) and Sarkar believe that the position 
of Durga in militant Hindu nationalism was firmly established with the canonical novel 
Anandamath (1881-2) by Bengali writer Bankimchandra Chattopadhyaya (1838-1894).
210
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
speech, and constructs Muslim men as invariably tyrannical, rabidly communalist, and innately violent, while 
Sikh/Hindu men are represented as all for inter-communal love and harmony. That a film based on Partition, 
representing Muslims in such a negative light, was shown repeatedly during the Gujarat violence is a chilling reminder 
of two things: the use of Partition narratives by the Hindutva right-wing to justify violence against Muslims and the 
elaborate methods of dissemination of Hindutva propaganda against Muslims in February and March 2002.  
  
210 Anandamath marks the birth of a completely new Hindu goddess who was associated with the Hindu nation (Sarkar, 
“Birth” 3959). Engagements between the profane and the sacred lead to the composition of “a new divine project as 
well as a politics of Hindu nationhood” (3959), in which “both Hindu and Nation were imagined through acts of 
opposition against the Muslim” (3969). The nation, the tri-partite Mother goddess, one of whose avatars is demon-
slaying Durga, is represented as the greatest of all the divinities; however, the Mother is being undermined by “Muslim 
tyranny” (Sarkar, “Birth” 3964). The narrative constructs Durga as “the mother as she would be” (Bankim 41) when all 
her devotees, her children, worship her by killing all Muslims in India. It is in this very powerful, resplendent, and 
 283 
 
Indeed, Bankim’s contribution to what later became known as the Hindutva movement is 
critical when we remember that “the materials of Hindu-extremist political rhetoric 
current in postcolonial India were fashioned with the very birth of nationalist 
historiography” (Chatterjee, Nation 94). Sarkar draws attention to the fact that while there 
had been previous attempts to construct a nationalist narrative, it was with Anandamath 
that the two concepts “Hindu” and “national” were united into one, singular, compelling 
icon of the Mother goddess, which incorporates the avatar of Durga (“Birth” 3969). And 
it was this interchangeability of “Hindu” and “national” (rashtriya) that RSS ideologues 
such as M.S. Golwalkar considered central to their conception of nation, nationality, and 
citizenship (Golwalkar 137).  
Like Neelkanth, Bankim blurs the difference between one Muslim and all 
Muslims, holding all Muslims responsible for the Nawab of Bengal’s misrule in the 
1770s. This narrative blurring informs the logic that is consistently employed by present-
day Hindutva organizations. Bacchetta has argued that Muslims become scapegoats in a 
process where they are constructed by Hindu nationalist organizations, such as the RSS 
and the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti (“National Committee of Women Volunteers”; Samiti), 
in terms oppositional to those assigned to the model for ideal Hindu men. This is done so 
as to displace onto Muslims the undesirable characteristics of men from “the Hindu 
community” (“All” 148). Then Muslims and everything associated with them are 
                                                                                                                                                                             
terrifying mood that we encounter Durga in Neelkanth’s writing, where she confronts the Razakar demons. This is what 
is most relevant in Anandamath to the way present-day adherents of Hindutva devote themselves to the Motherland. 
Anandamath extends the notion of the devotee’s piety from mere contemplation of the goddess and her leela (“divine 
sport”) to actually taking over the goddess’s divine activity. What is expected from members of the Hindu nation, 
therefore, is that they will violently assume charge of the Motherland’s “life” or “history” and kill Muslims, which will 
bring back the Motherland’s lost glory. No longer associated with rituals and contemplation, devotion is “relocated on a 
new register: that of war” (Sarkar, “Birth” 3966). Furthermore, war is not an option; it is a religious obligation, 
“enjoined upon by the goddess, in imitation of her own warlike aspect” (3966). Thus, a significant illusion that the 
novel creates through goddess-creation and the personification and deification of the Motherland is that the people of 
the land are the subjects of the goddess. They no longer constitute the country, and the country does not exist to nurture 
them. The Motherland has an agenda of her own; her subjects must rid her of her enemies (3966). 
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rejected; finally, organizations such as the RSS and the Samiti drive home to their 
adherents the fact that these undesirable characteristics now displaced upon Muslims 
must be eliminated as a way to cleanse the Hindu nation and put it in order.  
This is particularly so where the narratives of the sexual predation of Muslim men 
towards Hindu women are concerned. Bacchetta points out that, according to this logic, 
“the violence ascribed to them [Muslim men] can only be expelled when the latter 
[Muslim men] are neutralised” (149). Furthermore, Muslim identity is essentially 
embodied in Muslim males, while Muslim women are “potential objects of communal 
and (hetero-)sexual appropriation” (149). In addition to this, Muslimness (as contained in 
Muslim men) is associated with the collective memory of violence against Hindus, as 
well as the notion of “justice,” which can and must be achieved through revenge (149). 
This collective memory is a patch-work narrative of reconstructed histories that spans not 
only “Muslim invasions” but also centrally showcases the “vivisection” of Bharat Mata 
(“Mother India”) during Partition and the rapes of Hindu women in this period. Bacchetta 
points out that “the ‘original’ violence is always essentialised, and out of it is extracted 
the notion of ‘Muslimness’” (149). Each subsequent Hindu-Muslim conflict is 
constructed in “a chain of substitution as metaphorically related to the so-called original 
violence” (149). This inflation is consistently present in Hindutva ideology today and is 
compounded when sister affiliates of Hindutva organizations construct their feminine 
Self as dependent on the male Hindu nationalist’s discursive construction of Muslim men 
as “demonic, threatening, and in particular, threatening to Hindu women” (134). In turn, 
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Hindu nationalist discourse depends on this construction of Hindu femininity, which is 
“fabricated as essentially vulnerable” to attacks by Muslim men (148).211  
The contribution of Bankim’s Durga-as-Motherland characterization can be read 
in the fact that Durga makes an appearance in the name of the women’s wing of the VHP 
(Pathak and Sengupta 271). The significance of Durga’s fierce avatar as demon-slayer in 
the ideology and operations of Durga Vahini (“Durga’s Army”) is clear. Founded, 
significantly, in the aftermath of the enthusiastic participation of Hindu women during 
the Babri Masjid demolition in 1992, this organization aims to institutionally channel the 
enthusiasm of their many “Durgas” (Kovacs 376). Just as the VHP’s Bajrang Dal is 
intended to recruit young Hindu men, Durga Vahini recruits women between the ages of 
fifteen and thirty-five. The VHP’s expectations from the Durgas of Durga Vahini include 
the expectation that they will “create a Dharmic atmosphere and … re-establish Dharma 
by destroying all the wicked and crooked people like Durga Devi did in the ancient times. 
(“Durga Vahini”). And because the recruits are required to “ceaselessly work for the 
nation” and “adopt different programmes to create various virtues like awakening, unity, 
valour,” it is “but natural that these Durgas should be sturdy and quite competent both 
physically and mentally.” The motto of the organization is “Service, Security and 
Sanskar,”212 and besides regular Yoga and military training, the recruits are meant to 
frequently recite at least eight shlokas (roughly, “couplets”) of the “Devi Mahatmya.” 
They are supposed to learn first aid, acupressure, and home remedies; to arrange for 
                                                          
211 This is also true of the Hindutva approach to electoral gains. Amrita Basu points out that the BJP faces a serious 
contradiction as it tries to foster Hindu-Muslim violence so that it can get Hindu votes and simultaneously also attempts 
to portray Hindus as victims “whose violence is defensive and reactive,” in spite of the political and economic 
asymmetry that favours them today. But what the BJP can do, she points out, and what it does very well is justify 
Hindu aggression by pointing at what is conceived as the essentially sexually predatory nature of Muslim males and the 
inherent vulnerability of Hindu women (“Feminism” 163; “Women’s” 116).   
 
212 Sanskar is a Hindi word that originates from the Sanskrit samskara. It means “values” today in Hindi, but stems 
from the central Vedic notion of “ritual.” 
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“security” through legal aid and relief for young women who are widowed, deserted, or 
“involved in accident”; to arrange disciplined protests, exhibitions, and gatherings to 
resolve problems like obscenity, molestation, and human trafficking; to set up libraries, 
tailoring centres, medical centres, and crèches in poor urban locations; to “contribute 
towards forestalling the proselytising activities by cautioning our sisters of the 
conspiracies of alien faiths like Islam and Christianity”;213 and to inspire women to 
involve themselves in  “Gow-Sewa [cow-service], Gow-Pujan [cow-worship], Gow-
Rakshan [cow protection], Gow-Samvardhan [cow development] informing them about 
the religious, cultural, agricultural, commercial and medicinal importance of the mother 
cow” (“Durga Vahini”).  
Amongst all these declared aims, what emerges as the Durga Vahini’s main role is 
the work of agitation “by transforming religious discourse into a sustained hate 
campaign” (Basu et al 87). While the declared intentions of providing relief to young 
women in need and setting up centres to assist them appear to be worthy causes, they are 
little more than active recruiting strategies for the VHP’s violent political ideology. 
Despite their avowed aims to uplift Hindu women and provide them with institutional 
support, the VHP’s Krishna Sharma’s responses to forced arranged marriages, domestic 
                                                          
213 This notion of the alienness of Islam and Christianity stems from Savarkar’s point that Muslims and Christians do 
not belong in the Motherland like Hindus/Indians because while Hindus think of the mother/fatherland as a holy land 
(Punyabhu), “[t]heir holyland is far off in Arabia or Palestine … Consequently their names and their outlook smack of 
a foreign origin” (113). Golwalkar makes the same point and adds that “they” “still think that they have come here only 
to conquer and establish their kingdoms … What else is it, if not treason, to join the camp of the enemy leaving their 
mother-nation in the lurch?” (127) This definition of nation “that is readily reduced to the question of territorial 
integrity” (Pandey, “Hindus” 252) is ultimately where the idea of the loyalty test for Muslims originates because 
Savarkar says that Muslims, Christians, and other religious minorities should “feel as Indians first and every other thing 
afterwards” (139). Golwalkar thinks on the same lines and points out that non-Hindus have a rashtra dharma (“national 
responsibility”), a samaja dharma (“duty to society”), a kula dharma (“duty to ancestors”), and it is only in their vyakti 
dharma (“personal faith”) that they can choose any path that “satisfies … [their] spiritual urge” (133). Note that Hindus 
are automatically exempted from the need to prove their loyalty to the nation; it is Muslims who need to demonstrate 
their loyalty. Indian Muslims must, therefore, remember their non-Muslim ancestors, customs, language, culture and, 
couched in conveniently vague terms that may be filled in as and when required, “all such elements of national 
heritage” (321). 
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violence, and divorce are that women must learn to adjust and that they might consider 
stifling their screams while their husbands are beating them, lest the neighbours get to 
hear (Anitha et al 333). Indeed, the sister organizations of the BJP, the RSS, and the VHP 
intensively promote the wifely ideal espoused by sacred Vedic texts. Mridula Sinha of the 
BJP Mahila Morcha (“Women’s Front”) emphasizes that the primary role of women is 
child-rearing and that any professional jobs they may take on must not tax their domestic 
responsibilities. Women must adjust to keep the family together, she says (330). And 
although Asha Sharma of the Samiti supports women’s education, she supports it not 
because it is in the interests of women themselves, but because it makes them better 
nationalist mothers who would inculcate nationalist values in their children. She 
specifically points out that the Samiti is against “the concept of a ‘modern woman’ as she 
epitomises selfishness,” and that women are taught to give first priority to the family and 
to their children (330). She supports and defends sati, which for her exemplifies the ideal 
of female self-sacrifice. This kind of rhetoric validates Rajan’s point that the recuperation 
of radical goddesses such as Durga by Hindutva organizations or writers such as 
Neelkanth becomes problematic when we take into account two things: the way this 
radicalism is invoked, evoked, and deployed (against the interests of Muslim 
women)(“Is” 34), and the fact that the prevalence and prominence of goddesses in India 
do not necessarily represent the material and historical conditions in which the goddesses 
are worshipped
214
 (Rajan, “Is” 35; Pathak and Sengupta 287).  
                                                          
214 What is significant is that even though unconventional and/or powerful women may find sanction for their conduct 
through reference to them, goddesses, with the exception of the devoted consorts Sita and Savitri, are “rarely invoked 
as explicit role-models in the socialisation of girls” (35). Chatterjee has argued that the adulation of women as 
goddesses or mothers is actually a brilliant patriarchal, nationalist strategy that combines coercive authority and subtle 
persuasion (Nation 130).  
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Put differently, any claim to the appropriation of Durga as radical and 
empowering for women in Hindu nationalist discourses, such as those employed by 
women’s organizations such as Durga Vahini or the Samiti or literary narratives such as 
Neelkanth’s “Durga,” is completely undermined when we note the material conditions of 
women in India today. Goddesses are the products of the feminization of attributes such 
as righteousness, justice, wealth, and learning, and do not represent any real, practically 
applicable status of women (Rajan, “Is” 35). While India has many goddesses, the sex-
ratio is alarmingly unequal and points to other gender-related problems such as female 
foeticide, female infanticide, lower life expectancy for girls and women, domestic 
violence, and dowry-deaths. In fact, the 2012 annual report of the National Crime 
Records Bureau notes that 228,650 cases of crimes against women were reported in the 
country in 2011, as compared to 213,585 cases reported in 2010 (79). These figures mark 
an increase in crimes against women in India by 7.1% (79). The report further points out 
that these crimes have steadily increased since 2007 (79). In 2011, there were 24,270 rape 
victims (83); 8,618 cases of women who died of dowry-related issues (84); 94,041 cases 
of women who had been tortured (“cruelty by husband and relatives”)(84); and 9,961 
cases of sexual harassment (84).  
These figures throw into particularly sharp relief any attempts to prove that the 
worship of goddesses is in any way connected to the real status of women in India. Rajan 
points out that reformists, revivalists, and Hindu nationalists in the nineteenth century, 
and anti-colonial nationalists in the early and mid-twentieth century, had promoted the 
image of the militant Hindu goddess to achieve several ends: for spreading propaganda 
about the elevated status of Hindu women and the enlightened outlook towards women in 
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Hinduism; to attempt to emancipate women; to mobilize women to participate in the 
freedom struggle; and, most importantly, to provide “an inspirational symbolic focus – as 
in the evolution of the Bharatmata figure – for national and communal identity” (“Is” 36). 
It is the last that we see in literary narratives by Hindu nationalists such as Bankim and, 
in present-day India, Neelkanth. Today, Hindu nationalists have pushed into the arena 
assertive female leaders and aggressive female orators such as Uma Bharati and Sadhvi 
Rithambara
215
 as symbolic, “divine” entities; they have also set up organizations such as 
the Durga Vahini that promote the ideal of connecting an enlightened Hinduism which 
venerates goddesses to the notion that this corresponds to the high status that Hindu 
women are supposed to have enjoyed in the Vedic period. This popular perception, 
whose crystallization in people’s imagination is shown to have started in the late 
nineteenth century and persists till today, has been refuted by many scholars. For 
instance, Uma Chakravarti and Kumkum Roy have analyzed sacred Hindu texts as well 
as the debates surrounding them in nationalist discourses and have reached the conclusion 
that the image of an impressive past of Hindu women was largely fabricated in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for political and ideological ends.
216
  
These ends can be reconstructed when we consider the persuasive attempts by the 
Sangh Parivar to create historical explanations of “a causal link between patriarchal 
                                                          
215 The late Vijayaraje Scindia (1919-2001) from the royal family of Gwalior was also a prominent Hindutva speaker.  
  
216 To cite only one example from Roy’s research, the much-quoted statement from the Manusmriti that characterizes 
the worship of women as pleasing the gods is superficial when it is acknowledged that the “worship” of women was 
nothing like the worship of gods; it was actually circumscribed within the domestic sphere and overlaid with patriarchal 
values. So, the gifts that women were given, which were considered accessories of their worship, were designed to 
make them attractive to their husbands, thereby “enabl[ing] the woman to comply with her designated function as a 
procreative instrument” (21). Thus, Roy writes, exposing as hollow the clearly sexist paradigm of Hindu nationalist 
discourses that claim emancipated status for ancient Hindu women, “the very composition and preservation of the 
traditions which are claimed as precursors of present-day Hindutva were processes which were structured in terms of 
gender” (15). Like today, there was a gendered difference, namely gendered inequality, in the expectations of the way 
women lived their lives in the past (17). 
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institutions and the threat of the outsider/other” (Roy 11). Hindutva organizations have 
been working for years to cast Indian Muslims, particularly men, as those who threaten 
Hindus and Hindutva (Kovacs 377). Thus, the BJP’s Mridula Sinha says that “[i]n 
ancient India women were accorded great respect. It was Muslim invasion that restricted 
women to the domestic role” (Anitha et al 329-30). The BJP always refers to Vedic 
history and claims that Hindu women had equal status with men until Muslims came and 
all Hindu women had to go into seclusion (Basu, “Women’s” 111). The Samiti holds the 
same views (Anitha et al 332). An example of this perception can be seen in Neelkanth’s 
“Durga” when a character, Parvati, voices her worst fears about the Razakars: “And it 
would be alright if these people were to kill us, instead they will abduct us and put us in 
burqa and do this and that to us, they will put us behind purdah …” (3). When looked at 
in the context of Partition violence and the horrific sexual violence women underwent, 
the “this and that,” as well as the subsequent ellipsis in Parvati’s speech can be 
interpreted to mean sexual violence. Parvati quite rightly fears rape by these violent 
Muslim hooligans.  
At the same time, Neelkanth’s choice of demonstrative pronouns and punctuation 
creates an open sense of vagueness
217
 that readers are left to populate with the worst fears 
their imaginations can conjure from a repertoire of long-established stereotypes about 
Muslims. Furthermore, the fear of purdah that Neelkanth endeavours to impress his 
readers with as a sign of Muslim aggression and backwardness also alienates Hindu 
women from Muslim women by suggesting that Muslim women are oppressed while 
Hindu women are liberated. This is another common and highly problematic right-wing 
                                                          
217 This vagueness in women’s speech is typical in Indian society, which considers sex a taboo subject, often even 
amongst women.     
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as well as mainstream refrain that is meant to reinforce the inferiority and backwardness 
of Islam and posit that it was Muslim aggression and domination in the past that forced 
Hindu men to seclude Hindu women and make them backward too (Basu, “Women’s” 
110, 11; Anitha et al 322; Menon, Everyday 28-9, 39-40). Indeed, Parvati’s words echo 
the oft-quoted sentiments of Hindutva orator Uma Bharati, whose hate speeches were 
instrumental in provoking and maintaining a communally tense environment before the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992. Bharati says that she “feels” for her “Muslim 
sisters,” who are so terribly oppressed that they actually want to wear the burqa (qtd in 
Basu, “Feminism” 172). The representation of Muslim women by Neelkanth as 
oppressed corroborates Roy’s point that the right-wing image of Hindu women not only 
envisages them as a homogeneous group of women undistinguished within themselves by 
individual aspirations and desires, and regional, linguistic, class, or caste differences, but 
it also very sharply distinguishes them from those who are excluded from this group 
(“Where” 10). In this way, potential solidarities along gender lines between Hindu and 
Muslim women at the time of Partition and even today over common struggles, such as 
the constant battle against male sexual violence and other patriarchal issues, are totally 
undermined. 
Like other Hindu nationalist women’s organizations, the Samiti has adopted the 
Sangh Parivar’s overall objective of abolishing the present format of a constitutionally 
secular Indian state and imposing a Hindu nation in its place, which would exclude as 
citizens non-Hindus such as Muslims, of course, but also Parsis, Christians, and Jews, as 
well as “a great many people who call themselves Hindu but who do not conform to the 
Sangh’s ascetic machoised Hindu nationalist ideals” (Bacchetta, “All” 135, Gender 5). 
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This category includes members of tantrik and shakta sects, secular Hindus, and gay 
Hindus. Thus, despite differences in approach, both the Samiti and Durga Vahini refuse 
to refer to Durga solely as “an iconographic representation of the current or future state of 
Bharat Mata meant primarily to arouse the nation’s virile sons”; they uphold Durga 
explicitly as an example of female activism (Kovacs 377). Many of the nationalist 
women whom Kovacs interviewed maintain that even though there is compassion and 
kindness in Durga’s nature, these can be “no longer administered; in fact, it is explicitly 
argued that, in the face of ‘evil’, it is important not to show compassion anymore” (380). 
And it is to protect the people whom the Hindutva right-wing deems “Hindu” that their 
inner Durga emerges. It is in this context that we must read Neelkanth’s narrative choice 
of gendering the attempted appropriation of Sikhs into the Hindutva fold through the 
characterization of Balwinder as Durga. 
The way Neelkanth manipulates goddess narratives as well as Partition narratives 
in conjunction with one another is another Hindu nationalist strategy, similar to the 
assertion by the VHP’s Krishna Sharma that it was the Muslim “lack of respect” for 
women that caused (Hindu) women to commit suicide during Partition. The Samiti’s 
Asha Sharma also valorizes the self-immolation of women during Partition riots as an 
instance of sati (Anitha et al 331). Both comments reveal how central Partition memories 
are to the construction of Hindutva narratives. Indeed, Partition trauma is used again and 
again by Hindu nationalist women to justify current violence against Muslims (Bacchetta, 
“All” 150). Partition is the most immediate referent for recent violence against Muslims. 
Bacchetta writes, “Perhaps the most emotive issue that communalists have been able to 
manipulate into their agenda of aggression, revenge and retribution for past wrongs, was 
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the mass rape and abduction of women during, and following on, the partition” (Gender 
6). In this, then, Neelkanth is not alone, as he solders memories of Partition in “Durga” 
onto his carefully crafted fear of the Muslim Other in the Preface. 
Furthermore, because the culprit is always made out to be Muslim, this phantom 
menace of an always present external threat or challenge cleanly absolves Hindu society 
of being oppressive (Roy 11). Confrontations of patriarchy within Hindu communities are 
discouraged by Hindutva men’s as well as women’s organizations, and grounds have 
been created by underscoring the urgent need to maintain “Hindu unity” and tackle the 
ostensibly imminent and constant threat from Muslims, so that the question of solving 
gender-related issues simply does not arise (12). Thus, even as we view the 
representation of Balwinder as Durga in a critical light, we must also simultaneously 
question Neelkanth’s construction of the idyllic community of women devoted to their 
housework, their children, and their worship. This role of Hindu women that revolves 
around their singular focus on the domestic sphere is exemplified in the elaborate, 
concentrated, and relatively lengthy depiction of Anandi, the maternal figure par 
excellence, serving Gauri, the old cow, as well as the herd of cows that later appears on 
the scene. As I have already mentioned with regard to the aims and responsibilities of the 
recruits of Durga Vahini, and as I will also discuss later in this chapter, caring for cows is 
seen by Hindutva adherents as a Hindu duty, particularly for Hindu women. And so we 
are told that after Anandi has, according to her daily habit, fed Gauri a few rotis, “[s]he 
kept sitting there and slowly and gently stroked the cow’s dewlap. At this pleasurable 
touch, the cow closed her eyes” (1). A little later, having brought a pail of water for the 
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thirsty calves that have also arrived at the scene, Anandi rebukes them as if they were her 
children. The narrator tells readers,  
As they drank water … sometimes the calves would push and shove each other 
and fight with each other. Anandi would then smack one or two of them and 
mumble, ‘Rascals, they will not even drink water quietly. They will fight here too. 
After all, they’re just like our children.’ (2)  
It is this image of women as nurturers and caregivers which is ultimately deemed ideal 
and desirable to the Hindu nationalist project and which does not necessarily represent 
the political realities or aspirations of women.
218
 
In this way, in Hindu nationalist texts such as Neelkanth’s “Durga,” the powerful 
goddess is just a temporary avatar, to be employed when women – not only Hindu, but 
also, through their attempted appropriation, Sikh – are required to be violent and to be 
abandoned as soon as the Razakars have fled.
219
 This is why we are told that after the 
Razakars run away, the women pay darshan (“devotional respect”) to Balwinder and then 
hug her and sob. Alert for any signs of the Razakars’ return, Balwinder continues to hold 
on to the sword; but as the other women weep, her eyes also become moist, and she too 
weeps. Her tears signify the ebbing away of Balwinder’s fierce avatar as Durga as well 
as her assertive role as an independent woman. Balwinder is back to being a woman, a 
                                                          
218 This point will be dealt with in some detail later in this chapter. Also, it is not only contemporary creative literature 
such as Neelkanth’s Razakar that promotes the wifely and motherly ideal. The Gorakhpur-based Gita Press is a well-
known publisher of books that centrally place Hindu religion and culture. The Gita Press emphasizes constantly in its 
publications that the proper role of Hindu women is to be unconditionally devoted to their families. It warns that there 
are dangers that await those who do not do so (Basu, “Women’s” 114). Such dangers could include being abandoned 
by one’s husband for the crime of getting an abortion (114). While it is difficult to find out whether or how there is a 
direct connection between the BJP and its Hindutva affiliates and the Gita Press, it is certainly true that they have 
fostered the climate where these views flourish (123).  
 
219 For an analysis of how Hindutva women’s organizations recede in “peace time” and focus only on maintaining the 
essential core of “Hindu values” (sanskar/samskara), see Sarkar’s “Pragmatics of the Hindu Right: Politics of 
Women’s Organisations” (1999). 
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fact which is signified by the tears that she sheds out of relief that she has managed to 
avert certain catastrophe. In the words of one Samiti leader, “[t]he tender-hearted woman 
becomes bold and aggressive, if time demands” (qtd in Kovacs 376) and then returns to 
her “feminine” qualities when that time is past. 
What makes the fact of increased recruitment of women to Hindu nationalist 
groups an even worse blow to secularism is that it critically undermines gender 
solidarities that democratic women’s organizations and networks such as the Gujarat-
based organization SEWA (Self-Employed Women’s Association for India), for example, 
are trying to build or mend. And the myth of Durga as Mahishasuramardini is frequently 
used by these Hindu nationalist women, such as those of the Vahini, to justify their role 
in the devastating communal violence that occurred in Bombay in 1992 and 1993; in 
Bijnor between 1990 and 1993; and in Gujarat in 2002 (Kovacs 374). Flavia Agnes has 
pointed out how in the 1980s a campaign by the Shiv Sena, yet another Sangh affiliate, 
amongst their female cadres in Bombay momentarily replaced the Hindutva ideal of the 
traditional meek and domestic Hindu woman with a new Hindutva image, that of Durga 
as Mahishasuramardini.
220
 This martial image of Durga, victorious over the outsider 
demons who have taken over Heaven, was meant to stir the women and goad them into 
attacking Muslim Others, who are seen in the discourse of Hindutva ideologues and their 
present-day adherents, as I have already mentioned, to be aliens and outsiders
221
 (140).  
                                                          
220 The same shift can be seen amongst the RSS which idealizes those women from epic literature who embody 
suffering and self-sacrifice, but also celebrates courageous and powerful women who use violence, when it becomes 
necessary (ostensibly), to protect their communities (Basu, “Feminism” 171). 
 
221 Agnes points out that what is ironic is that it was the Indian women’s movement that had originally deployed and 
popularized the images of Durga and Kali in order to address violence within homes and communities (141). An 
example of such reference to goddesses is that India’s first feminist publishing house is called “Kali for Women.” To 
their utter dismay, Agnes points out, the women’s movement realized that not only have Hindutva forces been far more 
successful in mobilizing women with the use of these myths, but that women have turned from addressing patriarchy to 
attacking Muslims (141).  
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In the Bombay riots of 1992, in which a thousand people died (Banerjee, “Hindu” 
218), women mobilized by the Shiv Sena slept on the streets to prevent army trucks and 
fire engines from entering areas to put out fires or rescue Muslim hostages (Agnes 150; 
Banerjee, “Hindu” 216). They also blocked the arrests of several Shiv Sena leaders, 
looted stores, and attacked Muslim women (Banerjee, “Hindu” 216). The sharpest 
indictment of their participation in the post-demolition riots must come for the fact that 
they tore off other women’s clothes to facilitate rape (Dietrich 42). In connection with the 
most recent riots in Gujarat in 2002, BJP MLA Maya Kodnani was charged on August 
29, 2012, for leading Hindu mobs in the Naroda Patiya area of Ahmedabad and inciting 
them to commit violence (Soni, “Naroda Patiya”). Ninety-seven Muslim men, women, 
and children were killed in this massacre (Bhan, “Naroda”; “Gujarat Riots”). Muslim 
women were raped and gangraped, and a twenty-day old infant was killed (“Gujarat 
Riots”). Noting her crucial role in escalating the violence after her arrival in the area and 
encouraging the involvement of policemen in the attacks, Special Judge Jyotsana Yagnik 
called Kodnani the “kingpin of entire riots” and sentenced her to twenty-eight years in 
prison (Bhan, “Naroda”; Bhattacharya, “Former”).  
Thus, Hindu nationalist women’s presence in politics today is certainly not 
limited to being symbolic figures, such as the powerful and successful orators and 
performers Sadhvi Rithambara and Uma Bharati, who came into prominence during the 
Ramjanmabhoomi movement in the 1980s when they incited and provoked Hindutva 
activists into demolishing the Babri Masjid, or spokespersons such as Sushma Swaraj, 
who uphold Hindutva through powerful government portfolios or even as part of the 
opposition in Parliament. With an active leadership, elaborately hierarchical 
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organizational structure, and constantly reiterated ideology, it is the Samiti, the Mahila 
Morcha, and the Durga Vahini, all of whom uphold Durga as an ideal that have caused 
the presence of Hindu nationalist women to develop and flourish at the grassroots 
level.
222
 Kodnani herself is a Sevika (“volunteer” or “woman who serves”; member of the 
Samiti) and also the daughter of a staunch RSS worker who migrated to India during 
Partition (FP Politics, “Maya Kodnani”). Hence, many Hindu nationalist women are now 
at least skilled at organizing demonstrations, campaigning for elections, and using arms 
and ammunition (Basu, “Women’s” 105; Kovacs 381). Another indication of their 
extensive reach amongst sections of Hindus comes from the fact that the Samiti has a 
million members who operate out of shakhas (“branches”) in at least sixteen Indian states 
and many countries abroad (Bacchetta, “All” 135).  
These Durgas, then, unlike the Durga of the “Devi Mahatmya” or the Durga 
imagined by Guru Gobind Singh, fight for a misplaced sense of justice. Far from saving 
the world, they misappropriate a powerful myth and threaten to destroy any semblance of 
India’s secular, democratic fabric. And it is ultimately in the service of this ideology that 
Neelkanth represents Balwinder Kaur as Durga. While his text highlights the power of 
Durga to protect and defend the women of Jampanna Gate, the agency he accords to 
Balwinder becomes questionable in light of his Hindutva convictions, which, as I have 
                                                          
222 There is a qualitative difference in the way the men’s organizations and the women’s organizations appropriate 
Durga. In line with the shift in bhakti that occurs in Bankim’s founding text of Hindu nationalism, the all-male RSS’s 
activities encourage the view that the militant qualities of Bharat Mata as Durga have now transferred to the sons, 
“effectively substituting feminine strength with male virility” (Kovacs 375); the responsibility of the mother herself is 
now secondary and indirect and involves raising and rousing her sons to help her (376). On the other hand, the Samiti 
refers to Bharat Mata as Durga Devi and holds her responsible for the creation of all the divinities as well as the Hindu 
nation (376). The goddess has agency in their narrative (376). But, while they recognize her fierceness, they also 
promote other desirable feminine traits of Durga, such as motherhood and its attendant qualities of affection, 
auspiciousness, nourishment, selflessness, and forgiveness (376). In other words, while the Sangh “assigns mainly 
passive qualities to Hindu femininity and womanhood … the Samiti tends to represent them more widely in terms 
ranging from domesticated to fierce to out-of-control” (Bacchetta, “All” 136). The Samiti’s inspiring goddesses are the 
Sangh’s (and Bankim’s) Bharatmata, who contains Durga as one of her avatars, and the Samiti’s own Ashtabhuja, who 
also incorporates a Durga-like avatar (137). Thus, all the goddesses, singular or composite, which are significant for 
the Samiti, incorporate the demon-slaying Durga.  
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shown, are represented in his Preface. In light of this problematic representation of Durga 
in Hindutva texts, ideology, and practice, we must take into account the crucial questions 
Rajan asks about women’s agency and the way it is understood, interpreted, and 
deployed, often uncritically, in questionable or unconsidered ways and towards debatable 
or even suspicious ends. She writes that agency, the “autonomous action by the 
individual or collective subject,” tends to be understood as an “inherently radical force or 
attribute of women and other subordinated groups” (“Is” 37). This is why the recovery of 
women’s agency has been “uncritically pursued as a politically correct objective” in 
studies of society, culture, and history (37). But just like their empowerment, women’s 
agency can “neither be viewed as an abstraction, nor celebrated as an unqualified good. 
Agency is never to be found in some pure state of volition or action, but is complexly 
imbricated in the contradictory structures of patriarchy”223 (37). And as I have argued, the 
agency of women as Durga that Hindutva constructs is not in the interests of women 
because, first, it glosses over and ignores any demands that Hindu women may have for 
reforming patriarchal structures within Hindu communities and, second, it actively 
encourages and even commits outrageous acts of violence against Muslim women.   
 In addition to this, not only is the representation of Balwinder as Durga and the 
subtle attempt to co-opt Sikhs indicators of gendered Hindu nationalist discourses at work 
in Neelkanth’s writing, but the story also traffics in one of the most controversial Hindu 
and Hindutva images: namely the cow, who in “Durga” is significantly called Gauri, who 
                                                          
223 Furthermore, and this explains why Hindu nationalist women always easily dismiss all feminist demands and 
objections, the celebration of a “feminism” that is indigenous and always available in “our own tradition” becomes a 
pretext to reject outright crucial feminist demands and debates, which are always derided as “western” and, therefore, 
irrelevant and unimportant. And while the proponents of Hindutva reject western feminism, they aggrandise “the scope 
and politics of that [indigenous ‘feminist’] tradition” and, in the process, co-opt women’s agency for their own 
purposes (37).  
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is just as significantly killed by the Razakars. The brutal act of killing an animal and 
hanging its dead head from a tree is, we can imagine, in itself a terrible sight and testifies 
to how bloodthirsty the Razakars in Neelkanth’s “Durga” are. However, the Razakars’ 
killing of Moti, an old dog who is also a regular visitor to the locality, does not resonate 
in the text in the same way as the death of Gauri. Given that many Hindus believe today 
that the cow is sacred, it would appear that Gauri’s death has greater meaning than Moti’s 
death. Such is the weight of this common perception that the cow is sacred in Hinduism 
and that its sanctity must not be undermined that when historian D.N. Jha wrote his book 
The Myth of the Holy Cow (2001), his original publisher suddenly backed out at the final 
stages of printing the book. In Jha’s words, the publisher had suddenly found too much 
“sang-de-bœuf” (“beef blood”) in it (xii). Soon after this incident, Jha began to receive 
telephone threats from unidentified callers telling him not to go ahead with the 
publication of the book. In spite of this, it was published in India by a new Delhi-based 
publishing house called Matrix Books in August 2001. But then, “some right-wing 
politicians and groups of Hindu and Jaina fanatics, without reading a single page, termed 
it ‘blasphemous,’ demanded my arrest and succeeded in obtaining a court order 
restraining the circulation of the book” (xii). The Hyderabad Civil Court banned the book 
(book jacket). It was subsequently published internationally by left activist and political 
campaigner Tariq Ali of Verso. In an implicit reference to the banning of Salman 
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses (1988) in India and the fatwa issued against him in 1989 by 
Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, Jha writes, “There are no fatwas in the Hindu religion, but a 
self-appointed custodian of ‘Hinduism’ sentenced me to death. The atmosphere in India 
became charged with communalism. Intellectual terrorism became rampant” (xii). The 
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fact that Hindutva communalists used the Arabic word fatwa (“ruling”), which is most 
commonly employed by Islamists, reinforces my point that both these violent, intolerant 
ideologies feed off each other.  
Jha argues that many Hindus and Hindutva organizations have attempted to force 
the supposedly ancient sanctity of the cow into India’s political culture.224 They insist that 
the idea and practice of eating beef came to India with the Muslims, “treating it as the 
identifying mark of the Muslim community” (ix). Jha emphasizes that this holiness of the 
cow is a myth; while there were later attitudinal divergences over the consumption of 
beef in religious as well as secular texts, cow’s flesh was “very much a part of the early 
Indian non-vegetarian food regimen and dietary tradition” (ix). He points out, therefore, 
that beef eating was not brought to India by Muslims; that abstention from eating beef is 
not a mark of Hindu identity; and that allegations made by Hindutva organizations that 
beef-eating is indicative of Muslim presence in India and is conceived as a threat to the 
Hindu way of life is part of a sustained attempt to “foster the false consciousness of the 
‘otherness’ of followers of Islam”225 (x). Jha points out that the idea of abstention from 
beef as a specific and defining trait of Hinduism has taken such a grip over many Hindus 
and Hindutva followers that on one occasion when the RSS tried to claim that Sikhs were 
Hindus, there was vehement protest by Sikhs, and a Sikh youth leader suggested that a 
                                                          
224 Even a professed secularist such as Gandhi, for example, wrote in Harijan on September 15, 1940 that “[f]rom time 
immemorial this idea [beef-eating] has been repugnant to us, and we have worshipped the cow and her progeny” (282). 
Although Gandhi’s political outlook cannot be connected to hardline Hindutva, the fact that the man who led the anti-
colonial struggle against the British Raj and became known as the Father of the Nation propagated the myth that the 
cow is sacred to Hindus/Indians (who are apparently collapsed into one undistinguishable entity) and is, therefore, 
inviolable, has contributed to fixing the image of the cow as sacred even amongst non-right-wing Hindus. What further 
foregrounded the desired non-violent conduct of Indians towards the cow in secular nationalist discourses was the 
platform of ahimsa (“non-violence”) from which Gandhian nationalism truly came into its own.   
 
225 Hindutva speakers such as Rithambara and ideologues like Golwalkar frequently wax eloquent about what they see 
as the oppositional relationship between everything Hindus believe and everything Muslims believe. The logic is very 
simple and allows for no internal contradictions or complexities: because everything Hindus practice and believe is 
correct, whatever Muslims practice or believe is incorrect. Thus, Golwalkar complains: “If we worship cow, he [a 
Muslim] would like to eat it” (148). 
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cow should be slaughtered and beef served during the daily langar (“community meal”) 
in a gurdwara (21).  
Jha’s research consists of Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain religious scriptures; he also 
corroborates his findings from the sacred texts by referring to secular texts such as 
creative literature, treatises on law, and medical texts. His research establishes that beef-
eating is part of an ancient and enduring flesh-eating tradition prevalent amongst Indians 
of all castes and that even when eating beef was forbidden for Brahmins, they retained a 
memory of the ancient practice where Brahmins were fed beef in order to honour them 
(23). In fact, Jha states that the earliest evidence of general non-vegetarianism and, more 
specifically, beef-eating, comes from the Vedas.
226
 In a pastoral economy in which cattle 
rearing played a central role, the ancient inhabitants of what is called the Vedic period 
(roughly 2000 to 1000 BCE) performed animal sacrifices to their gods, a custom that they 
brought with them when they migrated east from the southern steppes of Eurasia (28). It 
was in the later Vedic period, with the gradual adoption of settled agriculture amongst the 
pastoral nomads, as well as the gradual consolidation of the landed priestly class around 
the second half of the first millennium CE, who were given not only land but also cattle 
as gifts and who now saw new value in their cattle as harness or draft animals, that cow 
slaughter began to be discouraged (41, 114). It became important to restrict the killing of 
cattle if the agrarian way of life was to survive (41). This idea is represented in the 
Upanishads and may have culminated in the notion of ahimsa (“non-violence”), which 
was nourished by Buddhism and Jainism and, later, brought to the fore by Gandhi in the 
                                                          
226 An important point that Jha makes in the course of his argument about the prevalence of beef-eating in the Vedic 
period is that when Hindutva followers assert that beef-eating was introduced in the subcontinent “from outside” by 
Muslims, who are considered foreigners in “their” country, they fail to acknowledge and/or realize that “their Vedic 
ancestors were also foreigners who ate the flesh of the cow and various other animals” (20). In fact, it is ironic that 
Hindutva adherents “trace the concept of sacred cow to the very period when it was sacrificed and its flesh was eaten” 
(18).   
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twentieth century; ahimsa may have challenged the culture of Vedic sacrifice and paved 
the way ideologically for a more stable, settled agrarian society and state. However, even 
this undermining of Brahminical sacrifice did not eliminate beef or any other meat from 
the regular diet of the Buddhist Age, as references from sacred Buddhist texts as well as 
secular texts such as the Arthashastra (circa fourth century BCE) show (Jha 42, 67, 68, 
70-71); there is no evidence to suggest that the cow was ever sacred to Buddhists either 
(71). It is with the second half of the first millennium CE and the gradual replacement of 
Vedic religion, which was predicated on sacrifice, with Puranic religion, which was 
not,
227
 that the lawgivers begin to forbid cattle slaughter (114).  
Jha concludes that secular commentators were familiar with the practice of cattle 
sacrifice and retained its memory in their texts “until at least the eighteenth century and 
perhaps later without feelings of guilt” (102). In fact, this memory exists alongside and 
despite the general disapproval for cattle slaughter in Kaliyuga (116). Furthermore, 
sacrificial killing of cows and buffaloes continued till 1874 at Todgarh in Merwara, 
Rajasthan, when the local Rawats entered into an agreement that they would abstain from 
eating beef (120). There are also several places, such as the Athanuramman temple in 
Salem district in Tamil Nadu, and Sonepur and Baud in Orissa, where buffalo sacrifice in 
temples and the consumption of buffalo-meat by middle- and lower-caste communities 
took place till the mid-twentieth century, when this practice was stopped as a result of the 
Hindu Religious Charities and Endowments Board taking over the administration of 
several village goddess temples (120). Buffalo sacrifices are still performed in Cenci in 
                                                          
227 Puranic religion is preoccupied with the concept of Kaliyuga (“the Age of Kali”), a particularly trying period of time 
that recurs at regular intervals in history and in which everything falls into chaos. To prevent the unleashing of total 
evil in Kaliyuga, certain sacrifices have to be made. Puranic religion decrees that one of the ways to restore dharma in 
Kaliyuga is to abstain from eating beef or killing cattle (Jha 114). 
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Tamil Nadu, Bangaon Mahisi in Bihar, the Kamakhya temple in Guwahati in Assam, and 
the Kali temple in Calcutta. Tribal communities such as the Dire in Hyderabad eat beef 
openly at feasts (121). Jha concludes that non-violence towards the cow and abstention 
from beef could not have been an indicator of community identity for Brahmins or the 
Brahminical social order (102).                   
However, over the centuries, the cow frequently became a political instrument in 
the hands of rulers. Thus, Mughal emperors Babar, Akbar, Jahangir, and Aurangzeb are 
said to have introduced a restricted ban on cow slaughter in order to accommodate Jain or 
Brahminical sensibilities and sensitivities (18). The Maratha ruler Shivaji is supposed to 
have made proclamations that Hindus must not tolerate cow slaughter or the oppression 
of Brahmins; both came to be understood as related and were, therefore, connected to 
ideas of sacrilege (18). But it was only in the late nineteenth century that the cow became 
a tool of mass political mobilization with the beginning of the organized cow-protection 
movement. The movement began with the strictly vegetarian Sikh Kuka (or Namdhari) 
sect in Punjab around 1870 and gathered momentum when the first Gorakshini Sabha 
(“Cow-Protection Assembly”) was founded in 1882 by Dayananda Saraswati (18-9).  
It was around this time that the cow became a symbol of the unity of a large, 
diverse group of “Hindus,” and cow slaughter by Muslims began to be challenged in an 
organized manner. All these developments provoked a series of communal riots in the 
1880s and 1890s. Sudhir Kakar points out that riots that took place in 1886 in Ambala, 
Ludhiana, Hoshiarpur, and Delhi occurred because of controversies surrounding alleged 
ritual cattle sacrifices by Muslims (44). There were rumours that Muslims were about to 
bring large quantities of beef into Ambala on the occasion of Eid. In Ludhiana, riots 
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began with the report that a Muslim family had slaughtered a cow in their house. In 
Hoshiarpur, a Muharram procession was interrupted by a bull. The processionists were 
already involved in arguments with Hindus over the entanglement of their tazia in the 
branches of a peepal tree. The Muslims wanted to cut a branch of the sacred tree to free 
the tazia. With the arrival of the bull on the scene, the Muslims began to chase it away 
with a stick. The Hindus protested, and riots began (44). In 1893, there were riots over 
the cow-protection issue in Azamgarh, Ghazipur, and Ballia districts and more than a 
hundred people were killed in different parts of the country. There were also riots in 
Ayodhya in 1912-1913 and in Shahabad in 1917
228
 (Jha 19).  
The contribution of Gandhi to the cow-protection debate and, eventually, to the 
mainstream perception that cows are sacred to Hindus, lay in his connection of ahimsa 
and cow-protection. He said that “Mother cow” is self-sacrificing and expects nothing 
from us. She is gentle and serves humans selflessly by offering them her milk while she 
is alive and “her flesh, her bones, her intestines,, [sic] her horns and her skin” after her 
death (Harijan, 15 Sep. 1940; 281). These qualities he cites as his reason for worshipping 
the cow and for discouraging the consumption of beef. He also provides validation for his 
beliefs by resorting to references to “ancient India,” where “[t]he cow was worshipped as 
mother” (282). It is Gandhi’s endorsement of cow-protection as an urgent item on the 
social agenda of Indians, as well as the growing perception amongst Hindus as a result of 
Gandhi’s politics and the stance of Hindu organizations such as the Arya Samaj and the 
                                                          
228 For an extensive analysis of the cow-protection movement in what is now Eastern Uttar Pradesh and West Bihar 
(the Bhojpuri zone) and a detailed discussion of the circumstances surrounding these two sets of Hindu-Muslim clashes 
in 1893 in Azamgarh, Ghazipur, and Ballia, and in 1917 in Shahabad, see Gyanendra Pandey’s “Rallying Around the 
Cow: Sectarian Strife in the Bhojpuri Region, c. 1888-1917” (1983).  
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RSS against cow slaughter, that have resulted in several Indian states passing legislation 
after independence to prohibit cow slaughter.  
However, tensions over the issue persist in a big way. In 1966, communalist 
political parties led a massive demonstration before Parliament House in New Delhi in 
favour of a national ban on cow slaughter. The demonstration culminated in riots in 
which at least eight people died and many were injured (Jha 19). In 1969 in Ahmedabad, 
a Muslim roadside green-grocer beat a cow which was nibbling at his vegetables. The 
Hindu cowherd and the green-grocer exchanged blows and the cow, which was not 
seriously injured, was taken for treatment in an exaggerated manner. Riots began, and 
lasted for ten days in various parts of Gujarat (Kakar 44-5). In the most recent communal 
riot that occurred in Hyderabad from April 8-12, 2012, beef was again at the centre of the 
controversy. It was alleged to have been thrown into the compound of a temple in 
Kurmaguda, an area with a majority of Muslims (Kumar, “Hyderabad”; “Riots”). Riots 
continued for four days, and one person was reported to have been killed.  
Indeed, the frequent occurrence of riots over cow-protection issues leads Kakar to 
suggest that, although there are various precipitating incidents where riots are concerned, 
the two that occur “with such regularity in reports that they may fairly be called 
archetypes … [are] … Muslim violence towards the cow,” and the tension and mass 
emotion surrounding religious processions during Muharram and Ganesh Chaturthi (44). 
Kakar points out that these incidents are archetypal because irrespective of whether or not 
they can be proved to have occurred, they are perceived as valid reasons for violence to 
start (44). Today, Hindu nationalist organizations like the RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal, and 
their other affiliates have an anti-slaughter ban as a prominent item on their political 
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agenda. The open attempt by Hindutva organizations to search for an opportunity to 
violently target Muslims is seen in a threat made in 2002 by a Bajrang Dal leader that he 
would enrol three million activists in the anti-cow slaughter movement during the 
Muslim feast of Bakreid (Jha 20) (which commemorates the proposed sacrifice of Isaq 
(Isaac) in the Qur’an by sacrificing either a goat, a cow, or in some places, a camel in the 
name of God). Another vivid example of how Muslims are attacked on the cow issue is 
seen in the slogan displayed on walls in Ayodhya and Faizabad in October 1990: “it is the 
compulsory religious duty of Hindus to kill those who kill cows” (qtd in Basu et al 70).  
Gyanendra Pandey points out that women and cows are both considered sacred 
property and sacred symbols of Hindus in Hindu nationalist discourses (“Hindus” 260). 
Yet, Pandey argues, while women’s sexuality, which is represented as being primitive, 
innocent, irrational, and impure, is constructed as a threat to Hindu nationalist discourse, 
cows are in a better position than women because they are in no way threatening to the 
Hindu community or to the dominance of men. Pandey points out that in Hindu 
nationalist discourses, the biggest injury one can do to the cow in order to humiliate 
Hindus is to kill it (261). And it is not that this injury is not felt deeply by Hindu 
nationalists and many non-right-wing Hindus who believe the cow is sacred. In fact, 
Golwalkar writes that the only reason Muslims slaughter cows is to “insult Hindu 
feelings” (150). But the worst thing that can be done to the Hindu community as well as 
the Hindu nation by symbolically threatening the masculinity of its men is to rape “its” 
women. Thus, Neelkanth’s “Durga” strategically represents the penultimate injury to the 
Hindu community through the violent manner in which Gauri is killed. In addition to the 
slaughter of Gauri, Neelkanth shows the Razakars adding insult to injury by leaving her 
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severed head dripping with blood hanging on the peepal tree; this constitutes an insult to 
yet another sacred symbol (the peepal tree). As if that was not enough, Neelkanth depicts 
Gauri’s head as having been placed on the sacred tree by the Razakars in such a way that 
her blood drips onto the little, ancient temple under the tree. In light of the opinions 
voiced by Neelkanth in the Preface, this representation creates the impression that Hindu 
nationalists actively and often successfully strive to promote: Hindus are under attack; 
everything that they hold sacred is critically undermined. However, the fact that the 
women are not raped is meant as a wake-up call to Hindus.  
It is as if Neelkanth, by bringing the women so close to being raped and yet 
saving them at the end, is warning Hindus that they might not be lucky enough to escape 
the next time the Razakars come calling. The implication of Gauri’s brutal slaughter is 
thus not only an act in itself that would justify further violence against Muslims, but it 
also adds a sense of vivid finality to the text and its narrative by reminding Hindus of 
what else (rape) could have happened, but did not. In other words, it makes violence 
against Muslims an immediate, pre-emptive necessity. Neelkanth’s conviction that 
Hindus must learn from Patel’s example in his dealings with Hyderabad in 1948 and 
conduct themselves accordingly is driven home to Hindus with clarity.   
As I have mentioned above, another significant fact about “Durga” is that there is 
not a single Muslim family or even person who lives within Jampanna Gate.
229
 The only 
Muslim who can be said to be represented, i.e. one who has words and actions attributed 
to him, is constructed as a stereotypically tyrannical and brutal man. As Moti attempts to 
                                                          
229 There is one fleeting reference to a Muslim who is not a Razakar. In order to show how lonely Rama, one of the 
women who lives in Jampanna Gate, had been before she came to this locality, Neelkanth refers to “the elderly Munshi 
Inayat Khan” (5), who occasionally exchanged a few cordial words with Rama while she used to wait for her father-in-
law and husband to return from work. Nothing more is said about Inayat Khan in the rest of the story. 
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defend the gates, the Razakar Hafiz declares, “he too is a Hindu dog, a kafir – like the 
Hindus, he too must be sent to Hell” (8). He strikes Moti twice, and “[t]he cowdung cake 
graced ground to the right side of the gates was drenched in thick blood and pieces of 
meat” (8). There is no positive Muslim character in the text, a depiction which is unlike 
other Partition texts that often incorporate sympathetic or friendly characters of the Other 
community. What is more, the fact that Jampanna Gate locality, which has no Muslims or 
Christians, is conceived as a little Hindustan (India) (4), “one, full, complete family made 
of smaller families” (5), reinforces its status as the microcosm of the “imagined 
community” (Anderson 6) that is the Hindu nation. The repeated point that “it was as if 
all the small families came together to build a big, united family” (Neelkanth 6) also 
resonates with the RSS’s idea of all Hindus being part of one, large, family in spite of 
diversity of language, regional, and even communal (as in the case of Sikhs) affiliation. 
Not surprisingly, the residents of Jampanna Gate belong to various places in India, such 
as Mathura (Uttar Pradesh), Rajkot (Gujarat), parts of present-day Maharashtra and 
divided Punjab; the locality is described as a Hindi-speaking haven of sorts for the North 
Indian residents, who find Telugu language and culture strange and unfamiliar (4). But, 
while there is great regional and linguistic diversity in the locality, there is no place in 
Neelkanth’s vision of an idyllic Indian community for alternative Indian cultural 
traditions that are not exclusively located in Brahminical Hinduism, or even syncretic 
traditions such as Hyderabadi Hindu-Muslim culture. Everything that does not conform 
to an exclusivist idea of upper-caste, middle-class Hindu community is an outside 
phenomenon that has no place in this limited idea of Hindustan, the Hindu nation.  
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What reaffirms the exclusive Hinduness of this nation is the fact that none of the 
sacred symbols require any explanation on the part of the narrator. This point is 
especially relevant since the locality is defined in exclusively Hindu terms. The sacred 
iconography and symbolism used to describe the residents and their lives are drawn 
solely from Hindu customs and beliefs. For example, the names of the human and bovine 
characters, such as “Anandi,” “Gauri,” and “Parvati,” refer to the Hindu goddess Parvati, 
consort of the god Shiva. There are also names like “Rama,” which refers to the goddess 
Lakshmi, consort of Vishnu, and “Mohan,” which refers to the god Krishna. Furthermore, 
a significant amount of time and space has been devoted in the narrative to Gauri, who 
has been visiting the locality for “who knows how many years” (2). Gauri prefers to sit 
under a grove of neem and peepal trees outside the gate, where Anandi often sits with her 
and affectionately feeds her with leftover rotis. Cows and peepal trees are worshipped by 
some Hindus, and neem is a medicinal tree that has many uses in daily life for Indians. 
The sense of domestic bliss in the story is significantly augmented by the welcome 
presence of Gauri and a herd of cows that also occasionally visits the area. The 
description of Anandi feeding the cows, offering them water, and affectionately smacking 
the mischievous calves enhances the idyllic tone of the narrative. There is also no need 
for the narrator to explain the recent history of cow-service amongst certain sections of 
Hindus. It is presumed that they will know they are being addressed here. Similarly, there 
is no need to explain the significance of the dead cow upon the tree, dripping blood on 
the temple. The readership of Neelkanth’s imagined Hindu nation will read the episode 
and keenly and jointly feel the profound insult the Razakars’ action constitutes.  
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Such a representation of Hindu symbols is in line with Benedict Anderson’s idea 
of recognition and empathy between readers of one nation, who have particular narrative 
ties that connect them in “indefinitely stretchable nets of kinship” (6). Anderson writes 
that such an ability by the reader to recognize the ethos of the nation in nationalist 
literature renders extensive commentary unnecessary (27). Thus, the Hindu nation, which 
is still not realized in truth, is imagined in and through reading because “the members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (6). It is 
significant to point out here that the intended Hindutva readership of Neelkanth’s writing 
is probably located in the Hindi-belt of North India (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Uttaranchal, 
Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana) and, 
possibly, some Hindi readers in Gujarat and Maharashtra as well. Because of the relative 
lack of popularity of Hindi in Andhra Pradesh, where the official languages are Telugu 
and Urdu (written in the Nastaliq script), it is safe to assume that Neelkanth is not writing 
for an audience situated in Hyderabad city or other parts of Andhra Pradesh.
230
 His 
choice of Hindi is made unusual by the fact that Hindi is the third or fourth language of 
the state in terms of popularity (it has no official status in the state); it can be assumed to 
be connected to the Urdu-Hindi language debates in North India, which have raged in 
that part of the country since the late nineteenth century and continue to hold sway in 
debates about the national language. In fact, Alok Rai has gone so far as to suggest in his 
                                                          
230 The only Hindi readership Neelkanth can really claim in Hyderabad city or other urban centres of Andhra Pradesh, 
such as Nizamabad or Warangal, are Hindi-speaking Arya Samajis. What drives home the lack of popularity of Hindi 
in the South, even amongst Hindutva activists, is that, during the Ramjanmabhoomi movement mobilizations in the late 
eighties and early nineties, large groups of RSS activists had arrived in Delhi from Hyderabad city to attend a VHP 
rally, but could not understand the speeches because they were all in Hindi. In addition to language problems, they 
were unsure about how they would contribute to the cause because Hyderabad city had only one Ram temple and that 
too had been only recently constructed (Basu et al 89-90).  
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book Hindi Nationalism (2001) that Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism, has its roots in the 
often highly charged mobilization in favour of “pure” Sanskritized Hindi (written in the 
Devanagari script and stripped of all “Muslim” Farsi and Arabic words) by the upper-
caste, Hindu élite of North India. While it is impossible to accept the Hindi-Urdu debates 
as the ideological trigger for Hindutva, the increasing efforts by Hindutva organizations 
to promote Hindi in all parts of the country as the national language of India make 
Neelkanth’s choice to write in a highly Sanskritized Hindi very apt.231      
The contribution of the peculiar genre ambiguity of “Durga” to this literary 
imagining in Hindi lies in the fact that it represents the nation in a compact form devoid 
of internal complications or contradictions. In the space of a few pages, Neelkanth creates 
a microcosm of the Hindu nation whose blissful sense of community is only threatened 
by the outsider; this, predictably, is “the Muslim.” The fact that there is no ambivalence 
within the nation makes for an idyllically conceived community. In addition to the 
playful, idealized representation of the children playing with the calves and the women 
gathering around Anandi in the evenings and listening to her sing bhajans (“devotional 
songs”) is also the description of the gentle breeze passing through the trees, crows 
cawing, and sparrows pecking at grain in front of the little temple. Finally, there is the 
carefully crafted timeless image of the nation, which is exemplified in Neelkanth’s 
representation of the little temple outside the gates of the locality. The narrator tells us 
that the threshold of the temple is blackened and smoothened by the soot of the earthen 
                                                          
231 The nation-wide Hindutva emphasis on Hindi can be seen in the fact that even in Tamil Nadu, where the agitations 
against “Hindi imperialism” (proposed constitutional amendments to make Hindi the sole official language of India) 
have historically been the fiercest and most violent, children were being taught by the VHP to say “namaste” instead of 
the Tamil greeting “vanakkam” in the early 1990s. They were told that “namaste” is the “appropriate Hindu greeting” 
(Geetha and Jayanthi 251). For more on the connection between Hindutva and Hindi education in the 1990s, which is 
when the expansionist phase of Hindutva seriously began, see (besides Rai’s Hindi Nationalism) Krishna Kumar’s 
“Hindu Revivalism and Education in North-Central India” (1990).     
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lamp that is regularly lit before it (1). Such reference to the aging of the threshold by soot 
indicates not only that the temple is visited regularly by devotees, but also that there is a 
certain ancientness about it. The impression of timeless harmony and domestic bliss is 
furthered by the qualifications extended to Moti’s and Gauri’s constant presence in 
Jampanna Gate. We are told repeatedly that both have been visiting the locality for “who 
knows how many years” (1).  
Anderson points out that while nation-states may be “‘new’ and ‘historical,’ the 
nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past, 
and still more important, glide into a limitless future” (11-2). This time of the nation, 
which collapses together the past, present, and future of the nation without 
differentiation, is called “homogeneous, empty time” (26). This conception also 
corresponds to the sense of the timeless Hindu nation in the discourse of Golwalkar, who 
writes that “we were one nation, with one motherland … from the Setu to the Himalayas 
– [this] has been our clear concept all down these ages” (81). When he writes that “[i]t 
was this picture of our motherland … that was constantly kept radiant in people’s minds 
for so many thousands of years” (81), he creates an imagined community held together 
by a collective memory that he asserts has survived intact since, literally, time 
immemorial. Anderson also writes that since there is no clearly known Originator of a 
nation that can write its history “‘down time’, through a long procreative chain of 
begettings,” the only alternative that remains is to fashion the nation “up time” (205). 
This is what Golwalkar explicitly does and what Neelkanth implicitly seeks to achieve.  
Moreover, the essence of the Hindu nation is gendered in this representation. In 
his influential theory of cultural nationalism, Partha Chatterjee makes the argument that 
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anti-colonial nationalism was constructed on the fundamental belief that the world of 
social institutions could be divided into two: the material sphere, and the spiritual sphere 
(Nation 6). The material sphere is the domain of the “outside,” where the superiority of 
“the West” in the realms of economics, science, technology, and statecraft had to be 
acknowledged (6). This was also the domain of men (120), and it was acknowledged as 
insignificant in the larger scheme of things because it was “outside us – a mere external 
that influences us, conditions us, and forces us to adjust to it” (120). The spiritual realm is 
what represents the true self; it is the “inner” domain and bears the essential hallmark of 
cultural identity; this is where the indigenous culture has never been surpassed (6). In 
fact, in this realm, “the East” has always been superior to “the West” (120) and has never 
been colonized by it
232
 (121).  
Thus, nationalism came to object to every attempt made by the colonial state to 
institute social reforms that focused on women or on the Hindu family and claimed that 
traditions that were associated with Hindu women or that constituted the status quo of the 
Hindu family were marks of the essential culture of Hindus/Indians and could not be 
altered
233
 (116). This meant that the spiritual or private domain had to remain unchanged 
because it was the repository of Hindu/Indian culture. The preservation of this realm was 
seen to be centrally dependent on the conduct of women (120), who were expected to 
emphasize their “feminine” attributes, which were thought to be reflected in their 
“modest” dress, eating habits, social demeanour, and religiosity (Nation 130; 
                                                          
232 While Chatterjee’s theory has been criticized by scholars, notably Ayesha Jalal, for its simplistic reinforcing of 
binaries and vast generalizations about India based exclusively on the study of nationalism in Bengal, it is nevertheless 
useful for my analysis because it illuminates how proponents of the Hindu nation imaginatively construct their 
gendered concept of nation based on just such an inner/outer, material/spiritual divide. 
     
233 This does not mean that the colonial state was eager to work in the interests of women. In fact, the attempts to bring 
about much-needed changes, such as the abolition of sati, were an opportunity for the colonial state to morally 
legitimate its presence in India. As Spivak has pointed out, “white men were saving brown women from brown men” 
(“Can” 297) and, in the process, seeking to justify Britain’s colonization of India.  
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“Nationalist” 158). Hindu women were supposed to dress in Indian clothes; they must not 
smoke, drink, or even eat the way men, who had to adopt western habits, did; they must 
continue to observe religious rituals that men now found difficult to carry out with their 
preoccupations with the material world; and they must maintain “the cohesiveness of 
family life and solidarity with the kin to which men could not now devote much 
attention” (Nation 130). In this way, the behaviour of women had to be maintained as 
markedly different from that of men. The upholding of such norms by women would 
ensure the sanctity and integrity of the home, the site where the spiritual life of the nation 
thrives (“Nationalist” 159).    
Chatterjee’s theorization comes into play in the RSS’s views that religion is 
timeless and unchanging and that women are custodians of this eternal religion (Sarkar, 
“Heroic” 209). Sarkar has pointed out that the RSS draws much inspiration from late 
nineteenth century Hindu revivalist-nationalists, who narrativized the Hindu woman’s 
body as “hemmed in with scriptural ritual, [and which] was imagined as a pure space that 
escaped the transformative effects of colonization, whereas the Hindu man, seduced by 
the operations of western power and knowledge, had surrendered himself and had lost his 
autonomy” (186). It was the woman’s body which remained “the site of an existent 
freedom as well as the future nation” (186). And it is this carefully constructed essence of 
the Hindu nation, embodied in Hindu women and the “cohesiveness of family life and 
solidarity” (Chatterjee, Nation 130) that we observe in the representation of their 
homemaking, their motherhood, and their worship in “Durga,” all of which is rudely 
interrupted when the Razakars attack Jampanna Gate. Furthermore, this nationalist 
construction of women’s bodies and their desired “modest” conduct came to the fore 
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during the impassioned debates in the Indian Constituent Assembly immediately after 
Partition (Menon and Bhasin 107-8, 115). As I have already mentioned in an earlier 
chapter, the nation’s honour as well as territorial integrity were seen to be dependent on 
the unconditional recovery of women abducted and raped during Partition (Menon and 
Bhasin 115; Butalia 151-2). Thus, national honour came to be conflated with the bodies 
of women. It is this (Hindu) national honour and, consequently, the “limitless future” 
(Anderson 11-2) of the Hindu nation that is threatened by the Razakars in “Durga.” 
Indeed, in the rhetoric of the Sangh Parivar, “Mother India is projected as being in danger 
of being raped and dismembered. The rapist is … [the Razakar] and the rape of women 
and of the nation are collapsed into one” (Dietrich 45).  
 In this chapter, I have argued that the representation of Balwinder Kaur as Durga 
may be an appropriate and empowering figure of women’s agency in terms of its 
Partition context. However, this representation is deeply questionable when we bear in 
mind two things: the deployment of the image of a blood-thirsty Durga, an avatar of the 
Motherland, in the service of violent Hindutva ideology; and the consistent, constant 
attempts by Hindutva organizations to co-opt Sikhs into their ideology and practice for 
purely instrumental, militant purposes. I have also argued that the fabricated narrative of 
the sacred cow is yet another attempt by Hindutva forces to attack what is already a 
battered Indian Muslim community. Finally, I have shown that Neelkanth’s narrative 
construction of the Hindu nation is effected through his use of strategically situated 
Hindu icons and symbols, which feature women and cows most prominently. This Hindu 
nation is threatened by the outsider, “the Muslim.” In elaborating upon these points, I 
have outlined how narratives of Partition violence from Hyderabad are being used as the 
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rationale for present-day militant Hindu nationalism by writers such as Neelkanth, who 
betray one of Hindutva’s most persistent and pernicious practices: its relentless 
persecution of Muslims. It is remarkable how similar Neelkanth’s strategy is to that other 
communal ideologue, Qasim Razvi, who elaborately and passionately retold stories about 
the rapes of Muslim women in other parts of the subcontinent during Partition to incite 
Razakar violence against Hindus in Hyderabad in the 1940s. 
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Epilogue 
 In June 2011, when I was in Hyderabad city researching this project, the recent 
agitations by political groups such as the Telangana Joint Action Committee as well as 
many pro-Telangana students from Osmania University were fresh in the minds of many 
Hyderabadis. In fact, after a brief lull in the face of the fierce Deccan summer, there were 
plans to organize a new bandh (city-wide protest) on June 25, two days after I was to 
leave Hyderabad city for Delhi. Struck by the festive atmosphere visible amidst crowds 
and throngs of people around Osmania University, Hussain Sagar Lake, and even 
Panjagutta and Banjara Hills, where red (communist) flags and bunting appeared to have 
taken over the streets and landmarks entirely, I asked my driver, also a Telangana Telugu, 
what Telangana meant to him. I asked him if he thought it was a good thing that 
Telangana would be carved out of Andhra Pradesh and made a separate Indian state with 
Hyderabad city as its capital. He was emphatic that Telangana must come about because 
not only was it the homeland of Telugus and their language and culture, but it would also 
give them greater rights and opportunities where education and employment prospects 
are concerned. He was also passionate about how Telugus deserved Telangana, how they 
were entitled to it, after all they had suffered under the Nizams and everything that they 
had been falsely promised by successive state and central governments. Indeed, farmer 
suicides, which have been triggered by crop failure and indebtedness and compounded by 
bad or indifferent state policies, have plagued the Telangana region for decades now. No 
less than a hundred and fifty-seven farmers killed themselves over a period of two 
months in 2011 (NDTV, “Farmer”). Pro-Telangana groups and individuals believe that a 
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separate Telangana state will make better policies to aid farmers in producing successful 
crops and increasing their yield.  
 However, the movement to bring about a separate Telangana state has already 
seen a lot of violence, and many students across Telangana have killed themselves over 
the centre’s delay in forming the new state. The latest suicide has been that of V. Santosh, 
a twenty-year old student of Saraswathi College in Tukkaguda, who hung himself on 
November 7, 2012 on the Osmania University campus and blamed the government in 
Delhi for the delay in the creation of Telangana state (BBC News, “India Telangana”; 
Menon, “Frustrated”). Violence also marks the approach of the activists of the Telangana 
Rashtra Samithi (“Telangana National Committee”; TRS), the only political party 
involved in the Telangana movement that was created solely to deal with the Telangana 
issue. On October 20, 2012, TRS activists vandalized the office of film director Puri 
Jagannath, whose latest Telugu film Cameraman Gangatho Rambabu (“Rambabu with 
Cameraman Ganga,” 2012) has been accused of being anti-Telangana and, consequently, 
“hurt[ing] the sentiments of people of the region” (Hindu, “Panel Suggests”, 
“Screening”). The aggressive tone of the activists of the TRS is also confirmed by its 
leaders. For example, on October 30, 2012, Telangana Rashtra Samithi Chief K. 
Chandrasekhara Rao told reporters in Hyderabad city that “[i]f the centre delivers 
Telangana state, there will be celebrations, otherwise there will be war” (Times of India, 
“TRS Chief”). 
 Aware of this violence, I decided to get a second opinion after listening to what 
my driver had to say. When I spoke to my other friends and colleagues, who included 
Telangana Telugus, Andhra (coastal as well as interior) Telugus, Hyderabadi Muslims, 
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Punjabis, Sikh migrants, and Oriya migrants what they thought about Telangana, there 
was considerable ambivalence. While most of them were affiliated to communist or left-
liberal political ideologies and welcomed, supported, and even participated in the 
agitations for a Telangana that would enable the self-determination of Telugus and 
improve the lot of the small and landless farmers in the region, they were also concerned 
that Telangana was being imagined as a state exclusively for Telangana Telugus. One 
friend, who is from coastal Andhra, said that there was a naïve assumption that all non-
Telangana people, such as Telugus from other parts of Andhra Pradesh, North Indians, 
Bangladeshi migrants, and Urdu-speaking Muslims, would leave Hyderabad city as well 
as other parts of Telangana and that open and empty houses would await Telangana 
Telugus. His words made me think of Partition, when houses were indeed left empty by 
departing people and were taken by arriving refugees, the new “rightful” citizens of India 
or Pakistan. Top police officials have also expressed such concerns, most recently in the 
context of the Telangana march of September 30, 2012. Their intelligence sources had 
told them to expect violence directed against the properties of people from Seemandhra 
(the non-Telangana part of Andhra Pradesh, which consists of Rayalaseema and Andhra) 
(News Track India, “Telangana”). Having read extensively about the high moral ground 
created by the Telangana Armed Struggle, I was a little crestfallen because the proposal 
for a new Telangana seemed to me to be like a new Partition, on a smaller scale, but 
perhaps with similarly divisive consequences. 
Perhaps this is why the centre in Delhi is treading with caution. As India’s Home 
Minister Sushilkumar Shinde has explained on November 2, 2012, the creation of 
Telangana is likely to have repercussions not only in Andhra Pradesh but also in 
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neighbouring states. So the Indian government is waiting for the Andhra Pradesh 
Congress Party, Telugu Desam Party, Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, and YSR Congress 
to make their stand clear on the issue. The BJP, Telangana Rashtra Samithi, and the 
Communist Party of India have explicitly declared themselves to be in favour of the 
formation of Telangana. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) is not in favour of the 
bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh, but they have supported marches by the people of 
Telangana to demand the creation of Telangana (News Track India, “Telangana”). In 
2011, Asaduddin Owaisi, the current President of the Majlis, made it clear that “separate 
Telangana or unified Andhra was never our electoral agenda.” He emphasized that the 
core agenda of the present-day Majlis in Hyderabad city and Andhra Pradesh is to 
represent the aspirations of minorities and Dalits and backward classes (Iftekhar, 
“Majlis”). At the same time, Owaisi has also clarified that the Majlis is not opposed to the 
demand for a separate Telangana state (Economic Times, “Majlis”). It is non-committal 
over the Telangana demand because it wants Rayala-Telangana (Deccan Chronicle, “T 
Statehood”), a state composed of Telangana and Rayalaseema.  
Another reason for the Majlis’ ambivalence emerges when we take into account 
that Owaisi has questioned the pluralist, secular credentials of the Telangana movement 
by pointing out that out of a hundred and nineteen legislative assembly seats from 
Telangana, there are only seven Muslim MLAs. He also asks why no one is raising 
important questions such as how river waters for irrigation purposes would be divided 
between the two states. This point becomes especially relevant in light of the fact that 
there have been many farmer suicides in the Telangana region over the failure of crops on 
account of water shortages (Iftekhar, “Majlis”). On the other hand, newspapers such as 
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the Deccan Chronicle have rightly pointed out that the Majlis’ reservations towards the 
idea of a separate Telangana stem also from the fact that its clout amongst Muslims will 
be undermined by the new state. This is especially so because many Muslims support the 
move for a separate Telangana. Muslim youth from Telangana are particularly active in 
the movement because they foresee better education and employment opportunities in the 
new state (“T Statehood”).   
 It is November 2012 and Telangana state has not yet been formed. But in the 
latest march in Hyderabad city on September 30 against the central government’s failure 
to announce the creation of Telangana during the period agreed to by it, the air was rife 
with hope again. Once again, Telangana activists were jubilant that this time, the centre 
(New Delhi) will pay attention to their protests and declare that Telangana will indeed be 
a separate state. The march was held a day after the annual ritual immersion of the Hindu 
god Ganesh, and Hyderabad city police initially refused permission for the march for this 
reason (News Track India, “Telangana”; FP Politics, “Telangana”). In the past, 
communal violence in Hyderabad city has frequently coincided with the festival of 
Ganesh. Violence was triggered between the police and the protestors when the latter 
tried to remove barricades and take the march to places that they had been prohibited (in 
advance) from accessing. The police used water cannons and tear-gas shells in response, 
and the protestors threw stones at them. Telugu news channels were blocked across 
Telangana and electricity supply to the towns and villages was cut (Hindustan Times, 
“Pro-Telangana”). Incidents of violence were reported from Osmania University campus, 
Khairatabad, and the Andhra Pradesh Secretariat (Indian Express, “Violence”). The 
police have claimed that twenty-five police vehicles were damaged, out of which three 
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were burnt, and two vans belonging to television newschannels were also attacked. They 
say that reporters were assaulted, trains were pelted with stones, and a railway track near 
Necklace Road station was damaged. According to the police, nineteen policemen were 
injured and about four or five protestors were also injured (FP Politics, “Telangana”). A 
poultry farmer, who took part in the march, later succumbed to the injuries he received 
during the violence (Hindu, “Poultry”).       
As far as partitions go, if Telangana is created, this would be the third such 
political shift for this region in the past sixty-four years. In 1948, Hyderabad state was 
absorbed into India amidst great violence; in 1956, the erstwhile princely state was finally 
divided into three, with one piece each going to the linguistically determined states of 
Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Andhra Pradesh. And now, on a date that is still vague, 
Telangana will be carved out of Andhra Pradesh. The simultaneous mood of excitement 
and apprehension towards the (always imminent and, so far, constantly deferrable) 
creation of Telangana was palpable last year as well as this year. Perhaps the new state 
will see further land reforms for the impoverished, landless farmers of Telangana. And 
perhaps there will not be communal violence and, instead, Telugu-speaking Hindus and 
Muslims will find common ground in the new state. It remains to be seen how the 
remnants of Hyderabad’s mixed, syncretic, cosmopolitan culture, which have thus far 
(barely/somehow) survived despotic rulers, military governments, and communal 
mobilizations, will face this new development.             
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